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INTRODUCTION 
1. Background to the research project 
In today’s world, states worldwide have become more and more economically interde-
pendent due to the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods 
and services, free international capital flows, and the increasingly rapid and widespread 
diffusion of technology. The International Monetary Fund has called this phenomenon 
‘economic globalization’.1 The concept of globalization refers to a complex series of 
economic, social, technological, cultural and political changes that have increased inter-
dependence, integration and interaction between people and companies in disparate 
locations. The term ‘liberalization’ on the other hand refers to the unimpeded flow of 
products between economic jurisdictions. This has led to the specialization of nations in 
terms of exports, and the pressure to end protective tariffs and other barriers to trade. 
Liberalization does not only concern the free movement of goods and capital, but also 
the free movement of persons and the freedom of establishment, the two latter being 
applicable to architects. 
 
In the 20th Century, the impact of globalization in the field of architecture is reflected by 
the impact of the international style of the 1930s, when many architects designed build-
ings all over the world: Le Corbusier in India, Kahn in Bangladesh, Foster in Japan, 
Wright in Japan, Utzon in Australia, etc.2 The international style was based on systema-
tization and standardization, mass production, economies of scale, functional logic and 
aesthetic composition devoid of both ornament and sentiment. Given a similar func-
tional program, the design of a building in southern Asia could be similar to one in 
South America. For several decades after World War II, this style greatly influenced the 
design of office buildings, schools, hospitals, laboratories and multifamily housing.3 The 
common characteristics are easy to identify: a radical simplification of form, a rejection 
of ornament, the adoption of glass, steel and concrete as preferred materials, the trans-
                                                                
1 International Monetary Fund 1997, p. 60.  
2 Mahgoub 2004.  
3 Lewis 2002.  
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parency of buildings and therefore of the construction (called the honest expression of 
structure), the acceptance of industrialized mass-production techniques and the ma-
chine aesthetic, acceptance of the automobile, design decisions that logically support the 
function of the building, and a vague but exciting sense of the future.4 
 
Nevertheless, architects have been practicing internationally for centuries. The ancient 
Romans established the first example of global architectural hegemony, spreading their 
ideals across the empire.5 However, an extremely rapid expansion in the provision of 
cross-border services only started in the early 1990s. This was generated in large part by 
the globalization of businesses, investments and interests of what had historically been 
domestic clients, but also by the increasing use of architectural competitions to select 
and award major public and private commissions. 6 In this way architects have domestic 
projects with international clients while they are increasingly becoming involved in 
European or international projects as well. 
 
Notwithstanding the process of globalization and the creation of the European Union 
which contributed significantly to the liberalization of trade and the free moment of 
professionals, the 20th Century has also been characterized by nation states imposing all 
sorts of requirements on ‘foreign’ products and professionals before they are allowed to 
enter their territory. In this regard, restrictions were often imposed on architects be-
cause of their (lack of) professional qualifications and the absence of uniformity with 
regard to architectural regulations. In several EU states anyone can perform the work of 
an architect while the use of the title is reserved for qualified professionals. In other 
states the title, as well as the practice of the profession, is regulated. When one is consid-
ered to be a qualified professional also differs. Some states require a degree in architec-
ture while other states only demand some years of training in an architectural office 
followed by an examination. Some countries do not require any qualifications whatso-
ever, and only demand that the building accords with the building specifications. In 
addition, the professions themselves have created a substantial number of rules with 
which their members have to comply. Next to these limitations on the entry to the pro-
fession and with regard to professional conduct, architectural liabilities and responsibili-
ties also differ. It follows that once a professional wants to provide services outside 
his/her national territory, s/he is often confronted with a whole set of different rules 
which are liable to hinder his/her free movement and to restrict competition as well. 
 
This thesis discusses the free movement rights of architects as laid down in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, and as interpreted by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, by studying secondary EU legislation which contains rather tech-
nical requirements that need to be met before architects are allowed to work in another 
EU state. It aims to determine whether architects who meet all these requirements are 
really free to engage in architectural activities in another Member State, or whether they 
                                                                
4 Hitchock & Johnson 1997.  
5 Lewis 2002.  
6 Keune 2004.  
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might still be hampered by all sorts of other requirements which are not covered by EU 
legislation. In addition to a high level of public regulation, free professionals are gener-
ally subject to self-regulation by professional associations which may not only limit the 
entry to the profession, but also the competition within the profession itself and the 
competition with other professions (conduct regulation). Furthermore, private law 
principles and obligations arising from contract law may also discourage architects from 
working outside their familiar national territory. On the other hand however, (self- and 
liability rules may also improve the quality of the services provided by the architect. 
 
On a national level, this thesis specifically examines the regulation of architects in two 
neighbouring countries: Belgium and the Netherlands. Not only do I discuss the public 
law requirements which need to be fulfilled before one can enter the profession, but also 
the private law responsibilities and liabilities of architects in the event that a building has 
a defect. The reason why I have chosen these two states lies in the fact that the regulation 
of the architectural profession in both countries differs to a large extent as far as the use 
of the title and the practice of the profession is concerned. Moreover, the contractual 
liability period which is, in principle, laid down in the Civil Codes of both states, varies 
considerably. Since both countries used to be part of the United Kingdom of the Nether-
lands after the French domination which introduced the Napoleonic Code and since 
even today the Belgian Civil Code is still a direct translation/copy of the Code Napoleon 
of 1804 (although it contains several amendments) which also forms the basis of the new 
Dutch Civil Code, this development is of great interest. 
 
Since the tasks performed by architects are complicated, and since their responsibilities 
are substantial, it is important that their designs provide for safe and secure buildings. 
States and professional associations argue that regulations are needed to safeguard qual-
ity since the architectural market is characterized by market failure.7 This is the public 
interest approach towards regulation. The private interest approach, on the other hand, 
indicates that regulation is merely a result of rent-seeking behaviour by individuals or 
associations who want to maximize their profits.8 In this regard I will examine whether 
there is indeed market failure in the architectural market which may justify the current 
regulations. 
 
It should be noted that my conclusions with regard to the architectural profession have 
also relevance for other liberal professions, since states and professional associations 
often use the same types of restrictions with regard to entry to a range of regulated pro-
fessions such as professional qualifications, a professional monopoly, a numerus clausus, 
advertising restrictions and price fixing. 
 
                                                                
7 This concept will be discussed in Chapter 11. 
8 The public interest approach as well as the private interest approach towards regulation will be discussed 
in Chapter 11. 
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By providing a legal and economic analysis, I hope to inspire lawyers, economists, archi-
tects and politicians to think about the regulation of architects in their countries, to aim 
for a more efficient regulation of the profession. 
2. Problem definition and research questions 
In the light of the legal analysis of the regulation of architects in Belgium and the Neth-
erlands, the question arises as to whether these regulations are needed to cure possible 
market failures, and whether they increase social welfare. Since the regulation of archi-
tects is quite different in each country, the regulations will be compared in terms of their 
efficiency. The problem definition (central research question) is therefore as follows: Is 
the Dutch or the Belgian combination of regulations and contract law provisions most 
cost-efficient from an economic point of view? 
 
In order to answer this question, several other questions have to be answered first. 
The first question concerns the regulation of architects at the EU level, and aims to de-
termine what requirements the European Union imposes upon individuals who want to 
access or pursue the profession of an architect. The first research question is: Is there 
legislation or case law at EU level that determines who should be allowed to use the 
title of architect or to practise the profession and how the profession should be prac-
tised? 
Since the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and regulations are directly applicable in 
the Member States, it is important to study EU law as well. As the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) has established in Van Gend en Loos9, ‘The European Union is a 
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their 
sovereign rights and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also 
their nationals, obligations imposed upon member states by the treaties can be enforced 
by individuals, in the form of individual legal rights, before national courts.’ Further-
more, in Costa, it was held that ‘Community law must be given primacy by national 
courts over any incompatible national law’10. This is highly relevant, since architects can 
in principle directly rely upon provisions of EU legislation against Member States before 
their national courts, at least, if these provisions confer specific rights upon them and 
are sufficiently clear and precise and unconditional. Even Directives, which are not 
directly applicable, can be invoked by individuals against a Member State that has failed 
to implement them on time or has implemented them incorrectly if the above-
mentioned conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, certain provisions even have horizontal 
direct effect which encompasses that these can be invoked against individuals or other 
private actors as well.  
                                                                
9 Case C-26/62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
10 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593. In Simmenthal, it was held that national courts 
should even disapply conflicting provisions of national law. See Case C-106/77 Amministrazione delle Fi-
nanze dello Stato v Simmenthal S.p.A. [1978] ECR 629.  
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Since the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in Simmenthal that national 
courts should disapply provisions of national law that conflict with Community law, EU 
legislation and case law is highly relevant with regard to determining the exact rights 
and obligations of EU architects and the exact scope of the Belgian and Dutch regula-
tions.  
 In this thesis it will be discussed in how far Member States are free to determine 
who is allowed to practise the profession of architect and use the title on their territory, 
specifically in the light of the process of globalization and the ever increasing move-
ments of professionals in and to the European Union. Part I of the thesis will thus 
whether other EU (and non EU) nationals are or should be allowed to practise the pro-
fession of architect in Belgium and the Netherlands and which conditions needs to be 
fulfilled for this. The free movement of architects in and to the European Union will 
thus be discussed. 
 Furthermore, EU competition  policy is also highly relevant with regard to the ar-
chitectural profession. Not only states but also private undertakings such as professional 
associations can create rules on who is allowed to practise a profession and how this 
profession should be practised. This might have an effect on trade in the European Un-
ion as well. n evaluation of EU competition law principles will contribute to determin-
ing the lawfulness and scope of national law rules and self-regulatory rules. 
  
The second research question is: Which national regulations and self-regulatory meas-
ures issued by professional associations exist in Belgium and the Netherlands with 
regard to the architectural profession? Without a discussion of the legislation that is 
currently in force, it will be impossible to determine whether or not the national legisla-
tions are in conformity with EU legislation and economic (cost) efficiency. In this re-
gard it has to be determined whether or not architectural associations have also issued 
rules that regulate the profession. Their content, scope and legal value (i.e. are these 
rules enforceable) has to be discussed. Such analysis is required to determine whether 
the Belgian or the Dutch combination of regulatory and non-regulatory options will be 
most efficient from an economic point of view. If it turns out that the national regula-
tions are incompatible with EU legislation, the free movement of architects in the EU 
might be restricted. 
 
Next to a discussion of the requirements imposed upon architects by public law, a dis-
cussion of the obligations and responsibilities imposed by private law seems to be war-
ranted to achieve a sound understanding of what the practice of the profession exactly 
entails. In this regard it should be noted that it is possible that not only public regula-
tions issued by the Belgian and Dutch governments and the rules created by architec-
tural associations are able to restrict the free movement of architects, but also differ-
ences in contractual obligations and liability regimes. For this reason I will also examine 
their private law responsibilities. The third research question is therefore: What are the 
tasks, obligations and liabilities of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands? 
 
After this legal analysis, an economic analysis will be presented of the regulation of ar-
chitects in both states. In this way I will first determine why such regulations are created 
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in the first place and whether there are alternatives to changing the behaviour of legal 
subjects. My fourth question is: What does economic theory teach us about(self-) regu-
lation in the professions? In this regard it is important to demonstrate why regulation 
might be needed in the first place. The different approaches towards regulation will have 
to be discussed. The public interest approach to regulation stipulates that regulation is a 
correction for market failure which might be present due to the fact that consumers 
have less information at their disposal than service providers, while the private interest 
approach indicates that regulation is merely or predominantly the result of rent seeking 
behaviour by individuals or associations. It has to be determined whether and why regu-
lation might be needed with regard to the architectural profession. If regulation is cre-
ated to ensure a certain level of quality, it should be determined whether or not liability 
rules are sufficient to obtain this objective. 
 
The fifth research question is: Is there any market failure in the Belgian and Dutch 
markets for architectural services which might justify regulation? The economic theory 
which was discussed to answer question four will be applied to the markets under con-
sideration. In this way I aim to determine to what extent the Belgian and Dutch regula-
tions are really necessary and proportional to achieve the goals set. 
 
Hence, I come to the sixth question: Is the intensity of public regulation related to the 
intensity of the contractual obligations and liabilities of architects in Belgium and the 
Netherlands? In this thesis I aim to determine whether there is a link between the 
amount and level of public regulation, and the amount and level of contract law by 
which the architectural obligations and liabilities are determined. By interpreting the 
results of the previous questions, I will try to determine whether the system which im-
poses heavier regulatory requirements upon architects in terms of entry to the profes-
sion or professional conduct, is characterized by softer contractual liabilities and vice 
versa. 
 
Finally, after having determined the differences in regulations in both states and their 
economic consequences, an answer to the central research question will be formulated. 
By answering this question I hope to provide law and policy makers, architects and all 
interested parties with an insight regarding the particularities of these systems, and their 
possible efficiency gains and losses. This may inspire the legislators and the architectural 
associations of Belgium and the Netherlands, but also those of other states, to adapt or 
perhaps preserve their current systems. 
3. Research methodologies 
The research methodologies used in this thesis consist of a legal analysis of EU legisla-
tion and case law with regard to the public regulation of architects and a comparative 
legal analysis of the public regulation of the profession by the governments and architec-
tural associations concerned, and of the contractual obligations and liabilities of archi-
tects in Belgium and the Netherlands. An economic analysis will be undertaken of the 
regulation of professions in general, which will be applied to the architectural profession 
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in both states. In addition to studying the relevant legislation, considering the abun-
dance of case law and all sorts of legal and economic literature, I also had several meet-
ings and telephone conversations with members of the profession, lawyers specialized in 
‘building’ or ‘construction’ law, and insurance companies. 
 
Part I of the book focuses upon the regulation of architects in the European Union on a 
public law level. This discusses the requirements which need to be fulfilled before an EU 
architect is allowed to practise his profession in another Member State. Generally it 
must be stated that the freedom of movement of workers in the EU is secured, and that 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services on the 
part of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State, is prohib-
ited. This entails that discrimination based on nationality between professionals of the 
Member States has to be abolished, and that measures which are liable to affect the free 
movement of such professionals should be eliminated. By introducing the concept of 
EU citizenship, the Treaty of Maastricht established that non economically active per-
sons holding the nationality of an EU Member State can, subject to certain limitations 
and conditions, move and reside freely within the Union. Since their freedom of move-
ment would be impaired if certain family members, even if they hold a third-country 
nationality, were not allowed to join or accompany them, in addition third-country 
national architects are allowed to practise their profession in the EU if they are a family 
member of a Union citizen and certain conditions are fulfilled. To be complete, this 
thesis will also refer to the other possibilities of third-country national architects work-
ing in the Union. By referring to the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), as 
well as to relevant secondary legislation and case law, the possibilities for EU and non 
EU architects moving in, or to, the European Union will be discussed in detail. This 
thesis will not include a discussion of European private law since there is currently no 
European Civil Code that is binding upon EU Member States and/or its citizens. 
 
In Part II of this thesis a presentation and examination of the regulation of architects in 
Belgium and the Netherlands will be undertaken, both on a public law and a contract 
law level. I will investigate which requirements architects have to fulfil before they can 
enter the profession, and will emphasize the difference between ‘the right to use the title’ 
and ‘the right to practise the profession’. In this regard, the Belgian and Dutch public 
legislation which is specifically applicable to those who are allowed to use the architec-
tural title and the relevant national legislation that implements the EU policy discussed 
in Part I, will be discussed, as well as professional rules regulating architectural conduct. 
By studying the Civil Codes of both states, as well as the relevant literature and case law, 
the tasks, responsibilities and liabilities of architects will be analyzed and I will also dis-
cuss whether these professionals have the obligation to buy professional liability insur-
ance. In this regard the relevant Standard Conditions which are often used in the Neth-
erlands to regulate these issues in a general way, will also be reflected upon. 
 
The economic analysis in Part III provides an objective method for evaluating the effi-
ciency of the regulation of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands. It contains an 
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economic analysis of the (self-)regulation of liberal professions with an application to 
the specific case of the architectural market. The legal rules which were presented in 
Part II will be scrutinized from an efficiency point of view to determine whether the 
Dutch or Belgian regime which is applicable to the architectural profession corresponds 
better to the predictions of the economic model. To be able to reach such a conclusion, 
the objectives of regulation and the different approaches towards regulation in general 
will be discussed by focusing upon the economic literature. In this regard possible alter-
natives or complements to regulation such as liability rules, will also be discussed. In this 
way I aim to establish the effects of the regulations and to what extent the Belgian and 
Dutch regulations are really necessary. Furthermore, the regulatory instruments will be 
compared to liability rules. The legal analysis of contract law in Part II will be used to 
determine whether the intensity of public regulation is linked to the intensity of the 
contractual obligations and liabilities of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands. By 
applying all the information obtained, I will finally try to determine which combination 
of regulations or private law provisions is most likely to lead to more efficient outcomes, 
and whether the Dutch or the Belgian regime which is applicable to the architectural 
profession corresponds best to the predictions of the economic model. 
4. Scope – limits – points for further research 
The central goal of this thesis is to determine whether the Dutch or the Belgian regime 
which are applicable to the architectural profession is more efficient from a public and 
private interest perspective. Furthermore, I also aim to establish whether EU law fur-
thers or hinders market access. 
 
In this thesis the public regulation of architects in the EU, Belgium and the Netherlands 
will be discussed as well as their contractual tasks, obligations and liabilities within the 
traditional building process in both Member States. Since the responsibilities and tasks 
of architects are, in principle, determined by contract, and since it has been demon-
strated by case law that architects are, in the vast majority of cases, held liable on the 
basis of their contractual obligations, I will not discuss the liability in tort of architects, 
or their criminal liability. 
 In this regard it should be noted that this thesis only concerns architects stricto 
sensu, meaning that it only deals with architects who have, as their main task, the design 
of buildings and the supervision of the erection of building works. It does not discuss 
the situation of town planners, interior architects or garden and landscape architects. 
 This thesis does not include a discussion of European private law since there is 
currently no European Civil Code that is binding upon the EU Member States and/or its 
citizens. In this regard, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) prepared by the 
Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on European Private 
Law as well as the PEL SC (Principles of European Law on Service Contracts) which is a 
research project initiated by the Study Group on a European Civil Code with the aim of 
drafting common European principles for the most important aspects of the law of 
obligations and for certain parts of the law of property in movables, should be men-
tioned. The PEL SC contain a number of principles for different service contracts, under 
  Chapter 1  
9 
which is included design contracts, and reflects on the current approach to legal prob-
lems in the area of service contracts. Due to the fact that this thesis already covers an 
extensive analysis of the obligations and liabilities of architects in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and since parties are allowed to deviate from the PEL SC, the private regu-
lation of architects at EU level is not discussed separately. For a discussion of the Euro-
pean harmonisation of construction law I refer the reader to Jansen’s dissertation, To-
wards a European Building Contract Law11 and Kohl’s article, European Construction 
Law and the Draft Common Frame of Reference: Selected Topics12. 
 
With regard to the economic analysis, it should be noted that this thesis aims to demon-
strate that a law and economics approach towards regulation can be a useful method for 
analysing architectural law and policy. The economic analysis is provided to determine 
whether, and to what extent, it is efficient to regulate the architectural profession from a 
public interest and a private interest perspective. The public and private interest ap-
proach towards regulation will be discussed from a theoretical point of view, and I will 
try to determine whether there is any market failure with regard to the architectural 
profession in Belgium and the Netherlands in the light of the public and the private 
interest model. In this regard it should be noted however, that I will not look for empiri-
cal evidence to establish any market failure. First of all, this is not necessary in order to 
answer my central research question, and secondly the existence of a certain degree of 
market failure is highly probable due to problems of information asymmetry. The acqui-
sition of empirical evidence would require extensive research which would go beyond 
the scope of this thesis. My theoretical approach will thus provide certain important 
indications but more extensive and econometric research is needed to concretize these 
and to put these to the test. Further research is also needed to determine in more detail 
whether and in how far the respective regulations are really necessary to protect the 
general interest or whether they rather protect the professionals.  
 In this thesis I will not discuss whether it is better (i.e. more efficient) to have EU 
legislation to uniformly regulate (harmonize) the architectural profession. Reference can 
be made again to the Draft Common Frame of Reference and the PEL SC, neither of 
which are legally enforceable, and to the legal analysis of the regulation of architects in 
the European Union provided for in Part I of this thesis, which contains an effectiveness 
study to determine whether architects can practise their profession in other EU states 
without unjustified impediments. The economics of federalism provides a method to 
determine whether or not it would be more efficient to uniformly regulate the profes-
sion.13 However, this goes beyond the scope of this research which aims to establish 
whether EU legislation furthers the free movement of architects. 
 
                                                                
11 Janssen 1998. 
12 Kohl, 2009. 
13 See for example Heremans 2010, pp. 73-96; Kerber & Van den Bergh 2008, pp. 447-465; Faure 2008; Van 
Boom 2008, p. 17; Faure 2003; Marciano & Josselin 2002, p. 288; Van den Bergh 1998, pp. 129-152; Rib-
stein & Kobayashi 1996, pp. 131-199; Buchanan 1995, pp. 19-27; Van den Bergh 1994, pp. 337-366; 
Tullock 1969, pp. 19-29. 
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Finally it should be noted that this thesis describes the situation of architects up to 31st 
December, 2009. Developments after that date could only be taken into account to a 
limited extent. 
5. Structure 
The structure of this thesis is based on the research questions described above. 
 
In Chapter 2, the architectural profession in all its component parts and its development 
over the years is defined. The reader will be provided with tables and charts to allow a 
thorough understanding of how many professionals are covered by this thesis, their 
main occupations, their type of clients, etc. It will be demonstrated that for centuries, 
architects have practised their profession outside their country of origin. 
 
Part I (Chapter 3) contains the regulation of architects in the European Union. Since EU 
architects should be able to move freely within the Union in order to practise their pro-
fession, any restrictions that are liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of 
an architect in another Member State, violate EU law. To be complete, this chapter will 
also refer to the rights of third-country nationals to practise as an architect in the EU. In 
Part I, research question one will be answered. 
 
Part II of this thesis (Chapters 4-10) discusses the regulation of architects in Belgium 
(Section A) and the Netherlands (Section B) from a public and a contract law perspec-
tive. To answer research question two, the requirements which are imposed upon archi-
tects to enter the profession will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. The tasks, responsi-
bilities and liabilities of architects in both states will be analysed in Chapters 6 and 8 
which aim to provide an answer to research question 3. While Chapter 9 provides for a 
comparison between the public regulations and contract law of both states (Section C), 
Chapter 10 contains an overview of the public regulation of architects in fifteen EU 
Member States so that it can be determined whether or not the Belgian and Dutch pub-
lic regulations are particularly strict or lenient on a European level (Section D). An 
overview of contractual obligations and liabilities in these fifteen states is not given since 
obtaining all relevant information would be a complex task because contractual liabili-
ties are generally provided for in the contract itself, and parties are often allowed to 
deviate from the applicable governmental legislation. 
 
Within the light of research question four, Part III (Chapter 11) contains an economic 
analysis of the regulation of liberal professions. The private and public interest approach 
towards regulation will be presented, and different regulatory instruments will be dis-
cussed. Since the public interest approach towards regulation indicates that regulation is 
needed to correct market failure, I will attempt to provide an answer to research ques-
tion five, whether, or to what extent, there is any market failure in the Belgian and the 
Dutch architectural markets. In this way I try to determine to what extent the Belgian 
and Dutch ex-ante regulations are necessary to ensure high quality, or whether ex-post 
liability rules are sufficient to achieve this goal. The legal analysis of contract law in Part 
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II will be used to determine whether the intensity of public regulations is linked to the 
intensity of the contractual obligations and the liabilities of architects in Belgium and 
the Netherlands (research question six). By applying all the information obtained, this 
thesis will conclude with an answer to the central research question, and will establish 
which of the Dutch or the Belgian regimes that are applicable to the architectural profes-
sion are most likely to be most cost-efficient from an economic point of view.  
 
 
 
 
  
13 
THE ARCHITECT 
This thesis deals with the regulation of architects in the European Union in general, and 
two of its Member States in particular. Before discussing these regulations it is useful to 
have an understanding of what the architectural profession exactly entails and how it 
has developed throughout history. Furthermore, it is also interesting to know whether 
the subjects under consideration (architects) are many in number, how the professional 
group is exactly composed, whether their turnover is considerable, etc. In this way one 
can get a clear view of whom and what is covered by this research. . 
 In this chapter the history and development of the profession will be discussed in 
paragraph 2.1. Paragraph 2.2. will elaborate on the different tasks that architects per-
form, while paragraph 2.3. will provide the reader with relevant tables and charts which 
provide him/her with some interesting facts about the composition of the profession 
and how architects practise it. 
1. History and development of the profession 
European architecture is founded on the astonishing geometric and mathematical men-
tal development peculiar to the ancient civilizations, which flourished around the east-
ern Mediterranean: ancient Egyptian, Semitic, Babylonian and Arab peoples, and more 
prominently, the ancient Greeks.1 For centuries, the architect was the keystone to every 
large construction project. He was a master builder with responsibility for both the 
design and the construction of a building.2 In fact, the word “architect” is derived from 
the Latin archi-tectus or the Greek arkhi-tekton. Originally it was used to describe the 
leading stone mason of the ancient Greek temples of 500 B.C.3; “Arkhi” – meaning 
“head, chief, master” / “Tekton” meaning “worker, builder”. It is related to “Tekhne” 
which means “art, skill”.4 
 
                                                                
1 Ghyka 1938. 
2 Jones 2006, p. 1. 
3 http://www.architekton.com, last consulted 10 October 2009. 
4 Berman 2002, p. 5. 
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In Timaeus, Plato described the starting point of architecture and held that empty space 
is ‘the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things’.5 
All architecture begins with empty space; it is the art of distinctions within the contin-
uum of space, for example between solid and void, interior and exterior, light and dark, 
or warm and cold.6 In this way, one can say that ‘Architecture began when cave dwellers 
first hung skins in front of their caves to keep out the cold. By so doing they enclosed 
space, and thus they created space, rather than merely discovering it. But the discovery 
preceded the creation in their imagination. The cave was already there, along with the 
hill and the valley or the plain which the hill enclosed, and the fact that it was there to 
begin with was essential to the creation.’7 
 
As held by Jones, ‘Prior to 500 B.C., there were virtually no structures that existed above 
the ground floor. Building construction was basic and did not require a high level of 
expertise. The Greek civilization changed this pattern and provided revolutionary 
changes in building and provided revolutionary changes in building and architecture. 
The Greeks introduced a stationary dominance that brought an end to nomadic life 
which began the construction of permanent entities.’8 Numerous Greek buildings were 
temples which were an expression of their religious beliefs. The ‘master builder’9 was 
typically the head carpenter or head mason on the project, depending on the primary 
materials used for construction.10 
 The lifestyle of the wealthy Ancient Romans was characterised by luxury. Next to 
buildings which were designed in terms of their belief, aqueducts and roads were created 
for their practical use, while fountains, the forum and the Coliseum served mainly cul-
tural purposes. The architect Vitruvius (1st century B.C.) who is held to be the author of 
De Architectura, the oldest surviving document related to European Architecture, 
known today as The Ten Books of Architecture, described himself as a ‘client’ of the em-
peror. The book is a treatise written in Latin and Greek on architecture and dedicated to 
his ‘patron’, emperor Augustus. Vitrunius. In those days the patrons were drawn mainly 
from the social, political and religious aristocracy, from the papacy and the monarchy, 
through the various ranks of church and state down to the minor nobility and gentry to 
bankers and, latterly, to the prosperous bourgeoisie.11 It does not come as a surprise that 
a high level of expertise was required to create the desired buildings. Often the master 
masons alone did not have this expertise, meaning that the new levels of complexity 
triggered a shift in the role of the architect towards individuals with different back-
grounds, such as military engineers, civil servants and private persons.12 They all coop-
erated with the master masons to have the building erected. 
                                                                
5 Plato, Timaeus. See: The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Jowett, 1937, vol. 2, p. 31. Timaeus is a theoretical trea-
tise of Plato expressing his main ideas about the nature of the physical world. 
6 Mitchell 1990. 
7 Greenbie 1993, p. 82. 
8 Jones 2006, p. 10. 
9 An individual (or nowadays a full service team) that performs all facets of the construction process, includ-
ing design, engineering and construction. 
10 Jones 2006, p. 9. 
11 Allsopp 1993, p. 33. 
12 Jones 2006, p. 10. 
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While in the Middle Ages, which were characterized by the need for strong and fortified 
buildings without eloquent details or complex designs, master masons could generally 
lead the erection of a construction, beauty became important once again during the 
Renaissance. As suggested by Jones, ‘The knowledge of antique forms and artwork was 
possessed by the goldsmiths, sculptors and painters such as Brunelleschi, Michelozzo, 
Bramante, Raphael and Michelangelo who were called the ‘architects’ yet did not belong 
to construction guilds and were not masons or stone cutters. It was at this time that the 
titles of architect and master builder first became separated. While some form of an 
architect had been around since the first edifice was ever built, it was in this period of 
time that the profession of the architect as a designer, independent from the builder, 
began to be defined as an integral and mandatory part of the construction process.’13 
 
In 1753, Laugier beautifully described the complexity and the nobility of the architec-
tural profession: 
 
‘When one speaks of the art of building, the chaotic mess of clumsy debris, immense 
piles of shapeless materials, a dreadful noise of hammers, perilous scaffolding, a fear-
ful grinding of machines and an army of dirty and mudcovered workmen – all this 
comes to the mind of ordinary people, the unpleasant outer cover of an art whose in-
triguing mysteries, noticed by few people, excite the admiration of all those who pene-
trate them. There they discover inventions of a boldness that proclaims a great and 
fertile genius, proportions of a stringency that indicates severe and systematic preci-
sion, and ornaments of an elegance that tells of a delicate and exquisite feeling. Who-
ever is able to grasp true beauty to this extent will, far from confounding architecture 
with the lesser arts, be inclined to range it among the more profound sciences. The 
sight of a building, perfect as a work of art, causes a delightful pleasure which is irre-
sistible. It stirs in us noble and moving ideas and that sweet emotion and enchant-
ment which works of art carrying the imprint of a superior mind arouse in us. A beau-
tiful building speaks eloquently for its architect.’ 14 
 
It can be seen that the profession of architect was held in high esteem and was consid-
ered to be one of the highest arts. As construction projects grew in complexity and scale, 
this led to specialisation, and the design of buildings was, for the first time, held to be 
separated from the construction process at a cultural, legal, functional and economic 
level. The architect was deemed to be the intellectual, while the builder was the executive 
with muscular strengths. The architect was seen as a true professional. In 1819, the first 
school of architecture was established in 1819: the Ecole des Beaux-Arts.15 Those who 
                                                                
13 Jones 2006, p. 12; Coble & Blatter 1999, pp. 44-48; Woods 1999.  
14 Laugier 1753.  
15 “École des Beaux-Arts” (School of Fine Arts) refers to a number of influential Art schools in France. The 
most famous is located in Paris. The “Académie des Beaux-Arts“ was founded in 1648 by Cardinal Mazarin 
and developed studies in architecture, drawing, painting, sculpture, engraving, modelling, and gem cut-
ting. It was brought under control of the government by Louis XIV, originally to guarantee a pool of artists 
available to decorate the palaces and paint the Royalty, but was made independent by Napoléon III in 
1863. Beaux Arts style was modelled on classical “antiquities“, preserving these idealized forms and passing 
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studied at this establishment -and later also those who went to other educational institu-
tions- started to unite themselves in professional organisations, and some of them 
opened architectural offices together. The creation of guilds as confraternities of crafts-
men had emerged much earlier however, and flourished in the Middle Ages. 
 While, from the Renaissance onwards, architecture was regarded as an art, 20th 
Century modernism destroyed the aesthetic importance. Architects worked for clients 
who spent a lot of money (for example banks, insurance companies, bureaucracies) but 
who did not have any aesthetic interest in the building whatsoever. This caused the 
architect to become an anonymous and obscure face in the building process. It followed 
that the word ‘patron’ obtained a pejorative undertone. Accordingly, the role of both 
parties has changed over time and become the exact opposite to what it once was: 
nowadays architects refer to their employers as their ‘clients’. The 20th Century is char-
acterised by industrialisation and specialisation. Architects had to respond to increased 
project size and work complexity. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, there was a sub-
stantial identity of values between sponsors and their architects. Their shared social and 
educational backgrounds, through shared class origins, and the well-established tradi-
tions of the few building types in existence, ensured that there was little risk of hidden 
agendas not being fulfilled.16 There was also little need to lay down the programmes 
(today’s “briefs”) in detail. However, as held by Tiesdell and Oc, ‘The supersedence of 
craft-based trades by industrial rationalization led to the relative estrangement of the 
sponsor, the designer and the eventual user of the built environment. Such an estrange-
ment made the architect’s precise role in the process confused. The architect has to deal 
with the goals and aspirations of both the sponsor, which may increasingly include the 
ability to negotiate and manage a conflict-ridden, litigious construction process17 and 
the ultimate achievement of profit, and those of the users, who may be simply un-
known.’18 Since both sponsors and architects came from a much wider social back-
ground, the identity of class interest could no longer be assumed. Moreover, users of 
buildings began to develop their own voices. ‘In theory, architects were given freedom 
over the form of specific projects. They were, thenceforward, to absorb all their energy 
in stylistic debate. They were to be artists; their workplaces ‘studios’, their education in 
art institutions based on the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. They were to exhibit framed drawing 
in the Academies, today even those drawn by computers. The media, textbooks and 
professional institutions were committed to architecture-as-art. However, the sponsors, 
the selfsame elites, took control of the resources for architectural education, the media, 
publishing and exhibitions. Form could be censored at an institutional level, without 
destroying the apparent freedom of architects. Of course sponsors could not afford to be 
so cavalier. So they explicitly and elaborately prescribed it in a text -the brief- which was 
presented as ‘neutral’, ‘technical’ or ‘objective’ and thus beyond argument. By means of 
specific briefs, general design guides, Codes, Standards and legislation, a battery of writ-
ten and graphic prescriptions were produced. These texts became powerful prescrip-
                                                                                                                                                             
the style on to future generations. See http://www.jssgallery.org/Essay/Ecole_des_Beaux-Arts/-
Ecole_des_Beaux-Arts.htm, last consulted 11 October, 2009. 
16 Markus 1993, p. 20. 
17 Montgomery 1989, pp. 260-281. 
18 Tiesdell & Oc 1993, p. 44. 
  Chapter 2  
17 
tions which, in many important ways, designed a building long before a so-called de-
signer appeared on the scene.’19 
 As noted above, next to the changing relationship between the architect and his 
client due to changing backgrounds and the increasing influence of clients on the build-
ing process, specialisation and increased complexity characterise the 20th Century. This 
meant that the responsibilities of architects became enormous. Traditionally architects 
advised their clients on the budget and the schedule, made the design and supervised the 
building work. Over the centuries, the role of the architect has constantly been modified 
to suit the needs and requirements of their time. Where traditional methods were shown 
to be inadequate, new approaches were developed to take their place. As stipulated in 
the Beijing Charter, ‘Without exception, each redefinition pushes the boundary of archi-
tecture outwards for a wider coverage, as well as inwards for higher degrees of speciali-
sation in the component parts.’20 ‘A wider coverage of the contents of the architectural 
profession and finer degrees of specialisation have empowered the 20th and 21st Century 
architect with unprecedented professional opportunities and potential, yet at a personal 
level, an expanding profession with growing specialisation can seem elephantine.’ 21 In 
this regard, the Beijing Charter holds that ‘In a sense, the architects’ Tower of Babel 
appears to have fallen: it is increasingly difficult for one architect to grasp the expertise 
of a fellow colleague; although the body of knowledge has grown collectively, the out-
look of any single designer tends to become paradoxically narrow and fragmented.’22 To 
cope with new technologies, building contractors (hereinafter: entrepreneurs) began to 
introduce sub-contracts. Furthermore, the architect went through the same process as 
the builder with his sub-contractors. All sorts of other professionals, consultants and 
managers have come to the fore, who assume responsibility for various areas of speciali-
sation. These sub-contractors can be hired by the building master but also by the archi-
tects themselves. Moreover, practices have arisen which offer design as well as building 
services, so that the profession of ‘master builder’ has revived, especially with regard to 
turn-key projects. This results in a power struggle between these professionals. It can be 
asked whether the growth of such firms and the involvement of more specialists who 
consequently gain more authority and responsibility, can be found in the fact that archi-
tects may have taken a backseat due to liability concerns (risk-aversion) and the fact that 
they might not be able to keep up with modern trends in the construction industry. We 
can also ask whether the precise role of the architect is still clear. The construction in-
dustry is constantly growing and developing into an increasingly professional, white 
collar industry.23 More educated professionals, more complexity, new technologies, 
more lawsuits, higher compensation and more turn-key projects have influenced the 
                                                                
19 Markus 1993, p. 20. 
20 Article 3.1 Beijing Charter. In 1999 more than 6,000 people, of whom 2,500 were architectural students, 
met in Beijing to take part in the activities of the XX World Congress of Architects organised by the Archi-
tectural Society of China. The ambitious Congress theme ‘Architecture of the 21st Century’ was thor-
oughly and pragmatically dealt with by the international community of architects during the congress. The 
papers presented were published in three reference works, as well as the Beijing Charter which was a gen-
eral synthesis.  
21 Beijing Charter, Article 3.1. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Jones 2006, p. 76. 
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architectural profession. Nevertheless, the architects’ primary function has remained 
constant: the design of buildings.24 
 
It can thus be concluded that for centuries the architect was a ‘master builder’ who was 
responsible for the design and the construction of buildings. Due to new technologies 
and higher complexity, more specialised professionals were needed, leading to the sepa-
ration of the designer and the building contractor. While the building contractor takes 
care of the execution of the building, the architect advises his client on the project and 
the budget, designs the building and supervises the building works. However, due to the 
ever increasing complexity, even architects may have difficulty keeping up with all new 
technologies. Specialists are involved and turn-key projects have gained in popularity. 
This has caused the exact role of the architect to become unclear, and means that archi-
tects are losing their previously prominent role. 
2. Content of the profession 
‘In architecture, as in all other Operative Arts, the end must direct the Operation. The 
end is to build well. Well building hath three Conditions: Commodity, Firmness, and 
Delight.’25 These words of Sir Henry Wotton, were inspired by the writings of the Ro-
man architect, Vitruvius, who saw “durability, convenience and beauty” as the condi-
tions to be met by an architect, emphasising the complexity of the building art.26 The 
function of architecture is to shelter human activity (utilitas or commodity), to durably 
challenge gravity and the elements (firmitas or firmness) and to be an object of beauty 
(venustas or delight). The art of architecture lies in knowing how to establish the appro-
priate relations between the three conditions. 
 Throughout history, the most important function of architecture has been the pro-
vision of shelter. Architecture creates an artificial climate to secure the survival of man-
kind and to protect individuals against the climate, animals, enemies, etc. and this lies at 
the heart of most architectural activities. By designing buildings, architects create the 
environment in which persons spend their lives. After the struggle for survival had been 
won, investment could be made in work that had spiritual, symbolic or enriching sig-
nificance.27 As held by Nuttgens, ‘The need of people was no longer simply for shelter; 
there was a requirement for something more permanent, more lasting and more emo-
tionally significant. In that sense the story of great architecture can be seen as the aston-
ishing story of how individuals and groups have taken the structures, groupings, plans, 
access and service arrangements originally evolved to satisfy basic human needs, and 
transformed them into one of the greatest manifestations of the human spirit.’28 Today, 
buildings have importance on an economic, social, political and cultural level. As sug-
gested by King, ‘Economically, they house activities, occupy land, create work and, in 
modern market societies, they provide for investment and capital. Socially, buildings 
                                                                
24 Jones 2006, p. 75. 
25 Wotton 1624. 
26 Rybczynski 2001, p. 4. 
27 Farmer 1993, p. 3.  
28 Nuttgens 1993, p. 5. 
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house institutions, provide shelter, support relationships, express social division, permit 
hierarchies, embody property relations and enable the expression so status, identity and 
authority. Culturally, they store sentiment, symbolize meaning, embody history and 
express identity. Politically, buildings represent authority, symbolize power, become an 
arena for conflict and are a political resource.’29 It is therefore clear that buildings have a 
myriad of functions and that the importance of architecture has always been acknowl-
edged. 
 
To achieve all these aims, architects provide a broad selection of services such as the 
planning of buildings and developments, interior and exterior design, planning permis-
sion applications, preparation and monitoring of construction, technical control and 
certification, feasibility studies, procurement of building materials, topographical de-
termination, demarcation and land surveying.30 Usually, architects start their task with 
the examination of the building site. They advise their clients on the selection of build-
ing materials, the applicable laws and rules, and the construction costs. Drawing a plan 
is the essential factor in the creation of a work of architecture; it is the organization of 
areas and spaces to accommodate and link together the needs -or functions- for which 
the building is erected.31 As indicated by Le Corbusier, ‘The plan is the generator’.32 The 
drawings, specifications and other construction documentation are prepared and ad-
ministered by the architect during construction. In this regard it should be mentioned 
that the transfer of information between the participants and the processing of this in-
formation by these same participants, is of the utmost importance. The design by the 
architect combines and converts numerous items of information into a coherent design 
proposal, represented in a form that communicates with other participants, such as 
those from whom planning permission must be sought, or those who will eventually 
construct the building.33 After the design is complete, architects can be hired to super-
vise the construction of the building works by the builder. It can be said that no one can 
control a project better than the one who devised the concept and who has studied the 
methods needed to realize the design since s/he knows the difficulties. Architects have to 
guide their clients, who often expect to have the latest innovations in their buildings, as 
to what approaches are the best for a new building project, the best models, the best 
materials and the best methods to make their project come alive. Architects are there-
fore coordinators, and have to unify various formal, technical, social and economic 
problems that arise in connection with their building. 34 Since architecture is held to be a 
discipline which ‘draws knowledge from the humanities, the social and the physical 
sciences, technology, environmental sciences, the creative arts and the liberal arts’35, 
architects have to unify knowledge from different complex fields which they cannot 
                                                                
29 King 1991, p. 11.  
30 See also Stocktaking Exercise on Regulation of Professional Services: Overview of Regulation in the New 
EU Member States, European Commission, Competition DG, COMP/D3/MK/D(2004), paragraph 82. 
31 Nuttgens 1993, p. 6. 
32 Le Corbusier 1927, pp. 35-36. 
33 Day & Powell 1993, p. 166. 
34 Gropius 1965, p. 98.  
35 Skolimowski 1993, p. 498. 
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master all by themselves. It follows that architects are, in general, specialized in a par-
ticular field, and collaborate with different specialists such as landscape architects, engi-
neers, quantity surveyors, interior designers, builders and subcontractors. Their poten-
tial is therefore no longer valued in the first instance in terms of their artistic abilities, 
but in terms of their technical knowledge.36 It follows that, due to their specialisation 
which necessarily brings about a reduction of competence in general, specialists are 
often intruding on the traditional areas of the architects’ responsibilities, such as their 
management function. 
 
It has become obvious that the tasks of an architect comprise much more than is at first 
expected. The profession embraces a myriad of skills, abilities and know-how, and dem-
onstrates a multi-layered proficiency. It has numerous facets and is challenging for eve-
ryone who practices it.  
3. The architectural profession in Europe: facts and figures 
In this section I will present some data which are interesting within the ambit of this 
thesis. These data were collected by other researchers, Eurostat and my own contacts 
with architectural associations and registration offices. In this chapter I will not try to 
explain these data. Where data are important with regard to the national regulations 
under consideration, they will be discussed in more detail in Part II, where reference will 
be made to this chapter if necessary. 
 
In 2008 a Sector Study37 was commissioned by the Architects’ Council of Europe (ACE). 
This is a professional organisation whose members are the national representatives and 
regulatory bodies of the profession in all EU Member States, Accession States, Norway 
and Switzerland. It is claimed to be the first comprehensive study of the architectural 
profession carried out in Europe. All 32 countries (hereinafter: Europe 32) from which 
the ACE drew its membership at the time of the study in 2008, were invited to partici-
pate and 17 countries38 (hereinafter: Europe 17) fully participated. Additionally, several 
other countries, which had recently carried out national studies, shared the results of 
these studies with the ACE and hence could also be considered. The research was con-
ducted in two phases and was the first comprehensive study of the architectural profes-
sion in Europe. In phase I, Member Organisations were addressed by means of a written 
questionnaire. Since the researchers felt that the ACE was seeking data which simply did 
not exist in many countries, they addressed in phase II a certain number of architects 
directly. In this way, a total of 8,083 architects replied. It should be noted however, that 
the response rate for Belgium was only 15% and for the Netherlands 10%. Only persons 
                                                                
36 This also has its influence on architectural education systems. The oldest educational establishments were 
attached to art academies since architecture was seen as a mixture of art and craft. Now, most architectural 
schools are faculties of technical universities because they were started at around the turn of the 20th Cen-
tury when the technical aspects of the discipline were regarded as decisive. See Lund 1993, pp. 477-480. 
37 Mirza & Nacey 2008.  
38 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom. 
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qualifying as real ‘architects’, i.e. persons who were professionally and academically 
qualified and generally registered/licensed/certified to practise architecture in the juris-
diction in which they resided and were responsible for advocating the fair and sustain-
able development, welfare, and cultural expression of society’s habitat in terms of space, 
forms and historical context, were invited to take part. Since this study is only a first 
attempt and might, on certain points, not be representative of the whole profession due 
to the limited number of participants, some caution should be taken when looking at the 
results. 
 
According to the study, Europe 32 has an estimated 483,000 architects. One quarter 
(25%) of architects are based in just one country: Italy. A reason for this density is not 
given but can certainly not be found in an indolent liability regime since Italy is the only 
state of the old EU 15 in which architects cannot limit their personal liability by the 
creation of a company. The second highest number of architects is recorded in Ger-
many, accounting for 20% of the European total. Third highest is Spain, with 45,000 
architects and three countries – Turkey, the UK and France – have around 30,000 archi-
tects each (between 6 and 7% of the European total). It follows that these six countries 
together account for 74% of all of Europe’s architects. The 27 Member States of the 
European Union account for 436,280 of these architects. 
 A comparison between the numbers of registered architects in different European 
countries shows that there are significant differences in the volume of architects per 
country. When comparing the number of architects with the general population, the 
study reveals that there are approximately 0.8 architects per 1,000 population in Europe. 
The highest density of architects occurs in Italy (2.1 architects per 1,000 population), the 
Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia and Portugal. The lowest density of archi-
tects is recorded in Eastern Europe -Slovakia, Latvia, Czech Republic and Romania- 
with each recording 0.3 or fewer architects per 1,000 population. The range in the den-
sity statistic across Europe is huge: in Italy there is one architect for every 485 people 
while in Slovakia the ratio is nearly ten times lower at one architect for every 4,155 peo-
ple. According to the 2008 study, in Belgium there are 11,500 architects39 and the density 
is 1.1 per 1,000 persons while in the Netherlands 9,100 were counted, representing a 
density of 0.6. There are therefore fewer ‘real’ architects in the Netherlands than in Bel-
gium. 
 It may be that distinctions in cultural patterns, in the standing of the profession, in 
building practice and in legislation, are accountable for such differences.40 An overview 
can be found in Table 1 and Chart 1.41 
                                                                
39 In a telephone conversation held on 17th September, 2009, the Belgian Order of Architects revealed that on 
that date there were 7,060 architects registered in the Flemish Region and 5,654 in the Walloon and Ger-
man Region. Every year the number of professional extends considerably. I did not receive more recent 
data from the Dutch Foundation Bureau Architects Register (SBA) nor from the Association of Dutch Ar-
chitects (BNA). The latter held that information was only available to its members. 
40 The Bond der Nederlandse Architecten (a Dutch architectural association) indicates that differences in the 
quality of the built environment are less sharp than the disparities in architect numbers would suggest: Bond 
der Nederlandse Architechten, The Architectural Profession in the Netherlands, leaflet, August 2006, p. 4.  
See http://www.bna.nl/binaries/bna-downloads-3/infoblad-the-architectural-profession-in-nl.pdf, last 
consulted 23 December 2009. 
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Table 1 
Estimated number of architects in each country and number of architects per 1,000 population 
 Number of 
 architects 
Population Architects per  
1000 population 
Austria 3,800 8,331,930 0.5 
Belgium 11,500 10,666,866 1.1 
Bulgaria 3,500 7,640,238 0.5 
Croatia 3,000 4,435,383 0.7 
Cyprus 430 794,580 0.5 
Czech Republic 3,000 10,381,130 0.3 
Denmark 7,000 5,475,791 1.3 
Estonia 700 1,340,935 0.5 
Finland 3,600 5,300,484 0.7 
France 29,400 63,753,140 0.5 
FYROM 3,000 2,045,117 1.5 
Germany 95,000 82,221,808 1.2 
Greece 15,000 11,214,992 1.3 
Hungary 4,000 10,045,000 0.4 
Ireland 3,500 4,419,859 0.8 
Italy 123,000 59,618,114 2.1 
Latvia 700 2,270,894 0.3 
Lithuania 2,000 3,366,357 0.6 
Luxembourg 600 483,799 1.2 
Malta 500 410,584 1.2 
Netherlands 9,100 16,404,282 0.6 
Norway 3,600 4,737,171 0.8 
Poland 13,500 38,115,641 0.4 
Portugal 16,300 10,617,575 1.5 
Romania 5,500 21,528,627 0.3 
Slovakia 1,300 5,400,998 0.2 
Slovenia 1,350 2,025,866 0.7 
Spain 45,000 45,283,259 1.0 
Sweden 5,400 9,182,927 0.6 
Switzerland 5,300 7,591,414 0.7 
Turkey 32,300 70,586,256 0.5 
United Kingdom 31,600 61,185,981 0.5 
Europe- 32 483,480 586,877.058 0.8 
Population source: Eurostat. Population as at 1st January 2008. Copyright (c) Eurostat 
Architects source: Various sources. The starting point was the research publication produced by COAC – 
Architectural Practice Around the World by the Collegi d’Arquitectes de Catalunya (COAC), based on infor-
mation supplied by national institutes and associations of architects of the individual countries. Further data 
was collected by ACE in Phase I of the research. The Mirza & Nacey researchers attempted to verify all figures 
using a mixture of primary and secondary sources including Member Organisation websites, telephone/email. 
Very often different sources produced conflicting figures, sometimes substantially different. The researchers 
hold that final figures are their best estimates based on these several different sources. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
41 The tables and charts are those which are provided by the Mirza & Nacey 2008  
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Chart 1 
Estimated number of architects in each European country 
number of architects, 000’s 
 
 
16% of all architects in Europe are not economically active. They are retired, unem-
ployed, or not working for other reasons. In Belgium only 2% is not economically active 
while in the Netherlands this number is 6%. 
 
The study also revealed that the vast majority of architects (93%) work or reside in the 
same country as they are registered in. 4.2% of Belgian architects are working or residing 
in a different country from the one in which they are registered. With regard to Dutch 
architects, this number is 6.7%. In this regard it should be noted that these figures ares-
timations based upon questionnaires to which only a small percentage of architects have 
responded, so that more detailed research is necessary. Furthermore, this does not nec-
essarily mean that architects do not make use of their freedom of movement: one can, 
for example, also be registered in a Member State in which one did not study. This was 
not covered by the study. The number of cases which were dealt with by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union with regard to the free movement of architects suggests 
that the architectural profession is characterised by mobile professionals. The free 
movement rights of architects will be elaborated on in Part I of this thesis. 
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Table 2 
 Architects working/resident in 
different country from the one in 
which registered (per cent) 
Austria 12.5 
Belgium 4.2 
Denmark 3.3 
Estonia <1 
Finland <1 
France 8.3 
Germany 7.9 
Greece 6.0 
Ireland 18.2 
Luxembourg 11.1 
Malta 14.3 
Netherlands 6.7 
Romania 6.3 
Slovenia <1 
Sweden 5.9 
Turkey 6.4 
United Kingdom 6.3 
Europe-17° 7.0 
* EUROPE – 17 figure is a weighted average and takes account of the  
number of architects in each participating country. 
 
It was further demonstrated that a significant proportion of architects operate alone as 
sole principals42 (24%) and as freelancers43 (9%) which is typical for the liberal profes-
sions. Including sole principals, private practice dominates, and accounts for more than 
two thirds of the profession (67%). One quarter (27%) of architects work in private 
practice as salaried architects (including associates), while the remainder are principals, 
partners or directors with an equity stake in the practice. Next to private practice, the 
principal employers are governments and local authorities. 5% of architects work for a 
municipal local authority, 1% for a regional local authority and 1% for central govern-
ment or its agencies. Taken together, the public sector employs 13% of the profession. 
Private practice is the largest employment field in most countries. Fewer architects are 
employed in the public sector than in the private sector in all countries. According to 
the study, in Belgium 21% work as a sole principal, 12% are partners or directors in a 
company, 3% are salaried architects, 22% work as freelance architects and 6% work for 
local public authorities. In the Netherlands, 31% work as a sole principal, 45% as a part-
ner or director, 9% are salaried and 2% work for local public authorities. The remaining 
architects are associates, or work in educational or other establishments. For more de-
tails see Tables 3 and 4. 
                                                                
42 An architect, working independently, who provides a full range of architectural services to clients.  
43 An architect who contracts his/her services to an architectural practice or organisation (i.e. the form of 
structure through which architects practise the architectural profession. It includes sole principals, part-
nerships and limited companies) and does not accept commissions directly from clients. 
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Table 3 
 Per cent architects working 
Sole Principal 24 
Partner/Director 16 
Associate 5 
Private Practice Salaried 22 
In-House 3 
Agency 6 
Freelance 9 
Other Private 4 
Local Authority-Municipal 5 
Local Authority-Regional 1 
Central Government 1 
Education 2 
Health <1 
Other Public 3 
Chef De Project <1 
Europe-17° 100 
* weighted to reflect the total architectural population in all 17 countries 
 
Table 4 
Architects’ field of employment by country (per cent) 
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Austria 66 30  1  2 0  0  0 1  0  0 0 0 
Belgium 21 12  5  3 0 23 22 5  6  0 0 3 
Denmark 11  7  6 26 4  4  2 6 21  3 4 6 
Estonia 16 56  8 12 0  4  4 0  0  0 0 0 
Finland 12 12  0 31 1  5  2 3 21  4 4 4 
France 23  5 12  6 1 23 25 1  1  1 1 3 
Germany 40 14  1 19 5  3  3 4  7  0 1 3 
Greece 14 15  6 13 1  3 23 4  7  1 6 8 
Ireland 16 23 14 26 1  1  2 3  6  2 1 3 
Luxembourg 31 14  8  7 1 15 16 1  5  0 0 1 
Malta  9 15  4 31 1  2 12 3  5 13 1 4 
Netherlands 31 45  5  9 3  0  3 0  2  0 2 1 
Romania 14 23 12 25 1  6 10 3  2  1 3 2 
Slovenia 18 13 10 23 2  5 18 2  5  0 1 2 
Sweden  8 10 5 30 1  4  6 2 22  3 6 3 
Turkey 10 20 2 33 1  2 13 2  6  1 6 5 
United Kingdom  8 17 13 43 4  0  1 7  5  0 1 2 
Europe-17° 24 16  5 22 3  6  9 4  6  1 2 3 
* weighted to reflect the total architectural population in all 17 countries 
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The total value of the European construction market (Europe 32) is estimated to be 
worth in excess of 1,65 billion Euros per year.44 This includes civil engineering and infra-
structure work. There are four significant players, who together account for 54 % of total 
construction output: the UK, France, Germany and Italy. In Belgium, the construction 
market’s size amounted in 2007 to 52.987 million Euros, representing 4,967 Euros con-
struction output per head of population. In the Netherlands this number amounted to 
78.648 million Euros representing 4,794 Euros construction output per head of popula-
tion. See Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Table 5 
Size of construction market Million of Euros (or ECU up to 31.12.1998) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 26.487 27.037 27.834 28.590 28.211 28.591 30.510 31.622 32.669 34.973 
Belgium 30.368 30.691 33.761 35.862 36.688 36.394 37.680 40.126 42.659 48.680 
Bulgaria 738 1.205 1.396 1.507 1.727 1.813 2.088 2.866 3.999 5.321 
Croatia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cyprus 1.103 1.149 1.192 1.234 1.324 1.453 1.599 1.834 2.117 2.273 
Czech Republic 11.805 12.426 12.182 12.880 14.255 17.011 17.904 18.686 21.101 25.665 
Denmark 18.167 18.997 19.553 20.550 21.408 21.550 22.492 23.337 25.140 28.552 
Estonia 819 1.075 998 938 1.058 1.252 1.352 1.503 1.992 2.569 
Finland 11.922 13.665 15.099 17.077 17.709 17.457 17.667 18.859 20.867 22.665 
France n/a n/a 141.002 157.605 165.638 170.250 177.465 190.175 204.994 228.674 
FYROM n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Germany 232.295 224.543 229.880 225.270 214.460 199.390 195.730 189.440 184.480 196.690 
Greece 14.033 14.900 16.327 21.214 23.107 24.331 27.295 29.244 30.247 31.263 
Hungary 4.258 4.130 4.553 5.430 6.592 8.177 8.021 8.892 9.776 9.948 
Ireland n/a n/a n/a 17.587 19.926 21.294 23.820 27.595 31.556 n/a 
Italy 122.206 123.471 129.065 138.840 148.197 156.842 163.900 173.415 181.237 192.843 
Latvia 572 869 1.047 1.224 1.426 1.627 1.841 2.575 3.167 4.604 
Lithuania 1.182 1.484 1.396 1.348 1.465 1.713 2.131 2.434 2.897 3.873 
Luxembourg 2.041 2.311 2.559 2.810 3.067 3.511 3.671 3.701 4.007 4.290 
Malta 278 271 273 339 328 399 361 362 376 415 
Netherlands 47.043 49.839 55.027 60.287 64.656 64.880 63.650 63.675 66.284 72.085 
Norway 15.942 16.251 17.220 18.154 19.291 21.625 20.663 21.921 25.847 29.448 
Poland 20.925 25.513 27.084 31.790 34.928 31.244 26.164 27.280 35.680 43.749 
Portugal 19.056 20.848 22.019 24.376 26.226 26.912 25.708 27.167 27.940 27.260 
Romania n/a 4.226 3.671 4.491 5.486 6.171 6.811 8.114 11.319 15.882 
Slovakia 4.018 3.969 3.127 3.939 4.012 4.605 4.774 5.318 6.300 6.613 
Slovenia 3.209 3.353 3.980 3.741 3.645 3.972 4.346 4.716 5.191 8.947 
Spain 81.376 88.001 93.696 127.335 146.380 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Sweden 15.970 16.217 17.240 18.981 19.143 19.842 20.148 22.097 n/a n/a 
                                                                
44 Source of all data except for Turkey: Eurostat, National Accounts by 31 branches – aggregates at current 
prices. For Turkey the data are provided by TurkStat, the Turkish Statistical Institute.  
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 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Switzerland 25.147 25.689 26.649 28.585 29.730 31.912 31.181 32.289 33.944 34.534 
Turkey (1) n/a 1.478 3.096 5.301 13.440 24.802 33.858 39.182 45.590 66.696 
United King-
dom 147.515 161.920 177.002 201.818 214.421 230.849 227.986 250.884 245.458 n/a 
Europe- 32 
(€ 000 millions) 
858 895 1.092 1.219 1.287 1.326 1.347 1.415 1.475 1.596 
Source of all data except Turkey: Eurostat, National Accounts by 31 branches – aggregates at current prices 
Copyright © Eurostat. All Rights Reserved. 
 (1) Source: Derived from raw data sourced from TurkStat, the Turkish Statistical Institute. Raw data (not 
reproduced here) is Copyright (c) TURKSTAT. Raw data converted from New Turkish Lira to Euros using 
conversion rates as at 31.12 each year. NB, conversion rates changed significantly over the period 1997 to 
2001, and have been more stable since 2002. 
 (2) Note: some countries which provided data for previous years are marked n/a for 2007 (and occasionally 
for 2005 and 2006) so the ‘total’ figure has been adjusted to include the latest available figure for those missing 
years. Data for Spain is n/a since 2002, here too the latest (2001) figure has been added by the Mirza & Nacey 
2008 to Europe’s ‘total’ figure for those missing years. It was decided to use the latest available data sourced 
from Eurostat rather than to research missing data direct from national statistical offices, as it proved hard to 
reconcile data between different sources. Construction output includes civil engineering and infrastructure 
work. 
 
Table 6 
Estimated size of construction market, 2007 (or latest available year) by country, and comparative values. 
 Construction 
output 
(€m’s) 
Population (num-
ber as at 
01.01.2008) 
Construction 
output per head  
of population (€’s) 
Architects (est. 
number) 
Austria 37,544 8,331,930 4,506 3,800 
Belgium 52,987 10,666,866 4,967 11,500 
Bulgaria 5,321 7,640,238 696 3,500 
Croatia n/a 4,435,383 n/a 3,000 
Cyprus 2,273 794,580 2,861 430 
Czech Republic 27,934 10,381,130 2,691 3,000 
Denmark 28,552 5,475,791 5,214 7,000 
Estonia 2,569 1,340,935 1,916 700 
Finland 26,077 5,300,484 4,920 3,600 
France 228,674 63,753,140 3,587 29,400 
FYROM n/a 2,045,177 n/a 3,000 
Germany 212,890 82,221,808 2,589 95,000 
Greece 32,969 11,214,992 2,940 15,000 
Hungary 10,436 10,045,000 1,039 4,000 
Ireland 31,556 4,419,859 7,140 3,500 
Italy 203,428 59,618,114 3,412 123,000 
Latvia 6,533 2,270,894 2,877 700 
Lithuania 5,338 3,366,357 1,586 2,000 
Luxembourg 4,585 483,799 9,477 600 
Malta 415 410,584 1,011 500 
Netherlands 78,648 16,404,282 4,794 9,100 
Norway 35,003 4,737,171 7,389 3,600 
Poland 43,749 38,115,641 1,148 13,500 
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 Construction 
output 
(€m’s) 
Population (num-
ber as at 
01.01.2008) 
Construction 
output per head  
of population (€’s) 
Architects (est. 
number) 
Portugal 27,260 10,617,575 2,567 16,300 
Romania 15,882 21,528,627 738 5,500 
Slovakia 8,401 5,400,998 1,555 1,300 
Slovenia 10,718 2,025,866 5,291 1,350 
Spain 146,380 45,283,259 3,233 45,000 
Sweden 22,097 9,182,927 2,406 5,400 
Switzerland 34,534 7,591,414 4,549 5,300 
Turkey 70,156 70,585,256 994 32,300 
United Kingdom 245,458 61,185,981 4,012 31,600 
Europe- 32 1,658,367 586,877,058 2,826 483,480 
Source: Construction output and population data – Eurostat Copyright © Eurostat. All Rights Reserved. 
 Construction output includes civil engineering and infrastructure work. 
 
The total value of the architectural market in the 17 surveyed countries is estimated to 
be 11.6 billion Euros. This relates to the total value of the revenue generated by the pro-
fession. However, the Mirza & Nacey research indicates that this figure is very much an 
estimate, and relies on survey data from which it has been grossed up. Any other pub-
lished data on the size of the European architectural market were not found, so this 
estimate is very much a first attempt at establishing the market size and will have to be 
refined. If this figure is grossed up to reflect all 32 European countries, the total esti-
mated value of the architectural market in Europe is 22 billion Euros. 
 Analysed per architect, the highest values are recorded by architects in Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the UK. The average market size per architect in these three countries 
is 95,000 Euros or more. By comparison, the average market size per architect is under 
25,000 Euros in Finland, Greece, Romania and Turkey. In the Netherlands, the market 
size (the architectural market as measured as the sum of the revenues earned by private 
architectural practices in each country) is 901,558,000 Euros, representing 99,072 Euros 
per architect and 54,959 Euros per 1,000 population. The architectural market consti-
tutes 1.1% of the whole construction market. In Belgium, the market size is only 
327,108,000 Euros, representing a value of 28,444 Euros per architect and 30,666 Euros 
per 1,000 population. This architectural market is 0.6% of the construction market. The 
architectural market is thus larger in the Netherlands than in Belgium. See Table 7 and 
Chart 2. 
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Table 7 
Estimated size of architectural market, by country, and comparative values 
 Market size 
(€000’s) 
Value per 
architect(€’s) 
Value per 1000 
population (€’s) 
Architectural market as 
per cent construction 
market 
 Austria 296,789 78,102 35,621 0.8 
Belgium 327,108 28,444 30,666 0.6 
Denmark 356,228 50,890 65,055 1.2 
Estonia 27,524 39,320 20,526 1.1 
Finland 42,580 11,828 8,033 0.2 
France 1,103,778 37,543 17,313 0.5 
Germany 3,988,103 41,980 48,504 1.9 
Greece 294,149 19,610 26,228 0.9 
Ireland 408,855 116,816 92,504 1.3 
Luxembourg 31,828 53,047 65,788 0.7 
Malta 13,320 26,641 32,443 3.2 
Netherlands 901,558 99,072 54,959 1.1 
Romania 112,659 20,484 5.233 0.7 
Slovenia 40,501 30,001 19,992 0.4 
Sweden 145,073 26,865 15,798 0.7 
Turkey 726,778 22,501 10,296 1.0 
United kingdom 2,800,042 88,609 45,763 1.1 
Europe-17° 11,616,874 45,405 31,017 1.1 
 ‘Market size’ refers to the architectural market as measured by the sum of the revenues earned by private 
architectural practices in each country. Data refers to 2007. 
 
Chart 2 
Estimated value of Architectural Market 
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The largest single sector of the market is work with regard to individual houses. These 
account for an estimated 31% of the architectural market. Other private housing work – 
which will include flats and housing developments – account for a further 14%. So, in 
total, 45% of the architectural market is private housing. Add in the public housing 
share, and housing in total accounts for 49%. 18% of the market is commercial work, 
while public works (including public housing) accounts for 24%. Over half of the work 
in Belgium is private housing (59%). This is the highest number within Europe 17. In 
the Netherlands this is 30%. Not only is private housing the dominant source of reve-
nue, more architectural practices are involved in private housing than in any other sec-
tor. 76% of architectural practices had, in the past 12 months before the study was pub-
lished, derived revenue from work on individual houses; while 48% had undertaken 
other private housing work. 42% have been involved in the office sector. An overview is 
presented in Charts 3 and 4 and Tables 8 and 9. 
 
Chart 3 
Proportion of market by building sector 
 
Table 8 
Comparison of the proportion of the market accounted for by different building sectors, and the proportion of 
practices involved in these building sectors 
 Per cent of market Per cent of practices involved 
Individual houses 31 76 
Other private housing 14 48 
Offices 10 42 
Retail  5 26 
Leisure and the arts  3 14 
Industrial  8 32 
Health  4 14 
Education  6 22 
Public housing  4 13 
Other private  7 29 
Other public 10 30 
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Table 9 
Proportion of work undertaken by the building sector, analysed by country (per cent) 
 
In
di
vi
du
al
 h
ou
se
s 
Pr
iv
at
e h
ou
sin
g 
O
ffi
ce
s 
Re
ta
il 
Le
isu
re
 
In
du
str
ia
l 
H
ea
lth
 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
Pu
bl
ic
 h
ou
sin
g 
O
th
er
 p
riv
at
e 
O
th
er
 p
ub
lic
 
To
ta
l 
Austria 20 8 11  3 4  7 7  7 13  8 11 100 
Belgium 44 15  7  4 2  5 4  3  5  2 10 100 
Denmark 20 11 12  5 5  8 5  6 10  8 11 100 
Estonia 18 8 24  6 1  2 3  9 13  8  7 100 
Finland 18 8 13 13 4  7 4  6  8  5 14 100 
France 24 14  7  4 4  3 7  8  7  6 16 100 
Germany 30 13 10  4 2 11 4  7  2  7 11 100 
Greece 42 15  7  6 3  4 1  3  3  5 11 100 
Ireland 29 11  8  9 4  3 8  7  8 10  4 100 
Luxembourg 43 13  8  3 3  4 2  7  2  3 11 100 
Malta 28 18 10 10 4 10 3  1  1  9  8 100 
Netherlands 18 12 14  4 6  8 8  8 13  4  5 100 
Romania 34 11 13  8 3  9 1  3  4  8  6 100 
Slovenia 27 9  9  2 6  9 2  8 11  4 14 100 
Sweden 19 14 14  4 5  6 3  7 11  7 10 100 
Turkey 30 23  7 10 2  8 2  2  2  8  5 100 
United kingdom 38 16  8  4 3  2 2 11  3  8  6 100 
Europe- 17 31 14 10  5 3  8 4  6  4  7 10 100 
 
Chart 4  
Proportion of work undertaken for each main building sector, ranked in order of highest private housing work 
 
per cent total market 
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Private individuals are architects’ principal client type, accounting for almost half (47%) 
of architectural practices’ revenue. This clearly mirrors the importance of individual 
housing as the largest market sector. Public sector clients account for 22% of revenue, 
while 10% of revenue comes from developers and 14% from private companies. See 
Chart 5 and Table 10. 
 
Chart 5 
Proportion of market by client type 
 
Table 10 
Proportion of work undertaken for different clients, analysed by country 
Per cent  
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Austria 40 9 18 0 13 10 4 6 100 
Belgium 54 13 11 0 3 2 13 5 100 
Denmark 39 19 10 0 3 15 7 8 100 
Estonia 25 34 16 0 3 16 6 1 100 
Finland 24 15 25 0 3 12 18 2 100 
France 34 13 6 0 2 1 35 8 100 
Germany 49 6 13 0 7 13 5 8 100 
Greece 56 13 9 0 5 7 4 5 100 
Ireland 35 21 9 0 4 9 6 14 100 
Luxembourg 48 19 4 0 9 3 16 1 100 
Malta 34 34 16 0 4 0 4 7 100 
Netherlands 35 27 10 0 3 11 8 5 100 
Romania 44 22 18 0 2 3 5 4 100 
Slovenia 37 20 12 0 9 14 7 2 100 
Sweden 32 23 14 0 4 12 9 4 100 
Turkey 53 8 22 0 1 4 5 7 100 
United kingdom 48 22 13 0 3 4 1 10 100 
Europe- 17 47 10 14 0 6 9 7 7 100 
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Building design is very clearly the principal revenue generating activity, accounting for 
two thirds (66%) of the total market. The only other significant service type is interior 
design, which accounts for 9% of total architectural revenue. The remainder of the mar-
ket is split between several types of service, for example planning, project management, 
feasibility studies, landscape design, each of which accounts for 5% or less of the total. In 
Belgium, building design constitutes 74% of the architects’ work. In the Netherlands, 
this is 69%. 
 
There are an estimated 69,800 private architectural practices in the 17 responding coun-
tries. Grossing-up this figure to reflect all 32 European countries produces an estimate 
of 130,000 private architectural practices in Europe. More than half (54%) of these prac-
tices are one person firms. A further 35% have between 2 and 5 architectural staff. 8% of 
practices have between 6 and 10 architectural staff and 3% have 11 and 30. Only 1% of 
architectural practices have more than 30 staff. It follows that architectural practices are 
skewed very heavily towards small firms (‘micro-enterprises’). However, large firms 
employ a significant number of architects. The researchers estimate that in the Europe 
17 countries, 12% of the total private practice workforce is employed in firms of more 
than 50 architectural staff. Hence, 19,000 architects are employed in 350 firms. At the 
other end of the scale, the 37,000 one person firms employ 21% of all private practice 
architects. In Belgium 2.403 out of 3.894 architectural practices have only 1 member of 
staff. In the Netherlands, this is 1.896 out of 3.304. 
 Over half of the principals work in ‘independent architect practices’. This may in-
clude freelance architects and architects working on their own as a sole principal. The 
independent architect practices model is most common in Austria, Belgium France, 
Germany and Luxembourg. In each of these countries it accounts for over 50% of archi-
tectural practices. In the Netherlands this is 38%. 18% of principals work in partnerships 
and 22% are directors in limited companies. See Chart 6 and Table 11. 
 
Chart 6 
Type of architectural businesses 
 
  The Architect  
34 
Table 11 
Legal formation of architectural practices – based on type of practice in which principals work (per cent) 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
ar
ch
ite
ct
 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
Li
m
ite
d 
co
m
pa
ny
 
Pl
c 
(p
ub
lic
 li
m
ite
d 
co
m
pa
ny
) 
Co
rp
or
at
io
n 
Ec
on
om
ic
 
in
te
re
st
 
gr
ou
p 
Austria 59 9 29 3 0 0 
Belgium 52 12 25 7 2 2 
Denmark 48 28 14 3 0 7 
Estonia 0 44 25 19 6 6 
Finland 32 11 5 52 0 0 
France 54 7 35 3 0 1 
Germany 70 19 8 1 0 2 
Greece 37 35 7 5 0 16 
Ireland 33 13 49 3 0 1 
Luxembourg 57 11 25 7 0 0 
Malta 44 25 16 0 3 13 
Netherlands 38 21 32 6 0 3 
Romania 28 20 43 3 1 4 
Slovenia 35 24 27 4 2 8 
Sweden 28 26 16 11 1 18 
Turkey 25 9 56 6 1 3 
United kingdom 26 9 57 3 0 6 
Europe- 17 52 18 22 4 1 3 
 
The average revenue per practice in 2007 was considerably higher in the Netherlands45 
than in Belgium.46 Practices with only 1 staff member earned 33,457 in Belgium and 
84,497 in the Netherlands. Likewise differences exist in practices with more staff. In 
practices with 31 to 50 staff members for example, the average revenue was 1,750,000 in 
Belgium and 2,910,834 in the Netherlands. See Table 12. 
 
Table 12 
Average revenue per practice analysed by country and practice size 
 Size of practice (number of architectural staff) 
 1 2 3 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 30 31 to 50 51+
Austria 67,216 198,915 271,281 457,591 1,530,625 n/a n/a
Belgium 33,457 88,979 147,571 171,167 334,375 1,750,000 n/a
Denmark 72,903 291,700 n/a 566,330 n/a n/a n/a
Estonia n/a n/a 231,665 322,500 n/a n/a n/a
                                                                
45 See also the report of the Dutch Central Agency of Statistics, Architecten- en ingenieursbureaus (Brance-
beschrijving 2000-2006), 2 October 2008. 
46 The Belgian Federal Public Service ‘Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy’ only has data regarding 
the gross average income of architects who work as employees. These data also include the income of en-
gineers. The figures can therefore not be compared to those of Mirza & Nacey, 2008. See also Alajääskö 
and Blackburn, 2004, who discussed the total turnover share of architectural and engineering activities 
products with regard to eight EU Member States.  
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 Size of practice (number of architectural staff) 
 1 2 3 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 30 31 to 50 51+
Finland 42,376 70,000 98,545 350,000 62,500 n/a 600,000
France 48,803 138,158 298,773 698,573 n/a n/a n/a
Germany 43,604 88,458 197,263 406,027 1,139,455 1,745,167 3,768,279
Greece 29,018 33,612 55,231 284,625 194,708 n/a 1,328,750
Ireland 72,361 146,294 270,556 498,453 1,580,107 4,650,000 n/a
Luxembourg 61,335 n/a 216,417 605,778 1,502,042 n/a n/a
Malta 46,171 83,375 64,086 236,250 496,725 n/a n/a
Netherlands 84,497 103,714 292,003 325,909 1,401,228 2,910,834 n/a
Romania 39,555 39,680 72,235 129,915 273,301 n/a n/a
Slovenia 27,506 51,220 126,564 342,832 750,000 835,000
Sweden 54,762 257,250 n/a 304,719 521,629 n/a 1,542,654
Turkey 17,028 38,556 57,292 154,042 372,851 n/a 1,261,888
United kingdom 52,205 130,164 212,467 893,258 n/a n/a n/a
Europe- 17 59,389 117,827 201,693 498,563 1,282,563 3,156,907 4,563,556
Figures are averages (means). The minimum number of responses to give a reliable answer is 10. But for 
smaller countries, Mirza & Nacey have extended this to 5 and, in very exceptional cases, to 4. Where there are 
fewer than four responses, or where the figure varies excessively from the mean, the researchers marked the 
data as n/a Calculated as the sum of the average of each of four practice sizes. Where data for a practice size is 
n/a the ‘All’ average for that size has been applied, but grossed up or down dependent upon the grossing factor 
calculated for available data for that country. 
 
The most common method of calculating charges is as a percentage of the total contract 
value. A majority of jobs currently being undertaken by architects are being charged 
using this method. The number for Belgium is 57% and for the Netherlands 40%. Next 
most popular (23%) is a charge agreed after an estimate of the time required; while 16% 
base their charges on an hourly rate. 6% of jobs appear to be undertaken ‘at risk’, where 
there has been no agreement on charges. See Table 13. 
 
Table 13 
How charges are calculated (per cent current jobs) 
 Method of calculating charge 
 Per cent of 
contract value 
Lump sum Hourly 
charge 
No charge agreed 
(effectively at risk) 
Austria 67 18 13  3 
Belgium 57 21 19  2 
Denmark 29 39 23  8 
Estonia 47 41 9  3 
Finland  5 43 48  3 
France 68 26 6  1 
Germany 61 18 18  4 
Greece 39 41 12  8 
Ireland 61 26  7  7 
Luxembourg 72 13 13  2 
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 Method of calculating charge 
 Per cent of 
contract value 
Lump sum Hourly 
charge 
No charge agreed 
(effectively at risk) 
Malta 58 17 13 11 
Netherlands 40 38 17  4 
Romania 64 23  8  5 
Slovenia 60 26  8  7 
Sweden  3 39 53  5 
Turkey 45 30  5 20 
United kingdom 35 42 18  3 
Europe- 17 56 23 16  6 
 
The Europe 17 average hourly charge-out rate for principals is 63 Euros per hour. This 
is the average rate which principals charge clients for an hour of their work, before tax. 
This is 21% more than the average rate at which architects are charged out by private 
practices (50 Euros per hour), technical staff is charged-out at an average of 40 Euros 
per hour. Average hourly charge-out rates vary considerably between the 17 surveyed 
countries. The researchers have attempted to adjust these data to take account of differ-
ent price levels between the countries, using a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) index. 
The researchers used an index sourced from Eurostat, whose Comparative Price Level 
Indices assess the price level of each country in comparison with all 27 EU Member 
States. Each country’s average hourly rate figure is divided by the country’s index value 
to create the PPP adjusted figure. The PPP hourly charge-out rates are highest for prin-
cipals in Ireland and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, principals earn 116 Euros per 
hour, architects 92 Euros and technologists 68 Euros. In Belgium the earnings are con-
siderably lower: principals earn 60 Euros per hour, architects 47 Euros and technologists 
42 Euros.47 Lowest hourly rates are recorded in Romania and Turkey. The pattern is very 
similar for architects and for technical staff. See Table 14 and Chart 7. 
 
Table 14 
Average hourly charge-out rates adjusted to take account of Purchasing Power Parity 
 Average hourly charge-out rates adjusted to take account of purchasing power parities 
(ppp), Euros 
 Principals Architects Technologists 
Austria  79 69 54 
Belgium  60 47 42 
Denmark  73 65 54 
Estonia  74 46 32 
Finland  57 49 41 
France  74 69 46 
Germany  58 52 39 
                                                                
47 The unadjusted average hourly charge-out rates also indicates a considerable difference between the rates 
in Belgium and the Netherlands: 120 Euros for principals, 95 Euros for architects and 70 Euros for tech-
nologists in the Netherlands; 64 Euros for principals, 50 Euros for architects and 45 Euros for technologists 
in Belgium. 
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 Average hourly charge-out rates adjusted to take account of purchasing power parities 
(ppp), Euros 
 Principals Architects Technologists 
Greece  39 16 11 
Ireland 116 80 60 
Luxembourg  90 71 50 
Malta  82 61 34 
Netherlands 116 92 68 
Romania  24 13 7 
Slovenia  48 39 23 
Sweden  73 64 55 
Turkey  20 11 7 
United kingdom 103 79 67 
Data is expressed in Euros, but each country’s figure has been adjusted using an index of Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP). This index takes account of price level differences across countries. An index sourced from 
Eurostat was used, whose Comparative Price Level Indices assess the price level of each country in comparison 
with all 27 EU member countries. Thus EU 27 = 100. Other indices are for example: Ireland 124, France 108, 
Germany 103, Greece 89, Turkey 71, Romania 61. Each country’s average hourly rates figure is divided by the 
country’s index value to create the PPP adjusted figure. 
 
Chart 7 
Average hourly charge-out rates for Principals, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity 
 
average rates, €’s, adjusted for PPP 
 
Architects in Europe earn an average of 36,686 Euros before tax. However, there is a 
substantial variation in this average across Europe. The researchers have attempted to 
adjust the average earnings to take account of differing price levels in the 17 surveyed 
countries, adjusting each country’s average earnings figure by its purchasing power. 
These adjusted figures show average earnings are highest in the Netherlands (52,224 
Euros adjusted for PPP; 54,000 Euros unadjusted) and Ireland, and lowest in Romania 
and Turkey (20,486 Euros adjusted for PPP; 14,648 Euros unadjusted). In Belgium the 
earnings are 28,222 Euros adjusted for PPP and 30,000 Euros unadjusted. 
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 In general, the highest earning group of architects is partners/directors. Their aver-
age earnings, at 44,847 Euros, are 17% higher than those of the second highest earners, 
sole principals. Salaried architects in private practice earn an average of 34,047 Euros, 
some 24% below that of partners/directors. The average earnings of architects in lo-
cal/central government, at 25,124 Euros, are 26% lower than those of salaried architects 
in private practice. Principals (sole principals and partners/directors) earn 30,000 Euros 
in Belgium48 and 72,500 in the Netherlands. Private practice salaried architects earn 
24,000 Euros in Belgium and 42,000 in the Netherlands. It is obvious that there is a huge 
income difference between these two neighbouring countries. Table 15 deals with the 
average earning of full-time architects in general. These are ranged in Chart 8. Chart 9 
gives an indication of the earning by field of employment. 
 
Table 15 
Average earnings analysed by country and field of employment (unadjusted) 
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Austria 50,000 40,000 48,000 n/a n/a n/a 47,460 n/a n/a n/a 
Belgium 30,600 24,000 30,000 24,000 30,000 31,000 30,000 28,500 n/a 33,734 
Denmark 67,150 53,720 67,150 53,720 n/a 46,736 53,720 53,720 30,218 53,720 
Estonia 41,280 25,800 27,735 n/a n/a n/a 25,800 n/a n/a n/a 
Finland 35,000 49,250 42,000 36,000 n/a 36,500 39,800 45,000 42,500 45,000 
France 29,000 42,000 30,000 46,800 35,000 37,200 35,500 n/a n/a 39,585 
Germany 40,000 46,300 40,000 36,000 35,000 48,000 40,000 45,000 50,500 47,000 
Greece 30,000 30,000 30,000 18,000 20,000 22,500 24,000 21,500 30,083 26,000 
Ireland 75,000 80,000 77,500 60,000 n/a 72,500 65,000 70.000 60,000 66,000 
Luxembourg 57,000 45,000 50,000 90,000 n/a 50,000 50,000 n/a n/a n/a 
Malta 51,000 42,000 42,000 20,000 25,000 n/a 25,250 n/a n/a 25,000 
Netherlands 45,144 103,500 72,500 42,000 n/a n/a 52,000 n/a n/a n/a 
Romania 16,788 26,889 22,384 11.472 14,943 10,912 13,990 11,192 11,836 11,514 
Slovenia 33,000 26,000 30,000 16,500 12,000 15,600 24,000 17,000 n/a 34,000 
Sweden 38,376 44,772 42,640 34,347 31,980 5,010 35,178 34,538 43,706 35,178 
Turkey 26,366 26,366 26,333 13,988 17,577 11,952 14,648 14,062 10,546 11,718 
United kingdom 50,992 58,373 56,360 46,966 n/a 67,095 49,650 n/a n/a n/a 
Europe- 17* 38,227 44,847 40,292 34,047 20,641 37,927 36,953 25,124 25,266 30,742 
* Europe – 17 figure is a weighted average and takes account of the number of architects in each participating 
country. Earnings date converted from local currencies to Euro, exchange rate as at 01.09.2008. A table with 
average earnings, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity, was not available. 
 
                                                                
48 In Belgium the average earnings of sole principals are higher than that of partners/directors. 
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Chart 8 
Average earnings, all full-time architects, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
 
Chart 9 
Earnings by field of employment (unadjusted) 
 
 
The Mirza & Nacey research indicates that the highest number of hours worked is re-
corded by sole principals (51 hours per week) closely followed by partners/directors (50 
hours per week). Their salaried colleagues in private practice work an average of 46 
hours per week. Architects working in the public sector have a shorter working week 
than in the private sector, although average hours are still 42 (local authorities and cen-
tral government) or 43 hours (other public). The longest working hours per week for 
partners/directors are recorded in Belgium (58 hours) and Malta (54 hours); the longest 
working hours for private practice salaried architects are in Belgium, Austria, France 
and Turkey (each over 48 hours). In Belgium, architects not working for the govern-
ment, work more hours per week than their colleagues in the Netherlands (Belgium: 
sole principals 53.5 hours; parent/director 58.3 hours; private practice salaried 49.8 
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hours; freelance architects 45.1 hours; other private: 48.8 hours; local/central govern-
ment 43 hours; other public 45 hours – Netherlands: sole principals 48 hours; part-
ner/directors 47.3 hours; private practice salaried 46.2 hours; freelance architects 42 
hours; other private 47.3 hours; local/central government 50 hours; other public 51.7 
hours). Furthermore, architects in all employment areas report that they work longer 
hours than their contracts demand. Table 16 gives an overview. 
 
Table 16 
Average number of hours worked per week, analysed by country and by field of employment 
 
So
le
 p
rin
ci
pa
l 
Pa
rt
ne
r/
 
di
re
ct
or
 
Pr
iv
at
e p
ra
ct
ic
e 
sa
la
rie
d 
Fr
ee
la
nc
e 
O
th
er
 p
riv
at
e 
Lo
ca
l/ 
ce
nt
ra
l 
go
v’
t 
O
th
er
 p
ub
lic
 
Austria 54.0 51.3 48.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Belgium 53.5 58.3 49.8 45.1 48.8 43.0 45.0 
Denmark 44.3 47.0 39.5 40.0 40.1 40.1 40.7 
Estonia 56.0 45.3 43.8 n/a 40.0 n/a n/a 
Finland 44.9 43.3 37.9 38.8 39.1 39.0 40.5 
France 49.0 51.4 48.3 48.5 46.6 37.0 47.4 
Germany 51.5 51.8 46.1 46.9 47.1 43.0 44.6 
Greece 54.2 50.3 44.0 48.2 44.8 44.9 44.6 
Ireland 44.6 50.3 41.9 40.0 48.8 40.6 39.4 
Luxembourg 50.0 49.6 47.6 46.6 47.1 43.7 45.0 
Malta 57.1 54.1 45.8 48.8 50.0 46.9 48.8 
Netherlands 48.0 47.3 46.2 42.0 47.3 50.0 51.7 
Romania 51.5 50.5 45.6 50.8 46.2 45.8 48.3 
Slovenia 47.6 48.9 45.7 45.1 41.4 44.0 50.0 
Sweden 43.7 41.8 41.7 38.0 42.5 42.1 42.9 
Turkey 49.3 48.9 49.7 46.6 50.6 40.9 41.4 
United kingdom 47.5 45.3 42.3 n/a 42.3 37.0 37.5 
Europe- 17 51.0 50.1 46.0 47.0 46.6 42.2 43.3 
 
Approximately 6% of practice revenues are generated by work undertaken outside the 
country in which the architectural practices are based. This proportion is highest in 
Denmark (12%), Turkey (9%), Luxembourg (8%), Romania and Malta (both 7%). In 
Belgium, work undertaken outside the country amounts to 3.2% while in the Nether-
lands this number is 3.4%. See Chart 10 and Table 17. 
 At first sight this might suggest that the profession is cautious in its approach to 
pan-European working.  
 However, this does not encompass that architects are not mobile. Since 1997, 2,536 
decisions were taken regarding the recognition of architectural qualifications for the 
purpose of permanent establishment within the EU Member States,  
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EEA countries and Switzerland.49 Most of these decisions were positive and the architec-
tural profession was number 11 on the list of mobile professions. 
 The recognition of architectural qualifciations This will be further discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Table 17 
Proportion of practice revenue derived from 
outside the country, analysed by country 
 Turnover derived from 
outside the country (per 
cent) 
Austria  4.2 
Belgium  3.2 
Denmark 12.4 
Estonia  4.2 
Finland  3.9 
France  3.9 
Germany  3.4 
Greece  1.5 
Ireland  5.3 
Luxembourg  7.6 
Malta  7.3 
Netherlands  3.4 
Romania  7.4 
Slovenia  5.3 
Sweden  6.3 
Turkey  9.2 
United kingdom  5.8 
Europe- 17  6.0 
4. Conclusion 
It can be concluded that the architectural profession is practised by a large number of 
professionals in Europe and that the value generated by the architectural market is con-
siderable. 
However, the profession has different particularities in every state. The architectural 
clientele differs as well as do the architectural business types and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, the architects’ revenue. In the following part of this thesis dealing with the regula-
tion of architects in the EU, Belgium and the Netherlands will be discussed in detail and 
it will be determined whether also the content of the architects’ work differs in these 
Member States. In this way I will try to find an explanation for the abovementioned 
differences between these two states. 
 
 
                                                                
49 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?fuseaction=stats.ranking&services-
=false 
Chart 10 
Source of revenue 
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PART I 
THE REGULATION OF ARCHITECTS 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
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PUBLIC REGULATION OF ARCHITECTS AT EUROPEAN UNION LEVEL 
1. Introduction and structure 
Since architects provide a broad selection of services such as making designs, preparing 
and monitoring construction and land surveying, their work is of considerable impor-
tance and involves a high degree of responsibility, not only towards their clients, but 
also towards society as a whole. Buildings need to be safe and secure not only for their 
owners, but also for visitors, persons walking by, etc. The prevention of harm (negative 
external effects) is often invoked as one of the reasons why regulation is needed.1  
 The profession of architect2 is regulated in the vast majority of the EU Member 
States which means that the pursuit of the profession is subject, directly or indirectly, to 
laws, regulations or administrative provisions, and to the possession of evidence of edu-
cation and training (or an attestation of competence). If and how these Member States 
regulate the profession falls within the competence of the Member States, either by the 
introduction of state regulation or by the creation of self-regulation by professional 
associations. A combination of both is also possible. However, even though States are 
not obliged to introduce regulation on title protection, professional protection or any 
other type of regulation, restrictions to the free movement of architects are not allowed 
unless they are justified and proportional. Since architects do not always intend to work 
in the state in which they obtained their qualifications and may wish to move to another 
state to practise their profession, while clients may want to engage an architect estab-
lished in another country, a policy was created at the European Union level to ascertain 
the free movement of professionals and their clients within (and to) the Union. This 
freedom of movement forms part of a broader policy called European integration. In 
this chapter I will discuss the most important aspects of this process with regard to the 
architectural profession. In paragraph 3.2, the basic principles of free movement will be 
referred to while paragraph 3.3 discusses the recognition of professional qualifications 
                                                                
1  In Part III of this thesis (paragraph 11.3.6.), also other reasons will be given to explain the creation of 
regulation. 
2 It should be repeated that this thesis only aims to discuss the regulation of architects in a narrow sense, and 
that it does not involve the regulation of town planners, garden and landscape architects or interior archi-
tects.  
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in greater detail. In this regard it should be noted that the situation of third country-
nationals possessing a diploma obtained in the EU as well as EU or third country-
nationals holding evidence of qualifications obtained outside the EU, will be referred to 
as well. Paragraph 3.4 deals with the recent Directive on services in the internal market, 
and its implications on the free movement of architects. The different process of aca-
demic recognition as opposed to professional recognition will be explained in paragraph 
3.5. Paragraph 3.6 briefly discusses some common restrictions which are often imposed 
upon liberal professions by professional associations or states in the field of EU compe-
tition law. Finally, paragraph 3.7 contains a conclusion. This thesis does not include a 
discussion of the possible advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of a binding 
European Code on contractual obligations and responsibilities of architects. In this 
regard I refer to the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) prepared by the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on European Private Law. 
The PEL SC (Principles of European Law on Service Contracts), which is a research 
project initiated by the Study Group on a European Civil Code with the aim of drafting 
common European principles for the most important aspects of the law of obligations 
and for certain parts of the law of property in movables, should also be mentioned. The 
PEL SC contains a number of principles for different service contracts, including design 
contracts, and reflects the current approach to legal problems in the area of service con-
tracts. However, since there is no legally enforceable European Civil Code, parties are 
allowed to deviate from these principles. For a discussion of the European harmonisa-
tion of construction law I refer the reader to Jansen’s dissertation, Towards a European 
Building Contract Law3 and Kohl’s article European Construction Law and the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference: Selected Topics4. 
2. The legal foundations of the free movement of architects 
In this paragraph I will discuss if and under which conditions architects are allowed to 
move to an(other) EU State in order to practise the profession there. Paragraph 3.2.1 
deals with EU nationals, while paragraph 3.2.2 discusses the situation of architects not 
holding the nationality of an EU Member State. 
2.1. Architects holding the nationality of an EU Member State 
As stated above, the architectural profession as such, as well as the educational pro-
gramme which needs to be completed to become an architect, are regulated differently 
throughout the European Union. Member States often distrust foreign professionals and 
are not always eager to accept them with regard to working on their territory. Even 
today, professionals often face difficulties when moving to another country. By creating 
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 19575, Member States had already de-
                                                                
3 Jansen 1998.  
4 Kohl 2009. 
5 The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), signed in Rome on 25 
March 1957 and entered into force on 1 January 1958. 
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cided to make regulations on a ‘European’ scale to overcome such problems. Its purpose 
was to establish a customs union – a free trade zone with a common external tariff6 – 
based on the four freedoms: free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The 
EEC reflected a conception of the individual, primarily as an economic actor, since it 
conferred rights by virtue of the individual’s participation in the production process, 
and as an independent supranational economic organization. In this regard Article 2 
EEC indicated that the Community had to establish a common market so that the de-
velopment of economic activities would be promoted, including a high degree of com-
petitiveness and convergence of economic performance and a better quality of life. After 
the European Union7 was created by the Treaty of Maastricht, the EEC was renamed 
and replaced by the European Community (EC). As held by Article 3(1) (c) EC, the EC 
aimed to create an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member 
States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. In this 
area without frontiers (Article 14 EC) discrimination based on nationality would be 
prohibited (Article 12 EC). After the amendment of the EU and EC Treaty by the Lisbon 
Treaty8, these principles can now be found in the amended Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). As 
held by Article 3(2) TEU, the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured, 
in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, 
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. The Union shall es-
tablish an internal market (Article 3(3) TEU) in which the four freedoms are ensured 
(Article 26 TFEU) and any discrimination on grounds of nationality is forbidden (Arti-
cle 18 TFEU). 
 
The importance of these Articles, which contain general principles of EU law, is consid-
erable. In 1962, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) held in Van Gend en 
Loos that, since the states have limited their sovereign rights in this area, Article 18 
TFEU (article 12 EC)9 must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating indi-
vidual rights which national courts must protect.10 Furthermore, in Costa it was held 
                                                                
6 The same customs duties, quotas, preferences or other non-tariff barriers to trade apply to all goods enter-
ing the area, regardless of which country within the area they are entering. Economic efficiency and closer 
political and cultural ties between the member countries are the main purposes for the creation of a cus-
toms union. 
7 The Treaty on the European Union which was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and which entered 
into force on 1 November 1993, renamed the ‘European Economic Community’ the ‘European Commu-
nity’.  
8 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009. 
9 For the sake of clarity I will use the old numbering (before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) be-
tween brackets after the new numbers, unless a certain article was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and 
does not have a corresponding old number.  
10 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos. The ECJ held that the Community constitutes a new legal order of inter-
national law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently 
of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals, 
but is also intended to confer rights upon them which become part of their legal heritage. According to the 
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that Community law must be given primacy by national courts over any incompatible 
national law.11 It follows that individuals -and thus also architects- can invoke their non-
discrimination rights directly before their national courts. 
 
Next to the general prohibition on discrimination mentioned in Article 18 TFEU, Title 
IV TFEU contains more detailed rules on the abolition of obstacles to the free move-
ment of economically active persons and services in particular. Title IV (Free Movement 
of Persons, Services12 and Capital) of Part III (Union Policies and Internal Actions) of 
the TFEU contains the four fundamental freedoms which are recognised within the 
Union and consists of four chapters: Chapter 1 concerns the free movement of workers 
(Articles 45-48 TFEU) (Articles 39-42 EC), Chapter 2 the right of establishment (Arti-
cles 49-55 TFEU) (Articles 43-48 EC), Chapter 3 the freedom to provide services (Arti-
cles 56-62 TFEU) (Articles 49-55 EC) and Chapter 4 the free movement of capital and 
payments (Article 63-66 TFEU). As held by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in Gebhard13, the situation of a Community14 national who moves to another Member 
State of the Community in order to pursue an economic activity there, is governed by 
the chapter of the Treaty on the free movement of workers, the chapter on the right of 
establishment or the chapter on the freedom to provide services, these being mutually 
exclusive. 
 Since architects may want to perform professional activities in another Member 
State as a worker or as a service provider, but may also move to another Member State 
to establish themselves there, this chapter will provide a detailed overview of the content 
and meaning of these freedoms and their implications for EU-architects. Paragraph 
3.2.1.1 discusses the free movement of workers, paragraph 3.2.1.2 the freedom of estab-
lishment, and paragraph 3.2.1.3 the freedom to provide services. In 1992, free move-
ment rights were extended to persons who are not economically active, and the concept 
of citizenship of the Union was introduced. This will be discussed in paragraph 3.2.1.4. 
It will become apparent that the rules concerning the freedom of movement constitute, 
each within its own area of application, leges speciales of the general prohibition of dis-
crimination as provided for in Article 18 TFEU (article 12 EC).15 
                                                                                                                                                             
spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the Treaty, as held by the ECJ, individuals can thus directly 
rely on the prohibition of discrimination which is stipulated in Article 12 EC.  
11 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL. In Costa, the ECJ continued its reasoning developed in Van Gend en 
Loos and held that the transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal sys-
tem of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty, carries with it a permanent limitation of their 
sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act, incompatible with the concept of the Commu-
nity, cannot prevail.  
12 In case of the provision of services, emphasis is laid on the service in question, rather than on the person 
providing it. 
13 Case C-55/94 Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165. 
14 Even though the ‘European Community’ no longer exists as such, reference will still be made to the Com-
munity if case law or secondary legislation is discussed which dates from prior to the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
15 Van Den Bossche 2004, p.804. 
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2.1.1. Free movement of workers (architect-employees) 
The principles, conditions and particularities concerning the exercise of the right to free 
movement by workers, is based upon a substantial legal framework which mainly con-
sists of provisions enumerated in Chapter I of Title IV of Part III of the TFEU, secon-
dary legislation and judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). 
The relevant provisions and cases will be discussed in this paragraph. 
 
As held by Article 45 TFEU (Article 39 EC), freedom of movement for workers shall be 
secured within the Union. Such freedom of movement entails the abolition of any dis-
crimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards em-
ployment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. It entails the 
right – subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health – to accept offers of employment actually made; to move freely within the 
territory of Member States for this purpose; to stay in a Member State for the purpose of 
employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals 
of that State as laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State subject to the con-
ditions which shall be embodied by implementing regulations to be drawn up by the 
Commission. Article 45 TFEU is not applicable to employment in the public service. 
 
The exact content and meaning of this Article has been explained and developed by the 
ECJ. 
 As stipulated in Hoekstra16, the term ‘worker’ is a Community concept of which the 
Court claims ultimate authority in terms of defining its meaning and scope. It must be 
defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish an employment relation-
ship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned. The essential feature 
of an employment relationship is that, for a certain period of time, a person performs 
services for, and under the direction of, another person in return for which s/he receives 
remuneration.17 These activities have to be effective and genuine, to the exclusion of all 
activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary.18 The 
principle of free movement of workers comprises thus the right of an employee to leave 
the territory of a Member State and to enter the territory of another Member State and 
to reside therein in order to take up work. As was ruled in Walrave19, Bosman20 and 
                                                                
16 Case C-75/63 Hoekstra (née Unger) v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en ambachten 
[1964] ECR 177. 
17 Case C-66/85 Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121, §17. It should be noted that the 
activies may not be purely marginal and ancillary: Case C-337/97 C.P.M. Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de 
Informatie Beheer Groep [1999] ECR I-3289. 
18 Case C-337/97 Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep; Case C-357/89 Raulin v. Nether-
lands Ministry of Education and Science [1992] ECR I-1027. Also workseekers have a limited right to move 
freely within the territory of other Member States and to stay there for the purposes of seeking employ-
ment: See Case C-282/89 R. V. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Antonissen [1991] ECR I-00745; Case 
C-316/88 Centre Public d’Aide Sociale v Lebon [1987] ECR I-2811. 
19 Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cyclise Internationale [1974] ECR 1405. 
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Angonese21, Article 45 TFEU has vertical and horizontal direct effects. This indicates that 
it is not only binding on Member States but also applicable to private persons. The Arti-
cle entails that direct or indirect discrimination22 on grounds of nationality is strictly 
forbidden, as well as national measures which are not directly or indirectly discrimina-
tory on nationality grounds, but which do restrict the freedom of movement of EU 
workers.23 It follows thus that even non-discriminatory restrictions can breach the 
Treaty if they constitute an excessive obstacle to the freedom of movement. Only if there 
is an objective justification for indirect discrimination or non-discriminatory restric-
tions (Article 45(3) TFEU, first sentence) or when the public service exception (Article 
45(4) TFEU) applies, can exceptions to the core principle of free movement be tolerated. 
 Since architects can practise their profession as employees, Article 45 TFEU is of 
importance when discussing their free movement. The ECJ has not yet decided upon a 
case involving a violation of Article 45 TFEU with regard to the architectural profession 
in particular. However, since it is not excluded that an architect-employee can encoun-
ter limitations on his freedom of movement, the abovementioned principles as devel-
oped by the ECJ should not be ignored. 
 
As stated by Article 46 TFEU (Article 40 EC), the Council shall issue Directives or make 
regulations setting out the measures required to bring about freedom of movement for 
workers as defined in Article 45 TFEU. This has resulted in the creation of secondary 
legislation which specifically deals with the free movement of workers in particular, but 
also of Directives which deal with the recognition of professional qualifications and are 
applicable to workers as well as to self-employed persons. As indicated above, the latter 
Directives will be discussed in paragraph 3.3. Finally Directive 2004/38/EC24, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v. Bosman [1995] ECR 
I-4921, paragraphs 82-84. 
21 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Riparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4139. 
22 Indirect discrimination occurs for example, where benefits are made conditional, in law or fact, on resi-
dency or place of origin requirements that can more easily be satisfied by nationals as opposed to non-
nationals: Case C-355/98 Commission v. Belgium [2000] ECR I-1221. Furthermore, the imposition of a 
language requirement for certain posts can also be qualified as a form of indirect discrimination since it is 
likely that a far higher proportion of non-nationals than nationals will be affected by it. In certain circum-
stances, such a requirement can be justified as long as it is proportionate: Case C-379/87 Groener v. Minis-
ter for Education [1989] ECR 3967. In O’Flynn, the ECJ held that it is not necessary to prove that a national 
measure in practice affects a higher proportion of foreign workers, but merely that the measure is ‘intrinsi-
cally liable’ to affect migrant workers more than nationals: Case C-237/94 O’Flynn v. Adjudication Officer 
[1996] ECR I-2617. 
23 It mostly concerns access to the employment market, e.g. if the transfer system developed by national and 
transnational football associations requires a football club, which seeks to engage a player whose contract 
with another club had come to an end, to pay a sum of money to the latter club. This rule can prevent 
players from securing employment with another club: See Case-415/93 Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Association ASBL & others v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. See also Case C-18/95 F.C. 
Terhoeve v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Ondernemingen Buitenland [1999] ECR-I-345, 
paragraph 39; Case C-190/98 Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Mashinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493.  
24 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Right of 
Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, 
OJ L 158, 30 April 2004, pp. 77-123 
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applies to all Union citizens (including workers) irrespective of their level of economic 
activity, also entered into force. This Directive will be discussed in paragraph 3.2.1.4. 
 As held by the preamble of Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on the Freedom 
of Movement for Workers within the Community25, the objective of freedom of move-
ment for workers entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality be-
tween workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other 
conditions of work and employment, as well as the right of such workers to move freely 
within the Community in order to pursue activities as employed persons, subject to any 
limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Due to 
this freedom, the worker is guaranteed the possibility of improving his/her living and 
working conditions and of promoting his social advancement, while s/he is helping to 
satisfy the requirements of the economies of the Member States. The most important 
provision of this regulation is Article 1 which states that any national of a Member State, 
shall, irrespective of his place of residence, have the right to take up an activity as an 
employed person, and to pursue such activity within the territory of another Member 
State in accordance with the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action governing the employment of nationals of that State. S/he shall, in particular, 
have the right to take up available employment in the territory of another Member State 
with the same priority as nationals of that state. Furthermore, any national of a Member 
State and any employer pursuing an activity in the territory of a Member State may 
exchange their applications for, and offers of, employment, and may conclude and per-
form contracts of employment in accordance with the provisions in force laid down by 
law, regulations or administrative action, without any discrimination resulting there-
from (Article 2). As stated by Article 3(1), all national rules which limit application for, 
and offers of, employment, or the right of foreign nationals to take up and pursue em-
ployment or subject these to conditions not applicable in respect of their own nationals, 
will not apply. Of course this is also applicable to architects wishing to pursue their 
profession in another Member State. It follows that States that use these types of rule 
violate EU law. Examples of cases in which national restrictions were brought before the 
ECJ by an architect will be provided for in the following paragraphs, since the ECJ has 
not yet ruled upon such measures within the field of the free movement of workers. 
 Regulation 635/2006/EC of the European Commission of 25 April 2006 repealing 
Regulation 1251/70/EEC of 29 June 1970 on the Right of Workers to Remain in the 
Territory of a Member State after Having been Employed in that State, is another regu-
lation which specifically deals with the free movement rights of workers. It repealed 
Regulation 1251/70/EEC26 since Article 17 of Directive 2004/38/EC already included its 
main elements and amended these by granting beneficiaries the right to remain a more 
privileged status, namely that of the right of permanent residence. I refer to paragraph 
                                                                
25 Council Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on the Freedom of Movement for Workers within 
the Community, OJ L 257, 19 October 1968, p. 2, amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 312/76 of 9 
February 1976, OJ L 039, 14 February1976, p. 2, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2434/92 of 27 July 1992, OJ 
L 245, 26.08.1992, p. 1 and Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004, OJ L 229, 29.06.2004, p. 35. 
26 Regulation 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right of workers to remain in the territory 
of a Member State after having been employed in that State, OJ 1970, No. L142/24, p. 402. 
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3.2.1.4 of this thesis in which the right to remain of workers in the European Union will 
be compared to that of citizens who have not been economically active. 
 
It follows that EU architects performing effective and genuine services for and under the 
direction of another person in return for remuneration, should be able to move freely 
within the Union. In principle, any discrimination as regards employment, remunera-
tion and other conditions of work and employment is prohibited. This is, however, 
subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health. These are all very broad and open concepts, upon which a myriad of possible 
limitations can be based. Some of these limitations are laid down in secondary legisla-
tion and specifically in the Directives on the mutual recognition of diplomas and profes-
sional qualifications which will be discussed in paragraph 3.3. 
2.1.2. Freedom of establishment (self employed architects) 
Article 49 TFEU (Article 43 EC) stipulates that restrictions on the freedom of establish-
ment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State are pro-
hibited. Freedom of establishment includes the right to take up and pursue activities as 
self-employed persons, and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies 
or firms, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country 
where such establishment is effected. Just like Article 45 TFEU on workers, Article 49 
TFEU on the freedom of establishment requires equal treatment of persons working in 
another Member State of the European Union. The difference between both provisions 
lies in the fact that Article 49 TFEU applies to persons working in a self-employed ca-
pacity.27 In contrast to a provider of services who moves to another Member State to 
pursue his activity there on a self-employed and temporary basis, the concept of estab-
lishment allows a Union national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the 
economic life of a Member State other than his state of origin. In this way he can con-
tribute to the economic and social interpenetration within the Union in the sphere of 
activities as self-employed persons, while having an established professional base within 
the host Member State.28 Restrictions which are often imposed by Member States on 
persons who aim to establish themselves on their territory, relate to the entrance to a 
profession. In this way it occurs that requirements are demanded which cannot, or only 
with more difficulty, be obtained by foreigners, such as the possession of a certain ‘na-
tional’ diploma. Other restrictions relate, for example, to the actual pursuit of the pro-
fession, such as the imposition of higher social contributions payable by nationals of 
other EU states. 
 
Even though the original EEC Treaty provided for a system of secondary legislation to 
be created in order to implement the freedom of establishment (as well as the freedom 
to provide services) so that the exact meaning and scope of these freedoms could be 
                                                                
27 Mayras AG in Case C-2/74 Jean Reyners v. Belgium State [1974] ECR 631 and Case C-107/94 Asscher v. 
Staatsecretaris van Financiën [1996] ECR I-3089. 
28 Case C-55/94 Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano; Case C-2/74 
Reyners v. Belgium, paragraph 21. 
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defined, during the transitional period only very few efforts were made. In the field of 
the architectural profession or any other liberal profession in particular, no activity had 
been undertaken at all. In 1974 however, the ECJ opened the way to the free movement 
of persons in two landmark cases which specifically dealt with the profession of lawyers: 
Reyners29 in the field of freedom of establishment and Van Binsbergen30 with regard to 
the freedom to provide services. Since this section deals with the freedom of establish-
ment, I will now discuss the former case as well as other landmark cases in this field. In 
this way the reader will be provided with an overview of the development of the princi-
ple of free movement by the ECJ. As held by the ECJ, the rule on equal treatment of all 
persons embraced in Article 49 TFEU, is one of the fundamental legal provisions in the 
Community. Since it lays down a precise result which has to be achieved, namely non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality, it can be directly invoked by nationals of all 
the other Member States, despite the Treaty requirement in Article 50 TFEU (Article 44 
EC) that Directives should be adopted specifically with regard to the mutual recognition 
of diplomas. Even though the Council (at that time) failed to issue a Directive on the 
recognition of diplomas, non compliance was sanctioned by the Treaty itself, with direct 
effect. This would also be the case if an issued Directive would not meet the objectives of 
Article 49 TFEU. It follows that Article 49 TFEU precludes the competent national au-
thorities from simply refusing, without further explanation, to allow nationals of an-
other Member State to practise their trade or profession, on the grounds that their quali-
fication is not equivalent to the corresponding national qualification.31 As held in Wal-
rave and Koch32, this does not only apply to the action of public authorities, but extends 
likewise to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating, in a collective manner, gainful 
employment and the provision of services. It follows that Article 49 TFEU also has a 
certain horizontal direct effect. In this regard it should be noted however that it remains 
unclear as to whether the Treaty freedoms have full horizontal effect, in the sense of 
imposing legal obligations on all individuals and not only on powerful collective actors 
such as sporting organizations which are effectively self-regulating and possess powers 
akin to public law.33 In Wouters34 -a case concerning a regulatory measure adopted by 
the Netherlands Bar Council on partnerships between barristers and accountants- the 
Court held that compliance with Articles 49 and 56 TFEU (Article 49 EC) is also re-
quired in the case of rules which are not public in nature, but which are designed to 
regulate, collectively, self-employment and the provision of services. 
 
With regard to professional qualifications, it must be stated that, in the absence of har-
monizing Directives, Member States are entitled to regulate the knowledge and qualifi-
                                                                
29 Case C-2/74 Reyners v. Belgium. 
30 Case C-33/74 Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsverenging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 
1299. 
31 Case C-71/76 Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765; Case C-222/86 
UNECTEF v. Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, paragraph 13. 
32 Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405. 
33 Craig & De Burca 2003, p. 771. 
34 Case C-309/99 Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-577. 
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cations necessary to pursue a particular occupation.35 It is quite logical that Member 
States will not allow everybody to practise as an architect on their territory since they 
want to ensure that architectural services are provided by professionals disposing of 
certain knowledge and competences, to safeguard the quality and safety of buildings to a 
certain extent. However, often Member States also act purely in a protectionist fashion 
to restrict competition and to privilege their own nationals with regard to the access to 
and the actual pursuit of work. The motives for regulations will be further analysed in 
Part III of this thesis. In any case, as mentioned above, the Union aims to establish an 
internal market (Article 3(3) TEU) (Article 2 EU) in which the freedom of movement is 
ensured (Article 26 TFEU) (Article 14 EC) and any discrimination on grounds of na-
tionality is forbidden (Article 18 TFEU) (Article 12 EC). Since Member States can de-
termine which qualifications are required to practise a profession, the procedure for the 
recognition of equivalence must enable the national authorities to assure themselves, on 
an objective basis, that the foreign diploma certifies that its holder has knowledge and 
qualifications which are, if not identical, at least equivalent to those certified by the 
national diploma. That assessment of the equivalence of the foreign diploma must be 
effected exclusively in terms of the level of knowledge and qualifications which its 
holder can be assumed to possess, having regard to the nature and duration of the stud-
ies and practical training which the diploma certifies that s/he has carried out. Where 
employment is dependent on possession of a diploma, the ECJ ruled that it must be 
possible for a national of a Member State to obtain a judicial review of a decision on the 
part of the authorities of another Member State, and to ascertain the reasons for refusing 
to recognize the equivalence of a diploma. In Vlassopoulou36 the ECJ confirmed that a 
Member State which receives a request to admit a person to a profession to which ac-
cess, under national law, depends upon the diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
qualification which the person concerned has acquired in order to exercise the same 
profession in another Member State by making a comparison between the specialized 
knowledge and abilities certified by those diplomas and the knowledge and qualifica-
tions required by the national rules.37 Simple refusal without any inquiry is thus not 
allowed. 
 
Just like Article 45 TFEU (article 39 EC), Article 49 TFEU (article 43 EC) does not only 
cover direct discriminatory restrictions.38 As held in Kraus39 and Gebhard40, all national 
                                                                
35 Case C-222/86 UNECTEF v. Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, paragraph 13. 
36 Case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357. 
37 In this case the Advocate General held that, unlike Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a 
general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas award on completion of professional 
education and training of at least three years’ duration, OJ 1989, No. L19/16, the Treaty did not of itself 
give EC nationals the right to establish themselves in any Member State, subject only to the possible re-
quirement of completion of an adaptation period. Rather, Article 43 EC simply required the state to take 
into account qualifications and training already received, and only if it were found that these were equiva-
lent to the Member State’s requirement, could an EC national rely upon them. This Directive was not ap-
plicable to Vlassopoulou’s case since the time limit for its implementation had not yet expired. 
38 It should be noted, however, that the exclusion of non-nationals from performing a certain profession is 
allowed if the function involves the exercise of official authority (Article 51 TFEU) (Article 45 EC). Special 
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measures which are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of any of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty are, in principle, forbidden. Only if the 
following four conditions are fulfilled may restrictions be justified: they must be applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in 
the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 
Gebhard extrapolated the rule of reason that was developed in the realm of the free 
movement of goods and services through the Cassis de Dijon41 and the Van Binsbergen 
cases, and which was later, through Kraus, also adopted for the freedom of establish-
ment, to a rule of reason that is independent of the individual freedoms, stating that any 
restriction on any of the four freedoms should be objectively justified.42 However, in this 
regard, it should be noted that this system of objective justification only applies where 
the subject matter is not covered by secondary legislation or by the specific case law of 
the ECJ. The ECJ first developed specific rules for specific restrictions, with the result 
that different systems as laid down in case law apply for different restrictions.43 In this 
way, restrictions with regard to the recognition of diplomas could be solved under the 
Vlassopoulou doctrine. Where no secondary legislation applies, and where no specific 
system is laid down in case law, a national measure that is liable to hinder or make less 
attractive the exercise of one of the freedoms, may be objectively justified by applying 
the four-stage test that was laid down in Gebhard. It follows that not only direct and 
indirect discriminatory measures are forbidden (for example single-practice rules which 
are likely to have more adverse consequences for non-nationals who usually have a 
primary practice in another Member State44) but even national rules which constitute a 
sufficient hindrance to the freedom of establishment.45 
 
The case law mentioned above does not concern architects in particular, but sets out 
general rules which can be applied to restrictions on the free movement of architects. 
The ECJ has, however, also made important rulings in relation to the free movement of 
architects in particular. In this chapter, I will discuss all the cases on the freedom of 
establishment of architects which have been decided upon by the ECJ. This paragraph 
only addresses the cases in which a violation of Article 49 TFEU was established as such 
– meaning without the involvement of a violation of a provision in an accompanying 
Directive. Both cases deal with restrictions regarding entry to the profession. Cases 
which specifically deal with the violation of secondary legislation on the recognition of 
architectural qualifications will be referred to in paragraph 3.3. 
                                                                                                                                                             
treatment of foreign nationals is also possible on grounds of public policy, public security or public health 
(Article 52 TFEU) (Article 46 (1) EC). 
39 Case C-19/9 Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663. 
40 Case C-55/94 Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano. 
41 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
42 Claessens 2008, p. 23.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Case C-107/83 Ordre des Avocats v. Klopp [1984] ECR 2971. 
45 It must be noted that, in most cases of direct discrimination, a justification can only be found in Article 52 
TFEU (express derogations in Treaty), whereas in all other cases, wider public interest grounds (manda-
tory requirements) such as fiscal supervision, can be invoked. 
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Patrick46 concerned a dispute between the French Minister for Cultural Affairs and a 
British subject who possessed a certificate issued by the Architectural Association of the 
United Kingdom, which allowed him to practise the profession. In 1973 Mr. Patrick 
applied for authority to practise as an architect in France. Under the first subparagraph 
of Article 2(2) of the French law of 31 December 1940 establishing the Architects’ Order 
and governing the title and profession of architect, nationals of foreign countries had to 
be authorized to practise the profession of architect in France, subject to the conditions 
of reciprocity laid down by diplomatic conventions and the production of a certificate 
equivalent to the certificate required for French architects. Under the third subpara-
graph of Article 2(2), foreigners not covered by provisions of a convention could, excep-
tionally, receive the said authorisation. According to a Ministerial Decree of 22 June 
1964 which was introduced to implement this provision, holders of certificates issued by 
the aforesaid UK Architectural Association were considered to fulfil the conditions 
concerning equivalent qualifications as laid down in Article 2(2). Nevertheless, by a 
decision of 9 August 1973, the applicant was refused the authorization requested on the 
ground that, under the provisions of the law of 31 December 1940, such authorization 
was exceptional in the absence of a reciprocal convention between France and the appli-
cant’s country of origin, and that the EEC Treaty could not be a substitute for the con-
vention, since Articles 52 to 58 EEC (Articles 49 to 54 TFEU) referred, for the attain-
ment of this freedom, to Directives of the Council which had not yet been issued. The 
Administrative Tribunal of Paris, to which an application had been made for the an-
nulment of this decision, asked the Court whether, given the state of Community law on 
9 August 1973, a British subject was entitled to invoke in his favour, the benefit of the 
right of establishment to practise the profession of architect in a Member State of the 
Community. 
 The ECJ held that under the provisions of Article 52 EEC, freedom of establishment 
includes the right to take up activities as a self-employed person and to pursue them 
under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where 
such establishment is effected. In this regard the ECJ referred to its judgement in 
Reyners, in which it was held that the rule on equal treatment is, by its essence, capable 
of being directly invoked by nationals of all the other Member States. In the absence of 
transitional provisions concerning the right of establishment in the Treaty of Accession 
of 22 January 1972, by which the United Kingdom joined the EEC, the principle con-
tained in Article 43 had, in the case of the new Member States and their nationals, been 
fully effective since the entry into force of the said Treaty on 1 January 1973. A Member 
State could not therefore, after 1 January 1973, make the exercise of the right to free 
establishment by a national of a new Member State subject to an exceptional authoriza-
tion, in so far as s/he fulfils the conditions laid down by the legislation of the country of 
establishment for its own nationals. It followed that the old Member States47 were not 
allowed to invoke against the direct effect of the rule on equal treatment with nationals 
contained in Article 49 TFEU the fact that the Council had failed to issue Directives 
provided for by Articles 50 and 53 TFEU (Article 44 and 47 TFEU) on the mutual rec-
                                                                
46 Case C-11/77 Patrick v. Ministre des Affaires Culturelles [1977] ECR 1199. 
47 Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, France, Germany and Italy. 
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ognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications. The appli-
cability of the Treaty provisions had to be made easier by such Directives, but was not 
made dependent on the implementation of a programme of progressive measures so 
that Member States are not allowed to deny the practical benefits of that freedom to a 
person subject to Community law. It was thus concluded that, with effect from 1 Janu-
ary 1973, a national of a ‘new’ Member State who held a qualification recognized by the 
competent authorities of the Member State of establishment, as equivalent to the certifi-
cate issued and required in that State, enjoyed the right to be admitted to the profession 
of architect and to practise it under the same conditions as nationals of the Member 
State of establishment, without being required to satisfy any additional conditions. Re-
quiring any kind of prior authorisation while the person involved fulfils the conditions 
laid down by the country of establishment for its own nationals, constitutes therefore a 
restriction on the effective exercise of the freedom of establishment, and is not allowed. 
 
In Commission v Hellenic Republic48 Article 4(2) of the Greek Decree-Law No 2728 of 12 
November 1953 and Article 2 of the Greek law No 1486 of 17 October 1984 were at 
issue. These provisions maintained that a person holding the required qualifications and 
the necessary authorization could not exercise the profession of architect, civil engineer, 
surveyor and lawyer, unless the individual concerned was an ordinary member of the 
professional body of architects, civil engineers, etc. Registration was thus a precondition 
for, and facilitated access to, the professions concerned, and their exercise in the Hel-
lenic Republic. Consequently the conditions for registration with that body had to be 
identical for Greek nationals and nationals of the other Member States, in accordance 
with Articles 49 and 56 TFEU which prohibit, in their respective fields of application, 
any discrimination on the grounds of nationality. However, whereas Greek nationals 
were ordinary members of that body as of right, the Greek legislation did not provide 
for access by foreigners to that status. The national provisions in question did not ex-
pressly confer on the nationals of other Member States the right to register as ordinary 
members of the Technical Chamber. In this regard the Hellenic Republic maintained 
that the national provisions in question did permit the registration of foreigners as ordi-
nary members of the Technical Chamber, and that that was the interpretation consis-
tently adopted by that body. The ECJ, however, did not accept this argument. It held 
that the fact that the legislation was silent as regards the right of nationals of other 
Member States to register as ordinary members of the Technical Chamber, gave rise to 
an ambiguous state of affairs, and kept the persons concerned in a state of uncertainty as 
to the possibility of relying on the provisions of the Treaty which have direct effect. The 
retention of legislation with such a lacuna therefore amounted to a failure by the Hel-
lenic Republic to comply with its obligations under the Treaty. The Court ruled fur-
thermore that mere administrative practices which, by their nature, are alterable at will 
by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, could not be regarded as 
constituting the proper fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty.49 By maintaining in 
force provisions which did not expressly uphold the right of nationals of the other 
                                                                
48 Case C-38/87 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 4415. 
49 See in that regard also Case C-168/85 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 2945. 
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Member States to register as ordinary members of the Technical Chamber, where such 
registration is a precondition for, and facilitated access to, the professions concerned, 
and the exercise thereof in the Hellenic Republic, the Hellenic Republic had failed to 
fulfil its obligations under Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. 
 Since the Commission did not receive any notification of the measures which 
should have been taken by Greece to comply with this judgment, the Commission initi-
ated the procedure provided for in Article 185 TFEU (Article 169 EC) and instituted 
another action before the ECJ against the Hellenic Republic, for failure to fulfil its obli-
gations. In this subsequent case50, the ECJ held that even though Article 260 TFEU (Ar-
ticle 228 EC) does not specify the period within which a judgement must be complied 
with, the interest in the immediate and uniform application of Community law requires 
that the process of compliance with a judgment must be initiated immediately, and must 
be completed as soon as possible. Since Greece had not initiated such a process immedi-
ately after the judgement in case C-38/87, it had failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
Treaty. 
 
It can be concluded that both the Commission and the ECJ are aware of the fact that 
compliance with the Court’s judgements is of major importance, and that even every 
‘appearance’ that foreigners are treated less favourably than nationals, constitutes a 
violation of the principle of freedom of movement. The Court’s case law has therefore 
contributed significantly to the development of the internal market and to the mobility 
of professionals. Next to the far-reaching decisions of the Court, a general programme 
was adopted to eliminate restrictions to the freedom of establishment, by the adoption 
of numerous Directives laying down rules according to which professional qualifications 
obtained in one Member State would have to be recognized in other EU countries.51 
These Directives were based on Article 50 TFEU (Article 44 EC) and Article 53(1) TFEU 
(Article 47(1) and (2) EC) and aimed, not only to eliminate overt discrimination, but 
also any form of disguised discrimination in respect of the taking up or pursuit of an 
activity as a self-employed person. Even though little effort was made initially, several 
successive recognition regimes were created in the course of time. In this regard, men-
tion should be made of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States which will be discussed in paragraph 3.2.1.4.; the Directives on the mutual recog-
nition of diplomas and qualifications which can be found in paragraph 3.3. and Direc-
tive 2006/123/EC52 on services in the internal market which is not only applicable within 
the context of freedom of establishment, but also with regard to the free movement of 
workers and the freedom to provide services, and is therefore separately addressed in 
paragraph 3.4. 
                                                                
50 Case C-328/90 Commission v. Hellenic Republic [1992] ECR I-00425. 
51 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment adopted on 18 December 
1961, 31961X1202, OJ 002 15.01.1962, p. 33. 
52 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in 
the Internal Market, OJ L 376/36. 
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2.1.3. Freedom to provide services (self-employed architects) 
As stipulated in Article 56 TFEU (Article 49 EC), restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the Union are prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who 
are established in a State other than that of the person for whom the services are in-
tended. Services are considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaty where 
they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the 
provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons. They shall 
in particular include: activities of an industrial character; activities of a commercial 
character; activities of craftsmen; activities of the professions. Without prejudice to the 
provisions relating to the right of establishment, a person providing a service may, in 
order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided, 
under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals (Article 57 
TFEU) (Article 50 EC). Just as is the case with regard to the free movement of workers 
and the freedom of establishment, the principle of freedom of services was interpreted 
and explained by the ECJ and regulated more extensively by secondary legislation. 
 
After it was established in Reyners53 that Article 49 TFEU has direct effect, the ECJ con-
cluded the same about Article 56 TFEU in Van Binsbergen54, since both Articles 49 and 
56 TFEU impose a well-defined obligation. The freedom to provide services entails the 
carrying out of an economic activity55 for remuneration and during a temporary period, 
in a Member State in which either the provider or the recipient of the service is not 
established. In this regard, Article 56 TFEU forbids all discrimination -direct, indirect as 
well as non-discriminating impediments56- against the provider by reason of his nation-
ality, or the fact that he is established in a Member State other than that in which the 
service is to be provided. This is opposed to the freedom of establishment which is ap-
plicable to situations in which persons move to work in another EC Member State on a 
permanent basis. The freedom for the recipient to move is the necessary corollary of the 
provider’s freedom.57 The limitation in time is determined by the regularity, periodicity 
or continuity of the service provision. As stated by Advocate General Mayras in Van 
Binsbergen, a fundamental aspect of the difference between, on the one hand, the mere 
occasional provision of services, even temporary activities and, on the other hand, estab-
lishment, is that the person providing services falls outside the competence and control 
of the national authorities of the country in which the services are provided. 
As noted above, the Treaty’s prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of national-
ity, extends likewise to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating, in a collective 
                                                                
53 Case C-2/74 Reyners v. Belgium. 
54 Case C-33/74 Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid. The case 
concerned a Dutch legal adviser who transferred his place of residence from the Netherlands to Belgium 
during the course of the proceedings. Under Dutch law however, only persons established in the Nether-
lands could act as legal advisers.  
55 It is essential that the service has an economic nature: the remuneration must be a consideration for the 
service in question. Case C-263/86 Belgium v. Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. 
56 Case C-427/85 Commission v. Germany (Lawyers’ Services case) [1988] ECR 1123 
57 Cases C-286/82 & 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377. 
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manner, gainful employment and the provision of services.58 In this way, non-
discriminatory measures issued by professional bodies fall under EU scrutiny. Ethical 
rules issued by self-regulatory professional bodies, which have been sanctioned by the 
public authorities, may even be considered national regulatory measures.59 This implies 
that these rules must be justified on grounds of public interest to be compatible with 
Articles 56 and 57 TFEU (Article 50 EC).60 Indeed, just as is the case for workers, or in 
case of establishment, restrictions on the freedom to provide and receive services must 
be adopted in pursuance of a legitimate public interest which is not incompatible with 
Community aims (Article 62 jo Article 52 TFEU) (Article 55 jo Article 46 EC) or in 
matters of public authority (Article 62 jo Article 51 TFEU) (Article 55 jo Article 45 EC). 
Furthermore, restrictions must be applied without discrimination and must be propor-
tionate. Market access restrictions which apply to national service providers as well, can 
fall within the ambit of Article 56 TFEU, if these obligations are comparable to those 
imposed by the legislation of the home Member State (double burden for the foreign 
service provider).61 It follows that, if a ground of public interest is invoked by a State, it 
has to take account of the provisions to which a service provider is already subject in his 
Member State of establishment.62 
 
With regard to cases relating to the free movement of architects in particular, it should 
be noted that almost all cases are based upon the non-recognition of professional quali-
fications, and mostly deal with provisions of secondary legislation. These are all dis-
cussed in paragraph 3.3. For now, reference is made again to case C-38/87 Commission v 
Hellenic Republic63, which has already been discussed in paragraph 3.2.1.2, since this case 
did not deal with professional qualifications. 
 
As noted above, various approaches and regimes have been introduced to make job 
mobility for professionals a practical reality. Next to a general programme to eliminate 
restrictions to the freedom of establishment, a general programme for the abolition of 
restrictions to the freedom to provide services was created by the Council on 18 Decem-
ber 196164 on the basis of Article 52 EC (Article 59 TFEU). In this regard, Directives 
were created in order to abolish restrictions on the freedom to provide services and to 
                                                                
58 The abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the freedom of movement for persons, would be 
compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralized by obstacles resulting from the exercise 
of their legal autonomy by associations or organizations not governed by public law. It follows that Article 
56 TFEU has a certain horizontal direct effect as well. See Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch, paragraphs 17, 
23-24; Case C-13/76 Donà [1976] ECR 1333, paragraphs 17-18; Case C-415/93 Bosman, paragraphs 83-84; 
Case C-281/98 Angonese, paragraph 32. 
59 Case C-266-267/87 The Queen v. Association of Pharmaceutical Importers, ECR 1295. 
60 Grounds of public interest can include professional rules relating to organizations, competence, profes-
sional ethics, supervision and responsibility: see the rule of reason doctrine as developed by the Court in 
Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville et al., [1986] ECR 3713 and C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, both cases concerning the free movement of goods. 
61 Case C-369/96 & C-376/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-8453. 
62 Case C-279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, at 3325. 
63 Case C-38/87 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. 
64 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services adopted on 18 Decem-
ber 1961, OJ L 001 3 January 1994, p. 401. 
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introduce into the law of the Member States, a set of provisions which would facilitate 
the effective exercise of this freedom. The secondary legislation which is relevant within 
the scope of the freedom to provide services is Directive 2004/38/EC which will be dis-
cussed in the next paragraph, since it deals with the movement rights of all EU citizens; 
the Directives on the recognition of professional qualifications; Directive 2006/123/EC 
which will be discussed in paragraph 3.4 and Directive 96/71/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 16 December 1996, concerning the posting of workers in 
the framework of the provision of services. The latter Directive is applicable to under-
takings established in a Member State which, in the framework of the transnational 
provision of services, post workers to the territory of a Member State while having taken 
certain transnational measures (Article 1). The posting of workers refers to workers who 
wish to carry out their work for a limited period in the territory of a Member State other 
than the State in which they normally work. This Directive stipulates that Member 
States have to ensure that the undertakings guarantee workers posted to their territory, 
certain terms and conditions of employment. As held by the ECJ in Finalarte Sociedade 
Construçao Civil65, the potential overlaps between workers and temporary service pro-
viders can be found in the fact that workers employed by a business established in one 
Member State, who are temporarily sent to another Member State to provide services 
(posted workers), do not, in any way, seek access to the labour market in that second 
State since they normally return to their country of origin or residence after completion 
of the work. As will be discussed hereunder66, Article 17(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC 
stipulates that Article 16 does not apply to the posting of workers, as regulated by Direc-
tive 96/71/EC. This means the fact that the rules of the host Member State (i.e. the state 
where the employee is sent to work) will be applicable instead of the rules of the state of 
origin, which would be the normal case under Article 16 of the Services Directive.67  
2.1.4. Citizenship of the Union (architect-employees, self-employed architects) 
As noted above, the right of free movement of persons in the Community was intro-
duced by the EEC Treaty, signed in Rome, in 1957. This freedom was not bound to any 
citizenship concept but was rather closely linked to the conduct of an economic activity. 
Consequentially, the right of residence was accorded to workers and their families, 
linked to the right to exercise a labour activity in another EEC Member State. With the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU 1992), provisions on European citi-
zenship were included in the EC-Treaty (Article 17-22 and 255 EC) which can now be 
found in Articles 15 and 20-25 TFEU. The Preamble to the TEU 1992 states that the 
High Contracting Parties resolved to establish a citizenship common to nationals of 
                                                                
65 Case C-49/98 Finalarte Sociedade Construçao Civil v. Urlabus-und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft 
[2001] ECR I-7831, paragraphs 22-23. 
66 See Chapter 3.4. 
67 In this regard it should be mentioned that Article 3 of Directive 2006/123/EC states that if the provisions 
of this Directive (e.g. Article 16) conflict with a provision of another Community act governing specific 
aspects of access to, or exercise of, a service activity in specific sectors of specific professions (Directive 
96/71/EC), the provision of the other Community act shall prevail, and shall apply to those specific sectors 
or professions.  
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their countries. It has evolved as the process of European integration moved on to create 
an ever-closer Union among the peoples of Europe. As will be explained hereunder, 
through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union, the rights and interests of the 
nationals of the Member States would be strengthened and protected. Important in this 
regard is that, due to the introduction of EU-citizenship, one does no longer have to 
perform an economic activity to benefit from certain free movement rights. Since archi-
tects holding the nationality of a Member State are also considered to be Union citizens, 
their rights and freedoms as Unions citizens will also be discussed. 
 
Article 2 TEU 1992 (Article 3 TEU) held that one of the objectives of the Union is to 
strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member 
States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union. According to Article 20 
TFEU (Article 17 EC), every person holding the nationality of a Member State is auto-
matically a citizen of the Union. It follows that Member States therefore decide who is a 
Union citizen.68 Even though the concept of nationality is determined by national law 
and not autonomously, according to Community law69, Union citizenship exists along-
side and complements national citizenship and provides additional rights to nationals of 
Member States of the Union. Union citizens enjoy the rights conferred by the Treaty 
and are subject to the duties imposed thereby. In this regard, Article 21 TFEU (Article 
18 EC) indicates that every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid 
down in this Treaty, and by the measures adopted to give it effect. If action by the Union 
should prove necessary to attain this objective, and the Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the European Parliament and the Council may adopt provisions with 
a view to facilitating the exercise of the above-mentioned rights. It follows that the citi-
zens’ rights which were introduced by the TEU 1992, make it possible for every citizen 
of the Union to move and reside freely within the EU. This freedom is however subject 
to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty, and to the measures adopted 
to give it effect. This means that even though the right of free movement and the right of 
residence constitute the foundations of Union citizenship, these rights are not unlim-
ited. The limitations are provided for in the Treaty (for example the exception to the 
right of free movement regarding public policy, public security and public health con-
tinue to apply70) as well as in Directives. 
 
It should be noted that the introduction of Union Citizenship did not initially add sub-
stantially to Community law. Already existing rights were mainly reiterated or general-
                                                                
68 See also Case C-192/99 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237 
and Case C-369/90 Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabri [1992] ECR I-4239. 
69 Final Act to the Maastricht Treaty, Pt. III 2nd Declaration (on nationality of a Member State); see also 
Conclusions of the European Council in Edinburgh, Bull. EC 12/92, 26 et seq. It is for each Member State 
to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality.  
70 Union Citizenship extends to all rights and duties of Union law and therefore includes fundamental free-
doms resulting from constitutional traditions common to Member States (Article 6 EU) as well as to social 
rights which previously mainly existed only on the basis of secondary legislation. What is constitutive for a 
citizen’s status are political rights, i.e. primarily the right to vote and stand for election (Article 22 TFEU) 
(Article 19 EC). 
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ised. The Treaty provisions with regard to the free movement of workers, establishment 
and services were already interpreted by the ECJ as not as having a narrow economic 
purpose, but rather a wider social and economic purpose. However, with the contribu-
tion of the ECJ through the combined effects of Articles 20 and 18 TFEU (Articles 17 
and 12 EC), the right to equal treatment was enhanced, and the general principle of 
equal treatment for lawful residents was established. In this regard the ECJ held, in Mar-
tinez Sala71, that the citizenship provisions provide substantive free movement rights in 
addition to those already granted by Community law, and that some kind of universal 
non-discrimination right (including access to all manner of welfare benefits) has taken 
roots in Community law as a consequence of the creation of the figure of the Union 
citizen.72 Lawful and authorized residence in another Member State by a national of one 
of the other Member States was held to be sufficient to bring a person within the scope 
ratione personae of Community law. The economic status of the person involved was 
thus not at issue. On the basis of Articles 20 and 21 TFEU (Article 18 EC) protection 
against discrimination based on nationality was extended to every Union citizen. A 
citizen of the European Union, lawfully resident in the territory of a host member State, 
can rely on Article 18 TFEU in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae 
of Community law.73 As held in Grzelczyk, those situations include those involving the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, and those involving the 
exercise of the right to move and reside freely in another Member State, as conferred in 
Article 20 TFEU.74 The Court indicated that Union Citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find them-
selves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law, irrespective of their 
nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for. Since the former 
connection with one of the free movement rights was abandoned, the scope of persons 
protected was extended. Through the ECJ’s case law, for the first time a significant pro-
nouncement on the meaning of European Citizenship was made: Union Citizens law-
fully residing in a Member State other than their Member State of origin are entitled to 
equal treatment with respect to the full range of benefits which come within the material 
scope of EU law. The combined effects of Articles 20 and 18 TFEU enhanced the right to 
equal treatment to a general principle of equal treatment for all lawful residents. The 
same reasoning can be found in Bickel75. It follows that architects holding the nationality 
of, and lawfully residing in a Member State, who are moving to another Member State, 
and architects of that other Member State should be treated equally, on a professional 
                                                                
71 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
72 Fries & Shaw 1998, 533. 
73 Primary and secondary law does not, by itself, enhance citizen status. This was only achieved by reference 
to Article 12 EC (Article 18 TFEU) by the ECJ. Article 12 EC provides the key granting of access to rights 
which state constitutions often reserve for their nationals. It has generally granted all Union citizens access 
to citizen’s rights in terms of state constitutions: See Kadelbach 2003, pp. 39-40. 
74 Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (CPAS) 
[2001] ECR I-6193. 
75 Case C-274/96 Criminal Proceedings against H.O. Bickel and U. Franz [1998] ECR I-7637. The Court held 
that, if a European citizen was exercising his right to free movement as laid down in Article 18 EC, he 
would have a general right to non-discriminatory treatment in the sense of Article 12 EC.  
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level, on the basis of their Union citizenship.76 In Baumbast77, the ECJ even conferred 
direct effect upon Article 21 TFEU, since the rights of free movement and residence are 
conferred directly on every citizen of the Union by a clear and precise provision of the 
Treaty. It follows that a citizen of the European Union who no longer enjoys a right of 
residence as a migrant worker in the host Member State can, as a citizen of the Union, 
enjoy there a right of residence by direct application of Article 21 TFEU. As held above, 
this right is not unconditional, since it is subject to the limitations and conditions laid 
down by the Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect. The competent au-
thorities and, where necessary, the national courts, must ensure that these limitations 
and conditions are applied in compliance with the general principles of EU law and, in 
particular, the principle of proportionality.78 This means that national measures adopted 
on that subject must be necessary and appropriate to attain the objective pursued.79 In 
this way, Directive 90/364/EEC80, which has been repealed by Directive 2004/38/EC, 
holds that Member States can require that beneficiaries of the right of residence must 
not become an unreasonable burden on the public finances of the host Member State, 
and should be covered by sickness insurance. In the event of a lack of resources, a citizen 
of the Union does not derive from Article 21 TFEU the right to reside in the territory of 
a Member State of which he is not a national within the meaning of this Directive. Such 
a limitation is based on the idea that the exercise of the right of residence of citizens of 
the Union can be subordinated to the legitimate interests of the Member States.81 How-
ever, while the Member States may make residence of a citizen of the Union who is not 
economically active conditional on having sufficient resources, that does not mean that 
such a person cannot, during his lawful residence in the host Member State, benefit 
from the principle of equal treatment as laid down in Article 18 TFEU (Article 12 EC). 
In Trojani82, the applicant was lawfully resident in Belgium and should therefore have 
                                                                
76 In Wijsenbeek, the Court indicated that the mere presence of an EU citizen in any Member State other 
than his/her own, generates at least a basic obligation of equal treatment vis-à-vis the host State’s own na-
tionals. However, the presence of that citizen in his/her own Member State, does not generate any EU ob-
ligations at all: See Case C-387/97 Criminal Proceedings against Florus Ariel Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-
6207. See also Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D’Hoop v. Office national de l’eploi [2002] ECR I-6191 in 
which was decided that inequality of treatment is contrary to the principles which underpin the status of 
citizen of the Union, that is, the guarantee of the same treatment in law in the exercise of the citizen’s free-
dom to move. 
77 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091. 
 Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D’Hoop v. Office national de l’eploi [2002] ECR I-6191 
78 Due to the fact that the application of the limitations and conditions acknowledged in Article 21 (1) TFEU 
in respect of the exercise of that right or residence is subject to judicial review, any limitations and condi-
tions imposed on the right do not prevent the provisions of Article 21 (1) TFEU from conferring on indi-
viduals rights which are enforceable by them and which the national courts must protect. 
79 See, to that effect, joined cases C-259/91, C-331/91 and C-332/91 Allué and Others [1993] ECR I-4309, 
paragraph 15. 
80 This Directive was at issue in Baumbast. 
81 See also Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Shu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department[2004] ECR I-09925. 
82 Case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v. Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) [2004] ECR I-7573. A 
lack of resources was precisely the reason why Mr. Trojani sought to receive a certain benefit in Belgium. 
This benefit was refused on the grounds that he did not have Belgian nationality, and could not benefit 
from regulation 1612/68/EEC since his activities were not seen as real and genuine . 
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been treated equally, even with regard to social assistance benefits. In this regard it 
should be noted that migrant EU citizens have a legitimate expectation of a limited de-
gree of financial solidarity in terms of their degree of integration into the host society.83 
However the host Member State can decide that, due to this recourse to benefits, the 
applicant no longer fulfils the conditions related to the right of residence. In such situa-
tions, Member State may, within the limits imposed by Union law, take measures to 
remove such persons.84 It follows that, before Baumbast, it was widely assumed that 
non-economically active citizens had no rights of residence deriving directly from the 
TEC, only from Directives created under the Treaty. In Baumbast however, the ECJ held 
that Article 21 TFEU granted a generally applicable right to residence, which is limited 
by secondary legislation, but only where that secondary legislation is proportionate. 
Member States can thus only distinguish between nationals and Union citizens if the 
respective provisions satisfy the test or proportionality. It follows that Article 21 TFEU 
does not create a generalized right to reside within the territory of another Member 
States for all times for all Union citizens. 
 
The Citizens’ Rights Directive – Directive 2004/38/EC – of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Right of Citizens of the Union and their 
Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States, 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC85, 
68/360/EEC86, 72/194/EEC87, 73/148/EEC88, 75/34/EEC89, 75/35/EEC90, 90/364/EEC91, 
                                                                
83 Case C-209/03 R (Dany Bidar) v. London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills 
[2005] ECR I-2119, paragraphs 56-59. 
84 However, certain conditions need to be fulfilled before one can actually be removed. Recourse to the social 
assistance system by a citizen of the Union may not automatically entail such a measure. See, to that ex-
tent, Grzelczyk, paragraphs 42-43. 
85 Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning 
the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health , OJ Sp. Ed. 1964, No. 850/65, p. 117. 
86 Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families, OJ Sp. Ed. 1968, No 
L257/13, p. 485. 
87 Council Directive 72/194/EEC of 18 May 1972 extending to workers exercising the right to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, the scope of the Directive of 25 Feb-
ruary 1964 on the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign na-
tionals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, OJ L 121, 26 May 
1972, p. 32. 
88 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence 
within the Community for nationals of Member State with regard to establishment and the provision of 
services, OJ 1973, No. L172/14. 
89 Council Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the right of nationals of a Member State to 
remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed 
capacity, OJ 1975, No. L14/10. 
90 Council Directive 75/35/EEC of 17 December 1974 extending the scope of Directive No 64/221/EEC on 
the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which 
are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health to include nationals of a Member 
State who exercise the right to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued 
therein an activity in a self-employed capacity, OJ L 14 of 20 January 1975. 
91 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, OJ 1990, No. L180/26. 
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90/365/EEC92 and 93/96/EEC93 and amending Regulation 1612/68/EEC – entered into 
force on 30 April 2006. It amended regulation 1612/68/EEC on the freedom of move-
ment for workers within the Community and repealed a number of Directives which 
mostly linked the freedom of movement to the pursuit of an economic activity. Some of 
these Directives were applicable to workers, students or other economically inactive 
persons, others to self-employed persons working in another Member State on a per-
manent or temporary basis. It was held that to remedy this sector-by-sector, piece-meal 
approach to the right of free movement and residence, and to facilitate the exercise of 
this right, there needed to be a single legislative act. However, from the early 1990s on-
wards, the link between the freedom of movement and the pursuit of an economic activ-
ity loosened pursuant to Directive 90/364/EEC and the Union Citizenship provisions in 
the TFEU. Due to these novelties, secondary EU legislation concerning free movement 
was restructured by Directive 2004/38/EC which consolidated, in a single text, the legis-
lation on the free movement of citizens of the Union. As held by Article 2(1) and the 
preamble, Union citizenship should be the fundamental status of nationals of the Mem-
ber States when they exercise their right of free movement and residence. It is important 
to note that the Directive also confers considerable rights upon the family members of 
moving EU citizens, since it was held that the freedom of movement of EU citizens 
would be limited if their family members, even if they are third-country nationals, could 
not join them.94 In this regard, Article 4(1) indicates that all Union citizens with a valid 
identity card or passport and their family members95 who are not nationals of a Member 
State and who hold a valid passport, shall have the right to leave the territory of a Mem-
ber State to travel to another Member State. Accordingly, Article 5(1) holds that Mem-
ber States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity 
card or passport, and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member 
State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. Both provisions apply without 
prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls. 
It seems that, to enter the territory of a Member State, no economic activities are de-
manded, and the mere possession of Union citizenship is enough to benefit from these 
provisions. Union citizens and their family members in possession of a valid identity 
card or passport, who are not nationals of a Member State, and who accompany or join 
the Union citizen, even have a right of residence on the territory of another Member 
State for a period of up to three months without any conditions or any formalities (Arti-
cle 6). However, they will only have this right as long as they do not become an unrea-
sonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State (Article 14(1)). 
Nevertheless, to enjoy a right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a 
period of longer than three months, Union citizens have to be workers or self-employed 
persons in the host Member State or have to have sufficient resources for themselves 
and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the 
                                                                
92 Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed 
persons who have ceased their occupational activity, OJ 1990, No. L180/28. 
93 Council Directive 93/96/EEC 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students, OJ 1993, No. L 
317/59.  
94 There should therefore always be a Community dimension before the Directive applies.  
95 Article 2(2) of the Directive gives an exhaustive list of who is qualified as a Citizen’s family Member. 
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host Member State during their period of residence, and have comprehensive sickness 
insurance cover in the host Member State (see Article 7(1) jo 14(2)).96 It is important to 
note that an expulsion measure may under no circumstances be adopted against Union 
citizens or their family members if the Union citizens are workers or self-employed 
persons, or if they entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek em-
ployment (Article 14(4)). As held by Article 16(1), Union citizens who have resided 
legally for a continuous period of five years in the host Member State shall have the right 
of permanent residence there. In certain cases this right can already be enjoyed before 
completion of a continuous period of five years of residence (see Article 17). As held by 
Article 27(1), also within the application of Directive 2004/38/EC, Member States may 
restrict the freedom of movement and residence of Union citizens and their family 
members, irrespective of nationality, on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health.97 It follows that Directive 2004/38/EC distinguishes between economically 
active and non-active persons, since only the former are allowed to stay for more than 
three months without having to prove that they have sufficient resources or a compre-
hensive sickness insurance cover in the host State. 
 Next to the right of residence, the Directive also regulates the right of Union Citi-
zens to take up employment. As held by Article 24(1), subject to such specific provisions 
as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and in secondary law, all Union citizens re-
siding on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy 
equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. 
This right to equal treatment means, of course, the right to take up and fulfil work.98 
These rights are described more specifically and in greater detail in Articles 45, 49 and 
56 TFEU which have already been discussed. It follows that third-country architects 
                                                                
96 A right for residence for longer than three months is also conferred on union citizens who are enrolled at a 
private or public educational establishment, accredited or financed by the host Member State on the basis 
of its legislation or administrative practice, for the principal purpose of following a course of study, includ-
ing vocational training and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, and 
can assure the relevant national authority, by means of a declaration or by such equivalent means as they 
may choose, that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence, as well as 
on family members accompanying or joining a Union citizen who satisfies the conditions referred to in 
Article 7 (see Article 7 (1) (c), 7 (1) (d) en 7 (2)). As already held above, Article 10 of Regulation 
1612/68/EEC (repealed by Directive 2004/38/EC with effect from 30 April 2006 (see Article 38 (1)), gave 
the mover’s family a right to install itself with him as well. However, this right was based on the mover’s 
economic status as a worker, and not on his Union citizenship. As held above, this concept was only intro-
duced in 1993 by the TEU. 
97 These grounds shall not be invoked to serve economic ends. Measures taken on grounds of public policy 
or public security shall comply with the principle of proportionality, and shall be based exclusively on the 
personal conduct of the individual concerned. Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves con-
stitute grounds for taking such measures. The personal conduct of the individual concerned must repre-
sent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. 
Justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of general pre-
vention, shall not be accepted (Article 27 (2)). Before taking an expulsion decision on the grounds of pub-
lic policy or public security however, the host Member State shall take account of several considerations 
enumerated in Article 28. This will not be further elaborated on within this thesis. 
98 In Case C-131/85 Emir Gül v Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf [1986] ECR 1573, the ECJ already held in the 
light of Regulation 1612/68/EEC, that the third-country national spouse of a Union citizen must be subject 
to the same rules regarding access to, and pursuit of, an occupation as nationals of the host Member State.  
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who are a family member of an EU citizen making use of free movement rights, can 
invoke Directive 2004/38/EC to join the citizen to another EU state, and take up em-
ployment there. Within the light of public policy and public safety, their qualifications 
will be checked if they want to design buildings. As indicated before, this recognition of 
qualifications will be discussed in paragraph 3.3. 
 Comparing the status of market and Union citizens, makes it clear that a person’s 
personal status has become increasingly independent of the fundamental freedoms. As 
will be explained hereunder in more detail, the rights of economically active persons are 
broader than the rights of those who are not economically active. The recent develop-
ments in the ECJ’s case law, and the content of Directive 2004/38/EC, seem to reflect a 
philosophy of compromise between what Union citizenship could or should yield, and 
what the political and financial sensibilities of Member States are prepared to tolerate.99 
Since this thesis only concerns the regulation of economically active persons (archi-
tects), the emphasis of my research is on their status as workers or self-employed per-
sons, and not on their Union citizenship status. The free movement rights of EU archi-
tects will therefore not be further discussed in the light of their EU citizenship. Since 
workers and self-employed persons are treated as ‘a species of the genus citizen of the 
Union’100, I refer to the preceding paragraphs in this regard.  
2.2. Free movement of architects not holding the nationality of a Member State 
2.2.1. Introduction 
Even though this research  upon the situation of Belgian and Dutch architects, it would 
not be complete if the free movement rights of third-country architects (non-EU archi-
tects) would not be referred to. Indeed, European legislation has foreseen that also cer-
tain architects holding the nationality of a third country should be able, if certain re-
quirements are fulfilled, to practise the profession of architect in the EU and thus also in 
Belgium and the Netherlands.   
 Even though the Treaty of Maastricht incorporated asylum and immigration policy 
into the EU framework in 1992, with the exception of visa policy, matters of immigra-
tion were not treated within the regular Community-pillar, but were dealt with under a 
third, intergovernmental pillar.101 However, with the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Community became responsible for the development of a common EU 
immigration policy and was competent to draft legislation regarding the position of 
third-country nationals. Legislation on the free movement of third-country nationals 
was based upon Article 63(3) (a) and 63(4) EC (Article 79(2) TFEU). 
 The legal migration of third-country nationals to the EU is regulated on the basis of 
five Directives which have already entered into force and one draft Directive: Directive 
                                                                
99 Dougan 2001, p. 93.  
100 Cordinanzi, Lang & Nascimbene 2008, p. 67.  
101 Hailbronner 1999, p. 10. The pillar structure is abolished by the Treaty of Lisbon which means that almost 
all areas of Justice and Home Affairs will come under the Community method of decision-making: quali-
fied majority voting in the Council and co-decision of the European Parliament.  
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2003/86/EC on the right of family reunification102; Directive 2003/109/EC on the status 
of long-term residents103; Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of stu-
dents, pupils, unremunerated trainees and volunteers104; Directive 2005/71/EC on a 
specific procedure for admitting third-country national researchers105; Directive 
2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employments106; draft Directive on a single permit and a 
common set of rights. As indicated above, these Directives are based upon Title V of the 
TFEU (Title IV EC) which was introduced into the EC-Treaty with the 1999 Treaty of 
Amsterdam, that established a legal basis for the creation of a common European immi-
gration policy within an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’.107 EU immigration law 
and policies have developed within the framework of multi-annual programmes, of 
which the first was adopted in Tampere in October 1999, the second one in The Hague 
in 2004 and, on 2 December 2009, the Swedish Presidency submitted to the General 
Affairs Council and the European Council the result of the discussions, especially in the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council, for approval in accordance with Article 68 TFEU 
(Article 61 EC) and publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. The 
Tampere European Council centred on the rights of legally residing third-country na-
tionals, and stressed that these should enjoy “broadly the same rights and responsibili-
ties as EU nationals” which are “rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citi-
zens”.108 The Hague programme reiterated that the integration of immigrants remained 
one of the policy priorities in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.109 Common 
Basic Principles were adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 19 November 
2004, which established a direct link between immigration and the principles of non-
discrimination and equal treatment. As indicated in Article 79 TFEU (Article 63(3) and 
(4) EC), the Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all 
stages, the efficient management of migration flows and the fair treatment of third-
country nationals residing legally in Member States.110 Since the legal status of third-
                                                                
102 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3 
October 2003, pp. 12–18. 
103 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, OJ L 16, 23 January 2004, pp. 44–53. 
104 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service , OJ L 
375 of 23 December 2004, pp. 12-18. 
105 Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country 
nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ L 289, 3 November 2005, pp. 15-22.  
106 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155, 18 June 2009. 
107 It should be noted that Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland are not bound by any measure in the 
area of migration law, as they have negotiated opt-outs from Title V TFEU.  
108 The Commission held, however, that the scope of rights granted to third-country nationals may differ 
according to their length of stay. It should be noted, however, that the Tampere conclusions are merely po-
litical statements which are not legally binding as opposed to the Directives which do contain a binding set 
of rules which need to be implemented by the Member States. Furthermore, the Tampere conclusions are 
confined to third-country nationals who are already legally resident in an EU Member State.  
109 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, Annex I: The Hague Programme; Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, 4 and 5 November 2004, 14292/04, points 1.5, 4. 
110 The situation of asylum seekers or refugees or persons living illegally in the EU will not be discussed.  
  Public Regulation of Architects at European Union Level  
70 
country nationals should be approximated to that of Member State’s nationals, there 
should be enhanced non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life.111 With 
regard to long-term residents, the aim was to grant them a set of uniform rights “as near 
as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens” which includes inter alia the right to reside, 
work, receive education and the non-discrimination principle.112 Two non-
discrimination Directives entered into force after the adoption of the Amsterdam 
Treaty: Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin113 and Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation114. They are both 
based on Article 19 TFEU (Article 13 EC) and thus deal with discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. These 
Directives will not be discussed within this thesis which rather concerns itself with anti-
discrimination law based on nationality. Since the regulation of the profession of archi-
tect is central, economically motivated objectives for anti-discrimination law rather than 
human rights concerns lie at the heart of this thesis. 
 However, next to these Directives it should not be forgotten that the free movement 
rights of certain third country nationals are also provided for by Directive 2004/38/EC 
which was discussed in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, with regard to certain 
states, there are special rules under associations and partnership agreements. 
 In the following paragraph, an overview will be presented of those third-country 
nationals who enjoy free movement rights. 
2.2.2. Third-country national family members of EU citizens who made use of their free 
movement rights: Directive 2004/38/EC 
Directive 2004/38/EC confers extensive rights upon third-country family members of 
EU citizens who have made use of their free movement rights115. These family members 
are privileged in that their situation is governed by the law of the European Union 
rather than by national immigration laws. Within the scope of the Directive, family 
members are the spouse, the partner with whom the Union citizen has a registered part-
nership, the direct descendants of the Union citizen, his spouse or registered partner 
under the age of twenty one or the direct descendants who are dependant, as well as 
dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or registered 
partner (Article 2(2) jo 3(1) of the Directive). The Directive must be applied with regard 
to these family members if they accompany or join the Union citizen. With regard to 
any other family members, irrespective of their nationality who, in the country from 
                                                                
111 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Sn 200/99, Brussels, 
points 18-21. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180 , 19 July 2000 pp. 22-26.  
114 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation, OJ L 303 , 02 December 2000 pp. 16-22. 
115 See article 3 of the Directive. The situation of family members of EU nationals who did not make use of 
their free movement rights is regulated by the national law of the state of residence. In such cases, there is 
no issue of equal treatment. This will not be further discussed within this thesis. 
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which they have come, are dependants or members of the household of the Union citi-
zen having the primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds strictly re-
quire the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen, as well as with regard 
to the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested, the 
host Member State shall facilitate entry and residence (Article 3(2)). As noted by Peers, 
the Court has not yet clarified the interpretation and extent of the facilitation obliga-
tion.116 
 Under Article 5 of Directive 2004/38/EC, Member States are required to grant these 
third-country national family members the right to enter with a valid passport. A visa 
can be requested in accordance with Regulation 539/2001/EC or, where appropriate, 
with national law. Since the UK and Ireland do not participate in the common visa pol-
icy, third-country family members must comply with the visa formalities according to 
national law. On the basis of Article 6(2), third-country national family members who 
are in the possession of a valid passport, accompanying or joining the Union citizen, 
have a right of residence for a period of up to three months without any other condi-
tions or any formalities. This right lasts as long as they do not become an unreasonable 
burden on the state (Article 14(1)). As held by Article 7(2), third-country national fam-
ily members accompanying or joining the Union citizen in the host Member State, shall 
enjoy the right of residence for more than three months if the Union citizen is a worker 
or self-employed person or has sufficient resources so that s/he and his/her family will 
not become a burden on the social assistance scheme of the host Member State, or is 
following a course of study and is covered by comprehensive sickness insurance. In this 
situation, these family members may apply for a residence card. Articles 12 and 13 deal 
with the retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of death or 
departure of the Union citizen and in case of divorce, annulment of marriage or termi-
nation of the registered partnership. As held by Article 16(2), third-country family 
members who have legally resided with the Union citizen in the host Member State for a 
continuous period of five years, have the right of permanent residence there. Article 
17(3) jo Article 17(1) refer to certain situations in which the right of permanent resi-
dence can be enjoyed before completion of a continuous period of five years of resi-
dence. These will not be further discussed within this thesis. According to Article 18 of 
the Directive, third-country national family members who satisfy the five year require-
ment acquire the right of permanent residence and will be issued a permanent residence 
card (Article 20). 
 As held by article 23 of the Directive, irrespective of nationality, the family members 
of Union citizens who have the right of residence or the right of permanent residence in 
a Member State, shall be entitled to take up employment or self-employment there. In 
this regard I will discuss the recognition of the professional qualifications of third-
country nationals in more detail in paragraph 3.3.2. Finally, reference should be made to 
article 24 of the Directive which indicates that third-country nationals who have the 
right of residence or permanent residence, enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of 
the host Member State within the scope of the Treaty. Of course, in any case, the free-
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dom of movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members can be 
restricted on ground of public policy, public security or public health (article 27). 
2.2.3. Family members of Union citizens who have not made use of their free movement 
rights 
If the Union citizen has not made use of his/her free movement rights, a purely internal 
situation in which national law prevails arises. It follows that the non-discrimination 
principle and the principle of equal treatment (on the basis of nationality) do not apply. 
The Court has underlined the national sovereignty of the Member States in such cases in 
Saunders117, Moser118, Kremzow119 and Uecker and Jacquet120. In these cases nationals of a 
Member State were treated less favourably than nationals of another Member State who 
came to live in that state and, in certain cases, even less favourably than resident third-
country nationals.121 Later, the Court accepted to apply the free movement principles if 
‘some kind of Community dimension’ could be identified. In this regard, reference can 
be made to Singh122 in which the ECJ held that the temporary movement of a couple for 
employment in another Member State with the aim of avoiding an internal situation to 
be able to rely on Community law was not an abuse of rights. The Court has reiterated 
on numerous occasions that EU law applies to any EU national who works in a Member 
State other than that of his residence, irrespective of his place of residence and his na-
tionality.123 Even persons who work in their home state but move for personal reasons to 
another state fall within the scope of the Treaty.124 
2.2.4. Association and Partnership agreements. 
The European Union has concluded Association Agreements with a number of coun-
tries on the basis of Article 217 TFEU (Article 310 EC). Such Agreements are concluded 
jointly by the European Community (since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty by 
the Union) and the Member States in areas where they both have competences. Due to 
these Agreements, third-country nationals of certain states enjoy special treatment with 
                                                                
117 Case C-175/75 R. v. Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, paragraph 1. 
118 Case C-180/83 Moser [1984] ECR 2539. 
119 Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629. 
120 Joined Cases C-64/96 and 65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1977] ECR I-03171, paragraph 23. 
121 In Cases C-35/82 and 36/82 Morson and Janjan v. Netherlands ECR 3723, two Dutch nationals working in 
the Netherlands had no right under Community Law to bring their parents, of Surinamese nationality, 
into the country to reside with them. Had they been nationals of any other Member State working in the 
Netherlands, they would have been covered by Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68/EEC. Since they were na-
tionals working in their own Member State who had never exercised the right to freedom of movement 
within the Community, they had no rights under Community law. See Craig & De Búrca 2003, p. 742. 
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regard to entry and/or residence rights, and the Community/Union system is, to a cer-
tain extent, applicable to them. 
Commitments regarding freedom of movement fall, in any case, within the powers 
conferred on the Union by Article 217 TFEU.125 
1. The European Economic Area 
The Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) which was signed in Porto on 2 
May 1992126 confers rights on nationals of the European Economic Area (European 
Union and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). The Agreement allows them more spe-
cifically to participate in the Internal Market on the basis of their application of Internal 
Market relevant acquis. All new relevant EU legislation is dynamically incorporated into 
the Agreement, and thus applies throughout the EEA, ensuring the homogeneity of the 
internal market. The rules on entry and residence (Articles 28, 31 and 36 of the Agree-
ment deal with the free movement of workers, the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services, respectively) contained in the Agreement are identical to 
those in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and must be interpreted 
in accordance with the case law of the ECJ. Norway and Iceland are members of the 
Schengen Area since December 1996, with the result that all border controls between 
these states and the 24 other Schengen States are lifted. 
2. EC-Switzerland Agreement 
Switzerland concluded a bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons with the 
European Community on 21 June 1999.127 Swiss nationals and their family members are 
generally awarded the same free movement rights as EEA nationals and their family 
members. Article 1(a) and (d) indicates that the Agreement provides Swiss nationals 
with a right of entry, residence and stay, as well as access to work or self-employed ac-
tivities. Article 2 contains the principle of equal treatment, and prohibits any discrimi-
nation on the grounds of nationality, of one of the contracting parties lawfully residing 
in another contracting party. Article 7 provides for the equal treatment with regard to 
access to, and the pursuit of, economic activities. The Contracting Parties have to take 
all necessary measures to apply rights and obligations equivalent to those contained in 
EC law in terms of relations between them (Article 16). Swiss nationals can rely on the 
acquis communautaire, and the case law of the ECJ has to be taken into account. As held 
by article 9 of Annex I, which deals with the free movement of persons, any employee 
who is a national of a Contracting Party may not be treated differently to nationals of 
the host state as regards conditions of employment and working conditions. The 
Agreement contains an annex specifically dealing with the mutual recognition of profes-
sional qualifications (Annex III). Since 12 December 2008, Switzerland has been part of 
the Schengen Area, and all land border controls between Switzerland and the 24 other 
Schengen countries are lifted. 
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3. The EEC-Turkey Association Agreement 
The EEC-Turkey Association Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963.128 The 
Agreement includes a clause prohibiting discrimination with regard to Turkish employ-
ees in respect of remuneration and working conditions (Article 37). To progressively 
secure the free movement of workers between Turkey and the EU, the contracting par-
ties have to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 EEC (Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU). An 
Additional Protocol that was signed on 23 November 1970129 stipulates that the Associa-
tion Council, which is composed of members from the governments of the Member 
States and the Turkish government as well as the Council and the Commission, has to 
lay down the rules necessary for securing, in progressive stages, the freedom of move-
ment of workers (Article 36). In this regard, three Decisions have been taken. The most 
important one in terms of this thesis is Decision No. 1/80 which largely replaced the 
earlier Decision No. 2/76130 and gives some specific rights to Turkish employees who are 
already legally employed in a Member State. After having been admitted to the em-
ployment market of a Member State on the basis of a domestic decision, a Turkish em-
ployee will gradually acquire the right to equal treatment and unrestricted access to the 
employment market of that Member State.131 In this regard the Court has held in Kurz132 
that article 39 EC should be applied as far as possible to Turkish citizens under Decision 
No. 1/80. However, under this Decision Turkish workers only gradually acquire rights 
after having been granted access to the employment market of a certain Member State 
and after a period of legal employment. The rights laid down in Article 6(1) vary in 
accordance with the length of the period during which the Turkish employee has been 
legally employed in the Member State. After one year of legal employment in the Mem-
ber State, a Turkish worker who is duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a 
Member State, acquires the right to a renewal of his/her permit to work for the same 
employer if a job is available. After three years of legal employment, and subject to the 
priority accorded to workers of EU Member States, a Turkish worker acquires the right 
to respond to another offer of employment with an employer of his choice, but only for 
the same occupation. After four years of legal employment, the worker obtains the right 
of free access to any paid employment of his choice in the Member State. However, it 
should not be forgotten that Member State are still sovereign when it comes to regulat-
ing the admission of Turkish workers on their territory, as well as the conditions of their 
first access to the employment market.133 Nevertheless, the rights held by Turkish work-
ers on the basis of Article 6(1) of Decision No. 1/80 which has direct effect134, entail a 
right of residence.135 Family members (spouse and children) who have been authorized 
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131 Wiesbrock 2009, p. 103. 
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to join a Turkish worker who is duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a 
Member State, are also allowed to take up employment (Article 7 of Decision No. 1/80). 
After three years they receive an autonomous right to seek employment and an 
autonomous right of residence. Article 10, which also has direct effect, grants equal 
treatment and prohibits any Member State from discriminating against Turkish workers 
concerning remuneration and other working conditions, on the basis of their national-
ity. In this regard the EU Member States and Turkey are not allowed to introduce new 
restrictions on the conditions of access to employment applicable to workers and mem-
bers of their family legally resident and employed in their respective territories (Article 
13 Decision No. 1/80). 
 The Association Agreement also contains provisions on the abolishment of restric-
tions on the freedom of establishment (Article 13) and the free movement of services 
(Article 14). Although these provisions are not followed by a Decision, the provisions of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the case law of the ECJ have 
to be applied. Articles 13 and 14 of the Agreement jo article 41(1) of the Additional 
Protocol, aim to protect Turkish citizens from the introduction of more restrictive rules 
as those applicable at the date of entry into force of the Additional Protocol on the free-
dom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. It should be noted, however, 
that Article 41(1) does not provide Turkish nationals with a right of establishment or a 
right to provide services in the EU. Member States are only not allowed to introduce 
more stringent rules than those applicable at the time of entry into force of the protocol. 
4. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and other ex-Soviet states 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and 
Russia was signed on 24 June 1994.136 Russian nationals who are legally employed in the 
territory of a Member State have to be treated equally to nationals as regards working 
conditions, remuneration or dismissal, subject to the laws, conditions and procedures 
applicable in each Member State (Article 23). Member States are thus not allowed to 
discriminate Russian workers in these areas, but are still competent to regulate the entry 
and stay of these nationals, the working conditions as well as the establishment of natu-
ral persons, and the supply of services, unless this would jeopardize the purpose of the 
Agreement (Article 48). Russian nationals can rely on the Agreement before a national 
court.137 Similar Partnership and Cooperation Agreements have been concluded with 
Armenia138, Azerbaijan139, Georgia140, Kazakhstan141, Kyrgyz Republic142, Moldova143, 
Ukraine144 and Uzbekistan145. 
                                                                
136 OJ 1997 L 327, p. 1. It entered into force on 1 December 1997. 
137 Case C-265/03 Simentukov [2005] ECR I-2579, paragraphs 23 and 29. 
138 OJ L 239, 9 September 1999. 
139 OJ L 246, 17 September 1999. 
140 OJ L 4 August 1999. 
141 OJ L 196, 28 July 1999. 
142 OJ L 196, 28 July 1999. 
143 OJ L 181, 24 June 1998. 
144 OJ L 49, 19 February 1998. 
145 OJ L 229, 31 August 1999. 
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5. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement 
The European Union has concluded a bilateral Association Agreement with Egypt146, 
Israel147, Jordan148, Lebanon149, Morocco150, Tunisia151 and Algeria152. These Agreements 
saw the light in the framework of the Barcelona Process by which it was intended to 
establish political, economic and social cooperation between the European Union and 
certain countries of the Southern Mediterranean. Article 64 of all these Agreements 
prohibits any nationality discrimination of these Southern Mediterranean workers em-
ployed -even on a temporary basis- in the territory of a Member State in respect of 
working conditions, remuneration and dismissal (Article 64). This non-discrimination 
principle can be invoked directly by individuals before a national court.153 However, the 
renewal of residence permits is still governed by the national legislation of each Member 
State.154 Furthermore, these Agreements do not provide for any kind of freedom of 
movement of workers. Nevertheless, if a Euro-Mediterranean worker to which such an 
Agreement is applicable, is limited in his/her rights to remain when the Member State 
has granted him specific employment rights which go beyond his right of residence, the 
Member State is not allowed to deny his stay in the absence of a legitimate national 
interest such as public policy, public security or public health.155 
6. The ACP states and Latin American countries 
The European Union and 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP)156 con-
cluded a Partnership Agreement on 23 June 2000 – the Cotonou Agreement- for a pe-
riod of twenty years. From 1975 until 2000 the ACP-EC relations were governed by the 
regularly adapted and updated Lomé Conventions (Lomé I – Lomé IV bis). However, 
important developments on the international stage, such as the joint fight against terror-
ism, and socio-economic and political changes in the ACP countries have highlighted 
the need for a re-thinking of ACP-EC cooperation. The Cotonou Agreement aims to 
establish better development, economic, trade and political cooperation. The special 
relationships with the ACP states have to be seen in the light of colonization. The main 
aim of the convention is to reduce poverty by the integration of these states into the 
world economy. Within the scope of this thesis, most important is Article 13 of the 
Agreement, which contains the prohibition for all contracting parties to discriminate, 
and an obligation to guarantee a fair treatment of third-country nationals on their terri-
tory. As held by Article 13(3), the treatment accorded by each Member State to workers 
of ACP countries legally employed in its territory, shall be free from any discrimination 
based on nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal, rela-
                                                                
146 OJ L 304, 30 September 2004. 
147 OJ L 147, 21 June 2000. 
148 OJ L 129, 15 May 2002. 
149 OJ L 143, 30 May 2006. 
150 OJ L 138, 9 June 2000. 
151 OJ L 97, 30 March 1998. 
152 OJ L 265, 10 October 2005. 
153 Case C-97/05 Gattoussi [2006] ECR I-11917, paragraph 28. 
154 See Joint Declarataion annexed to the Final Act of the Agreements. 
155 Case C-97/05 Gattoussi, paragraph 40. 
156 The ACP Group of states counts 79 states. Only Cuba did not sign the Cotonou Agreement.  
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tive to its own nationals. Furthermore, in this regard, each ACP State shall accord com-
parable non-discriminatory treatment to workers who are nationals of a Member State. 
As argued by Wiesbrock, this last paragraph is to be interpreted consistently with the 
Lomé Conventions and therefore carries direct effect and comprises at least the right to 
be treated equally in respect of public-sector employment contracts, rules of private 
associations on the nationality of persons who can play for a professional sports team, 
and rules about elections to chambers of workers.157 The Cotonou Agreement does not 
contain an initial right of entry to the territory of a Member State but means that the 
initial right of access to the EU is governed by the national law of the Member State 
concerned, unless one falls within the ambit of Directive 2004/38/EC or one of the Di-
rectives discussed in paragraph 3.2.2.5. As long as individuals are legally employed, their 
legal residence cannot be terminated unless there are public security, public policy or 
public health reasons. Only the Association Agreement with Chile158 contains specific 
rules on the admission of employees of service providers within the context of free trade 
in services (see Articles 95-115 and Annex VII to the Agreement). This will not be fur-
ther discussed within this thesis. Numerous bilateral agreements between individual 
Member States and certain Latin American states exist, apart from the Cotonou Agree-
ment. 
7. Stabilization and Association Agreement with the Balkan states 
Croatia and Albania have both signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
the EU on 29 October 2001 and 12 June 2006 respectively. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia 
and Montenegro have also signed such agreements with the EU, but these are not yet 
ratified. These Agreements contain a non-discrimination clause with regard to working 
conditions. Just as is the case with the other Agreements discussed above (with the ex-
ception of the Association Agreement on the EEA and the Association Agreement with 
Switzerland), the conditions governing the right to entry still fall within the competence 
of the Member States. 
2.2.5. Non-privileged third-country nationals: Directives on legal migration of third-
country nationals 
Third-country nationals legally residing in a Member State159 can also invoke one of the 
Directives on legal migration if they fulfil certain criteria. Directives 2003/86/EC, 
2003/109/EC, 2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC on legal migration contain a right for third-
country nationals to participate in the labour market of the host Member States after a 
certain period of time and/or under certain conditions.160 In paragraph 3.3.2 which deals 
with the recognition of professional qualifications in the light of the free movement of 
                                                                
157 Wiesbrock 2009, p. 110; Cases C-162/00 Pokrzeptowics-Meyers [2002] ECR I-1049; Case C-438/00 
Seutscher Handballbund [2003] ECR I-4135. 
158 OJ L 352, p.3. 
159 As indicated before, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland are not bound by any measure in the area 
of migration law, as they have negotiated opt-outs from Title V TFEU. Their situation is also governed by 
the national law of the state of residence and will not be further discussed within this thesis.  
160 See Articles 11 and 14 Directive 2003/109/EC; Article 14 Directive 2003/86/EC; Article 18 Directive 
2004/114/EC and Article 13 Directive 2005/71/EC.  
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persons and services, I will discuss if and how these Directives provide for the recogni-
tion of professional qualifications obtained by third-country nationals to whom the 
Directives apply. 
1. Directive 2003/86/EC 
Directive 2003/86/EC, which was created under Article 63(3) (a) EC (Article 79 TFEU), 
provides for the right of third-country nationals who are legal residents of an EU Mem-
ber State to be reunited with their family members. The sponsor who is a third-country 
national residing lawfully in a Member State and applying, or whose family members161 
apply, for family reunification, has to hold a residence permit with a period of validity of 
at least one year and have reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent 
residence (see Article 2(c) and 3(1) of the Directive). Family members should be granted 
a first residence permit of a duration of at least one year that is renewable. As held by 
Article 14(1) (b) of Directive 2003/86/EC, third country nationals eligible for family 
reunification will have, in principle, the same rights as the sponsor and have access to 
any employment and self-employed activity.162 This right however can be restricted for 
up to twelve months after entry on the basis of the labour market situation of the Mem-
ber State concerned (Article 14(2)). After up to five years of residence, a sponsor’ spouse 
and children who have reached majority, must be granted an autonomous residence 
permit (Article 15(1)-(3)). 
2. Directive 2003/109/EC 
In accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/109/EC, Member States are obliged to 
grant long-term resident status to those third-country nationals having resided in their 
territory legally and continuously for a period of five years.163 Such third-country na-
tionals must demonstrate that they have stable and regular resources that are sufficient 
to provide for themselves and their family members without recourse to social assis-
tance and comprehensive sickness insurance (Article 5(1) (a) and (b)). If these condi-
tions are met, the applicant shall be granted permanent long-term residence status, and 
receive an EC residence permit with a validity of five years that is renewable (Articles 
7(3), 8(1) and 8(2)). As held by Article 11(1) (a) long-term residents shall enjoy equal 
treatment with nationals as regards access to employment and self-employed activity, 
provided such activities do not entail even occasional involvement in the exercise of 
public authority, and as regards conditions of employment and working conditions, 
including conditions regarding dismissal and remuneration. Furthermore, Article 11(1) 
(c) indicates that equal treatment should also be granted regarding the recognition of 
professional diplomas, certificates and other qualifications, in accordance with the rele-
                                                                
161 These are the sponsor’s spouse and natural or adopted children of the sponsor and/or the spouse, who are 
unmarried and minors according to the age of majority set by the law of the Member State (Article 4 (1) 
paragraph 2 of the Directive). First-degree relatives in the direct ascending-line and adult unmarried chil-
dren of the sponsor or the spouse, as well as unmarried partners, constitute voluntary categories of eligible 
family members (Articles 4 (2) and 4(3) of the Directive). 
162 The requirements which need to be fulfilled for family reunification can be found in Articles 7 and 8 of 
Directive 2003/86/EC. These will not be discussed within this thesis.  
163 Article 5 of Directive 2003/109/EC contains the conditions which need to be fulfilled.  
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vant national procedures. Long term residents are allowed to reside in another Member 
State for more than three months if they are engaged in an employed or self-employed 
economic activity, pursue studies or vocational training or for other purposes. They may 
be accompanied by their family if the family was already constituted in the first Member 
State (Article 16). However, according to Article 14(3), Member States are allowed to 
examine their labour market and give preference to EU citizens. Furthermore they can 
deny long-term residents access to employment which is different from that for which 
the residence permit has been granted. Integration measures can be demanded unless 
the applicant has already complied with the integration conditions which were de-
manded in order to obtain long-term resident status in the first state. The attendance at 
language courses can always be demanded. (Article 15(3)). 
3. Directive 2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC 
Directive 2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC are two Directives that also concern the legal 
migration of specific categories of third-country nationals. The first Directive deals with 
the conditions on the admission of students, pupils, unremunerated trainees and volun-
teers. Since this thesis deals with the free movement of architects, being professionals 
who are ‘fully fledged’, Directive 2004/114/EC is not of importance within the scope of 
this thesis. Directive 2005/71/EC contains a specific procedure for admitting third-
country national researchers. Due to its limited importance for architects, this Directive 
will not be discussed either. 
4. Directive 2009/50/EC 
Due to the inability of the Council of Ministers to come to an agreement on the Com-
mission’s proposal on a Directive for economic migration in 2001, there is currently no 
general instrument regulating the conditions for first entry and the residence of third-
country national labour migrants to the EU territory. However, in 2007 the Commission 
adopted another proposal for a Directive on the conditions for entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for highly qualified employment. Directive 2009/50/EC was 
adopted by the European Parliament on 25 May 2009 and has to be implemented in 
national law by 19 June 2011. As held by Article 2(1) (b), it applies to third-country 
nationals pursuing highly qualified employment, which is defined as genuine and effec-
tive work under the direction of someone else, for which a person is paid and for which 
adequate and specific competence, proven by the holding of higher professional qualifi-
cations, is required. Higher professional qualifications are defined as qualifications at-
tested by evidence of higher educational qualifications or by at least five years of profes-
sional experience, when provided for by national law. Higher educational qualifications 
refer to the degree or diploma obtained after the completion of a post-secondary course 
of higher education of at least three years, which must be officially recognized in the 
state in which the educational institution concerned is situated.164 The possibility of 
replacing higher educational qualifications with relevant professional experience must 
be foreseen by national law, and only applies by derogation. The level of this profes-
sional experience must, in any case, be comparable to the higher educational qualifica-
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tions and be relevant for the employment to be undertaken. Criteria for admission in-
clude a work contract or job offer for at least one year, compliance with the regulated 
professional rules or, for unregulated professions, the possession of relevant higher 
professional qualifications for the sector of occupation, valid travel documents and 
sickness insurance for the whole family (Article 5). Other requirements are related to 
the salary of the migrant worker which must be at least 1.5 times the average gross an-
nual salary of the host State, and must comply with the applicable collective agreement 
or practices in the relevant occupation.165 It is important to note that the Directive does 
not create a right of admission as such, since Member States retain the competence to 
control how many and which type of qualified workers to admit to their labour markets, 
which means that they are allowed to apply quotas.166 Furthermore, Member States even 
retain the possibility not to grant any residence permits for employment in certain pro-
fessions, economic sectors or regions.167 A Blue Card168 which entitles applicants to enter, 
re-enter and stay in the Member State issuing the permit and to enjoy the rights 
awarded to them by the Directive169, may be refused on the basis of their national labour 
market situation. Furthermore, as held by Article 8(2), preference may be given to Un-
ion citizens and resident third-country nationals. This is in line with Article 79(5) TFEU 
which holds that, with regard to economic migration, Member States have the right to 
determine the volume of admission of third-country nationals coming from third coun-
tries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed (Arti-
cle 79(5) TFEU). Under the rules set by the Directive, especially Article 14, EU Blue 
Card holders will enjoy equal treatment with nationals of the member state issuing the 
Blue Card, as regards working conditions, including pay and dismissal, education, train-
ing and recognition of qualifications and several other rights. Member States are even 
free to adopt more favourable rules for different types of employment (Article 3(4)). The 
Card will initially be valid for a period of between one and four years, provided that the 
work contract has a duration of at least one year (Article 7(2)). Since the Directive does 
not provide for a possibility of renewing the permit, third-country nationals will not be 
able to acquire long-term resident status in the EU. However, as laid down by article 16, 
highly skilled workers are allowed to accumulate periods of residence in different Mem-
ber States in order to achieve the five years of legal and continuous residence needed to 
obtain EU long-term residence status. During the first two years of employment, mi-
grant workers are not allowed to change employment within the Member State without 
the written authorization by the Member State’s authorities (Article 12(1) and (2) of the 
Directive). After two years, Member States are allowed, but are not obliged, to grant 
                                                                
165 Member States may also require that the applicant has an address in their territory and that the applicant 
does not constitute a risk to public security, public policy or public health. See Article 5 (2) and 5(3) of the 
Directive.  
166 See Article 6 and recital 8 of the preamble to the Directive.  
167 See recital 8 of the preamble to the Directive.  
168 See Article 7 (4) of the Directive. The Blue Card will facilitate access to the labour market for their holders 
and will entitle them to a series of socio-economic rights and favourable conditions for family reunifica-
tion and movement across the EU. Since the Blue Card will, in principle, be valid for a period of between 
one and four years – at least if the work contract has a duration of one year – and is not renewable, third-
country nationals will be excluded from acquiring long-term resident status in the EU on this basis.  
169 See Article 7 (1) jo 7 (4) of Directive 2009/50/EC. 
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such individuals equal treatment with nationals as regards access to highly qualified 
employment, without having to meet the entry requirements in terms of salary and 
qualifications. After eighteen months of legal residence, Blue Card holders may also take 
up highly qualified employment in another Member State.170 An application for a second 
Blue Card has to be made however, and the same conditions for entry have to be ful-
filled. The second Member State is also allowed to apply quotas, and can, while the ap-
plication is still pending, impose restrictions upon the equal treatment of the applicant, 
except as regards the freedom of association and the recognition of diplomas.171 As indi-
cated by Wiesbrock, this system leaves open the question of whether it is easier and 
more attractive for such migrant workers to apply for two separate Blue Cards, rather 
than to apply for two separate residence permits under national highly skilled migrant 
schemes.172 Family members of Blue Card holders will receive a residence permit with 
the same validity as that of the sponsor. It can thus be concluded that third-country 
architects not working in a self-employed capacity, who cannot invoke Directive 
2004/38/EC as a family member of a moving EU citizen, can, after the implementation 
period has expired, invoke Directive 2009/50/EC if the conditions for entry and resi-
dence, as defined in the Directive, are respected. However, the Directive does not give 
them a right to admission so that Member States can still refuse them on the basis of 
their national labour market situation. It follows that the Directive provides for a certain 
degree of harmonization, but leaves much room for discretion to the Member States. 
Furthermore, since professionals will not be able to gain permanent residence, it is ques-
tionable whether the Directive is an active instrument for third-country professionals. 
Nevertheless, since it provides third-country nationals with a common set of rules, it 
should be considered as an important step towards a possible harmonisation of rules 
with regard to economic migration in the European Union. 
5. Draft Directive on a single permit and a common set of rights 
Finally, mention should be made of the Draft Directive on a single permit for third-
country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State, and on a com-
mon set of rights for third country workers legally residing in a Member State, that was 
put forward by the Commission on 23 October 2007.173 The proposal applies to third-
country nationals seeking to reside and work in a Member State and to single permit 
holders who are defined as third-country nationals who have been issued a single per-
mit, i.e. a valid residence permit issued by the authorities of a Member State, granting a 
right of residence for the purpose of employment.174 As held by Article 4, applicants will 
                                                                
170 Article 16 of the Directive allows highly skilled migrants to accumulate periods in two or three Member 
States in order to fulfil the five-year residence requirement to obtain long-term residence status. This is a 
derogation from Directive 2003/109/EC. 
171 See Article 14 (4) of the Directive.  
172 Wiesbrock 2009, p. 224. 
173 COM (2007) 638 Final, 23 October 2007, CNS 2007/0229. 
174 See Article 2 (b), 2 (c) and 3 (1) of the Draft Directive. However, in order to reach unanimity, the Presi-
dency presented a revised draft which limited the scope of the proposal to single permit holders but 
opened up the possibility for Member States to maintain or adopt provisions granting equal treatment to 
other legally resident third-country nationals not holding a single permit. This means that the Draft does 
not include third-country nationals who were initially admitted to a Member State for other purposes such 
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have to submit a single application in order to obtain the right to reside and to work in a 
Member State. However, the competence of the Member States with respect to the ad-
mission of third-country nationals to their labour markets will not be affected. The 
Directive aims to control the lawfulness of third-country nationals’ residence and em-
ployment and to close the ‘rights gap’ between EU citizens and third-country nationals 
by granting a common set of equal treatment rights to single permit holders.175 As held 
by Article 11, third-country nationals obtain the right to enter and to stay in the Mem-
ber State issuing the permit and to have free access to the entire territory of that Mem-
ber State within the limits provided for by national legislation. Furthermore, they have 
the right to exercise the employment activity authorized under the single permit. A right 
of movement to other Member States is not included. As held by Article 12, equal 
treatment shall be enjoyed in respect of working conditions, education, recognition of 
qualifications, and some other rights. Equal treatment as regards the recognition of 
diplomas is only granted in accordance with national law. Recital 15 of the preamble 
even refers to Directive 2005/36/EC and holds that qualifications obtained by single 
permit holders in another Member State should be recognized in the same way as for 
Union citizens, which means that, in principle, access to the same profession176 shall be 
granted on equal footing as to nationals of the host Member State. If the Directive enters 
into force, it remains to be seen what the effects of this Directive will be on the migra-
tion of third-country architects. 
 In any case it should be concluded that the absence of a general policy for all types 
of workers demonstrates the lack of willingness of Member States to give up their sover-
eignty in immigration matters. However, the Directives prove that progress in this area 
has been made since they all contribute to the fair treatment of third-country nationals 
by restricting the discretionary powers of the Member State to a certain extent, and by 
providing minimum standards. It should be regretted that the Directives contains sev-
eral possibilities to limit equal treatment rights on the basis of national law. With the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is expected that more legislation will be created 
granting third-country nationals stronger rights, since the Treaty provides for qualified 
majority voting in this area. 
3. Free movement of architects through the recognition of professional 
qualifications 
In the previous paragraphs, the free movement rights of economically and non-
economically active persons within and to the European Union have been described. 
                                                                                                                                                             
as students, family members, researchers and refugees, and who were subsequently granted access to the 
labour market. The Draft is also not applicable to family members of Union citizens exercising their free 
movement rights, third-country nationals and their family members who enjoy free movement rights 
equivalent to those of Union citizens on the basis of bilateral agreements, posted workers, seasonal work-
ers, au pairs, self-employed persons, long term residents under Directive 2003/109/EC, and certain other 
categories of persons listed in Article 3 (1) of the Draft.  
175 Recital 3 and 9 to the preamble of the Draft Directive.  
176 As held by Article 4 (2) of Directive 2005/36/EC, a profession is considered to be the same as that for 
which the person is qualified in the home Member State if the activities are comparable.  
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Since this thesis deals with the regulation of architects, I will focus only on the first cate-
gory. As indicated above, each Member State is allowed to decide if and how it regulates 
a profession. It follows that the qualifications which are needed to practise the profes-
sion of architect -if any- are quite different and diverse in each Member State. Neverthe-
less, professionals, whether they are workers or self-employed persons, should be able to 
move freely within the EU, subject to the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative actions on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (Ar-
ticle 45(3), Article 49 jo 52 and Article 56 jo 62 TFEU) (Article 39(3), Article 43 jo 46 
and Article 49 jo 55 EC). Furthermore on the basis of Article 79(2) TFEU (Article 63(3) 
and (4)), Directives have been created to ensure the efficient migration of third-country 
nationals to the Union, which generally entail equal treatment as regards access to em-
ployment and self-employed activity. Since it is of importance that buildings are safe, it 
is important that they are designed by competent persons in the possession of the rele-
vant knowledge and abilities. It follows that Member States will demand a certain level 
of qualifications before an individual is allowed to work as an architect on their terri-
tory. To be able to determine whether someone disposes of the required qualifications, 
Directives have been created on the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and 
other evidence of formal qualifications on the basis of Articles 46, 50 and 53 jo 62 TFEU 
(Articles 40, 44 and 47 jo 55 EC). The Directives which are relevant for architects will be 
discussed in this paragraph. In this regard it should be noted however that since this 
thesis analyses the regulation of architects, it deals with professionals who are fully 
qualified to practise the architectural profession. It follows that the recognition of pro-
fessional qualifications should be distinguished from academic recognition, which will 
be discussed in paragraph 3.5 and concerns the recognition of a foreign qualification for 
the purpose of further studies. Since the main objective of academic recognition is to 
establish whether or not the holder of the qualification is capable of continuing studies 
in a chosen direction and at a chosen level, academic recognition results in a precise, 
exhaustive comparison of the training followed by the prospective candidate in relation 
to that which is required in the host Member State. Professional recognition, on the 
other hand, concerns the knowledge and skills of a professional, and whether they are 
appropriate for the pursuit of a particular line of work. It follows that, in such cases, the 
fully qualified professional status of the candidate counts for recognition. 
3.1. Architects holding the nationality of an EU Member State 
As regards recognition for professional purposes, it is important to distinguish between 
regulated and non-regulated professions. If the profession one wishes to pursue is not 
regulated in the host state, one is subject to the rules of the labour market and the be-
haviour of that market, and not to any legal constraints with regard to the diploma. In 
such a case, the system of recognition provided for by the legal instruments (especially 
Directives) regarding the recognition of diplomas is not applicable. It follows that, in 
such cases, one does not have to apply for the recognition of qualifications, and one may 
pursue the profession in that country under the same conditions and with the same 
rights and obligations as that country’s own nationals. A profession is said to be regu-
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lated on the other hand, when there is a statutory requirement to hold a diploma or 
other occupational qualification in order to pursue the profession in question. In that 
case, the lack of the necessary national diploma constitutes a legal obstacle to gaining 
access to the profession. If one seeks recognition of a certain diploma in order to pursue 
a regulated profession (whether on an employed or self-employed basis) in a Member 
State other than the one in which the qualifications were obtained, one is covered by 
Union law which the national authorities must apply. The right of establishment, the 
freedom to provide services and the free movement of workers are fundamental princi-
ples embedded in the TFEU. In order to enable these freedoms to be exercised, several 
Directives regarding the recognition of diplomas, applicable solely to the regulated pro-
fessions, have been adopted at European level. These will be discussed later in this chap-
ter. 
 
In the ambit of professional recognition, two general programmes adopted on 18 De-
cember 1961177 made provision for Directives to abolish restrictions to the freedom of 
establishment and the provision of services for various activities. As held in paragraph 
3.2., although the Council adopted a good number of these instruments, the work was 
far from complete in 1974 when the Court decided, in Reyners and Van Binsbergen, that 
despite omissions, under the terms of the Treaty, Articles 49 and 56 TFEU (Articles 43 
and 49 EC) have direct effect from the end of the transitional period onwards, that is 
since 1 January 1970. It was held that for this reason, there was no need to continue 
creating rules relating to the abolishment of restrictions. Consequently, the pending 
Directives were withdrawn. The direct effect of these free movement rights was that EU 
nationals became entitled to be treated as nationals. Since discrimination on the basis of 
nationality is prohibited, the host Member State has to allow nationals of other Member 
States to establish themselves or to provide services on its territory under the same con-
ditions as its own nationals. However, national conditions of access to, and exercise of, 
the activities continue to apply, which still leave barriers for non-nationals, since they 
can be obliged to engage in further studies to obtain the qualifications required.178 To 
diminish these obstacles, Community measures to facilitate free movement in the EU 
were still desired. These measures should secure mutual recognition of the national 
rules and possibly their harmonisation. Measures provided for by the Treaty (see Article 
53(1) TFEU and Article 62 TFEU) (Article 47(1) and 55 EC) to facilitate freedom of 
establishment and provision of services include, firstly, the mutual recognition of the 
diplomas and other qualifications required in each country for access to the profession 
under consideration. Even though the mutual recognition of qualifications is also a 
matter of importance in the field of the free movement of workers, in the field of estab-
lishment and services, disputes over the non-recognition of qualifications occur most 
                                                                
177 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment, 31961X1202, OJ 2, 
15.1.1962, pp. 36-45; General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services, 
31961X1201, OJ 2, 15.1.1962, pp. 32-35. 
178 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts_2004/3_2_3_en.htm, last consulted 15 December 2009. 
 Even though, through the cases of Reyners and Vanbinsbergen, the Court guaranteed the equal treatment 
of citizens across Member States, neither the mutual recognition of certificates of professional competence, 
nor the coordination of training requirements was guaranteed. 
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frequently. Since national requirements concerning qualifications and diplomas can 
indeed constrain citizens of other Member States in practising their rights of establish-
ment and offering their services as guaranteed in Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, the Council 
has, on the basis of Articles 53 and 62 TFEU, adopted Directives concerning the mutual 
recognition of diplomas in order to simplify the actual practice of the right of establish-
ment and the unconstrained performance of services.179 Article 53(1) TFEU furthermore 
addresses the need to coordinate national rules on the taking-up and pursuit of a profes-
sion, involving a minimisation of harmonisation of the rules, especially on the training 
for the qualifications required.180 However, since such harmonisation is a difficult proc-
ess, the Treaty only insists on it as a precondition for mutual recognition in the case of 
the pharmaceutical profession (Article 53(2) TFEU). With regard to the architectural 
profession in particular, the major differences between national rules have prevented 
harmonization, so that only a Directive on the mutual recognition of architectural quali-
fications has been adopted. Since it only dealt with the architectural profession and since 
several other Directives were created with regard to other professions, this was referred 
to as the vertical approach. Later legislation on mutual recognition involved a more 
general approach which was valid for all regulated professions that had not previously 
been the subject of specific EC legislation. This was called the horizontal approach. The 
relevant Directives will now be discussed. 
3.1.1. Vertical approach towards the recognition of architectural qualifications 
Since no secondary legislation was created with regard to the architectural profession 
before the end of the transitional period, the ECJ decided that it should contribute to the 
development of the freedoms. The Van Binsbergen and Reyners cases are important 
examples of this policy. Later, between 1975 and 1985, the EC-institutions created a 
number of Directives to establish a minimum harmonization of education and mutual 
recognition of diplomas for the following regulated professions: doctors181, nurses182, 
dentists183, veterinarians184, midwifes185 and pharmacists186. Until the mid-80s, a vertical 
                                                                
179 Schneider 1995, p.57. 
180 The results of mutual recognition after harmonization have gone furthest in the health sector, since the 
professional requirements, and especially the training courses, do not vary much from one country to an-
other making relatively easy to harmonize them. Most health professions benefit thus from full mutual 
recognition of national access diplomas in that the qualifications listed in Community Directives can be 
exercised in any Community country with regard to the establishment and freedom of services.  
181 Council Directive 75/362/EEC of 16 June 1975 (recognition) and Council Directive 75/363/EEC of 16 June 
1975 (minimum standards), [1975] OJ L 167. 
182 Council Directive 77/452/EEC of 27 June 1977 (recognition) and Council Directive 77/453/EEC of 27 June 
1977 (minimum standards), [1977] OJ L 176, 15 July 1977. 
183 Council Directive 78/686/EEC of 25 July 1975 (recognition) and Council Directive 78/687/EEC of 25 July 
1978 (minimum standards), [1978] OJ L 233, 24 August 1978. 
184 Council Directive 78/1026/EEC of 18 December 1978 (recognition) and Council Directive 78/1027/EEC pf 
18 December 1978 (minimum standards), [1978] OJ L 362, 23 December 1978. 
185 Council Directive 80/154/EEC of 21 January 1980 (recognition) and Council Directive 80/155/EEC of 21 
January 1980 (minimum standards), [1980] OJ L 33, 11 February 1980. 
186 Council Directive 85/432/EEC of 16 September 1985 (minimum standards) and Council Directive 
85/433/EEC of 16 September 1985 (recognition) [1985] OJ L 253, 24 September 1985. 
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approach was thus used: access to each profession was regulated separately by means of 
sectoral Directives.187 Since the costs of exchanging information between identical sys-
tems are very low, it was seen as an efficient integration method: identical education 
would lead to identical diplomas.188 Directives were used to establish minimum stan-
dards and contained a list of all the diplomas which were recognized in Europe. This 
approach is called ‘harmonization’. However by laying down minimum criteria for edu-
cation, the essence of the vertical approach -the mutual recognition of the qualifications 
of individuals exercising a certain profession- was made ‘harmless’.189 Indeed, a system 
based on harmonization does not seem to be build upon trust in each other’s qualifica-
tions with an eye to recognition. For architects190 however, only a Directive regarding the 
mutual recognition of diplomas was issued. Minimum harmonisation of education was 
not provided for, due to the large differences in educational requirements and a lack of 
agreement. In this regard it should be noted that in 1959, the six national professional 
associations of architects had already organised themselves on a European level to ad-
vise the European Commission and the Council of Ministers about European measures 
which could affect them. In this way they aimed to promote the abolition of all restric-
tions concerning the mobility of architects. In 1961, the ‘Working Group Architects’, 
established by the European Commission and composed of independent experts of the 
six Member States of the European Community of that time, came together to make 
proposals for the European recognition of architects.191 In this way, a Directive for the 
harmonization of legal and administrative rules for architects was proposed, together 
with one for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of for-
mal qualifications, and one for the co-ordinations of provisions relating to the freedom 
of establishment of architects. These would be the first Directives ever to encourage the 
free movement of professionals in the European Community and would be of huge 
importance as a precedent for numerous other professions. However, the different 
Member States did not come to a concordium. While some Member States (France, Italy 
and Belgium) held the opinion that the Directives should only apply to persons holding 
a university degree, others such as Germany and the Netherlands also wanted to ap-
prove non-university education in cases where practical experience complemented the 
theoretical knowledge up to university level. Another big obstacle for getting an agree-
ment was the length of the education involved: while in France and Italy one had to 
follow theoretical courses for five years, the education at the German ‘Ingenieurschulen’ 
was comprised of three years of theoretical courses followed by three years of practical 
experience. This was unacceptable for the Italians and the French. The national associa-
tion of architects in the Netherlands192 -which was at that moment in time the only state 
within the European Community without public regulation of the profession of archi-
tect due to the vehement opposition of other actors in the building process- wanted to 
regulate the profession as strictly as possible. The fact that it was harder for Dutch archi-
                                                                
187 A regulated profession is a profession to which access is regulated by law.  
188 Dankelman 1999, p. 9. 
189 Claessens 2008, p. 26. 
190 Council Directive 85/384/EEC of 10 June 1985 (recognition), [1985] OJ L 223, 21 August 1985. 
191 Dankelman 1999, p. 103; Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat 1989, p. 437. 
192 This is the BNA (Bond der Nederlandse Architecten). 
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tects to find work in another state than vice versa stimulated the Dutch association to 
claim regulation and title protection. However, because of all the large national differ-
ences, no agreement was reached at the European level. 
 In the meantime, two Directives for the mutual recognition of doctors193 were 
adopted which contained minimum standards for the structure and content of their 
education and which served as an example for the desired architects’ Directive. Mean-
while, the accession of some new Member States (Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom) in 1972 did not make things easier in the field of architecture due to the large 
differences between the countries: the United Kingdom and Ireland were unaware of the 
structure and educational culture of the architect profession in the continental form. 
 
As held above, due to the two landmark decisions of the ECJ in the cases of Reyners194 
and Van Binsbergen195 in 1974, in which Articles 49 and 56 TFEU were held to have 
direct effect, the Commission withdrew its proposals to issue Directives concerning the 
free movement of establishment and services of EC architects. However, the issue of the 
recognition of foreign diplomas still had to be dealt with. As the second196 and third197 
enlargement of the European Community would soon take place, the Council wanted to 
place more emphasis on quality rather than on quantity requirements. Nevertheless, 
disagreements about the minimum duration of degree programmes continued to domi-
nate the decision-making process. Those Member States requiring a lengthy education 
were afraid that reduced emphasis on the quantity aspect would lead to a quality dete-
rioration leading to low European standards.198 Furthermore, for Germany, where the 
education at the Fachhochschulen was held to be equivalent to a university education, an 
acknowledgement of the universities and not of the Fachhochschulen (3 year education) 
on a European level was unacceptable. The Italians, on the other hand, did not want to 
back down due to the length of the Italian education process and its severe regulations. 
Another problem was that the engineers who had set up their own European interest 
organisation -le Comité Européen des Ingénieurs Conseils (CEDIC )- wanted to be in-
cluded in the Architects’ Directive because of their close cooperation. The Dutch BNA 
on the other hand, supported the European recognition of architects because this consti-
tuted the only way to have the profession regulated in the Netherlands after the with-
drawal of the Dutch bill for the protection of the title of architect. 
 
Finally, on 10 June 1985, Council Directive 85/384/EEC saw the light of day.199 This 
involved the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications in architecture (hereafter: the Architects’ Directive), including measures 
to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide 
                                                                
193 Directives 75/362/EEC and 75/363/EEC. 
194 Case C-2/74 Reyners v. Belgium. 
195 Case C-33/74 Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid.  
196 Greece became a new Member State in 1981. 
197 Portugal and Spain joined the EC in 1986. 
198 Dankelman 1999, p. 115.  
199 The text of the Directive has been amended on several occasions, specifically due to the accession of new 
Member States. 
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services. It was the result of lengthy, difficult negotiations which lasted almost eighteen 
years, and was based upon Articles 46, 53 and 62 TFEU (Articles 40, 47 and 55 EC). As 
noted above, unlike the Directives which recognized medical qualifications, the Archi-
tects’ Directive was adopted without an accompanying Directive laying down minimum 
training requirements for architects (there was no coordination of national provisions 
relating to education and training) but merely provided for qualitative and quantitative 
criteria which were needed for a diploma to be recognized at the Community level. As 
concluded by the Commission, “The length of the negotiations which culminated in the 
adoption of Directive 85/384/EEC and its distinctive character in relation to the Direc-
tives recognizing the qualifications of certain medical professions reflect the fact that 
architecture is a complex, sensitive and problematic area. The main reason for these 
difficulties was the sometimes very pronounced differences between regulations in the 
field in the Member States. The enlargements of 1973 and 1981 meant that four addi-
tional legal structures had to be taken into account200, and this initially made the negotia-
tions even more complex. Moreover, architecture was not regulated in some of the old 
Member States (Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, plus Norway in an EEA con-
text). In other Member States (including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
Germany) only the title of architect is protected. Lastly, in yet other Member States 
(including Spain, Belgium and France) the title of architect is protected and, in addition 
(with a few rare exceptions) architects enjoy a monopoly in pursuing their activity. 
What is more, architects’ responsibilities and obligations vary greatly from one Member 
State to another. The difficulties caused by these sometimes very substantial differences 
in the way the profession is regulated and in the field of architecture itself explain why 
Directive 85/384/EEC does not contain a precise definition of architecture (see the sev-
enth, ninth and tenth recitals and Article 1(2))”201. In this regard, Part II of this thesis 
discusses the differences between the regulations in Belgium and the Netherlands on a 
public law and private law level. Recognition of qualifications under the Architects’ 
Directive applies only in so far as the holders of such qualifications are authorized to 
take up activities under the professional title of architect.202 It affirmed the fundamental 
principles of equivalence of diplomas if certain quantitative and qualitative require-
ments were fulfilled, and their mutual recognition by Member States.203 The principle 
that governed the implementation of Directive 85/384/EEC was the automatic recogni-
tion of diplomas in conjunction with the implication of the Court’s ruling in the Vlas-
                                                                
200 For many years the requirement of unanimity in the Council slowed the process. Now the co-decision 
procedure generally applies (Article 294 TFEU). 
201 Report from the Commission Review, on the basis of experience, of Council Directive 85/384/EEC of 10 
June 1985 pursuant to Article 30 thereof, p. 2. 
202 Article 1 (2) Directive 85/384/EEC.  
203 As held by Article 2, each Member State has to recognize the diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
formal qualifications acquired as a result of education and training and awarded to nationals of Member 
States by other Member States, by giving such diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifi-
cations, as regards the right to take up activities referred to in Article 1 and pursue them under the profes-
sional title of architect pursuant to Article 23 (1), the same effect in its territory as those awarded by the 
Member State itself. The quantitative and qualitative requirements can be found in Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Directive.  
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sopoulou case for various types of architectural training which are perfectly lawful, but 
which do not comply with the Directive. 
 Since the Architects’ Directive was replaced by Directive 2005/36/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications, the latter Directive will primarily be discussed within this thesis.204 
However, numerous references will be made to Directive 85/384/EEC in order to com-
pare the content of both Directives and to determine whether the new Directive con-
tains some extra safeguards for architects enjoying their free movement rights. How-
ever, between 1985 and 2005, other initiatives have been taken as well on a horizontal 
level. These will be discussed initially in the following paragraph.  
3.1.2. Horizontal approach towards the recognition of professional qualifications 
Due to the limited scope of the vertical harmonisation method and the difficult and 
time-consuming negotiations, attempts were made to create an environment of mutual 
trust with regard to foreign diplomas so that there would be no need for harmoniza-
tion.205 The sectoral approach was considered to be too rigid and tiresome, since every 
technical change in a Member State such as the introduction of a new education process 
or specialisation had to be processed into the recognition system which caused many 
difficulties such as a formal change in the text of the guidelines. The new system was 
based on the premise that the programmes of study and training through which people 
in the various Member States prepare themselves for a particular regulated profession 
are, in principle, of equal validity. Article 165(4) TFEU (Article 149(4) EC) which was 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, now even explicitly prohibits any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States. This new approach was strengthened by 
the abovementioned rulings of the ECJ in Reyners and Van Binsbergen. Recognition was 
not considered separately for each different profession, but for a group of professions 
for which the duration of education was the same. The regulations in the home country 
were applicable, even in cases of cross border trade, instead of the regulations in the 
receiving country. Mutual recognition without preceding harmonisation was the new 
technique to be used.206 This new line of reasoning, which actually, as early as 1974, was 
expressed by the Council in a non-binding resolution207, was reaffirmed by the European 
Council in 1984 in Fontainebleu, where it held that a new, more general approach to-
wards the recognition of higher-education diplomas was necessary, and would certainly 
be necessary in the light of the admission of new Member States. This was concretized 
by the creation of the following Directives: Directive 89/48/EEC208 on a general system 
for the recognition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of profes-
                                                                
204 See paragraph 3.3.1.2. 
205 The principle of mutual trust was based on the Court’s ruling in Case C- 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v.  
 Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon); Schneider 1995.  
206 See COM (85) 310, June 1985. 
207 [1974] OJ C 98/1. 
208 Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of higher-
education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years’ 
duration, OJ L 019 , 24 January 1989, pp. 16-23. 
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sional education and training of at least three years’ duration; Directive 92/51/EEC209 on 
a second general system for the recognition of professional education and training to 
supplement Directive 89/48/EEC and Directive 99/42/EEC210, establishing a mechanism 
for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional activities covered by 
the Directives on liberalisation and transitional measures, and supplementing the gen-
eral systems for the recognition of qualifications. These two Directives were both 
amended by Directive 2001/19/EC211 on the general system for the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications which also amended Directives 77/452/EEC, 77/453/EEC, 
78/686/EEC, 78/687/EEC, 78/1026/EEC, 78/1027/EEC, 80/154/EEC, 80/155/EEC, 
85/384/EEC, 85/432/EEC, 85/433/EEC and 93/16/EEC212 concerning the professions of 
nurse responsible for general care, dental practitioner, veterinary surgeon, midwife, 
architect, pharmacist and doctor. In 2005, Directives 89/48/EEC, 92/51/EEC, 
1999/42/EC, 2001/19/EC, as well as all the sectoral Directives which have been referred 
to above, were replaced by Directive 2005/36/EC. 
 
Directive 89/48/EEC established a common system for the recognition of diplomas and 
other higher education qualifications over three years in duration. The Directive con-
cerned regulated professions and was complemented by Directive 92/51/EEC which 
dealt with diplomas obtained after a shorter education period and amended by general 
Directive 2001/19/EC. As indicated above, which professions are regulated varies from 
one country to another. Access to non-regulated professions is not governed by the 
Directives. Access to these professions is, and will remain, free. Directive 89/48/EEC was 
created on the basis of Articles 40, 47(1) and 55 EC (Articles 46, 53(1) and 62 TFEU) 
and differed from the previous sectoral Directives because it applied to all regulated 
professions for which university-level training of at least three years duration was re-
quired, and which were not covered by a specific Directive, such as the Architects’ Di-
rective. It foresaw that diplomas were to be mutually recognised and that recognition 
was based on the principle of mutual trust, without prior coordination of the prepara-
tory educational and training courses for the various professions in question. As a basic 
principle, a host Member State could not refuse entry to a regulated profession to a 
national of a Member State who held the qualifications necessary for exercise of that 
profession in another Member State. This is due to the fact that the system was based on 
                                                                
209 Council Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a second general system for the recognition of profes-
sional education and training to supplement Directive 89/48/EEC, OJ L 209, 24 July 1992, pp. 25-45. 
210 Directive 1999/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 June 1999 establishing a mecha-
nism for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional activities covered by the Directives 
on liberalisation and transitional measures and supplementing the general systems for the recognition of 
qualifications, OJ L 201, 31 July 1999, pp. 77-93. 
211 Directive 2001/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2001 amending Council 
Directives 89/48/EEC and 92/51/EEC on the general system for the recognition of professional qualifica-
tions and Council Directives 77/452/EEC, 77/453/EEC, 78/686/EEC, 78/687/EEC, 78/1026/EEC, 
78/1027/EEC, 80/154/EEC, 80/155/EEC, 85/384/EEC, 85/432/EEC, 85/433/EEC and 93/16/EEC concern-
ing the professions of nurse responsible for general care, dental practitioner, veterinary surgeon, midwife, 
architect, pharmacist and doctor, OJ L 206, 31 July 2001, pp. 1-51 
212 Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to facilitate the free movement of doctors and the mutual 
recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications, OJ L 165 of 7 July 
1993.  
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the premise that the programmes of study and training through which people in the 
various Member States prepare themselves for a particular regulated profession are, in 
principle, of equal validity. As long as certain minimum conditions were met, comple-
tion of any of these programmes should provide access to the same regulated profession 
in any Member State. A person who, in one Member State, was sufficiently qualified to 
practise a particular profession could, in principle, also be allowed access to the same 
profession in another Member State, even if the study programmes in question differed 
to some extent in terms of duration and/or content. Member States should accept each 
other’s qualifications without insisting that they represent exactly the same knowledge 
and skills in all respects. If recognition took place, this entailed that one could practise 
the profession, subject to the same laws, regulations, administrative provisions and 
codes of practice as nationals of the host Member State. It should be noted however, that 
the general system did not provide for an automatic guarantee to those holding certain 
qualifications obtained in a Member State. Compliance with the criteria set out in Direc-
tive 89/48/EEC213 guaranteed only a starting point for the person wishing to practise a 
trade or profession, and the qualification held by that person was subject to scrutiny and 
control by the authorities of the host Member State. Member States were therefore still 
able to supervise every step in the recognition process. However, even if one did not 
possess the appropriate national diploma, the authorities of the host Member State 
should authorize the pursuance of the profession on its territory if one held the required 
diploma in the member state of origin. If applicants had the qualifications required in 
their country of origin, the host Member State could not refuse access to the occupation 
in question. Nevertheless, a certain length of professional experience in the relevant 
profession could be demanded if their training had a shorter duration than the training 
in the host state.214 Furthermore, if there were major differences in education and train-
ing, or in the structure of a profession, the Directive provided for compensation mecha-
nisms such as an adaptation period or an aptitude test.215 The application of a compensa-
tory measure could only be imposed after an individual review of an applicant’s knowl-
edge and experience demonstrated that the candidate did not have the required knowl-
edge and/or skills. It can be stated that Directive 89/48/EEC is a codification of the Vlas-
sopoulou judgment of the ECJ. In this regard is should be noted that it was possible that 
a particular profession was of a higher education level in one state while it was outside 
the higher education system in another state. It followed that a profession which was 
covered by the first general Directive (Directive 89/48/EEC) in some countries was cov-
ered by the second Directive (Directive 92/51/EEC) in other countries. In such cases, the 
education and training could nevertheless lead to a comparable level of professional 
competence and prepare individuals for the equivalent responsibilities. If that was in-
deed the case, the competence should be approved by the host country. If not, the host 
Member State could demand that a compensation measure should be imposed after 
having proved that there was indeed a substantial difference. Furthermore, in case the 
                                                                
213 The person should have pursued the equivalent of a three-year higher-education course in the Community 
and should have completed the necessary professional training in order to be qualified to take up the ‘regu-
lated profession’ in question. Likewise criteria were specified in the other general system Directives. 
214 See Article 4 (1) (a) of Directive 89/48/EEC and Article 4 (1) (a) of Directive 92/51/EEC. 
215 Bull. EC 6-1988, 11. The same principle was laid down in Directive 92/51/EEC.  
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profession in question was only regulated in the country in which the person wanted to 
work, but not in the country where he or she received the training, the competent au-
thority could require evidence that this person had at least two year of relevant profes-
sional experience within the last ten years, and possessed evidence of certain formal 
qualifications which prepared the holder for the pursuit of the profession.216 If the pro-
fession comprised specific regulated activities in the host state which did not form part 
of the profession as regulated in the Member State where the qualification was obtained, 
the host state was permitted to require the completion of an adaptation period or an 
aptitude test.217 
 
This general system permitted unrestricted professional movement for some 800 regu-
lated professions in Europe, ranging from engineers to bakers, chiropodists, taxi drivers 
and geologists218, while each Member State remained competent for regulating the pro-
fession in question on its territory, and was thus free to determine the content and the 
level of training required for the professions concerned to operate on their territory. 
Nevertheless access to a regulated profession must be permitted to any European citizen 
who is fully qualified to practise the same profession in another Member State. In this 
regard it is important to note that recognition can only be granted to the ‘end product’, 
i.e. to fully qualified professionals who have already received certain professional train-
ing (if this was required to be able to practise the profession) in addition to their univer-
sity diplomas. Just as with the vertical system of recognition, this horizontal system 
therefore applied to nationals who were fully qualified to pursue a given occupation in 
their own Member State and who wished to pursue the same occupation in the host 
Member State. As noted above, this profession had to be regulated in the host Member 
State and could not be covered by any other (vertical) recognition system. The horizon-
tal system was, in principle, thus not applicable to architects who fell under the ambit of 
Directive 85/384/EEC.219 Garden and landscape architects, town planners and interior 
architects to whom Directive 85/384/EEC was not applicable, could invoke the provi-
sions of the horizontal Directives to obtain recognition of their qualifications. In any 
case, under the general system, there was no list of diplomas which would automatically 
be recognised at European level, since a diploma was not recognized for its intrinsic 
value, but according to the profession to which it gave access. It follows that recognition 
depended on the profession to which the diploma gave access in the host Member State. 
Study programmes were therefore not harmonized in advance since the system was not 
designed for citizens wishing to study in another Member State, and seeking recognition 
of their diplomas for academic purposes. It follows that recognition still had to be for-
mally requested from the competent authority in the host country. Even though the 
training and educational requirements were fulfilled, an individual had to specify clearly 
which occupation he wished to pursue in his application for professional recognition. 
The recognition granted constituted the right to pursue a specific regulated profession 
                                                                
216 See Article 3 of Directive 89/48/EEC and Article 3 of Directive 92/51/EEC. 
217 See Article 4 (1) (b) of Directive 89/48/EEC and Article 4 (1) (b) of Directive 92/51/EEC. 
218 ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smn/smn39/docs/specialfeature_en.pdf, last consulted, 31 December 2009. 
219 It was held that it could give more protection for the observance of quality, health-care and security issues. 
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under the same conditions as the holders of national diplomas, but did not encompass 
that the diploma was regarded as equivalent to a national diploma for other purposes.220 
 It can be concluded that under the horizontal recognition system, access to a regu-
lated profession should be permitted to any European citizen who was fully qualified to 
practise the same profession in another Member State. Due to the lack of coordination 
of training requirements, automatic recognition could not take place which encom-
passed that if there were substantial differences between the training in the home and 
host Member State, an adaptation period or a test could be required. As will be dis-
cussed later in this thesis, the vertical system under Directive 85/384/EEC also entailed 
no harmonization of minimum training requirements. It did however foresee the auto-
matic recognition of professional qualifications which is currently provided for by 
Chapter III of Title III of Directive 2005/36/EC. However, the numerous cases which 
were brought before the ECJ demonstrated that Member States often lost sight of the 
general rule of mutual recognition of diplomas and instead, turned their focus solely on 
adding supplemental requirements in order to recognise foreign qualifications.221 Since 
there will still be cases in which the education or training received does not fall within 
the scope of either the three general Directives or the earlier sectoral Directives, for 
example, if it concerns professions which are unregulated in the host Member State or 
in the case that a certain qualification is not included within the relevant sectoral Direc-
tive, the rulings in Heylens and Vlassopoulou on the direct effect of Article 49 TFEU in 
the context of mutual recognition have not lost their relevance. In such cases, the 
knowledge and qualifications already acquired or recognized in another Member State 
should always be taken into account. 
 
Directives 89/48/EEC, 92/51/EEC, 1999/42/EC and 2001/19/EEC222 have now been re-
placed by Directive 2005/36/EC. Since they have never been applicable to fully fledged 
architects who fall under Directive 85/384/EEC, these Directives will not be further 
discussed. Most of these vertical Directives were also replaced by the new Directive 
2005/36/EC. This Directive, also called ‘the Professional Qualifications Directive’, will 
now be discussed in detail since it is the only Directive which is nowadays applicable to 
the recognition of the architectural profession. 
3.1.3. Directive 2005/36/EC 
1. Introduction 
Under the sectoral Directives, for all professions (with the exception of architects) 
automatic recognition was supported by the minimum co-ordination of training. With 
regard to this co-ordination, the necessary requirements were created by the Parliament 
and the Council acting in accordance with the co-decision procedure. In its explanatory 
                                                                
220 http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/rec_qual/recognition/in_en.html, last consulted on 15 December 
2009. 
221 Schneider 1995. Recently the situation has considerably improved and it is held that, on average, 80% of 
demands for recognition result in a positive decision, with no need for compensatory measures. See 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smn/smn39/docs/specialfeature_en.pdf, last consulted on 15 December 2009. 
222 This Directive incorporated the Vlassopoulou ruling in Directive 89/48/EEC.  
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memorandum to Directive 2005/36/EC, the Commission held that since account should 
be taken of the increasing pace of development of society and technology in the applica-
tion of procedures designed to maintain the relevance of the technical provisions under-
lying the general rules set out in EU law, technical updating of some requirements could 
be achieved more appropriately through the exercise of delegated powers. The sectoral 
Directives were considered to be unnecessarily inflexible and the technicalities specific 
to their application should appear in annexes and, when suitable, be subject to up-
dating through the exercise of delegated powers. These are laid down in Chapter III of 
Title III of the new Directive. The general system applies to professions where there is 
no harmonisation of minimum training requirements, and which is also applicable to 
sectoral professions where the specialisation or the formal qualifications for architects 
are not listed in Annex V of Directive 2005/36/EC (Chapter I of Title III of the Direc-
tive). It is also applicable to professions which would normally benefit from automatic 
recognition, but where the migrant does not fulfil the requirements for automatic rec-
ognition. It applies to crafts professions whenever the conditions of professional experi-
ence are not met (Chapter II of Title III of the Directive). It was held that, due to the 
upcoming enlargement, recognition rules should be simplified by the abolition of the 
different Directives referred to above. 
2. Towards Directive 2005/36/EC 
In accordance with Articles 165 and 166 TFEU, Member States are responsible for the 
content of teaching and the organization of education systems and vocational training. 
It follows that national differences exist which produce barriers to the free movement of 
workers, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. In the light 
of the subsidiarity principle, common rules were necessary to ensure that qualifications 
obtained by nationals of a certain Member State would be recognized in other Member 
States. In this way, Directives were adopted in accordance with the proportionality prin-
ciple, binding the Member States as to the result to be achieved, but leaving them the 
choice of the form and the most suitable methods of achieving that result. As noted 
above, for certain regulated professions, a vertical approach was adopted in the past with 
regard to the creation of legislation on the mutual recognition of professional qualifica-
tions. This enabled automatic recognition of qualifications without compensation ar-
rangements since, for most professions223, training procedures were previously harmo-
nised in the Member States. However, these Directives which were limited in number 
compared with the number of regulated professions, necessitated lengthy negotiations, 
were extremely complex and were incapable of being adapted to the growing number of 
professions. They were subsequently amended to bring their provisions into line with 
those of the new Directives based on the horizontal approach, before being absorbed 
into Directive 2005/36/EC. 
 
The 1993 White Paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’ had already 
singled out the adaptation of education and vocational training systems as one of the 
measures necessary for developing the European economy, seeing it as a key element for 
                                                                
223 However, this was not the case for architects. 
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the creation of a genuine European area and a market for qualifications and skills. The 
1999 Bologna declaration and the Council of Ministers of Education in Prague of 18 and 
19 May 2001 underlined the European commitment to introducing policies designed to 
facilitate access to education and continuous high quality training to improve the trans-
parency of qualifications and diplomas in order to achieve sustainable professional mo-
bility. 
 Following the European Council of Lisbon on 23 and 24 March 2000, which set a 
very ambitious goal for the development of the Union, with important economic, social 
and environmental implications, the Commission adopted a Communication on an 
Internal Market Strategy for Services224 which aimed in particular at making the free 
provision of services within the Community as simple as within an individual Member 
State. The overall objective for the advancement of the Union should be “to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge based society in the world by the year 2010”. 
In terms of this political and competition policy goal, all EU countries share an interest. 
By modernising the services sector where needed, they hoped to generate more growth 
and employment in the economy.225 
 After the Commission achieved a considerable consolidation of the 35 transitional 
Directives concerning crafts and trades professions through the third General System 
Directive (Directive 1999/42/EC – referred to above), the subsequent adoption of Direc-
tive 2001/19/EC226 which was created in the light of the SLIM (Simpler Legislation for 
the Internal Market) strategy, further simplified the legal and procedural regime for 
professional recognition. However, even then there continued to exist some twelve main 
Directives covering seven professions (within which was included the Architects’ Direc-
tive) plus three ‘horizontal’ Directives. As noted above, the piecemeal fashion in which 
the rules on professional recognition evolved, and the detailed variations in different 
parts of the legislation, provided the system with many difficulties and criticisms. 
 After the Communication from the Commission entitled ‘New European Labour 
Markets, Open to All, with Access to All’227, the European Council of Stockholm on 23 
and 24 March 2001 entrusted the Commission the task of presenting specific proposals 
for a more uniform, transparent and flexible regime for the recognition of qualifications. 
Furthermore, the Commission had to take action to ensure that citizens could get com-
prehensive information and advice, specific to their individual interest and rights. This 
had to be realized before the 2002 Spring European Council would begin. 
 In May 2001, at the time of the adoption of Directive 2001/19/EC on professional 
recognition, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agreed on the 
importance of consolidated versions, easily accessible to everyone, of the legal texts 
applicable in the field of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. The 
Commission intended to integrate the sectoral Directives into a consolidated framework 
and further planned to examine the possibility of consolidating the Directives into the 
general system. The numerous Directives on professional recognition which existed 
                                                                
224 COM (2000) 888. 
225 Comments and concluding remarks of former Commissioner Monti at the Conference on Professional 
Regulation, European Commission Centre Borschette, Brussels, 28 October 2003. 
226 Directive 2001/19/EC [2001] OJ L 206/1.  
227 COM (2001) 116. 
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contained numerous parallel provisions and variations which made them very difficult 
to understand or to apply correctly. A single Directive would make the Community 
system easier to manage and would be clearer, quicker, friendlier and more transparent 
for users. Better regulations and clearer governance would help to prepare for enlarge-
ment. 
 Accordingly, in its 2002 Action Plan for Skills and Mobility228, the Commission, 
motivated by the Lisbon strategy to promote a more dynamic and competitive economy 
in Europe, held that Community Institutions and Member States should facilitate em-
ployment opportunities. The Communication on an Internal Market Strategy for Ser-
vices which was adopted at the end of 2000, drew attention to the importance of services 
in the general economy, the new opportunities and practices developing out of new 
information and communications technologies, and the need to facilitate conditions of 
cross-frontier service provision Community-wide. To ensure that employment vacan-
cies would be filled by qualified applicants and that there would be a regular supply of 
qualified service suppliers to meet market demand, Directive 2005/36/EC was pro-
posed229 by the Commission and submitted to the Parliament, pursuant to Article 294 
TFEU (Article 251 EC) and Articles 46 and 53 TFEU (Articles 40 and 47 EC), in March 
2002. In its explanatory memorandum, the Commission stipulated that the free move-
ment of qualified professionals makes a particular contribution to the knowledge-based 
society and that it had particular importance in cases of specific shortages of qualified 
personnel. This proposal aimed to clarify and simplify the existing rules in order to 
facilitate the free movement of qualified persons between the Member States, particu-
larly in view of an enlarged European Union.230 The proposal took account of the view-
points of a myriad of interested parties including professionals and professional associa-
tions, and maintained the safeguards which were offered by the various existing recogni-
tion systems while strengthening them with a number of new rules. In this way, a more 
flexible and automatic procedure was introduced, based on common platforms estab-
lished by professional associations at the European level, stemming from increased co-
operation between public and private sectors. Furthermore, the proposal involved a 
simplification of the management and an updating of the rules, particularly in view of 
technological progress. In addition, it provided for co-operation amongst national ad-
ministrations and amongst national administrations and the Commission. Citizens 
could be informed and advised more easily in the event that they encountered difficul-
ties with regard to the recognition of their professional qualifications.231 
 The Economic and Social Committee was consulted by the Council on the basis of 
Article 304 TFEU (Article 262 EC). The section for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Citizenship was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, ex-
pressed its opinion on 4 September 2002. Not long thereafter, on 18 and 19 September, 
the Economic and Social Committee, representing organized civil society, including the 
                                                                
228 COM (2002) 72. 
229 COM (2002) 119 – 2002/0061 (COD), OJ C. 181 E, 30.7.2002, p. 183. 
230 http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/393&format=HTML&aged=1&-
language= EN&guiLanguage=en, last consulted 2 January 2008.  
231 http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/resume.jsp?id=220062&eventId=53758&backToCaller=NO&language-
=en, last consulted 23 December 2009. 
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social partners and thereby also professionals and consumers, adopted its opinion dur-
ing its 393rd Plenary Session. The Commission’s proposal was warmly welcomed since 
education and training, the development of the human resources and the development 
of the labour markets and their functioning, were considered to be the most important 
fields of action in order to achieve the Lisbon objective. 
 On 11 February 2004, the Commission welcomed the European Parliament’s opin-
ion at first reading. An amended proposal was published in April and in December of 
that same year, and the Commission supported the political agreement of the Council 
which retained the Commission’s proposal as amended by the new proposal.232 On 28th 
April 2005 the ‘Recommendation for Second Reading on the Council’s common posi-
tion for adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
recognition of professional qualifications’ was delivered after a number of informal 
contacts between the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Article 251(2) EC and the joint declaration on practical 
arrangements for the codecision procedure. It should be underlined that, throughout 
this whole process, the Commission did not advocate complete deregulation. Instead, 
careful re-regulation was called for. 
 On 11 May 2005, the European Parliament voted in favour of the new Directive. 
Not long after, on 17 May 2005, it was followed by the publication of the Outcome of the 
European Parliament’s second reading, which took place in Strasbourg from 9 to 12 
May. It contained some minor adjustments to the initial proposal, but had the same 
spirit. 
 On 7 September 2005, Directive 2005/36/EC was finally adopted.233 It entered into 
force on 20 October 2005. Member States had two years to implement the Directive into 
national law.  This period ended on 20 October 2007. 
3. Content of Directive 2005/36/EC 
Directive 2005/36/EC replaced fifteen existing Directives in the field of the recognition 
of professional qualifications: Council Directive 89/48/EEC, 92/51/EEC, as well as Di-
rective 1999/42/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the general 
system for the recognition of professional qualifications, and Council Directives 
77/452/EEC, 77/453/EEC, 78/686/EEC, 78/687/EEC, 78/1026/EEC, 78/1027/EEC, 
80/154/EEC, 80/155/EEC, 85/384/EEC, 85/432/EEC, 85/433/EEC and 93/16/EEC con-
cerning the professions of nurses responsible for general care, dental practitioners, vet-
erinary surgeons, midwives, architects, pharmacists and doctors, by combining them in 
a single text. Therefore, the proposal constituted the first comprehensive modernization 
of the Community system since it was conceived forty years earlier.234 
                                                                
232 The importance of freeing up all markets and removing unnecessary regulation to promote greater compe-
tition was underlined by the Kok Report in November 2004: See: Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy 
for growth and employment, Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, November 2004. 
233 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recogni-
tion of professional qualifications. 
234 The provisions of the Directive do not apply to those regulated professions already covered by other 
instruments of Community law. The specific Directives on the provision of services and establishment of 
lawyers, Directives 77/249/EEC and 98/5/EC, are not covered by this exercise, since they concern the rec-
ognition, not of professional qualifications, but of the authorisation to practice. Recognition of lawyer’s 
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 Since the objectives of this Directive, namely the rationalization, simplification and 
improvement of the rules for the recognition of professional qualifications, cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at EU 
level, the Directive was adopted in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set 
out in Article 5(3) TEU (Article 5(2) EC). Nevertheless, in its first reading, the European 
Parliament stated that the system for the recognition of professional qualifications is not 
intended either to modify the professional rules, including ethical rules, that apply to 
anyone pursuing a profession in a Member State, or to interfere with the Member States’ 
legitimate interests in preventing any of their citizens from evading the applicable na-
tional legal provisions relating to the professions. It follows that, in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, as set out in Article 5(4) TEU, the Directive does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives (recital 40). 
 
The legal bases of the Directive are Articles 46 TFEU (workers), 53 TFEU (establish-
ment) and 62 TFEU (services). It is subdivided into six Titles, preceded by an extensive 
and important preamble. Title I lays down the General Provisions, including the rele-
vant definitions and scope of the Directive. Title II lays down the provisions relating to 
the Free Provisions of Services, whilst Title III relates to Freedom of Establishment. 
Under this heading a “general system for the recognition of evidence of training”, is 
established (Chapter I). This relates to all professions which are not covered by Chapters 
II and III of the Directive. Chapter II contains a system on automatic recognition of 
qualifications attested by professional experience in certain industrial, craft and com-
mercial activities, while Chapter III contains a system of automatic recognition of quali-
fications for the professions of doctor, nurse, dentist, veterinary surgeon, midwife, 
pharmacist and architect. Hereunder the most relevant provisions will be discussed. 
a. General provisions (Title I) 
As held by Article 1, the Directive establishes rules according to which a Member State 
that makes access to or pursuit of a regulated profession in its territory contingent upon 
possession of specific professional qualifications -i.e. qualifications attested by evidence 
of formal qualifications, an attestation of competence- shall recognize professional 
qualifications obtained in one or more other Member States, and which allow the holder 
of the said qualification to pursue the same profession there for access to and pursuit of 
that profession. As noted before, a regulated profession is a professional activity or 
group of professional activities, access to which, the pursuit of which, or one of the 
modes of pursuit of which, is subject, directly or indirectly, by virtue of legislative, regu-
latory or administrative provisions to the possession of specific professional qualifica-
tions. In particular, the use of a professional title limited by legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provisions to holders of a given professional qualification shall constitute 
a mode of pursuit (Article 3(1)(a)). Although the Directive focuses on regulated profes-
sions, it will de facto encompass both regulated and non-regulated professions, and 
professions based on both shorter and longer periods of education, particularly because 
                                                                                                                                                             
qualifications was governed by Directive 89/48/EEC, and is thus covered by the new Directive 2005/36/EC 
(see recital 42).  
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a lot of professions are regulated in some EU countries and not regulated in other 
Member States. 
 
Article 2 of the Directive defines its scope. According to Article 2(1), the Directive shall 
apply to all nationals of a Member State wishing to pursue a regulated profession in a 
Member State, including those belonging to the liberal professions, other than that in 
which they obtained their professional qualifications, on either a self-employed or em-
ployed235 basis. The liberal professions are, as a professional group, characterized by the 
requirement to have a particular professional qualification. As held by the Commission 
in its written observations in Urbing-Adam236, the liberal professions (mentioned in 
Annex F(2) of the Sixth Directive237) fulfil activities which, inter alia, are of a marked 
intellectual character, require a high-level qualification and are usually subject to clear 
and strict professional regulation. In the exercise of such an activity, the personal ele-
ment is of special importance and such exercise always involves a large measure of inde-
pendence in the accomplishment of the professional activities. As held by recital 43, 
liberal professions are those practised on the basis of relevant professional qualifications 
in a personal, responsible and professionally independent capacity by those providing 
intellectual and conceptual services in the interest of the client and the public. The exer-
cise of the profession might be subject in the Member States, in conformity with the 
Treaty, to specific legal constraints, based on national legislation and on the statutory 
provisions laid down autonomously, within that framework, by the respective profes-
sional representative bodies, aimed at safeguarding and developing their professional-
ism and quality of service and the confidentiality of relations with the client. Even 
though liberal professions are occupations requiring special training in the liberal arts or 
sciences, such as lawyers, notaries, engineers, architects, doctors and accountants, it is 
not possible to establish an exhaustive list; different professions in different countries 
fall within this special category of service providers, ranging from journalists in Italy to 
oral hygienists in Finland.238 This does not stand in the way of architects practising their 
profession as an employee (worker). As stated before, the Directive is also based on 
Article 40 EC (Article 46 TFEU) dealing with the free movement of workers. 
 
Since the recognition of a professional qualification enables beneficiaries to gain access 
in the host Member State to the regulated profession in which they are qualified, and to 
practise it under the same conditions as nationals of that state (Article 4(1)), this guar-
antee is without prejudice to compliance by the migrant professional with any non-
discriminatory conditions of pursuit which might be laid down by the host state, pro-
vided that these are objectively justified and proportionate (recital 3). It follows that a 
                                                                
235 See Article 29 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
236 Case C-267/99 Christiane Urbing-Adam c. Administration de l’enregistrement et des domaines [2001] 
ECR I-7467, paragraph 39. 
237 Council Directive 77/388/EC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, OJ 1977 L 
145, p. 1. 
238 Commission Services Working Document, Regulation in Liberal Professions and its Effects: Invitation to 
comment, Brussels, 27 March 2003, p. 3. 
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migrant professional may have to comply with certain conditions in the host state which 
would not be imposed on him in his state of origin. However, the extra requirements to 
be fulfilled by these migrant professionals may not differ from the criteria to which the 
host country nationals are subjected. In any case, the profession which the applicant 
wishes to pursue in the host Member State for the purposes of this Directive, is the same 
as that for which he is qualified in his home Member State if the activities covered are 
comparable (Article 4(2)). 
 
Since discrimination based on residence is not allowed, recital 12 makes sure that a 
citizen who wishes to use a professional qualification obtained in one Member State in 
order to pursue the profession in a Member State where he does not fulfil the require-
ments imposed at national level as a condition of pursuing the profession in question, 
will be able to do so only if recognition is not simply a means of evading more stringent 
national rules. In practice, such a person will have to prove that, in the State in which he 
obtained his professional qualification, he genuinely extended his own professional 
training. Prohibition of this practice, known as “zigzagging”, is consistent with the 
Commission’s interpretation of existing Directives. It follows that the Directive does not 
concern the recognition by Member States of recognition decisions adopted by other 
Member States pursuant to this Directive. In other words, if Member State X awarded 
professional qualification Z on its territory through the mere recognition and/or the 
acknowledgement of the qualifications awarded to applicants in member State Y (quali-
fications which the State Y does not consider to be sufficient to pursue the profession on 
its territory), the abovementioned applicant may not apply for recognition of his profes-
sional qualification Z in Member State Y if he cannot prove that he has really improved 
his training through the acquisition of further professional training and/or experience in 
Member State X.239 Consequently, individuals holding professional qualifications which 
have been recognized pursuant to this Directive may not use such recognition to obtain 
in their Member State of origin rights which are different from those conferred by the 
professional qualifications obtained in that Member State, unless they provide evidence 
that they have obtained additional professional qualifications in the host Member State 
(see also recital 12). Consequently, the Directive does not concern itself with recognition 
by Member States of recognition decisions adopted by other Member States. 
 
It is important to note that where, for a given regulated profession, other specific ar-
rangements directly related to the recognition of professional qualifications are estab-
lished in a separate instrument of Community law, the corresponding provisions of this 
Directive shall not apply (Article 2(3)). If more specific legislation is applicable, the 
Professional Qualifications Directive should thus not be applied. 
 
Finally, mention should be made of the fact that even though the Directive concerns the 
recognition by Member States of professional qualifications acquired in other Member 
                                                                
239 Explanation of the European Parliament in its recommendation for Second Reading on the Council com-
mon position for adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the recognition 
of professional qualifications ( 13781/2/2004 – C6-0008/2005 – 2002/0061(COD)). 
  Chapter 3  
101 
States, it does not create an obstacle to the possibility of Member States recognizing, in 
accordance with their rules, the professional qualifications acquired outside the territory 
of the European Union by third-country nationals (recital 10). Article 2(2) foresees that 
each Member State may permit Member State nationals in possession of evidence of 
professional qualifications not obtained in a Member State, to pursue a regulated profes-
sion on its territory, in accordance with its rules. Member States are thus not obliged to 
let such professionals carry out activities in their territory. In this regard, Article 6 of 
Directive 85/384/EEC240 stated that Member States shall examine diplomas, certificates 
and other evidence of formal qualifications in the field covered by this Directive that 
have been obtained by the holder outside the European Union in cases where those 
diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications have been recognised 
in a Member State, as well as of training undergone and/or professional experience 
gained in a Member State. Council Recommendation 85/386/EEC of 10 June 1985 al-
ready urged the Member States to take into account the special position of nationals of 
Member States who have studied in a third country and who hold a diploma in architec-
ture recognized under the legislation of a Member State. The Member State has to give 
its decision within three months of the date on which the applicant submits his applica-
tion together with full supporting documentation. However, since this document was 
merely a recommendation, it was not legally binding. 
 
Furthermore, recognition by one Member State on the basis of national regulations 
regarding educational qualifications acquired in a third country, does not entitle the 
holder of those qualifications to perform the professional activity in question in another 
Member State. Only if the holder has three years’ professional experience in the profes-
sion concerned on the territory of the Member State which recognized his formal quali-
fications, do these qualifications have to be recognised by other Member States as well 
(Article 3(3)). This provision still deals with Union citizens however. With regard to the 
recognition of qualifications held by third country-nationals, Member States have (al-
most) full discretion.241 
b. Free provision of services (Title II) 
Title II of the Directive exclusively deals with the freedom to provide services. As held 
by Article 5(1), Member States are not allowed to restrict, for any reason relating to 
professional qualifications, the free provision of services in another Member State if the 
service provider is legally established in a Member State for the purpose of pursuing the 
same profession there, and where the service provider moves, if he has pursued that 
profession in the Member State of establishment for at least two years during the 10 
years preceding the provision of services when the profession is not regulated in that 
Member State. The condition requiring two years’ pursuit, shall thus not apply when 
                                                                
240 After amendment by Directive 2001/19/EC.  
241 Only in very specific circumstances can third country nationals rely on the Directive. For example, when 
married to a Union citizen, the equal treatment principle laid down in Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC 
is important. In the case of long term residence, these professionals can also rely on Directive 2003/109/EC 
while the rules laid down in GATS can also be beneficial for third country nationals. This will not be fur-
ther discussed within this thesis.  
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either the profession or the education and training leading to the profession is regulated. 
In the event that the profession is not regulated, and the migrant has not practised the 
profession for two years in his Member State of origin, Title II is not applicable. In that 
case, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as interpreted by the ECJ, 
will apply. 
 Moreover, the principle of free provision of services will only apply where the ser-
vice provider moves to the territory of the host Member State to pursue a certain profes-
sion on a temporary and occasional basis. The temporary and occasional nature of the 
provision of services shall be assessed case by case, in particular in relation to its dura-
tion, its frequency, its regularity and its continuity.242 After movement, the service pro-
vider shall be subject to professional rules243 which are directly linked to his professional 
qualifications, as well as to disciplinary provisions which are applicable in the host 
Member State to professionals who pursue the same profession in that State (Article 
5(3) and recital 8). 
 
Even though the Directive makes the recognition of migrant professionals dependent on 
the possession of specific professional qualifications, the Member State shall exempt 
service providers established in another Member State from the requirements which it 
places on professionals established in its territory relating to authorisation by, registra-
tion with, or membership of, a professional organisation or body and registration with a 
public social security body for the purpose of settling accounts with an insurer relating 
to activities pursued for the benefit of insured persons (Article 6).244 Article 7(1) and (2) 
states which information the host Member State is allowed to require when the service 
provider moves for the first time from one Member State to another in order to provide 
services. It is normal that, in this respect, Member States are likely to seek evidence of 
professional qualifications before they allow a migrant to provide services on their terri-
tory. Member States can, for example, also require information about insurance cover-
age or other means of personal or collective protection with regard to professional liabil-
ity (Article 7(1)). Declarations in this regard have to be renewed once a year if the ser-
vice provider intends to provide temporary or occasional services. It should be noted 
that Article 7(1) contains an obligation to provide information, but not one to buy in-
surance. The purchase of insurance is dealt with by the Services Directive 2006/123/EC 
provided that the regulated profession under consideration falls under its scope. The 
relevant provisions of this Directive will be discussed in detail later. In case it is not 
applicable, the EC Treaty applies to matters which fall under its scope. In any case, if the 
documents mentioned in Directive 2005/36/EC are not produced, but .the applicant 
                                                                
242 These criteria are identified by the ECJ in earlier case law. See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/-
c11065.htm, last consulted 2 January 2008. Recital 5 holds that in view of the different systems established 
for the crossborder provision of services on a temporary and occasional basis on the one hand, and for es-
tablishment on the other, the criteria for distinguishing between these two concepts in the event of the 
movement of the service provider to the territory of the host Member State should be clarified.  
243 These can have a professional, statutory or administrative nature such as rules concerning the definition of 
the profession, the use of titles, and serious professional malpractice. These rules are directly and specifi-
cally linked to consumer protection and safety. See also recital 8. 
244 See Article 22 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
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does not fail to fulfil any substantial condition (such as legal establishment, professional 
experience), a prohibition to practise for failing to respect formalities would go beyond 
what could be considered a proportionate sanction. 
 With regard to the first provision of services on the territory of another Member 
State, or in case of a material change in the situation substantiated by the documents, 
Member States may require that the declaration be accompanied by certain other docu-
ments, such as a proof of nationality of the service provider, evidence of professional 
qualifications, an attestation that he is legally established in the Member State for the 
purpose of pursuing the activities concerned, and that he is not prohibited from practis-
ing, even temporarily, at the moment of delivering the attestation. In the event that the 
profession is not regulated, proof can be demanded evidencing that the service provider 
has pursued the activity concerned for at least two years during the previous ten years 
(Article 7(2)). In any case the declarations which can be asked by the host State should 
not lead to a disproportionate burden on service providers, nor hinder or render less 
attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide services (recital 7). 
 
In principle, the service shall be provided under the professional title of the Member 
State of establishment (Article 7(3)). However, by way of exception, the service of a 
regulated professional activity shall be provided under the professional title of the host 
Member State for cases referred to in Chapter III of Title III. As will be explained here-
under, in general, architects belong to this category. For professions that have public 
health or safety implications and which do not fall under the scope of Chapter III of 
Title III, the competent authorities245 may check the professional qualifications of the 
service provider prior to the first provision of services (Article 7(4)). If these qualifica-
tions are verified, the service shall be provided under the professional title of the host 
Member State. 
 
As held by Article 8, the competent authorities of the host State may always ask the 
authorities of the Member State of origin to provide any information relevant to the 
legality of the service provider’s establishment and his good conduct, as well as the ab-
sence of any disciplinary or criminal sanctions of a professional nature. Article 9 aims at 
providing the recipients of the services with additional information about the service 
provider when that service provider is not entitled to use the relevant professional title 
of the host Member State. It is therefore only applicable when the professional uses the 
professional title of the Member State of establishment and relates to matters concern-
ing registration, authorization, professional title and insurance cover with regard to 
professional liability. 
 
The aim of Articles 5 to 9 is to set out clear rules making temporary and occasional 
cross-border service provisions less onerous for the service provider than establishment 
in the host Member State, taking into account the existing case-law and the need to 
                                                                
245 As held by Article 3 (1) (d), the concept ‘competent authority’ refers to any authority or body empowered 
by a Member State specifically to issue or receive training diplomas and other documents or information, 
and to receive the applications, and take the decisions, referred to in this Directive.  
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strike the appropriate balance between mobility and consumer protection.246 The Direc-
tive nevertheless reserves for Member States certain supervisory rights (such as prior 
notifications, annual renewal of certain documents, delivery of documents supporting 
the initial declaration such as proof of nationality, legal establishment and qualifications, 
automatic temporary registration, pro forma admission to a professional association or 
body and respect of codes of conduct, prior checks in case of professions with public 
health or safety implications, … ) over services undertaken on their territory, thus guar-
anteeing a balance between the free movement of services and the protection of the 
consumer.247 As underlined by the European Parliament, “masked establishment”, which 
exists where provisions relating to the free provision of services allow a migrant to avoid 
the provisions relating to the right of establishment in the country where he practises, in 
fact by enabling him to benefit, without any reason, from more advantageous regula-
tions than those laid down for national citizens, has to be avoided. 
 
It can thus be concluded that the regime in place for the ensemble of regulated profes-
sions, frees service providers from being subject to a procedure for recognizing their 
qualifications. 
 Furthermore, as held by Claessens248, the rules laid down in Directive 2005/36/EC 
are clearly an improvement on the protection of those professionals who provide ser-
vices without being fully qualified in Member States that allow such activities due to a 
lesser degree of regulation. Before the adoption of Directive 2005/36/EC the situation of 
these professionals was uncertain and only the ‘capstone’ rules could be applied to per-
sons in this situation. This meant that any hindrance to the free movement of services 
was, in principle, prohibited, unless such a prohibition could be objectively justified. In 
the new atmosphere, the Directive expressly forbids the restriction of the free provision 
of services on the grounds of qualifications. The Directive offers no possibility for ex-
emption. Whereas, under Article 49 EC and the Gebhard system, an objective justifica-
tion for such a restriction was possible, at least in theory, no exemptions to the rule are 
allowed under the Directive, at least not with regard to restrictions on professional 
qualifications. Directive 2005/36/EC lays down a solid foundation for the possibility of 
providing services in those Member States where such activities belong to the profession 
of architect. With regard to other restrictions (i.e. restrictions other than those related to 
professional qualifications such as restrictions dealing with insurance policies or con-
sumer protection), Directive 2005/36/EC is of no help since it only covers the first type 
of restriction. It follows that other restrictions on the provision of services by persons 
not holding the required qualifications must be addressed under the general system of 
Article 56 TFEU, and the objective justification test laid down in Gebhard. Directive 
2006/123/EC, which will be discussed in detail in paragraph 3.4, also deals with such 
issues (see for example Articles 16 and 17 of this Directive). 
                                                                
246 Report from the Presidency to the Permanent Representative Committee (Part 1)/Council (Competitive-
ness), Interinstitutional File: 2002/0061 (COD). 
247 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smn/smn39/docs/specialfeature_en.pdf, last consulted 23 December 
2009. 
248 Claessens 2008, pp. 127-128. 
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c. Freedom of establishment (Title III) 
With respect to establishment, the Directive comprises the three existing systems of 
recognition: 
 
Æ System of automatic recognition of qualifications for the professions of doctor, 
nurse, dentist, veterinary surgeon, midwife, pharmacist and architect (Chapter III) 
 
Chapter III contains the system of automatic recognition for a closed group of profes-
sions, including the architectural profession. 
 
Section 1 contains some general provisions and the basic principle of automatic recogni-
tion in Article 21(1). This Article stipulates that each Member State shall automatically 
recognize evidence of formal qualifications such as that of a doctor giving access to the 
professional activities of a doctor with basic training and a specialized doctor, as a nurse 
responsible for general care, as a dental practitioner, as a specialized dental practitioner, 
as a veterinary surgeon, as a pharmacist and as an architect, as listed in annex V, points 
5.1.1., 5.1.2., 5.2.2., 5.3.2., 5.3.3., 5.4.2., 5.6.2. and 5.7.1 respectively, which satisfies the 
minimum training conditions referred to in Articles 24, 25, 31, 34, 35, 38, 44 and 46 
respectively, and shall, for the purposes of access to, and pursuit of, these professional 
activities, give such evidence the same effect on its territory as the evidence of formal 
qualifications which it itself issues.249 
 Such evidence of formal qualifications must be issued by the competent bodies in 
the Member States and accompanied, where appropriate, by the certificates listed in the 
annex V. 
 
Section 8 of Title III deals with the profession of architect in particular. As held by Arti-
cle 48(1), the professional activities of an architect are the activities regularly carried out 
under the professional title of ‘architect’. This Article defines the material scope of the 
Directive and can be compared to Article 1 of Directive 85/384/EEC.250 It follows that 
the architects in the possession of qualifications listed in annex V point 5.7.1 which 
satisfy the conditions enumerated in Article 46, should be recognized automatically in 
another EU Member State. 
                                                                
249 With regard to architects this provision can be compared to Article 2 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
250 Article 1 of Directive 85/384/EEC referred to ‘activities in the field of architecture which are usually pur-
sued under the professional title of architect’. The concept of ‘architecture’ is opposed to the concept of 
‘architect’ because, in a number of Member States, architects are not the only individuals authorized to 
work in this field. As held before, in most Member States, activities in the field of architecture are pursued, 
in law or in fact, by persons who hold the title of architect, whether alone or together with another title, 
without those persons having a monopoly in pursuing those activities, save where there are laws to the 
contrary. Nevertheless, the aforementioned activities, or some of them, may also be pursued by members 
of other professions, in particular by engineers who have received special training in construction engi-
neering or building (see recital 28 of the preamble to Directive 2005/36/EC). Examples can be found in the 
list of diplomas mentioned in Article 11 which should be recognized by other Member States in accor-
dance with Article 10. The fact that not only architects can work in the field combined with the market dif-
ferences in regulations between Member States, explains the use of the term ‘usually’ in Article 1. The con-
tent of this Article is thus solely intended to indicate the scope of this Directive, without claiming to give a 
legal definition of activities in the field of architecture.  
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 As held by Article 21(3), the acquired rights referred to in Articles 23, and for archi-
tects more particularly laid down in Article 23(3), (4), (5) and 49, are not affected by 
this. According to these Articles, Member States are obliged to accept the evidence of 
formal qualifications as an architect listed in annex VI, awarded by the other Member 
States, and attesting a course of training which also began no later than the reference 
academic year referred to in that annex, even if they do not satisfy the minimum train-
ing requirements laid down in Article 46.251 The evidence of their formal qualifications 
shall, for the purposes of access to, and pursuit of, the professional activities of an archi-
tect, be given the same effect on the territory of the Member States as the evidence of 
formal qualifications as an architect which it itself issues. Under these circumstances, 
certificates issued by the competent authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany 
attesting that evidence of formal qualifications issued on or after 8 May 1945 by the 
competent authorities of the German Democratic Republic is equivalent to such evi-
dence listed in that annex, shall be recognised.252 Moreover, certificates issued to nation-
als of Member States by the Member States which joined the Union as of 1 May 2004 
and issued certificates from that moment onwards, and by Member States that became 
part of the Union as of 1 January 1995 and issued certificates afterwards, also have to be 
recognized by every Member State as long as they certify that the individual is allowed 
to use the professional title of architect, and that the individual has been effectively en-
gaged in the activities in question for at least three consecutive years during the five 
years preceding the award of the certificate. For all other Member States, the reference 
date is 5 August 1987 (i.e. the date on which the Architects’ Directive should have been 
implemented at the latest). This exception has been laid down in the Directive since 
Member States that joined the Union as of a certain date were not obliged prior to that 
date to issue qualifications satisfying all the requirements of the Directive, making it 
almost impossible for their nationals to move after membership. It follows that an Esto-
nian architect who does not possess qualifications which meet the minimum require-
ments of the Directive, but is in the possession of a certificate indicating that he was 
authorised no later than 1 May 2004 to use the professional title in Estonia, and that he 
has worked there for at least three years during the five years preceding the award of the 
certificate, should also be recognized by the other Member States. Furthermore, if a 
certificate was issued to an Estonian national by the Soviet Union – thus before Estonia 
became independent – Article 23 indicates that such a certificate should be recognised 
by the EU Member States if Estonia has attested the same legal validity to it within its 
territory as the evidence of formal qualifications specified in annex VI. The Directive 
                                                                
251 See Article 10, 11 and 12 of Directive 85/384/EEC. In this regard reference should be made to Article 48 (2) 
of Directive 2005/36/EC as well, which holds that nationals of a Member State who are authorized to use 
the title of architect pursuant to a law which gives the competent authority of a Member State the power to 
award that title to Member States nationals who have especially distinguished themselves by the quality of 
their work in the field of architecture shall be deemed to satisfy the conditions required for the pursuit of 
the activities of an architect, under the professional title of ‘architect’ (Article 48 (2)). The architectural na-
ture of the activities of the persons concerned shall be attested by a certificate awarded by their home 
Member State. See also Article 5 Directive 85/384/EEC.  
252 See Article 14 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
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contains a likewise system for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slo-
venia.253 
 
I will now turn to the requirements that need to be fulfilled so that the automatic recog-
nition of qualifications can take place. As noted before, architects in the possession of 
qualifications listed in annex V point 5.7.1 which satisfy the conditions enumerated in 
Article 46, should be recognized automatically in another EU Member State. As indi-
cated by Article 21(5), evidence of formal qualifications as an architect referred to in 
annex V, point 5.7.1, which are subject to automatic recognition, proves the completion 
of a course of training which began not earlier than during the academic reference year 
referred to in that annex. This is generally the academic year after the Directive should 
have been implemented, but can also be a later year if certain qualifications were only 
granted at a later date, for example because a certain form of education did not yet exist 
in the particular Member State. As indicated above, evidence of earlier qualifications can 
fall under Article 49 dealing with acquired rights.254 
 
According to Article 46, training as an architect shall comprise a total of at least four 
years of full-time study or six years of study, at least three years of which is on a full-
time basis, at a university or comparable teaching institution. The training must lead to 
successful completion of a university-level examination. 255 That training, which must be 
of university level, and of which architecture is the principal component, must maintain 
a balance between theoretical and practical aspects of architectural training and must 
guarantee the acquisition of the knowledge and skills enumerated in Article 46(1) a-k.256 
                                                                
253 See Article 23(3), (4) and (5) of Directive 2005/36/EC. 
254 It should be noted that Directive 85/384/EEC only contained a list of national qualifications which should 
be recognized on the basis of Article 10, which dealt with established rights. The Directive did not foresee a 
list of diplomas obtained by nationals after the notification of the Directive which should automatically be 
recognized. For the latter category the general system laid down in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Directive 
should be used. In Dreesen, the Court of Justice of the European Union has drawn a clear distinction be-
tween the ‘established rights’ arrangements (Chapter III of Directive 85/384/EEC) and the common ar-
rangements (Chapter II of Directive 85/384/EEC) in respect of qualifications awarded after the aforemen-
tioned dates. As held by the Court, the open arrangements enshrined in Articles 7 to 9 of the Directive 
contrast with the closed, special and exceptional arrangements by virtue of established rights. The Articles 
setting out the latter arrangements must therefore be interpreted strictly and must rule out any broader in-
terpretation or any interpretation by analogy. The arrangements in question are special and exceptional, 
and qualifications can be added to the list only in genuinely extraordinary circumstances, as when coun-
tries join the Union. The European Parliament commented however, that other arrangements should still 
be able to be reviewed as, in their present form they could, in the long-term in particular, give rise to 
clearly discriminatory situations. Otherwise, recourse to the procedure laid down in Article 7 would ap-
pear appropriate: See Report on the Commission’s report ‘Review on the basis of experience, of Council 
Directive 85/384/EEC of 10 June 1985 pursuant to Article 30 thereof’, explanatory statement, paragraph 4. 
255 See Article 4 Directive 85/384/EEC.  
256 These requirements can equally be found in the UNESCO/UIA Charter for Architectural Education, 
which was created on the initiative of UNESCO and the International Union of Architects (UIA). The UIA 
was founded in Lausanne on 28th June, 1948, to unite the architects of the world without regard to nation-
ality, race, religion, or architectural doctrine, and to federate their national organisations. From the 27 
delegations present at the founding assembly, the UIA has grown to encompass the key professional or-
ganisations of architects in 124 countries and territories, and now represents, through these organisations, 
more than 1,300,000 architects worldwide. Over time, the UIA has become an accomplished non-
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Article 46 gives thus a description of what is expected on a European level of persons 
holding formal qualifications in architecture and consequently contains very important 
and indispensable criteria. 
These are257: 
(a) ability to create architectural designs that satisfy both aesthetic and technical re-
quirements 
(b) adequate knowledge of the history and theories of architecture and the related arts, 
technologies and human sciences 
(c) knowledge of the fine arts as an influence on the quality of architectural design 
(d) adequate knowledge of urban design, planning and the skills involved in the plan-
ning process 
(e) understanding of the relationship between people and building, and between build-
ings and their environment, and of the need to relate buildings and the spaces be-
tween them to human needs and scale 
(f) understanding of the profession of architecture and the role of the architect in soci-
ety, in particular in preparing briefs that take account of social factors 
(g) understanding of the methods of investigation and preparation of the brief for a 
design project 
(h) understanding of the structural design, constructional and engineering problems 
associated with building design 
(i) adequate knowledge of physical problems and technologies and of the function of 
buildings so as to provide them with internal conditions of comfort and protection 
against the climate 
(j) the necessary design skills to meet building users’ requirements within the con-
straints imposed by cost factors and building regulations 
(k) adequate knowledge of the industries, organizations, regulations and procedures 
involved translating design concepts into building and integrating plans into overall 
planning. 
 
Article 46 sets thus out the conditions which have to be met by courses leading to quali-
fications recognized by the Member States. These conditions are fairly general and 
merely set out the main qualitative principles which courses must meet in order to qual-
ify for recognition under the Directive, such as an ability to create architectural designs 
that satisfy both aesthetic and technical requirements, a knowledge of the fine arts as an 
influence on the quality of architectural design and the necessary design skills to meet 
building users’ requirements within the constraints imposed by cost factors and build-
ing regulations. With the exception of the professions of doctor and architect, the Direc-
tive provides a minimum programme of courses to follow, which leaves room for the 
Member States to draw up more detailed study programmes258. As stated above, it took 
                                                                                                                                                             
governmental organisation, an incomparable professional network of architects that exists in all conti-
nents. See http://www.uia-architectes.org/texte/england/Menu-1/0-pourquoi-new.htm, last consulted 11 
October 2009.  
257 See Article 3 Directive 85/384/EEC. As held by Article 46 (2) of Directive 2005/36/EC, the Commission 
may adapt the knowledge and skills listed in paragraph 1 to scientific and technical progress.  
258 See in this regard recital 19. 
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17 years before the Architects’ Directive could enter into force while it only dealt with 
the mutual recognition of qualifications and did not contain harmonized study pro-
grammes. It is not difficult to imagine why this was not changed when Directive 
2005/36/EC was set up.259 It follows that the present Directive does not contain stipula-
tions about how the abovementioned skills should be developed, or about the mutual 
relationship between these skills. As held by Meijer and Visscher260 as regards Directive 
85/384/EEC which contains the same conditions, on the one hand, this gave Member 
States the freedom to determine the contents and (maximum) duration of their educa-
tional programmes. It was left to the discretion of individual Member States to select the 
educational institutions (and degree programmes) to be accredited based on these crite-
ria. On the other hand, the Directive posed a risk: in practice, its requirements could 
come to be seen as mere formalities, and the monitoring of developments in the differ-
ent Member States could become a very remote process. In this regard it should be 
noted that recital 27 stipulates that architectural design, the quality of buildings, their 
harmonious incorporation into their surroundings and respect for natural and urban 
landscapes and for the public and private heritage, is a matter of public interest. Mutual 
recognition of qualifications should therefore be based on qualitative and quantitative 
criteria which ensure that the holders of recognized qualifications are in a position to 
understand and translate the needs of individuals, social groups and authorities as re-
gards spatial planning, the design, organisation and realisation of structures, conserva-
tion and the exploitation of architectural heritage, and protection of natural balances. 
 
The Directive contains some derogations relating to architectural qualifications ob-
tained in Germany. As held by Article 47(1), the training provided by the German Fach-
hochschulen over a period of three years which satisfies the requirements referred to in 
Article 46 and gives access to the activities referred to in Article 48 under the profes-
sional title of ‘architect’, will also be recognised as satisfying the requirements of Article 
21 in so far as the training is followed by a four-year period of professional experience in 
Germany and is attested by a certificate issued by the professional association in whose 
roll the name of the architect wishing to benefit from the provisions of this Directive 
appears.261 Another exception to Article 21 can be found in Article 47(2) which relates to 
training as part of social betterment schemes or part-time university studies which sat-
isfy the requirements referred to in Article 46 which is attested by an examination in 
architecture and passed by a person who has been working for seven years or more in 
the field of architecture under the supervision of an architect or architectural bureau.262 
In this case, the examination must be of university level and be equivalent to the final 
                                                                
259 The lists of courses applicable to the other professions appear in Annex V (points 5.2.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.1 
and 5.6.1) and can be amended by a comitology procedure with a view to adapting them to scientific and 
technical progress (see Article 58 of the Directive). As held above, this is opposed to the general system in 
which there is no coordination of the minimum training requirements and thus also no automatic recog-
nition. 
260 Meijer & Visscher 2006, p. 3. 
261 The professional association must first ascertain that the work performed by the architect concerned in the 
field of architecture represents convincing application of the full range of knowledge and skills listed in 
Article 46 (1). See Article 4 (1) (b) Directive 85/384/EEC.  
262 See Article 4 (2) Directive 85/384/EEC.  
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examination referred to in Article 46(1), first subparagraph (Article 47(2)). Examples of 
qualifications that have been accepted under Article 47(2) are the Part II examination of 
the RIBA (Royal Institute of British Architects) in 1988 and the French DPLG (architec-
ture diploma awarded by the Government) as part of the continuing vocational training 
and upward mobility programme (1994). 
 After the aspiring architects have fulfilled the relevant conditions, the competent 
authorities of the Member States will provide them with evidence of their qualifications, 
indicating one of the professional titles enumerated in Annex V point 5.7.1. This will 
enable them to practise the profession in any Member State. 
 It is important to note that Article 22(b) stipulates that continuing education and 
training in the Member States has to ensure that persons who have completed their 
studies are able to keep abreast of professional developments to the extent necessary to 
maintain safe and effective practice (see also recital 39). This Article does not, however, 
introduce any obligation for Member States to set up programmes of continuing educa-
tion and training for architects, nor does it entitle Member States to require evidence of 
continuing professional development in terms of recognition. It follows that the absence 
of continuing education and training in the home Member State cannot be a reason to 
reject a request for recognition. Member States may only impose an obligation of con-
tinuing education and training on migrants already established on their territory to the 
extent that they do so, with regard to the profession concerned, for their own nationals. 
 
Æ General system for the recognition of professional qualifications (Chapter I) 
 
The general system for the recognition of evidence of training applies to all professions 
which are not covered by Chapters II and III of Title III263 and, in certain cases, in which 
the applicant’s profession is covered by one of these chapters but the applicant does not 
satisfy, for specific and exceptional reasons, the conditions laid down in those chapters 
(Article 10 and recital 17). As indicated above and as will be discussed in detail here-
under, architects generally fall under Chapter III. However, the general system is still of 
importance. As indicated by Article 10(c) and (d), Chapter I is also applicable to archi-
tects who are migrants and who hold formal qualifications which are not listed in Annex 
V, point 5.7264, and to architects holding evidence of formal qualifications as a specialist 
who must, for the purpose of the recognition of the speciality, follow the training lead-
ing to the possession of a title listed in annex V point 5.7.1265 This is without prejudice to 
                                                                
263 The scope of the application of the new Directive is considerably broader than that of Directives 
89/48/EEC and 92/51/EEC since every regulated profession which is not covered by part II or III is covered 
by Article 10. Problems with cases which fall in between these Directives will no longer occur. See for ex-
ample Case C-102/02 Ingeborg Beutenmüller v. Land Baden-Württemberg, [2004] ECR I-5405.  
264 Architects are in general covered by Chapter III of the Directive if they satisfy the requirements in annex 
V. In such cases their professional qualifications have to be recognized automatically. 
265 The Economic and Social Committee has stated that the application of the general system on a subsidiary 
basis to members of professions that come under the sectoral system is incompatible with the harmoniza-
tion of minimum training requirements. Moreover, there is no further point to the sectoral system if non-
compliance with the minimum training requirements laid down therein, automatically trigger the applica-
tion of the general system. Ultimately, this would create a two-tier profession of those whose training 
meets the minimum requirements of the sectoral Directive, and those whose training does not. It is, how-
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Articles 21(1) -principle of automatic recognition- and Article 23(3) dealing with archi-
tects who hold qualifications issued by the former Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia or who commenced their training in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania or Slovenia before these states became independent. 
 
In the general system of recognition, the various national education and training sys-
tems are grouped together in terms of a number of levels266 (5) without in any way affect-
ing each Member State’s educational structures (Article 11 and recital 13).267 When, in a 
host Member State, access to, or pursuit of a profession, is regulated, the competent 
authority in this Member State allows access to the profession in question, and pursuit 
thereof, under the same conditions as apply to its nationals, provided that the applicant 
holds an attestation of competence or evidence of formal qualifications required by 
another Member State (the home Member State) in order to gain access to, and pursue 
that profession, on its territory (Article 13(1)). The qualifications obtained in that 
Member State have to attest a level of professional qualifications at least equivalent to 
the level immediately below268 that required in the host Member State (Article 13(1)(b)), 
and have to be issued by a competent authority269 in a Member State. It follows therefore 
that not every professional may apply for diploma recognition under the general system, 
since the migrant holding a regulated profession only has the right to obtain recognition 
                                                                                                                                                             
ever, impossible for consumers to make that distinction and they themselves have no way of differentiating 
between qualified and less qualified providers. Since the profession of architect is covered in Chapter III of 
Title III of the Directive and the list in Annex 5 is quite extended, Article 10 will probably not be used very 
often in the case of architectural (related) occupations. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Commit-
tee on the ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the recognition of 
professional qualifications’, OJ of the European Union, C 61/67, COM (2001) 119 final – 2002/0061 
(COD), 2002/C 61/14, p. 9. 
266 The first three which are described correspond to the three levels of qualifications covered by Directive 
92/51/EEC. Directive 89/48/EEC has been split into the last two levels.  
 The diplomas awarded after the completion of a four-year post-secondary training course in a university 
or in an establishment of higher education are contained in both levels described under Article 11 d) and 
under Article 11 e). This is the result of a difficult compromise and allows the Member States to consider 
that their corresponding training belongs either to one or the other of those levels. This could have re-
sulted in excluding from the benefit of mutual recognition under the Directive, holders of qualifications 
under level 11 (c) when the host Member State would have chosen to classify the post-secondary training 
of 4 years required in its territory for the profession concerned under level 11 (e) (because of the gap of 
more than one level). In order to avoid this, and to keep the situation unchanged compared to the previous 
Directives 92/51/EEC and 89/48/EEC, a derogation was introduced in Article 13(3). According to this pro-
vision, the holder of qualifications under level 11 (c) has the right to have those qualifications recognised 
under the Directive if the host Member State requires post-secondary training of four years duration, re-
gardless of whether this training is classified under level 11d) or 11e).  
267 It is mportant to note that Article 12 (1) holds that if qualifications run parallel to standard qualifications 
(i.e. qualifications belonging to one of the five levels described in Article 11) and have an equivalent level 
and confer equivalent rights of access to, or pursuit of, a given profession, these qualifications have to be 
classified at the same level as the standard qualifications. 
268 In general it must be said that the outlines of the system in Article 3 and 4 of Directive 89/48/EEC (and 
92/51/EEC) are still visible in the new system, but due to the creation of these levels, it can actually be 
more difficult to have one’s professional qualification recognised. 
269 As held by Article 3 (1) (d), a competent authority is any authority or body empowered by a Member State 
specifically to issue or receive training diplomas and other documents or information and to receive the 
applications, and to take the decisions referred to in the Directive. 
i
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of his/her professional qualification if he is fully qualified in his home Member State for 
the same profession, and if the qualifications he holds are at least of the level immedi-
ately below that required in the host Member State. The rest cannot rely on the provi-
sions of the Directive – although nothing precludes the application of the principles laid 
down in Gebhard and Vlassopoulou. This is without prejudice to the possibility for the 
host Member State to require a compensation measure under certain conditions de-
scribed in Article 14. There is thus no obligation of recognition for the host Member 
State under the Directive if the migrant’s qualifications are of a level lower than that 
immediately below the level required in the host Member State. 
 When, on the other hand, in the Member State of the applicant, access to a profes-
sion is not regulated (i.e. not subject to the possession of specific professional qualifica-
tions), the applicant should, in order to be able to gain access to, and pursuit of, the 
profession in the host Member State which does regulate that profession, provide proof 
of two years of professional experience on a full-time basis over the preceding ten years 
on top of the qualification (Article 13(2)).270 In this case as well, recognition is only 
granted if the applicant is in possession of formal qualifications, the level of which is at 
least equivalent to the level immediately prior that required in the host State. As held by 
Article 13(2), this two years of professional experience may, however, not be required if 
the evidence of formal qualifications which the applicant possesses actually certifies 
regulated education and training at the levels of qualifications described in Article 11, 
points (b), (c), (d) or (e). 
 
It is important to note that if the professional can produce the requested attestations, 
integration is still by no means guaranteed. The only thing that is established at that 
point is the mere right to have one’s qualification recognized. As indicated above, in the 
absence of harmonization of the minimum training conditions for access to the profes-
sions governed by the general system, it should be possible for the host Member State to 
impose a compensation measure in the form of an aptitude test or an adaptation period, 
even if the test under Article 13 would succeed (being at the same level of qualification 
or with a 1 level difference) (Article 14(1) and recital 15). This is the case if the training 
is one year shorter than that required by the host Member State, the training received is 
substantially different, and if the profession in the host Member State comprises one or 
more regulated professional activities which do not exist in the home Member State, 
while that difference consists of specific training which is required in the host Member 
State and covers substantially different matters from those covered by the applicant’s 
qualifications.271 The migrant must be able to choose between these two options (Article 
14(2)).272 Any derogation from that choice should, in each case, be justified by an im-
perative requirement in the general interest, or if the profession which the individual 
                                                                
270 Migrants are entitled to the same rights even when they have worked part time only. Even though this is 
not explicitly stated in the Directive, it refers to the pursuit of the profession ‘on a full time basis’. The pro-
fessional experience of the migrant having worked part-time has to be equivalent to the required duration 
on a full time basis. 
271 In 2002, more than 80% of the applications were accepted without compensatory measures. 
272 Statistics observing similar conditions imposed by Directive 89/48/EEC showed that, in the past, migrants 
preferred adjustment training programmes to proof of competence. 
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wishes to pursue requires a precise knowledge of national law (Article 14(3)). It follows 
that, as opposed to the provisions in the previous horizontal Directives, the possibility 
for a Member State to require professional experience rather than compensation meas-
ures in the event of substantial differences relating to the duration and not the content 
of training, is abolished.273 It is thus no longer possible for a Member State to ask for 
compensation in terms of a substantial period of professional experience. In any case, 
compensation measures should always be proportionate (Article 14(5)). The Vlassopou-
lou principle can be found in this Article. In particular, if the host Member State intends 
to require the applicant to complete an adaptation period or take an aptitude test, it 
must first ascertain whether the knowledge acquired by the applicant in the course of his 
professional experience in a Member State or a third country is of a nature to cover, in 
full or in part, the differences. If this is the case, compensation measures are not allowed. 
In the old horizontal system, differences in time could be compensated for by profes-
sional experience. Differences in content were compensated for by an adaptation period 
or an aptitude test. The content and scope of such compensation measures was deter-
mined after application of the Vlassopoulou test. 274 Directive 2005/36/EC does no longer 
contain the possibility of making up for differences in time by the use of professional 
experience. In such cases an adaptation period or aptitude test can be required which 
will have to be proportional (Article 14(1)(a) and (5). With regard to differences in 
content, Article 14(5) specifically mentions that, to determine the scope and content of 
the compensation measures, the knowledge acquired by the applicant in the course of 
his professional experience has to be assessed. This means that, next to the proportional-
ity principle, the Vlassopoulou test is used.275 Even though the qualifications are, with 
respect to the recognition effect, grouped into different levels, it should not be forgotten 
that the structure and level of the professional training, probationary or professional 
practice, is determined by the Member States (Article 3(e)). The grouping into different 
‘European levels’ has thus no effect upon the national education and training structures, 
nor upon the competence of Member States in this field (recital 13). It follows that 
Member States retain the right to lay down the minimum level of qualification required 
to ensure the quality of the services provided on their territory. However, pursuant to 
Articles 18 TFEU and 45 and 49 TFEU (Articles 12 EC and 39 and 43 EC), they should 
not require a national of a Member State to obtain qualifications which they generally 
lay down only in terms of the diplomas awarded under their national educational sys-
tem, where the person concerned has already obtained all or part of those qualifications 
in another Member State. Any host Member State in which a profession is regulated 
                                                                
273 See Article 4 (1)(a) Directive 89/48/EEC. In this sense, the Directive is thus stricter than the old system, 
since now a Member State may ask for more invasive compensatory measures such as an aptitude test or 
an adaptation period.  
274 The ECJ’s Vlassopoulou judgement was implemented in Directive 89/48/EEC after adaptation by Directive 
2001/19/EC. 
275 As held by Claessens, the Vlassopoulou test was, for the first time, formulated as part of the principle of 
proportionality in Directive 2005/36/EC. Compensation for time differences must therefore be applied 
with the principle of proportionality in mind, yet without the specific reference to the Vlassopoulou prin-
ciple. See Claessens, 2008, pp. 37-38. 
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must take account of the qualifications obtained in another Member State and assess 
whether they correspond to those which it requires. 
 In any case, the general system for recognition does not prevent a Member State 
from making any person pursuing a profession on its territory subject to specific re-
quirements due to the application of professional rules justified by the general public 
interest. Rules of this kind relate, for example, to the organisation of the profession, 
professional standards, including those concerning ethics, and supervision and liability. 
 
Article 15 of the Directive contains a novelty: it makes provision for the waiving of 
compensation measures on the basis of common platforms. Common platforms are 
criteria of professional qualifications which are suitable for compensating for substantial 
differences which have been identified between the training requirements that exist in 
the various Member States for a given profession, and are laid down by a decision of the 
Committee on Recognition of Professional Qualifications276 pursuant to the comitology 
procedure277 (recital 16). They affect potentially all professions whose minimum training 
conditions are not harmonised at Community level. These substantial differences shall 
be identified by comparison between the duration and contents of the training in at least 
two thirds of the Member States, including all Member States which regulate this profes-
sion. Common platforms may be submitted to the Commission by Member States or by 
professional associations or organisations which are representative at national and 
European levels. The implementation of this regime is thus based on a public/private 
partnership. If the Commission adopts such measures which are designed to amend 
non-essential elements of the Directive by supplementing it, and the applicant’s profes-
sional qualifications satisfy the criteria established in these measures, the host Member 
State shall waive the application of compensation measures under Article 14 (Article 
15(3)). In this way, a more or less automatic recognition of qualifications is promoted 
under the general system on the basis of so-called ‘predefined compensation measures’. 
On the one hand, the free movement of professionals is facilitated by simplifying the 
case-by-case assessment of individual applications by the competent national authorities 
and, on the other hand, increased legal security is provided to migrants concerning the 
outcome of their applications.278 There is a thus movement from an individual case by 
case approach to a global solution open to all migrant professionals, while the Member 
States and the Community institutions will be able to benefit more from the work done 
by the professions in question with a view to promoting free movement. In any case, 
Member States continue to be competent with regard to deciding the professional quali-
fications required for the pursuit of professions in their territory, as well as the contents 
and the organisation of their systems of education and professional training. There is 
thus no question of harmonising national training conditions (Article 15(4)). This 
                                                                
276 This single Committee replaces the existing bodies, is composed of representatives from the Member 
States and presided over by a representative from the Commission. 
277 See Article 5 of Decision 1999/468/EC, as well as Article 7, having due regard to Article 8.  
278 A fully qualified professional who does not satisfy the criteria of the platform continues to benefit from the 
rules on recognition but could be required to comply with compensatory measures: See 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/docs/future/platforms_en.pdf, last consulted 31 De-
cember 2009. 
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would, according to Article 165 TFEU (Article 149 EC), require the unanimous agree-
ment of all Member States. Moreover, any request for recognition continues to be sub-
ject to examination by the competent national authorities, even if their scope will be 
‘framed’ by the platform.279 
 
Finally it should be repeated that since only architects falling within the scope of Article 
10(c) en (d) fall under the general system, the use of Chapter I of Title III is rather lim-
ited for the architectural profession. Therefore, this will not be further discussed. 
 
Æ System of automatic recognition of qualifications attested by professional experi-
ence in certain industrial, craft and commercial activities (Chapter II) 
 
As noted by recital 18, there is a need to simplify the rules allowing access to a number 
of industrial, commercial and craft activities in Member States where those professions 
are regulated, in so far as those activities have been pursued for a reasonable and suffi-
ciently recent period of time in another Member State. Article 16 of Directive 
2005/36/EC therefore holds that if, in a Member State, access to, or pursuit of, one of the 
activities listed in Annex IV – referring to various sectors ranging from the textile indus-
try through to the chemical industry, the petroleum industry, printing, manufacturing 
industry and construction industry in list I, the manufacture of transport equipment, 
activities allied to transport, postal services, telecommunication and photographic stu-
dios in list II and numerous sectors ranging from restaurants and hotels to personal, 
community and recreation services in list III – is contingent upon possession of general, 
commercial or professional knowledge and aptitudes, that Member State shall recognize 
previous pursuit of the activity in another Member State as sufficient proof of such 
knowledge and aptitudes (Article 16). For those activities, a system of automatic recog-
nition based on professional experience is thus maintained. The elements taken into 
consideration are the duration and form of professional experience (in a self-employed 
or employed capacity) in the reference sector, as well as previous training which may 
reduce the amount of professional experience required. In such cases, the received pre-
vious training should be evidenced by a certificate recognized by the Member State or 
judged by a competent professional body to be fully valid (Articles 17 -19). Since archi-
tects do not fall under this category, this aspect will not be further discussed. 
d. Procedure and consequences of recognition 
Chapter IV of Title III of the Directive contains some common provisions on establish-
ment. As held by Article 50(1), where the competent authorities of the host Member 
State decide on an application for authorisation to pursue the regulated profession in 
question by virtue of Title III, those authorities may demand several documents, under 
which a proof of nationality, a copy of the attestations of professional competence or of 
the evidence of formal qualifications, an attestation of possible professional experience 
                                                                
279 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smn/smn39/docs/specialfeature_en.pdf, last consulted 31 December 
2009 and http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/docs/future/platforms_en.pdf, last consulted 
31 December 2009.  
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and, if it also demands the same of its own nationals, proof of good character or re-
pute280, proof of the absence of bankruptcy, proof of lack of serious professional miscon-
duct, proof that the applicant is covered by a professional liability insurance, etc.281 An-
nex VII contains the complete list of documents which can be demanded. In the case of 
justified doubt, the host Member State is entitled to verify the authenticity and scope of 
the qualifications (Article 50(2) and (3)).282 As held by Article 51(1), the competent au-
thority of the host Member State shall acknowledge receipt within one month and shall 
inform the applicant of any missing documentation. The procedure for examining an 
application for authorisation to practise a regulated profession must be completed as 
quickly as possible and must lead to a duly substantiated decision -this means that rea-
sons need to be given for any rejection- by the competent authority in the host Member 
State, and in any case within three months of the date on which the applicant’s complete 
file was submitted.283 The deadline may be extended by one month in cases falling under 
Chapters I and II (Article 51(2). The decision, or failure to reach a decision within the 
deadline, is subject to appeal under national law (Article 51(3)).284 
 With regard to the freedom of establishment, Article 52(1) is of major importance 
since it determines the consequence of recognition: if, in a host Member State, the use of 
a professional title relating to one of the activities of the profession in question is regu-
lated, nationals of the other Member States who are authorised to practise a regulated 
profession on the basis of Title III, shall use the professional title of the host Member 
State, which corresponds to that profession in that Member State, and make use of any 
associated initials.285 
 
Title IV contains rules which are relevant with regard to the free movement of estab-
lishment, as well as the free provision of services. As held by Article 53, persons benefit-
ing from the recognition of professional qualifications should have knowledge of the 
language(s) necessary for practising the profession in the host Member State. Recogni-
tion of the professional qualifications can, however, not be denied or delayed until the 
migrant has acquired the necessary language skills. Article 54 deals with the use of aca-
demic titles as opposed to professional titles. It holds that host Member States have to 
ensure that persons are able to use academic titles conferred on them in their home 
Member State, and possibly an abbreviated form thereof, in the language of the home 
State.286 This is due to the fact that the recognition of professional qualifications does not 
necessarily imply practical equivalence in the education and training covered by such 
qualifications. The host Member State may require that title to be followed by the name 
and address of the establishment or examining board which awarded it. Where an aca-
demic title of the home Member State is liable to be confused in the host Member State 
with a title which, in the latter Member State, requires supplementary training not ac-
                                                                
280 See Article 17 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
281 See Articles 24 and 25 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
282 See Article 27 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
283 See Article 20 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
284 See Article 6a of Directive 85/384/EEC. 
285 See Article 23 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
286 See Article 16 of Directive 85/384/EEC.  
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quired by the beneficiary, the host Member State may require the beneficiary to use the 
academic title of the home Member State in an appropriate form to be laid down by the 
host Member State. As indicated before, in paragraph 3.5. academic recognition will be 
discussed more extensively. 
 
In order to facilitate the application of the provisions of the Directive, Article 56(1) 
provides for close collaboration between the competent authorities287 in the host and 
home Member States. The competent authorities shall exchange information regarding 
disciplinary action or criminal sanctions taken, or any other serious, specific circum-
stances which are likely to have consequences for the pursuit of activities under the 
Directive. To achieve this end, each Member State shall designate a coordinator who 
shall inform the other Member States and the Commission, of the initiatives taken. In 
most Member States, the competent authorities can, to some extent, delegate responsi-
bility for management of the professions to independent bodies such as professional 
associations. In other words, management of the professions is encompassed within 
each Member State’s internal affairs, and bodies other than government departments 
may consequently be made responsible for it. 
 Furthermore, as stipulated in Article 57 and recital 33, each Member State is obliged 
to designate a contact point to provide the citizens, and the contact points of the other 
Member States, with information concerning the recognition of professional qualifica-
tions, and to assist citizens in enforcing the rights which this Directive confers upon 
them, particularly through contact with the competent authorities who rule on requests 
for recognition. To this end, Article 58 sets up a single (comitology) committee which 
has to assist the Commission within the limits of the enforcement powers conferred on 
it by the Directive, and administer the Directive and its updating (see also recital 34). 
Contact points are thus set up to help professionals when they want to have their quali-
fications recognized. The recognition decision is taken by the competent authority. 
The Directive entered into force on 20 October 2005 and should have been imple-
mented by the Member States by 20 October 2007 at the latest.288 However, in September 
2009, all Member States except Greece had transposed the Directive and 17 out of 27 
Member States had fully implemented the Directive.289 
e. Conclusion 
Directive 2005/36/EC is intended to encourage the free movement of skilled labour 
throughout the European Union, while acknowledging that standards differ between the 
Member States. It aims to establish some equivalence between professionals trained in 
the Union so that such individuals should be able to move and practise in other Member 
                                                                
287 See Article 3 (1) (d) of Directive 2005/36/EC for the definition of ‘competent authority’. 
288 See Articles 63 and 64 of Directive 2005/36/EC. 
289 Report of the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department Eco-
nomic and Scientific Policy A, Recognition of Professional Qualifications, September 2009, p. 6. See 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/resume.jsp?id=220062&eventId=53758&backToCaller=NO&language-
=en.  As opposed to the Netherlands, Belgium has not fully implemented the Directive. However, as will 
be seen in Part II of this thesis, with regard to architects, the automatic system of recognition has been 
implemented. The reason for incomplete implementation is mainly due to the volume of the work, since 
some Member States have more regulated professions than others.  
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States without unnecessary impediments. With regard to services, the Directive contains 
the general principle of the free provision of services under the original professional 
title, subject to certain conditions which aim to protect consumers. The Directive fol-
lows the principle of mutual recognition with host country control.290 Member States 
shall thus not restrict the free provision of services in another Member State for any 
reason relating to professional qualifications, where the potential service provider is 
allowed to exercise the same profession in his home Member State, or where the poten-
tial service provided has legally pursued the same activities for at least two years during 
the past ten years, in a situation in which the home Member State does not regulate the 
profession. It follows that the regime in place for the ensemble of regulated professions 
frees services providers from being subject to a procedure for recognizing their qualifi-
cations. This direct access is a great step forward. This is to be counterbalanced by an 
increase in the mandatory sharing of information between the authorities of the Mem-
ber States, and with citizens. 
 
With regard to establishment, the three regimes which were used before the entry into 
force of Directive 2005/36/EC are brought together in one legal instrument: 
1. Automatic recognition of professional experience (Chapter II Directive 2005/36/EC 
– before Directive 1999/42/EC) 
2. Automatic recognition of diplomas on the basis of minimum conditions of harmo-
nised training (Chapter III Directive 2005/36/EC – before: vertical Directives). It 
should be noted that for architects, Directive 85/384/EEC contained no harmonized 
training requirements nor does the Annex to Directive 2005/36/EC contain such 
harmonization. However, for almost all other regulated professions, training re-
quirements are harmonized. 
3. Mutual recognition of training titles combined by the possible requirement for 
supplementary measures (Chapter I Directive 2005/36/EC – before Directives 
89/48/EEC and 92/51/EEC). This recognition mechanism applies in a subsidiary 
way to regulated professions and specific situations not covered by other recogni-
tion rules. 
 
The objective of the Directive was the creation of an efficient system for the recognition 
of qualifications in the field of the regulated profession, so that free movement will be 
enhanced and employment vacancies will be filled by a regular supply of qualified appli-
cants. Since there is only one piece of legislation to refer to instead of the several sectoral 
and horizontal Directives, the system is simpler and more transparent. The body of the 
Directive contains the main rules on professional recognition, while the specific techni-
calities and details appear in the seven annexes. This envisages that the technical re-
quirements should be easier and faster to update. Previously, national legislation had to 
be updated every time there was a change in the technical requirements to mirror a 
change at EU level. By referring to the annexes, national adjustments do not have to be 
made. The Directive brings greater liberalization in terms of the provision of services, 
                                                                
290 Compliance with the mutual recognition principle is extremely important, since the estimated cost of the 
non-application of the mutual recognition principle is around EUR 150 billion. 
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more automatic recognition of qualifications, and increased flexibility in the procedures 
for updating the Directive. In this way it contributes greatly to mobility in terms of skills 
and brings us closer to the objective of a more competitive Europe as set out in the Lis-
bon agenda. The new legal framework constitutes a balanced opening of the market. 
The fact that a different number of professions are regulated in each Member State may 
hinder transparency however. Furthermore, the possibility of establishing more flexible 
recognition procedures through common platforms, raises concerns of professional 
associations that individuals with a shorter education can claim recognition more easily. 
In this regard, cooperation between the national administrators and national profes-
sional associations across the Union can contribute to enhanced free movement rights 
or at least better information systems for citizens. 
 
However, for architects, not that much has changed. As held by Article 62 of Directive 
2005/36/EC, references to Directive 85/384/EEC shall be understood as references to 
this Directive and acts adopted on the basis of these Directives shall not be affected by 
the repeal. 
 As will be seen hereunder, following the Bologna Declaration of June 1999, Schools 
of Architecture across the European Union have to notify the Commission of new di-
plomas in Architecture and existing diplomas in Architecture modified to relate to a two 
cycle Bachelor-Masters format or other formats, such as a 3+2 model. After 20 October 
2007, diplomas will only be evaluated in the context of Directive 2005/36/EC. Both Di-
rective 85/384/EC and Directive 2005/36/EC require an education of at least four years – 
the practice for most third level institutes in Europe is, however, a five year study pro-
gramme. Furthermore, Article 46 of Directive 2005/36/EC which forms the basis for the 
study curriculum leading to a qualification in architecture, corresponds to Article 3 of 
Directive 85/384/EEC.291 A difference between the Directives is that the old Architect’s 
Directive did not make such a strong formal distinction between the freedom of estab-
lishment and the freedom to provide services as Directive 2005/36/EC does. Further-
more, as opposed to the former Directive, Directive 2005/36/EC contains an express 
provision on permanent education and retraining in Article 22(b). In case the Directive 
is not applicable, for example because the profession is unregulated in the host Member 
State292, the professional can still find protection in the Treaty Articles and the Vlas-
sopoulou and Gebhard rulings of the ECJ.293 Directive 2005/36/EC can be qualified as a 
                                                                
291 Advisory Committee on Education and Training in the Field of Architecture, Draft recommendation 
concerning a Guideline Document relating to establishing an opinion regarding Diplomas in Architecture 
and their compliance with the Architects’ Directive 85/384/EEC, adopted by the Committee at its meeting 
of 7 April 2006, MARTK/D/4984/12006-EN. 
292 See for example Case C-164/94 Aranitis v. Land Berlin [1996] ECR I-135; Case C-234/97 Fernandez de 
Bobadilla v. Museo Nacional del Prado, Comité de Empresa del Museo Nacional del Prado, Ministerio Fis-
cal [1999] ECR I-4773; Case C-313/01 Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di 
Genova [2003] ECR I-13467. In the latter case the ECJ held that in such a case the Vlassopoulou ruling has 
to be applied since Directive 2005/36/EC does not apply to professionals who are not ‘produit fini’); Case 
C-285/01 Isabel Burbaud v. Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité [2003] ECR I-08219 (entry exams). 
293 As held above, the ECJ developed a considerable amount of case law and contributed to the development 
of the recognition of diplomas by holding, in Thieffry and Heylens, that discriminatory barrier have to be 
removed. Such barriers are only allowed if there is an objective justification (see Klopp, Kraus, Säger (Case 
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lex specialis compared to the system of relying directly on Articles 49 and 56 TFEU (Ar-
ticles 43 and 49 EC) combined with the discussed judgements. It should be noted, how-
ever, that with regard to the creation of aptitude tests in case of differences between the 
qualifications required in the home and the host Member State, cooperation between 
the bodies and the universities is a challenge, as the universities do not have an incentive 
to make these.294 
 
In sum, it can be said that Directive 2005/36/EC tries to strike a balance between the free 
movement of skilled professionals and consumer protection (see also recital 44). It relies 
significantly on the exchange of information between national authorities, particularly 
regarding the disciplinary, administrative or penal sanctions that would affect migrant 
professionals, or with regard to the authenticity of their diplomas. It is a more flexible 
system than that existed in the past, but problems with the recognition of qualifications 
have not disappeared. As held by the Parliament, this may be due to the fact that the 
education systems in the different Member States differ, especially when it comes to 
specialisation, which means that automatic recognition is no  easily applied. Further-
more, since automatic recognition is a procedure regulated in a particularly detailed 
manner, it can be difficult for the competent authorities and for individuals to obtain all 
the necessary documentation.295 
                                                                                                                                                             
C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-4421), Vlassopoulou., Gebhard, …). In this 
regard the ECJ held in Säger that national legislation which makes the provision of certain services within 
the national territory by an undertaking established in another Member State subject to the issue of an 
administrative licence for which the possession of certain professional qualifications is required, consti-
tutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU. Even though 
specific requirements can be imposed in the light of the particular characteristics of certain provisions of 
services, the freedom to provide services may be limited only by rules which are justified by imperative 
reasons relating to the public interest, and which apply to all persons or undertakings pursuing an activity 
in the State of destination, insofar as that interest is not protected by the rules to which the person provid-
ing the services is subject in the Member State in which he is established. Furthermore, those requirements 
must be objectively necessary in order to ensure compliance with professional rules and must guarantee 
the protection of the recipient of services, while they must not exceed what is necessary to attain those ob-
jectives. See also Cases C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-659, C-180/89 Commission v Italy 
[1991] ECR I-709 and C-198/89 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1991] ECR I-727. Although the situa-
tions covered in cases like Vlassopoulou and Gebhard are nowadays covered by secondary legislation, the 
principles laid down in these cases are still of the utmost importance in connection with situations that are 
not covered by secondary legislation. 
294 Report of the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department Eco-
nomic and Scientific Policy A, Recognition of Professional Qualifications, September 2009, p. 30; Cases C-
154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-659, C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-709 and C-
198/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-727.  
295 Report of the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department Eco-
nomic and Scientific Policy A, Recognition of Professional Qualifications, September 2009, p. 55. 
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3.2. Architects not holding the nationality of an EU Member State 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In paragraph 3.2.2 the free movement rights of third-country nationals were discussed. 
Since Directive 2005/36/EC is not applicable to third-country nationals wishing to pur-
sue a regulated profession in another Member State, and does thus provide for recogni-
tion of their professional qualifications, one has to verify whether the Directives and 
Agreements discussed in paragraph 3.2.2 contain some clauses related to professional 
recognition. 
3.2.2. Third-country national family members of EU citizens who made use of their free 
movement rights: Directive 2004/38/EC 
Even though Directive 2005/36/EC is not applicable to third-country nationals wishing 
to pursue a regulated profession in a Member State (Article 2(1)), the same principles 
should be applied to third-country family members of Union citizens on the basis of 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC. As held by the ECJ in Gül with regard to the then 
applicable Directive 75/363/EEC296, a third-country national spouse of a worker must be 
able to rely on the right to equal treatment in respect of the recognition of professional 
qualifications and diplomas under the same conditions as nationals of the host Member 
State.297 As held by Wiesbrock, the same conclusion can be drawn in respect of Directive 
2005/36/EC.298 Thus, in the case of a third-country national who has acquired a profes-
sional qualification in a Member State, he should, in principle, obtain access to the same 
profession as exercised in that country under the same conditions as nationals of the 
host Member State. It follows that, since it is possible that a specific architectural qualifi-
cation of a third country national is listed in Annex V.7, if the qualifications were ob-
tained within the EU, automatic recognition should take place in accordance with Chap-
ter III of Title III of the Directive. If this is not the case, recognition can possibly be 
granted in accordance with the general system which entails that the level of profes-
sional qualifications should be at least equivalent to the level immediately below that 
which is required in the host Member state. The completion of an adaptation period, or 
the taking of an aptitude test, may be required in accordance with Article 14 of Directive 
2005/36/EC. 
 It is, however, more likely that a third-country national spouse is in the possession 
of a third-country qualification. If this is the case, in the light of Article 24 of Directive 
2004/38/EC which imposes equal treatment, reference should be made to Article 3(3) of 
Directive 2005/36/EC which indicates that the evidence of formal qualifications issued 
by a third country shall be regarded as evidence of formal qualifications if the holder has 
three years’ professional experience in the profession concerned on the territory of the 
                                                                
296 Council Directive 75/363/EEC of 16 June 1975 concerning the coordination of provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in respect of activities of doctors , OJ L 167, 30 June 1975, pp. 14–
16. 
297 See paragraph 29 of the judgement.  
298 Wiesbrock 2009, p.89. 
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Member State which recognised the evidence of formal qualifications. In all other cases, 
the third-country national has to rely on the case law of the ECJ in Vlassopoulou, Tawil-
Albertini299 and Hocsman.300 As indicated above, in the first case, the ECJ held that, when 
assessing third-country qualifications, Member States are obliged to examine whether 
the work experience gained in another Member State corresponds to the experience 
required under national law. In Tawil-Albertini however, the Court held that the recog-
nition by a Member State of qualifications obtained in third-countries is not binding 
upon other Member States. In Hocsman it was held that all the diplomas, certificates and 
other evidence of formal qualifications of the person concerned, together with all rele-
vant experience, must be taken into account by comparing the specialized knowledge, 
abilities and experience certified with the knowledge and qualifications required by 
national law, even if they are obtained outside the European Union. It follows that, even 
though decisions of one Member State may not be binding upon another Member State, 
a third-country national family member with a third-country diploma should receive a 
comprehensive assessment of his or her diploma and the professional experienced 
gained in another Member State or a third country. 
3.2.3. Family members of Union citizens who have not made use of their free movement 
rights 
As indicated in paragraph 3.2.2.3, if the Union citizen has not made use of his free 
movement right, one deals with a purely internal situation in which national law pre-
vails. It follows that the non-discrimination principle, the principle of equal treatment 
(on the basis of nationality) and thus also the obligation to recognize professional quali-
fications, do not apply. 
3.2.4. Association and Partnership agreements. 
1. The European Economic Area 
As indicated in paragraph 3.2.2.4, the Agreement on the European Economic Area 
(EEA)301 allows nationals of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to participate in the 
Internal Market on the basis of their application of Internal Market relevant acquis. All 
new relevant EU legislation is dynamically incorporated into the Agreement, and thus 
applies throughout the EEA, ensuring the homogeneity of the internal market. The rules 
on entry and residence contained in the Agreement are identical to those in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, and must be interpreted in accordance with 
the case law of the ECJ. An amendment to Annex 7 of the EEA Agreement had to be 
made in order to permit a simultaneous application of the Directive in the EU and in the 
EEA States. 302 This was done by means of a decision from the EEA Joint Committee that 
                                                                
299 Case C-154/93 Tawil-Albertini [1994] ECR I-451.  
300 In Case C-238/98 Hugo Fernando Hocsman v. Ministre de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité [2000] ECR I-6623 
and Case C-319/92 Salomone Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [1994] ECR I-425 the 
Vlassopoulou principle was extended to third-country qualifications.  
301 OJ L 1, 3 January 1994. 
302 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/docs/future/faq_en.pdf, last visited 23 December 2009. 
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is responsible for the day-to-day management of the EEA Agreement, and is composed 
of ambassadors of the EEA-EFTA States, representatives from the European Commis-
sion, and EU Member States. This decision was taken on 26 October 2007. With regard 
to architects, the list of certificates which have to be given the same effect on the Mem-
ber States’ territories due to Article 49(2) of the Directive which deals with acquired 
rights specific to architects, is supplemented by certificates issued to nationals of Mem-
ber States by Iceland and Norway from 1 January 1994 onwards and 1 May 1995 for 
Liechtenstein. These states and the diplomas to be recognized are also added to Annex 
VI.6 of the Directive. Furthermore, in accordance with the Decision of the EEA Joint 
Committee, Annex V.7 which contains a list with diplomas that have to be recognized 
automatically, is supplemented by diplomas issued by Iceland, Norway and Liechten-
stein together with the respective reference academic year. Directive 2005/36/EC applies 
to both EU nationals and nationals from Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway since 1 July 
2009. 
2. EEC-Switzerland Agreement 
As indicated in paragraph 3.2.2.4, in 1999, the European Community and its Member 
States, on the one hand, and Switzerland, on the other, concluded a bilateral agreement 
on the free movement of persons which entered into force on 1 June 2002. A protocol, 
which entered into force on 1 April 2006, was concluded to extend the agreement to the 
ten new Member States while a second protocol of 27 May 2008 makes the Agreement 
applicable to Bulgaria and Romania.303 Article 9 and Annex III of the agreement dealt 
with the recognition of professional qualifications. Article 18 of the agreement provides 
that amendments to Annex III must be adopted by decision of the Joint Committee. The 
Annex adds a number of Swiss diplomas that have to be recognized throughout the 
Union, and indicates that Switzerland has to recognize the EU diplomas as well. How-
ever, the above procedure has to be completed before Swiss nationals can be covered by 
Directive 2005/36/EC. Until then, the ‘old’ Directives continue to apply. They will apply 
even when repealed by the new Directive at the end of the transposition period.  
3. The EEC-Turkey Association Agreement 
Neither the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, nor Decision No. 1/80 contains a 
specific clause on the recognition of professional qualifications. However, numerous 
studies have been conducted to compare the qualifications associated with the profes-
sions covered by the automatic system of Directive 2005/36/EC with Turkish qualifica-
tions.304 As held in paragraph 3.2.2.4, Decision No. 1/80 does not constrain the compe-
tence of Member States to regulate the admission of Turkish workers to their territory 
or their competence to lay down the conditions of their first access to the employment 
market. 
                                                                
303 OJ L 89, 28 March 2006. 
304 See for example, http://www.tobb.org.tr/abm/haberler/09ilerleme/Tarama%20Raporu.pdf; 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_files/03/SC03DET_mutual_recognition.pdf, both visited last on 23 
December 2009.  
  Public Regulation of Architects at European Union Level  
124 
4. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and other ex-Soviet states 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements do not contain special rules relating to 
the recognition of professional qualifications. Even though the individuals covered by 
the Agreements should be treated equally in general, Member States retain their compe-
tence to apply their laws and regulations regarding entry and stay, work, labour condi-
tions and establishment of natural persons and supply of services, except where such 
legislation is applied in a way that nullifies or impairs the benefits arising out of the 
Agreement.  
5. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
These Agreements do not contain specific rules relating to the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications. 
6. The ACP states Latin American countries 
As indicated in paragraph 3.2.2.4, the Cotonou Agreement does not contain an initial 
right of entry to the territory of a Member State, but only contains a general non-
discrimination clause and the guarantee of fair treatment of third-country nationals on 
the territory of Member States. There is no specific clause dealing with the recognition 
of professional qualifications.  
7. Stabilization and Association Agreement with the Balkan states 
Again, the conditions governing the right to entry fall entirely within the competence of 
the Member States. There is only a general non-discrimination principle in respect of 
working conditions, but there are no specific rules dealing with the recognition of pro-
fessional qualifications. 
3.2.5. Non-privileged third-country nationals: Directives on legal migration of third-
country nationals 
1. Directive 2003/86/EC 
As held by Directive 14(1)(b) of Directive 2003/86/EC, third country nationals eligible 
for family reunification will have, in principle, the same rights as the sponsor – i.e. a 
third country national residing lawfully in a Member State and applying, or whose fam-
ily members apply, for family reunification to be joined with him/her – to any employ-
ment and self-employed activity.305 Since the Directive’s principle aim is to deal with 
family reunification, it does not contain a specific clause dealing with the recognition of 
professional qualifications. 
2. Directive 2003/109/EC 
Article 11(1)(a) of Directive 2003/109/EC indicates that long-term residents shall enjoy 
equal treatment with nationals as regards access to employment and self-employed 
activity, provided that such activities do not entail even occasional involvement in the 
exercise of public authority, and conditions of employment and working conditions, 
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including conditions regarding dismissal and remuneration. Furthermore, as held by 
Article 11(1)(c), equal treatment should also be granted regarding the recognition of 
professional diplomas, certificates and other qualifications, ‘in accordance with the 
relevant national procedures’. With regard to the recognition procedure, I refer to the 
analysis in this paragraph with regard to third-country family members of EU citizens 
(Directive 2004/38/EC). 
3. Directive 2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC 
Since these Directives are not important within the scope of this thesis for the reasons 
set out in paragraph 3.2.2.5, I will not discuss them any further. 
4. Directive 2009/50/EC 
Directive 2009/50/EC which applies to third-country nationals pursuing highly qualified 
employment for which higher professional qualifications are required and which should 
attest to the completion of a post-secondary course of higher education of at least three 
years duration306, reference should be made to recital 19 of the preamble which indicates 
that professional qualifications acquired by a third-country national in another Member 
State should be recognised in the same way as those of Union citizens. Qualifications 
acquired in a third country should be taken into account in conformity with Directive 
2005/36/EC. As held by Article 14(1)(d), EU Blue Card holders shall enjoy equal treat-
ment with nationals of the Member State issuing the Blue Card, as regards recognition 
of diplomas, certificates and other professional qualifications in accordance with the 
relevant national procedures. Individuals who belong to a regulated profession must 
fulfil the relevant professional rules on the same footing as are applicable to EU citizens 
under national law.307 With regard to unregulated professions, practitioners have to 
provide proof of possessing the required higher professional qualifications in the occu-
pation or sector concerned.308 The Directive must be implemented by 19 June 2011 at 
the latest. Again with regard to the recognition procedure, reference is made again to my 
analysis in this paragraph regarding the qualifications of third-country family members 
of EU citizens.  
5. Draft Directive on a single permit and a common set of rights 
The Draft Directive for a single permit and a common set of rights refers in recital 15 of 
the preamble also to Directive 2005/36/EC. The procedure has been described above. It 
should be noted however that since Article 12 of the Directive does not specifically men-
tion Directive 2005/36/EC, and since most third-country national workers are likely to 
have qualifications obtained in a third country and reside in their Member State of ad-
mission and are therefore dependent upon the national legislation of that Member State 
with regard to the recognition of their qualifications, it is unlikely that Directive 
2005/36/EC will be taken into account. Equal treatment in respect of qualifications is 
not even awarded to long-term residents and highly qualified professionals.  
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3.3. Case law on the recognition of architectural qualifications 
In paragraph 3.2, case law has been discussed which specifically dealt with the free 
movement of architects. These cases were based on the provisions in the Treaty. In this 
paragraph I will now focus on the cases which have been decided upon by the ECJ re-
garding the recognition of architectural professional qualifications as provided for in the 
Directives which have previously been discussed. It should be noted that all the cases are 
still based on the Treaty and the provisions of Directive 85/384/EEC. 
 
Egle309 concerned a German national residing in Belgium who applied to have his name 
entered on the register of the Architects’ Association of the Province of Limburg in 
Belgium. Mr. Egle held a diploma awarded by the Department of Architecture of the 
German Constance Fachhochschule on 25 July 1981 following completion of four years 
of study, including two practical semesters, in accordance with the Fachhochschulgesetz 
of the Land Baden-Wuerttemberg. Mr. Egle’s application was rejected by the Council of 
the Architects’ Association of the Province of Limburg. The Council held that Chapter 
II, and more specifically Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 85/384/EEC -which holds that each 
Member State shall recognize the diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications acquired as a result of education and training of which the total length of 
education and training consists of a minimum of either four years of full-time studies at 
a university or comparable educational establishment, or at least six years of study at a 
university or comparable educational establishment of which at least three must be full 
time, and which is awarded to nationals of Member States by other Member States- only 
intended to include four years of full time theoretical studies. After appeal and appeal in 
cassation, the Belgian Supreme Court raised a preliminary question before the ECJ and 
asked whether education and training which lasts for four years, and which includes 
integrated practical semesters supervised by the college, can be regarded as four years of 
full-time study. 
 The ECJ first observed that even though Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive requires 
that the length of education and training consists of at least four years of full-time stud-
ies, the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) provides that training given over three years 
in ‘Fachhochschulen’ in the Federal Republic in Germany satisfies the requirements of 
the Directive as to the length of training, provided that such training is supplemented by 
a four-year period of professional experience in the Federal Republic of Germany.310 The 
Court continued and held that, with regard to the concept of ‘studies’, within the mean-
ing of Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive, it should be pointed out that, according to Article 
3, the courses of architectural studies are to be balanced between the theoretical and the 
practical aspects of training. Consequently, the concept of ‘studies’ could be applied to 
practical training which the student must undergo in order to obtain the architectural 
diploma. 
 The Court further held that it was, in that respect, apparent from the documents 
before it, that the practical semesters organized by the Fachhochschulen formed an inte-
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gral part of the studies. The content of those semesters was precisely regulated by the 
Fachhochschulen, and their completion by the student resulted in an assessment by a 
member of the teaching staff. Moreover, the practical semesters were integrated into the 
courses of architectural studies in such a way that they were always placed between 
semesters of theoretical training, so that the studies could never finish with a practical 
semester. For these reasons it was held that this kind of practical training constituted an 
integral part of the architectural studies for the purposes of Article 4(1)(a) of the Direc-
tive. 
 The Court went even further and stipulated that with regard to the requirement laid 
down in Article 4(1)(a), stating that the studies must be full-time, it had to be pointed 
out that this refers to the time which the student must devote to his training in order to 
obtain the diploma in architecture. Such is the case when the practical semesters are 
organized and supervised by the university, and demands that the student makes him-
self available full-time in the same manner as is required during the semesters of theo-
retical training. 
 As remarked by the Court in its judgement, this interpretation was confirmed by a 
joint declaration of the Commission and the Council, contained in the minutes of the 
session at which the Directive was adopted, which states that “periods of practical train-
ing incorporated into the course culminating in an examination do not affect the full-time 
nature of such training’” That same interpretation is further confirmed by the fact that 
the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Directive lays down a different rule with 
regard to architectural training given over three years in the Fachhochschulen. Those 
years are recognized, provided that they are supplemented by a four-year period of pro-
fessional experience. The Court held that that requirement of professional experience in 
the case of training given over three years would be meaningless if training consisting of 
four years of study also fell within the scope of that rule. As remarked before, Mr. Egle 
completed a study comprising four years of education. If the Community legislature had 
wished to bring within that rule all courses of architectural training provided in the 
Fachhochschulen in the Federal Republic of Germany, it would not have distinguished 
between those lasting three years and those lasting four years. 
 It was thus concluded that Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 85/384/EEC is to be inter-
preted as meaning that education and training which last for four years, and which in-
cludes practical semesters organized and supervised by the Fachhochschulen, must be 
regarded as four years of full-time study. 
 
In Bauer311 the same question was posed, but this time in the light of Chapter III of Di-
rective 85/384/EEC (Articles 10 and 11) which introduced transitional rules for Com-
munity nationals who commenced their studies during the third academic year at the 
latest, following notification of the Directive (August 1985). The Court referred to its 
interpretation and judgement in Egle, and stated that the third subparagraph of Article 
11(a) must be interpreted in such a way that education and training which lasts for four 
years, and which includes two practical semesters supervised by the Fachhochschule of 
Stuttgart, must be regarded as four years of study. 
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Dreesen (I) 312 concerned a Belgian national residing in Belgium, who studied to obtain 
an engineer’s diploma in building construction (‘Ingenieur-Urkunde, Fachrichtung Ho-
chbau’) at the Aachen State Civil Engineering College. He received his diploma on 16 
February 1966 and was then entitled to describe himself as ‘Ingenieur (grad.)’. 
 From 1 August 1966 until 1991, that is for 25 years, Mr Dreessen worked in Belgium 
as a salaried architect in various firms of architects. After the bankruptcy of his last em-
ployer, he applied, on 12 December 1991, to the ‘Ordre des Architectes de la Province de 
Liège’ (Architects’ Association of the Province of Liège) for his name to be entered on 
the register of that association, so that he could practise as a self-employed architect. 
The Council of the Architects’ Association of the Province of Liège rejected his applica-
tion on the ground that his diploma was ‘not equivalent to a diploma awarded by a de-
partment of architecture within the meaning of the Directive’. Mr. Dreesen appealed 
against that decision. The Council of Appeal stayed the proceedings and requested the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the expression ‘Architek-
tur/Hochbau’ in Article 11 of Directive 85/384/EEC, and for a ruling on whether a di-
ploma awarded in 1966 by the ‘Allgemeiner Hochbau’ (general construction) department 
of the Staatliche Ingenieurschule für Bauwesen Aachen must be treated as equivalent to a 
diploma awarded by the ‘Architektur’ department for the purposes of Article 11 of the 
Directive. 
 As held above, under Article 10 of the Directive, each Member State has to recog-
nize the diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications set out in 
Article 11, where such nationals already possessed these qualifications at the time of 
notification of the Directive or where their studies leading to such diplomas, certificates 
and other evidence of formal qualifications commenced during the third academic year 
at the latest following such notification. This is the case even if those qualifications do 
not fulfil the minimum requirements laid down in Chapter II. Member States have to 
give these qualifications as regards the taking up and pursuit of the activities referred to 
in Article 1, the same effect within their territory as the diplomas, certificates and other 
evidence of formal qualifications which they award in architecture. Under the fourth 
indent of Article 11(a) of the Directive, the diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
formal qualifications referred to in Article 10, include, in Germany, the diplomas (‘Prue-
fungszeugnisse’) awarded before 1 January 1973 by the departments of architecture of 
Ingenieurschulen, accompanied by a certificate from the competent authorities to the 
effect that the person concerned has passed a test of his formal qualifications in accor-
dance with Article 13. The question of interpretation raised by the fourth indent of 
Article 11(a) was thus whether that provision is capable of covering the engineer’s di-
ploma in Allgemeiner Hochbau awarded to Mr Dreessen on 16 February 1966. 
 To answer the questions, the ECJ referred to the distinction made in Directive 
85/384/EEC between the definitive arrangements (Chapter II) relating to the profes-
sional title of architect and the transitional arrangements (Chapter III) for ensuring 
recognition of rights acquired in the field of architecture. The transitional system which 
was applicable to this case was characterized by an exhaustive list of the diplomas, cer-
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tificates and other evidence of formal qualifications of each Member State which are 
eligible for recognition. With respect to colleges of engineering in Germany, recognition 
was limited to the diplomas awarded by departments of architecture. Mr Dreessen’s 
diploma was not awarded by such a department. Consequently, having regard to the 
wording of the fourth indent of Article 11(a) of the Directive, his diploma could not be 
recognized at Community level. According to the Court, the fact that the former col-
leges of engineering (Ingenieurschulen), which did not have departments of architecture, 
were incorporated as from 1971 into Fachhochschulen whose diplomas form part of the 
system of recognition introduced by the Directive, did not militate against that conclu-
sion. Advocate General M. Darmon held in that regard that if this designation was in-
correct or incomplete, it was up to the Member State in question -that is the Federal 
Republic of Germany- to seek and obtain an amendment to the Directive in order to 
correct that error or omission. It followed that a diploma awarded in 1966 by the Allge-
meiner Hochbau department of the Staatliche Ingenieurschule für Bauwesen, Aachen, 
could not be equated with the diplomas referred to in the fourth indent of Article 11(a) 
of the Directive. 
 
Dreesen (II)313 was the continuation of the Dreesen (I)-case. After the ECJ’s negative 
ruling, Mr. Dreesen made a fresh application to the Provincial Council for his name to 
be entered on the register, claiming, primarily, that his diploma did not appear in the list 
in Article 11(a) of the Directive owing to an error on the part of the German authorities. 
He held that the Provincial Council should have carried out a comparative examination 
of the education and training received, in accordance with the Court’s judgment in 
Vlassopoulou. The Provincial Council rejected his fresh application on the ground that it 
was not required to take into consideration Mr Dreessen’s knowledge and qualifications, 
or to evaluate them. Since he had already made an application which had been rejected, 
his second application was held inadmissible as being res judicata. The Appeals Com-
mittee reversed that decision on 16 June 1999, finding that Mr Dreessen had shown that 
he possessed the qualifications and knowledge required under Belgian legislation, and 
ordered that his name be entered in the register of the Provincial Association. The Na-
tional Council brought an appeal on points of law, claiming that where a Directive has 
been adopted on the basis of Article 47(1) EC (Article 53 TFEU) to determine the condi-
tions for mutual recognition of the diplomas required for admission to a profession, the 
competent authorities of a Member State to which an application has been made for 
authorisation to practise that profession must restrict themselves to ascertaining 
whether or not the conditions laid down by the Directive have been met. The National 
Council held that where those conditions are not met, the competent authorities cannot 
go on to carry out a comparison between the qualifications and the knowledge of the 
applicant, and those required under the national provisions governing access to the 
profession -as the Appeals Committee had decided on the basis of Article 43 EC (Article 
49 TFEU). Finally, the Belgian Supreme Court decided to refer a preliminary question to 
the ECJ. It asked whether Articles 10 (Article 4 TEU) and 43 EC meant that the compe-
tent authority of a Member State was required to take into consideration the diploma 
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relied upon by the applicant, and to make a comparison between, on the one hand, the 
specialised knowledge and abilities and the qualifications evidenced by that diploma 
and, on the other hand, those required under the national rules, even where there exists, 
with regard to the profession in question, a Directive adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article 47(1) and (2) EC (Article 53(1) and (2) TFEU), and that Directive pro-
vides, so far as it concerns courses of study taken up or pursued during a transitional 
period, an exhaustive list of the diplomas or certificates, awarded in the various Member 
States, which are to enable the profession concerned to be practised in the other Mem-
ber States, where the applicant falls within the scope of that transitional scheme, and 
where the diploma on which he relies is not included in that exhaustive list. 
 The ECJ held that, by reason of the express terms of the question which gave rise to 
the judgment in Dreessen (I), which were solely concerned with the interpretation of 
Article 11 of the Directive, the Court gave no ruling on the possibility of Mr Dreessen’s 
qualifications being recognised on the basis of the Court’s interpretation of Article 43 
EC in Vlassopoulou. In the case under consideration, by contrast, the question referred 
for a preliminary ruling specifically concerned that question. Therefore, the purpose of 
the present reference for a preliminary ruling was not to ascertain whether, in the case 
in the main proceedings, the national authorities were required to recognise Mr Drees-
sen’s diploma as being equivalent to the qualifications in architecture referred to in 
Directive 85/384/EEC, but to ascertain whether those authorities must examine whether 
Mr Dreessen’s professional qualifications and experience corresponded in full or in part 
to the requirements and conditions for access to the profession of architect in Belgium 
and, depending on the outcome of that examination, accord him the right to practise 
that profession there. The ECJ referred to its former rulings in Vlassopoulou, Haim314 
and Hocsman315 and held that the authorities of a Member State to which an application 
has been made by a Community national for authorisation to practise a profession, 
access to which depends, under national legislation, on the possession of a diploma or 
professional qualification or on periods of practical experience, are required to take into 
consideration all of the diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications 
of the person concerned and his relevant experience, by comparing the specialised 
knowledge and abilities so certified and that experience with the knowledge and qualifi-
cations required by the national legislation. The Court confirmed that those judgments 
are merely the expression of a principle inherent in the fundamental freedoms of the 
Treaty, and that the legal effect of that principle cannot be reduced as a result of the 
adoption of Directives on mutual recognition of diplomas.316  
 
In Commission v. Greece317, the Commission brought a case before the ECJ since it held 
that by adopting and retaining in force the provisions of Article 3(1)(c) and (2) of Presi-
dential Decree No 107/1993 (Decree No 107/1993) of 22 March 1993, and by accepting 
that the Greek Technical Board with which a person must be registered in order to be 
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able to pursue the profession of architect in Greece, systematically refused to register 
Community nationals holding diplomas which had not been awarded in Greece and 
which ought to be recognised under Council Directive 85/384/EEC, the Hellenic Repub-
lic had failed to fulfil its obligations under that Directive. 
 In Greece, Decree No 107/1993 was adopted in order to implement, among others, 
the Directive. Article 3(1)(c) of Decree No 107/1993 laid down, among the conditions 
for obtaining authorisation from the Technical Board to pursue the profession of archi-
tect, the obligation to produce the certificate issued by the competent authorities of the 
person’s Member State of origin, or of the State from which he comes, attesting that the 
diplomas or other evidence of formal qualifications submitted corresponded to those 
provided for by that decree. However, Article 27 of Directive 85/384/EEC provided that 
such a certificate could only be required in exceptional circumstances, where legitimate 
doubt existed. It follows that the obligation laid down in Article 3(1)(c) of Decree No 
107/1993 required the persons concerned to adduce additional proof not provided for in 
Directive 85/384/EEC. The Court held that such obligation had a deterrent effect which 
went against the facilitation of the effective exercise of the right of establishment, which 
the Directive and Article 43 EC (Article 49 TFEU) sought to achieve and to maintain. 
 Another complaint was associated with the fact that the Technical Board did not 
examine applications within the time-limits laid down in the Directive. In this regard, 
Article 20 of the Directive required that the procedure for authorising the person con-
cerned to take up one of the activities in the field of architecture is to be completed as 
soon as possible, and not later than three months after presentation of all the documents 
relating to the person concerned. The only exceptions to that requirement were the 
institution of an appeal or where it was necessary to carry out a re-examination of the 
file if the host Member State had detailed knowledge of a serious matter which had oc-
curred prior to the establishment of the person concerned in that State, or if it knew that 
the declaration referred to in Article 17(3) of the Directive contained incorrect informa-
tion (see Articles 17(4) and 18(2) Directive 85/384/EEC).  
 None of the above derogations were pleaded by the Greek Government. Neverthe-
less, a quick and effective registration procedure is one of the objectives envisaged by the 
Directive. Accordingly, as held by the ECJ, the need to register the persons concerned as 
soon as possible applied to the whole of the procedure for the processing of applications 
and also for required the persons concerned to be called upon to complete their applica-
tion by submitting any missing documentary evidence as soon as possible. That obliga-
tion was also among those flowing from Article 43 EC, which seeks to eliminate restric-
tions on the freedom of establishment. It followed that the Hellenic Republic had vio-
lated its obligations under Directive 85/384/EEC. 
 
In Commission v. Spain318, the Commission started proceedings against Spain since Arti-
cle 10(2) of the Spanish Royal Decree 1081/1989 of 28 August 1989 held that where 
work consists in drawing up construction projects or optionally assuming control over 
works, holders of qualifications in architecture awarded by another Member State which 
have been recognized in Spain pursuant to the provisions of the Decree, were not al-
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lowed to pursue in Spain activities other than those which they were authorised to pur-
sue in their country of origin on the basis of the qualifications awarded by the latter.  
This would only be different if they would collaborate with another member of the pro-
fession who is authorised to pursue those activities and who holds a qualification which 
is likewise recognised under Spanish law. 
 The Spanish Government submitted that it was for the national legislation of the 
host Member State to define the scope of activities of the profession of architect, and to 
determine the applicable legal regime. It held that Articles 2 and 10 of the Directive did 
not require more than that the host Member State should recognise diplomas awarded 
by other Member States and to give them the same effect within its territory as the di-
plomas which are awarded by itself. Since the definition of the profession of architect 
differs from Member State to Member State, the host Member State would enjoy wide 
powers to regulate the conditions under which the title of architect could be used. 
 The Commission, on the other hand, held that although the statutory definition of 
the field of architecture and the legal arrangements governing the profession of architect 
are matters for the national legislation of the host Member State, the scope of the activi-
ties of architects holding a qualification obtained in Spain is no wider than that of archi-
tects from other Member States. In the event that the scope was wider however, a mi-
grant architect could, in the host Member State, have a wider scope in terms of profes-
sional activity than that for which he was originally trained. That possibility had been 
anticipated by the Directive which held in Article 1(2) that activities in the field of archi-
tecture shall be those activities usually pursued under the professional title of architect.319 
It followed that the Community legislature accepted that the recognition of qualifica-
tions required by Articles 2 and 10 of the Directive may have the consequence that 
members of the profession will be authorised to exercise, under the professional title of 
architect, certain activities which their qualifications do not entitle them to pursue in 
their country of origin. 
 The Spanish Government referred to Article 1(2), and contended that the Directive 
indeed covered the activities usually pursued under the professional title of architect. In 
this regard, Spanish legislation recognised the diplomas, certificates and other formal 
qualifications that open the way to activities within the architectural sector that are 
usually pursued under the professional title of architect. However, the activities covered 
by Article 10(2) of the Royal Decree did not form part of these usual activities. Accord-
ing to the Spanish Government, activities consisting of drawing up construction projects 
or optionally assuming technical control over works, are matters which come, in various 
Member States, within the competence of civil engineers. Article 10(2) of the Royal 
Decree was designed precisely to remedy the fact that certain qualifications mentioned 
in the Directive do not confer on those holding them full competence within the techni-
cal field relating to the stability of buildings. The provision therefore required only that, 
                                                                
319 As held in the preamble, the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications presupposes that such diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications au-
thorize the taking up and pursuit of certain activities in the Member State of issue. Therefore, the recogni-
tion of certain certificates under this Directive should continue to apply only insofar as the holders of such 
certificates will be authorized, in accordance with legal provisions still to be adopted in the Member State 
of issue, to take up activities under the professional title of architect.  
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in the case where the formal qualification awarded in the Member State of origin does 
not confer full competence on the migrant architect, the latter must work in conjunction 
with another member of the profession who is appropriately authorised, and whose 
qualification is recognised by Spanish legislation. This other member of the profession 
did not necessarily need to be a Spanish national or to have obtained his qualification in 
Spain. According to the Spanish Government, there were thus significant differences in 
terms of the scope of the activities covered by the qualification giving access to the pro-
fession of architect and in regard to the training, tasks and liability of architects. In the 
absence of harmonisation of the rules relating to training and areas of competence of 
architects in the different Member States, the Spanish Government held that Article 46 
EC320 allows the Member States to put in place mechanisms to ensure that those benefit-
ing from the Directive may assume responsibility for the security of architectural pro-
jects. That is the situation, in particular, where a case involves members of the profes-
sion who, in their Member State of origin, are required to work in conjunction with 
another member of the profession in order to be able to guarantee that the project will 
meet the requirements of public security specific to that State. According to the Gov-
ernment, Article 10(2) of the Royal Decree complied with the principle of proportional-
ity and was designed to protect public security, which is guaranteed by the requirement 
of collaboration with a member of the profession who is authorised to make structural 
calculations. 
 Nevertheless, the Commission held that in any event, in order to guarantee ade-
quate protection for the recipient of the services supplied by an architect, the Commu-
nity legislature provided in Article 16(2)321 of the Directive, a specific measure designed 
to inform consumers of the conditions of training and the origin of the qualification of 
migrant architects. Within the existing legal framework, Member States had thus at their 
disposal, safeguard measures designed to ensure that the Directive is effective and to 
remedy situations which do not satisfy the conditions of the Directive. Any additional 
measure taken by the host Member State, such as an obligation to work in conjunction 
with a member of the profession who is authorised, in that State, to perform the activi-
ties in respect of which the migrant architect has not received training, was thus prohib-
ited. Furthermore, since it had not been established that there was a substantial differ-
ence regarding the training and the scope of the activities of architects from other 
Member States compared with holders of Spanish qualifications, it was not even neces-
sary to consider whether Article 46 would be applicable to the present case. In addition, 
the Commission submitted that Article 10(2) did not comply with the principle of pro-
portionality. 
                                                                
320 Article 46 (1) EC states: ‘ The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not 
prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing 
for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health …’ 
321 As held above, Article 16 (2) provides that if the academic title used in the Member State of origin, or in 
the Member State from which a foreign national comes, can be confused in the host Member State with a 
title requiring, in that State, additional education or training which the person concerned has not under-
gone, the host Member State may require such a person to use the title employed in the Member State of 
origin or the Member State from which he comes in a suitable form to be specified by the host Member 
State.  
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 The ECJ held that under Article 10(2) of the Royal Decree, the range of activities 
open to persons holding qualifications in architecture awarded by a Member State other 
than the Kingdom of Spain, is not the same as is open to persons holding qualifications 
obtained in Spain. However, Directive 85/384/EEC is designed to ensure mutual recog-
nition of diplomas by giving the qualifications acquired in another Member State the 
same effect as they have in the host Member State as regards access to the activities usu-
ally pursued under the professional title of architect (Article 2 Directive). Furthermore, 
as noted above, Article 10 of the Directive which refers to acquired rights, extends mu-
tual recognition to certain other qualifications which do not meet the requirements set 
out in Chapter II of the Directive, including those specified in Articles 3 and 4. It follows 
from Articles 2 and 10 of the Directive that, when an activity is usually pursued by ar-
chitects holding a qualification awarded by the host Member State, a migrant architect 
holding a formal qualification coming within the scope of the Directive must also be 
able to pursue such an activity, even if his qualifications are not necessarily substantively 
equivalent in terms of the training received. The Court stipulated that, while it is true 
that it is for the national legislation of the host Member State to define the field of activi-
ties covered by the profession of architect, once an activity is considered by a Member 
State as coming within that field, the requirement of mutual recognition means that 
migrant architects must also be able to pursue that activity. As regards the Spanish Gov-
ernment’s argument that the Directive, in accordance with Article 1(2) thereof, covers 
only activities usually pursued under the professional title of architect, and that the 
activities covered by Article 10(2) of the Royal Decree do not form part of those usual 
activities, the Court ruled that it was not disputed that those activities are usually pur-
sued by architects holding a qualification awarded by the Kingdom of Spain. It follows 
that such activities therefore do come within the scope of the Directive. Furthermore, 
the preamble to the Directive makes it clear that Article 1(2) is not intended to provide a 
legal definition of activities falling within the architectural sector. Furthermore, with 
regard to the application of Article 46 EC (Article 52 TFEU) to the present situation, the 
ECJ held that it should be borne in mind that this provision is not designed to reserve 
certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of Member States, but permits national laws 
to derogate from the principle of free movement to the extent to which such derogation 
is and continues to be justified for the attainment of the objectives referred to in that 
Article (public health, public policy, public security).322 However, where Community 
Directives provide for harmonisation of the measures necessary to ensure the protection 
of a specific objective, recourse to Article 46 EC is no longer justified, and the appropri-
ate checks must be carried out and the measures of protection adopted within the 
framework outlined by the harmonising Directive.323 Directive 85/384/EEC provides for 
measures to be taken where there is no substantive equivalence between, on the one 
hand, the training received in the Member State of origin or from which the person 
concerned comes and, on the other, that provided in the host Member State. In this 
                                                                
322 This was already decided in Case C-5/77 Tedeschi v. Denkavit [1977] ECR 1555, paragraph 34. 
323 Case C- 251/78 DenkavitFuttermittel v Minister für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen [1979] ECR 3369, paragraph 14; Case C-190/87 Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises 
Borken and Another v Moormann [1988] ECR 4689, paragraph 10, and Case C-112/97 Commission v Italy 
[1999] ECR I-1821, paragraph 54. 
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regard, Article 16(2) of the Directive even provides that if the academic title used in the 
Member State of origin, or in the Member State from which a foreign national comes, 
can be confused in the host Member State with a title requiring, in that State, additional 
education or training which the person concerned has not undergone, the host Member 
State may require such a person to use the title employed in the Member State of origin 
or the Member State from which he comes in a suitable form to be specified by the host 
Member State. It followed that, by providing, in Article 10(2) of the Royal Decree, that 
persons holding qualifications in architecture awarded by another Member State and 
recognised under the Directive, may not pursue in Spain activities other than those 
which they are authorised to pursue in their country of origin on the basis of the qualifi-
cations awarded by the latter, unless they collaborate with another member of the pro-
fession who is authorised to pursue those activities and who holds a qualification which 
is likewise recognised under Spanish law, the Kingdom of Spain had failed to fulfil its 
obligations under Articles 2 and 10 of that Directive. It follows that once an activity is 
regarded by a Member State as coming within the field of activities covered by the pro-
fession of architect, the requirement of mutual recognition means that migrant archi-
tects must also be able to pursue that activity. 
 
In Commission v. Italy324 the Commission initiated proceedings against the Italian Re-
public for failing to adopt all the measures necessary to implement Articles 4(1) second 
subparagraph, 4(2), 7, 11 and 14 of Directive 85/384/EEC. This case dealt with the lack 
of implementation measures or the incorrect transposition of the Directive into domes-
tic law, and the violation of Articles 43 and 49 EC. In this way Italy failed to implement 
Article 4(1) second subparagraph on the automatic recognition of the training given in 
the German Fachhochschulen, Article 4(2) on social betterment schemes, Article 14 on 
the recognition of qualifications issued by the German competent authorities attesting 
the equivalence of qualifications awarded from 8 May 1945 with the formal qualifica-
tions listed in Article 11 and Article 11 with regard to the recognition of the university 
diploma in civil engineering awarded by the Faculty of Engineering of the University of 
Oporto. In this regard the ECJ referred to the general principle that a Member State 
cannot rely on the direct effect of a Directive in order to absolve itself from taking, in 
due time, implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of that Directive.325 
Since Member States always have to fulfil their supranational Community obligations, 
the Commission’s complaint with regard to the abovementioned Articles was held to be 
well founded. 
 The Commission also made a complaint for the incomplete implementation of 
Article 7 of the Directive. According to this Article, each Member State has to commu-
nicate as soon as possible, simultaneously to the other Member States and to the Com-
mission, the list of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications as 
well as any amendments which are awarded within its territory and which meet the 
criteria laid down in Articles 3 and 4. As held by Article 7(2) of the Directive, for infor-
                                                                
324 Case C-298/99 Commission v. Italy [2002] ECR I-03129. 
325 Case C-102/79 Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 1473, paragraph 12 and Case C-96/95 Commission v. 
Germany [1997] ECR I-1653, paragraph 37. 
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mation purposes, the lists and the updating thereof will be published by the Commis-
sion in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
 According to the Italian Government, it was not necessary to list expressly the 
qualifications which must be accorded automatic recognition under national law since 
to have an overview, it was sufficient to consult the Commission communications. 
 The ECJ held that Article 7 of the Architects’ Directive does indeed not expressly 
require Member States to set out, in a national list, the qualifications to be accorded 
automatic recognition included in the lists published by the Commission pursuant to 
Article 7(2). However, the transposition of a Directive into national law must effectively 
guarantee the full application of the Directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner 
so that, where the Directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons con-
cerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them 
before the national courts.326 The Italian legislation did not contain provisions ade-
quately stating which qualifications would be recognised by the Italian authorities. More 
specifically, annex A to Decree No 129/92 concerned only the recognition on a transi-
tional basis of the qualifications mentioned in Article 11 of Directive 85/384/EEC. Arti-
cle 2 of the decree provided merely that recognition was to be accorded to the qualifica-
tions fulfilling the requirements of Article 3 of the Directive, Article 5(1)(a) authorised 
the person concerned to establish himself when he is in the possession of a recognised 
qualification, and Article 9(1)(a) contained a similar provision on the exercise of free-
dom to provide services. Since it is essential that nationals of Member States are able to 
identify the qualifications which must be accorded automatic recognition by the host 
Member State in order to guarantee effective mutual recognition of qualifications in 
architecture, since this was not the case in Italy, the Italian Republic had failed to adopt 
the measures necessary to implement Article 7 of the Directive. 
 In the same case, problems were also encountered with regard to Article 4(2)(a) of 
the Italian Decree No 129/92 which provided that architects wishing to obtain recogni-
tion in Italy of a qualification awarded to them in another Member State are required to 
submit their original diploma or a certified copy. As held by the Court, this obligation 
constituted an impediment to the freedom of establishment, and to the freedom to pro-
vide services enshrined in Article 43 and 49 EC, in that it gives rise to additional obsta-
cles for all architects applying for recognition of their qualifications, having regard to 
the risk of the original diploma being lost or of possible delay on the part of the Member 
State of origin in awarding that diploma, and the additional steps and costs resulting 
from the procedures for certifying true copies of original diplomas. Furthermore, the 
requirement specifying that the only acceptable evidence is the original of the diploma 
or a certified copy, is clearly disproportionate to the objective pursued -the practise of 
the profession only by those who have acquired certain qualifications attested by a rec-
ognised diploma (public interest) – in that it precludes any other form of evidence 
which might establish with the same degree of certainty the existence of the diploma in 
question, such as a certified statement or recognition of the applicant’s diploma by the 
authorities or professional organisations of the Member State of origin. It followed that 
                                                                
326 Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-499, paragraph 9; and Case C-96/95 Commission v 
Germany, paragraph 35. 
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Article 4(2)(a) of Decree No 129/92 was incompatible with Articles 43 and 49 EC. The 
same was true for Article 4(2)(c) of Decree No 129/92 and Article 4(1)(c) of Decree No 
776/94 which provided that the application for recognition of a qualification must be 
accompanied by a certificate of nationality. Article 4(3) of Decree No 129/92 and Article 
10 of Decree No 776/94 stated that all documents which have not been drawn up in 
Italian must be accompanied by a translation into Italian. Those translations had to be 
certified as true to the original by the Italian diplomatic or consular authorities located 
in the Member State in which the documents were drawn up, or by an approved transla-
tor. Just like the requirement in Article 4(2)(a) of the Decree which was discussed above, 
the Court held that the requirements incorporated in Article 4(2)(c) of the Decree could 
not be regarded as necessary or justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. 
They were therefore incompatible with Article 43 EC. 
 With regard to Article 11(1)(c) and (d) of Decree No 129/92, the Court identified 
another violation of the Directive. According to Article 12 of the Directive, an exception 
to the minimum training requirements defined in Articles 3 and 4 is made with regard 
to architects to whom another Member State had issued a certificate stating that, at the 
time when Directive 85/384/EEC was implemented, they were entitled to bear that title 
in that other Member State, even though such persons did not fulfil the minimum re-
quirements. The deadline for the validity of the certificates which could be issued in the 
context of Article 12 of the Directive corresponds to that for the obligation to imple-
ment the Directive, namely 5 August 1987. Article 11(1)(c) and (d) of Decree No 129/92 
on the other hand, accorded the title of architect to persons who, before the decree en-
tered into force, that is to say before 19 February 1992, were authorised to bear that title 
in another Member State. The extension of the deadline in Italy to February 1992 was 
said to be the result of the belated implementation of the Directive. Its intention was to 
give the persons concerned a transitional period corresponding to that which would 
have been prescribed if the Directive had been implemented on the due date.327 In this 
regard, the ECJ made it clear however that a Member State which had been late in im-
plementing Directive 85/384/EEC may not extend the transitional period provided for 
in Article 12 of the Directive. 
 Furthermore, Article 9(1) of the Italian decree also violated EC law. This Article 
prohibited architects established in other Member States, and who wished to provide 
services in Italy, from having there a permanent infrastructure. In this respect, the Court 
referred to its previous rulings in Gebhard328 and Commission v. Italy329. It stipulated that 
the fact that the provision of services is temporary does not mean that the service pro-
vider may not equip himself with some form of infrastructure in the host Member State 
(including an office, chambers or consulting rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is 
                                                                
327 As held before, Article 12 of Directive 85/384/EEC relates to certificates issued to nationals of Member 
States by Member States in which there are regulations at the time of notification of this Directive govern-
ing the taking up and pursuit of the activities referred to in Article 1 under the professional title of archi-
tect, stating that the holder received authorization to bear the professional title of architect before the im-
plementation of this Directive and had effectively exercised the activities in question under such regula-
tions for at least three consecutive years during the five years preceding the issue of the certificate. 
328 Case C-55/94 Gebhard paragraph 27. 
329 Case C-145/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-2235, paragraphs 22 and 23. 
  Public Regulation of Architects at European Union Level  
138 
necessary for the purposes of performing the services in question. Consequently, Article 
9 of the Decree was held to be incompatible with Article 49 EC. 
 Finally, Article 9(3) of Decree No 129/92 provided that even in respect of the provi-
sion of services, architects had to be enrolled on the registers held by the provincial 
councils and the national council of the professional body for architects. That registra-
tion was at the expense of the professional body for architects. Enrolment on the register 
of one provincial body did not authorise the provision of services in another province. 
Services could only be provided after the council had authorised registration. As stated 
above, Article 22(1) of Directive 85/384/EEC indicated in this respect that Member 
States shall, in the case of provision of services, exempt nationals of other Member States 
from registration with a professional organization or body. Member States may how-
ever, so as to permit the implementation of the provisions relating to professional con-
duct in force in their territory, require automatic temporary registration or pro forma 
registration with a professional organization or body or in a register, provided that this 
registration does not delay or in any way complicate the provision of services or impose 
any additional costs on the person providing the services. However, the registration 
required under the Italian legislation delayed the provision of services, since enrolment 
on the register occurred only within 30 days of submission of the application, while the 
first services could only be provided after effective registration. Furthermore, enrolment 
on the register of each provincial body in whose district a service was to be provided 
further complicated that provision of services. Article 9(3) of the Italian Decree thus 
violated Article 22 of Directive 85/384/EEC. 
 
In Commission v. Hellenic Republic330, the ECJ held that by failing to adopt and commu-
nicate to the Commission, within the prescribed periods, the laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative measures necessary to comply with Directive 85/384/EEC, the Hellenic 
Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under the EEC Treaty. As stated before, the 
Court keeps, together with the European Commission, an eye on whether or not the EU 
Member States take the necessary measures to implement Directive 85/384/EEC. This 
should be an incentive for Member States to adopt implementing measures on time, and 
in a correct way, to prevent violation of EC law. The same was held in Commission v. 
Italy331. 
 
The most recent example in which a failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations 
under Directive 85/384/EEC was attacked was in Commission v. Portugal.332 In this case 
the Court held that by requiring holders of profession qualifications in architecture 
conferred by other Member States to sit an entrance exam for the Portuguese Institute 
of Architects whenever they were not enrolled in the institute of architects in another 
Member State, the Republic of Portugal has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 
2 and 10 of Directive 85/384/EEC. 
                                                                
330 Case C-309/90 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1991] ECR I-5311. The exact facts of the case have not 
been published, but they are not that important because it is obvious that there was a violation of EC law 
due to a lack of communication. 
331 Case C-296/90 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-03847. 
7332 Case C-43/06 Commission of the European Communties v. Republic of Portugal [2007] ECR I-73. 
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It can be concluded that states and professional associations are quite inventive when it 
comes to thinking about reasons for restricting the entry of new professionals into their 
territory. However Directive 85/384/EEC and Directive 2005/36/EC are quite clear and 
precise and the above-mentioned case law demonstrates that the Court is quite active in 
safeguarding the free movement rights of EU architects.  It is clear that application of 
the Directive does not always result in automatic recognition of the applicant’s qualifica-
tions. It is thus possible that, even though a person holds a diploma in a field in which a 
Directive on mutual recognition of diplomas has been adopted, he cannot avail himself 
of the mechanism for automatic recognition laid down by such a Directive, for example 
because his diploma was awarded in a third country or because, for other reasons, the 
conditions for the applications of that mechanism are not met. Since the object of such 
Directives is to facilitate the mutual recognition of qualifications by laying down rules 
and common criteria which result, as far as possible, in automatic recognition, it is not 
the purpose for those Directives to make recognition of such qualifications more diffi-
cult in situations falling outside their scope, nor may they have such an effect. It follows 
therefore that Member States must comply with their obligations as regards mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications arising from the Court’s interpretation of 
Articles 49 and 53 TFEU333, in examining any application for authorisation to practise a 
profession, access to which depends, under national legislation, on the possession of a 
diploma or professional qualification or on periods of practical experience, where the 
diploma held by the Community national is not the subject of automatic recognition 
under a Directive on the mutual recognition of diplomas, even if such a Directive has 
been adopted in the professional field in question. As held by the Court in Dreessen (II), 
those authorities are thus required to take into consideration all of the diplomas, certifi-
cates and other evidence of formal qualifications of the person concerned as well as his 
relevant experience, by comparing the specialised knowledge and abilities so certified 
and that experience, with the knowledge and qualifications required by the national 
legislation. As held above, the fact that a person concerned cannot avail himself of the 
mechanism for automatic recognition laid down by the Directive on the mutual recog-
nition of diplomas, does not necessarily entail that his qualifications will not be recog-
nized at all. 
 Due to the clear system of Directive 2005/36/EC and the Court’s case law, I expect 
that, in the future, most cases which will have to be decided upon will deal with the 
rights of third-country nationals who aim to practise their profession in the European 
Union. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the ECJ is 
also competent to give preliminary rulings the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.334  
The recognition of the qualifications of third-country nationals will now be discussed. 
                                                                
333 See, in particular, Vlassopoulou, Haim and Hocsman. 
334  As regards visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons (in particu-
lar, judicial cooperation in civil matters, recognition and enforcement of judgments), any national court or 
tribunal –no longer just the higher courts– will be able to request preliminary rulings, and the Court will 
have jurisdiction to rule on measures taken on grounds of public policy in connection with cross-border 
controls. Consequently, the Court of Justice will have general jurisdiction in this area from the date of en-
try into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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4. Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market335 
4.1. Towards Directive 2006/123/EC 
As noted above, one of the Union’s aims is establishing or ensuring the functioning of 
the internal market (Article 26 TFEU). In the decade after the completion of the first 
Single Market programme in 1993, the removal of barriers created at least 2.5 million 
extra jobs and an increase in wealth of nearly 900 billion Euros.336 Competition increased 
as companies found new markets in other Member States. As will be explained in Part 
III of this thesis, this generally entails that the price of numerous products decreases 
while the number of products available to consumers is augmented. Most of these bene-
fits occurred in the market for goods however. With regard to services, the Single Mar-
ket had not yet worked as well as it should have. A report from the Commission on ‘The 
State of the Internal Market for Services’ demonstrated that, a decade after the envisaged 
completion of the internal market, there were still a large number of barriers preventing 
or slowing down the development of services between Member States, in particular 
those provided by small and medium sized enterprises.337 There were still numerous 
barriers hindering service providers from establishing themselves in other Member 
States or from trading across borders, so that there was still a huge gap between the 
vision of an integrated European Union economy and the reality as experienced by 
European citizens and providers. These barriers were mostly administrative in nature 
and were based on the lack of mutual trust between Member States, fed by the legal 
uncertainty that is associated with cross-border activities. Since services accounted for 
between 60 and 70% of economic activity in the EU 25338, Europe had a serious problem. 
Of course all these violations could be addressed by means of infringement proceedings 
launched by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.339 However, due to the range and 
scale of the problems identified, infringement proceedings alone could not cure the 
encroachments, certainly not in a systematic way. The numerous country-specific regu-
lations led to barriers to free movement which could only be removed solely by relying 
on direct application of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU (Articles 43 and 49 EC).340 Especially 
following the 2004 enlargement, it became extremely complicated and costly for na-
tional and Community institutions to address these barriers on a case-by-case basis 
through infringement procedures against the Member States concerned. Moreover, the 
                                                                
335 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in 
the internal market. The Directives is also called the ‘Services Directive’ or the ‘Bolkestein Directive’ as a 
reference to the Commissioner who proposed this Directive to extend the market even more.  
336 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/docs/services-dir/explanatory/completing_UE_SM_for-
_services_en.pdf, last consulted 17 December 2009. 
337 A characteristic of country-specific regulations is that they cause additional fixed costs that are often 
independent of firm size. This implies that, in relative terms, the strongest effect of policy heterogeneity 
falls upon small-and medium-size service firms. See Kox, Lejour & Montizaan 2004, p. 9. 
338 Services account for +/-70% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and employment in the majority of 
Member States. See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_19_en.htm, last consulted 17 
December 2009. 
339 De Witte 2007, p. 5-6. 
340 See recital 1 of the preamble to Directive 2006/123/EC.  
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lifting of many barriers requires prior coordination of national legal schemes, including 
the setting up of administrative cooperation. 
 
Since services constitute the engine of economic growth and since the fragmentation of 
national regulations has a negative impact on the entire economy and prevents consum-
ers from gaining access to a greater variety of competitively priced services, the Euro-
pean Commission proposed a Directive on services in the internal market in March 
2004.341 In this way the Directive aimed to provide a legal framework that would elimi-
nate the obstacles to the freedom of establishment for service providers and the free 
movement of services between the Member States, so that the EU would become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge based society in the world by the year 2010 
and would achieve the goal set by the European Council in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March 
2000. It has been argued that the Commission realized at the time that the double-track 
approach to the establishment and functioning of the internal market for services (on 
the one hand, the most ‘obstructed’ and economically important sectors had been the 
subject of sector-specific internal market legislation as part of the 1992 programme and, 
on the other hand, the Court of Justice of the European Union had put in place a ‘catch-
all’ legal regime342 which allowed the Commission -in its other capacity as guardian of 
the Treaty- and interested firms or individuals to tackle national impediments to the 
services market that had been left in place by the EU legislative programme) was not 
sufficient for the establishment of a true single market of services.343 During its plenary 
session in Strasbourg on 15 November 2006, the European Parliament reached an 
agreement on the proposal. 
 To overcome these difficulties, Directive 2006/123/EC (the Services Directive) was 
created. This establishes a general legal framework that benefits a wide variety of ser-
vices while taking into account the distinctive features of each type of activity or profes-
sion and its system of regulation. Since legal obstacles are often common to a large 
number of different activities, the Commission opted for a horizontal approach. In the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal of the Directive it was held that the adjust-
ment of legislation by all the Member States according to common principles and a 
common timetable would make it possible to benefit on a European scale from the re-
sulting economic growth, to avoid distortions of competition between Member States 
that make their adjustments at different rates, and to encourage improved mobilisation 
around this objective, also in terms of the allocations of national and Union administra-
tive resources. 
                                                                
341 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market, 
COM 2004 2 Final – 2004/0001 COD. 
342 The ECJ stated in 1991 that the Treaty requires the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without 
distinction to national providers of services and to those of other member States, when such a restriction is 
liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Mem-
ber State. See Case 76/90 Säger v. Dennemeyer, paragraph 12. This extension of the scope of the Treaty 
prohibition was compensated by the fact that national restrictions, if indistinctly applied, may be kept in 
place if they are necessary to achieve one of a long list of mandatory requirements: See Gebhard. 
343 De Witte 2007, p. 11. 
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4.2. Content of Directive 2006/123/EC 
4.2.1. General provisions 
The Services Directive, which is based on Articles 53(1) jo 62 TFEU (Articles 47(1) jo 55 
EC) builds on, and complements, the Union acquis, especially with regard to the rules 
concerning the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.344 Its 
provisions are, to a large extent, based on the rulings of the ECJ, so that its content is not 
a novelty but a clarification of the Court’s case law. It does not result in a detailed and 
systematic harmonisation, but is limited to the essential rules concerning the freedom of 
establishment and services. Harmonisation is only opted for in terms of matters with 
regard to which other solutions are deemed to be ineffective, such as administrative 
cooperation or reliance on the adoption of codes of conduct by the interested parties at 
Community level. 
 
It is important to note that the Directive has a residual character: it only applies if no 
other, more specific Directive, regulation or other EC act, applies. As held by recital 31, 
the Directive is consistent with, and does not affect, Directive 2005/36/EC. It deals with 
questions other than those relating to professional qualifications, such as professional 
liability insurance, commercial communications, multidisciplinary activities and admin-
istrative simplification.345 Both Directives are thus complementary instruments. With 
regard to temporary cross-border service provision, a derogation from the provision on 
the freedom to provide services in this Directive ensures that Title II on the free provi-
sion of services of Directive 2005/36/EC is not affected. Therefore, none of the measures 
applicable under that Directive in the Member State where the service is provided is 
affected by the provision on the freedom to provide services. This is confirmed in Arti-
cle 3(1)(d) which holds that, if the provisions of this Directive conflict with a provision 
of another Community act governing specific aspects of access to, or exercise of, a ser-
vice activity in specific sectors or for specific professions such as the Professional Quali-
fications Directive, the provisions of the other Community act shall prevail, and shall 
apply to those specific sectors or professions. It should be noted that this concerns only 
the specific conflicting provisions and not the remaining provisions of the Service Di-
rective which will still apply. Important within the scope of this thesis is that recital 33 
specifically indicates that the Services Directive includes the services provided by archi-
tects. 
 
It should be noted that even though Directive 2006/123/EC is often referred to as the 
‘Services’ Directive, the concept of ‘service provider’ should not be limited solely to 
cross-border service provision within the framework of the free movement of services 
(Article 56 TFEU), but should also cover cases in which an operator establishes itself in 
a Member State in order to develop its service activities there (Article 49 TFEU).346 In 
                                                                
344 See recital 30 of the preamble to Directive 2006/123/EC. 
345 An example of administrative simplification is the use of electronic procedures. 
346 See recital 77 of the preamble to Directive 2006/123/EC. 
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this way Article 1(1) holds that the Directive establishes general provisions facilitating 
the exercise of the freedom of establishment for service providers, and the free move-
ment of services, while maintaining a high quality of services. The Directive shall apply 
to services supplied by providers established in a Member State (Article 2(1)). It follows 
that the following types of service provision are thus included: services provided by 
someone who establishes in another Member State; services provided by someone who 
temporarily moves to the country where the customer is located; services provided by 
someone at a distance from his country of establishment, for example over the internet, 
by phone, or through direct marketing; services provided by someone in his home 
Member State to a customer who has travelled from another Member State.347 
4.2.2. Administrative simplification 
Chapter II of the Directive contains rules on administrative simplification. As held by 
Article 5(1), Member States have to examine the procedures and formalities applicable 
to access to a service activity and to the exercise thereof, and simplify them in the event 
that the procedures and formalities are not sufficiently simple. In this way Member 
States have to accept any document from another Member State which proves the pos-
session of a certificate, attestation, or any other document proving that a requirement348 
has been satisfied, and may not require a document from another Member State to be 
produced in its original form save in the cases provided for in other Community in-
struments, or where such a requirement is justified by an overriding reason relating to 
the public interest, including public order and security (Article 5(3)). However, this is 
not the case with regard to the documents referred to in Article 7(2) -documents which 
may be demanded before the first provision of services- and Article 50 of Directive 
2005/36/EC -documents which can be required in the event of establishment in another 
state to pursue a profession (see Article 5(4)). It follows that these documents may be 
demanded in their original form or as a certified copy. 
 
A very important provision is Article 6(1) which indicates that Member States have to 
ensure that it is possible for providers to complete procedures and formalities for access 
to the exercise of services activities through points of single contact. These points have 
an important role to play in providing assistance to providers, either as the authorities 
directly competent to issue the documents necessary to access a service activity, or as 
                                                                
347 Examples are hotel services, services provided in theme parks or other tourist attractions, and health 
services. 
348 The Services Directive applies to those requirements which affect the access to, or the exercise of, a service 
activity. As held by Article 4(7), the concept of requirement covers any obligation, prohibition, condition 
or limit provided for in the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States, or in con-
sequence of case-law, administrative practice, the rules of professional bodies, or the collective rules of pro-
fessional associations or other professional organisations, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy. 
The Services Directive does not apply to those requirements which do not specifically regulate or specifi-
cally affect the service activity, but have to be respected by providers in the course of carrying out their 
economic activity in the same way as by individuals in their private capacity. This means that, for example, 
rules concerning the development or use of land, town and country planning as well as building standards 
will generally not be affected by the Services Directive (recital 9). 
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intermediaries between the provider and the authorities which are directly competent. 
In this way, service providers do not need to contact several competent authorities or 
bodies349 to collect all relevant information, and to complete all necessary steps relating 
to their service activities. It follows that administrative procedures are further simplified 
in this way (recital 48). It should be noted however, that the detailed tasks of the points 
of single contact differ from the tasks of the contact points mentioned in Article 57 of 
Directive 2005/36/EC, insofar as the latter handle only the information requirements350 
for the recognition of professional qualifications. Whereas only one single contact point 
is to be set up in each Member State which will make available information concerning 
recognition of professional qualifications and assistance to citizens wishing to have their 
professional qualifications recognised in another Member State, the points of single 
contact will make it possible for citizens and businesses to actually complete all proce-
dures and formalities relating to access to, and exercise of, service activities, including 
those related to the recognition of professional qualifications. It follows that the role of 
the points of single contact is to inform providers of services (from other EU Member 
States and from its own State) complete and comprehensive information about all rele-
vant procedures and formalities needed for access to his service activity351; coordinate 
requests from providers with the relevant competent authorities, and receive certain 
obligatory information from the provider such as applications for authorisation that is 
needed to exercise his service activity. In this regard it should be emphasized that the 
points of single contact do not monopolise access to the competent authorities. Service 
providers are free to communicate directly with these authorities. The competence of 
the points of single contact includes the means by which service providers can complete 
all pertinent procedures and formalities, although the Commission has clarified that 
                                                                
349 As held by Article 4(9) Directive 2006/123/EC, competent authorities are any body or authority which has 
a supervisory or regulatory role in a Member State in relation to service activities, including, in particular, 
administrative authorities, including courts acting as such, professional bodies, and those professional as-
sociations or other professional organisations which, in the exercise of their legal autonomy, regulate in a 
collective manner access to service activities or the exercise thereof. Hence it may be concluded that the 
term ‘competent authority’ is not applied in the same sense as in Article 56 of Directive 2005/36/EC which 
defines competent authorities in Article 3(d) as any authority or body empowered by a Member State to 
issue or receive training diplomas and other documents or information and to receive the applications, 
and take the decisions referred to in this Directive. The real differences between the two types of compe-
tent authorities will only become clear after the implementation of the two Directives in the Member States 
and it seems that some governments may decide that both roles should be taken up by the same body or 
authority as there is a certain logic in such an approach: See Architects’ Council of Europe, Directive 
2006/123/EC on Services in the Internal Market (SIM), Guide for the Member Organisations of the ACE 
on Transposition and Implementation of the SIM Directive, Draft version 6.1, 12 September 2007. 
350 These information requirements include the relevant laws, codes of conduct and social legislation. The 
Contact Points are supposed to form a network structure at European level as the Directive only requires 
that one Contact Point be defined by each Member State. 
351 As held by Article 7 (1), Member States shall ensure that certain necessary information is available to the 
providers and recipients through points of single contact (PSC). If concrete questions arise, the PSC must 
act as a portal to the relevant competent authority that can provide more detailed information and advice 
on the general interpretation and application of the relevant requirements. This information must be de-
livered in plain and intelligible language, easily accessible to service providers and recipients, available by 
electronic means (Article 7 (1) and (3)), up-to date (Article 7(3)) and delivered as quickly as possible (Arti-
cle 7 (4)). The PSC do not give legal advice in individual cases, but general information on the way in 
which requirements are usually interpreted (Article 7(6)). 
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Member States may decide that they only play a coordinating role so that final decisions 
remain with the existing competent authorities.352 To speed up the process, Member 
States have to ensure that all procedures and formalities relating to access to a service 
activity and to the exercise thereof, may be easily completed through the relevant point 
of single contact and with the relevant competent authorities, at a distance, and by elec-
tronic means (Article 8). It follows that Directive 2006/123/EC contains some new rules 
which encourage and even oblige Member States to actively cooperate with each other 
when dealing with cross border service provisions. The Directive aims to ensure that 
this cooperation works effectively and rapidly. 
4.2.3. Measures relating to the freedom of establishment for service providers 
Chapter III of the Directive only applies to cases of establishment and not to cross-
border service provision. The freedom to provide services is specifically dealt with in 
Chapter IV. Chapter III covers both the situation where a service provider seeks to es-
tablish in another Member State and the situation where he wants to establish in his 
own State. In short, Member States have to examine whether existing authorisation and 
licensing schemes can be replaced by simpler measures such as notifications (Article 9). 
Authorisation schemes which are maintained must respect principles such as non-
discrimination, objectivity and transparency. Any measures that are discriminatory to 
the provider, and that are not objectively justifiable by an over-riding reason relating to 
the public interest, are therefore not allowed. In addition, authorisation procedures will 
have to be streamlined, criteria for obtaining an authorisation will have to be known in 
advance, and deadlines for replies will have to be made public and respected. The pro-
cedures will thus be screened and, where unjustified, removed. 
 Article 14 contains a list of requirements which are prohibited and which can thus 
not be maintained by Member States. Examples are requirements that are discrimina-
tory or in other ways particularly restrictive353, prohibitions on having an establishment 
in more than one Member State, a case-by-case application of an economic test making 
the granting of authorisation subject to proof of an economic or market need354, an obli-
gation to provide or participate in a financial guarantee or to take out insurance from a 
provider or body established in their territory, an obligation to be pre-registered, for a 
given period, in the registers held in their territory, or to have previously exercised the 
activity for a given period in their territory. Article 15 on the other hand, contains ex-
amples of severe obstacles to the freedom of establishment which are subject to evalua-
tion since they can often be replaced by less restrictive means, but might nevertheless be 
justified. There is no outright prohibition, but Member States are required to review 
their legislation and rules provided for by professional associations and to evaluate these 
on the basis of the criteria of non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality as set 
out in Article 15(3). Member States have to examine whether their legal systems impose 
                                                                
352 See recital 48 of the preamble and Article 6 (2) of the Directive.  
353 In many cases the ECJ has already found them to be incompatible with Article 43 EC, such as nationality 
requirements or requirements relating to the place of residence of providers. 
354 This prohibition shall not concern planning requirements which do not pursue economic aims, but serve 
overriding reasons relating to the public interest. 
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certain requirements on service providers, including quantitative or territorial restric-
tions, in particular in the form of limits fixed according to population or of a minimum 
geographical distance between providers, obligations to operate through specific legal 
forms355, requirements relating to shareholding in a company356, requirements relating to 
reserved functions, and compliance with fixed minimum and/or maximum tariffs (cost 
information systems)357.358 It is noted that such requirements are permissible, provided 
they are non-discriminatory, necessary and proportional. 
 
It can be concluded that obstacles to the freedom of establishment will be eliminated 
through: 
- administrative simplification measures in Member States which make it easier for a 
service  provider in one Member State to become established in another Member 
State 
- certain principles which authorization schemes must respect: they cannot discrimi-
nate against a service provider on grounds of nationality; the authorisation schemes 
must be objectively justified (they must be in the public interest) and the objective 
cannot be attained by means of a less restricted measures (Article 9); 
- the prohibition of particularly restrictive legal requirements (Article 14); 
- the obligation to assess further certain other legal requirements (Article 15).359 
4.2.4. Measures relating to the free provision of services 
With regard to the freedom to provide services, Article 16(1) indicates that Member 
States shall respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State other 
than that in which they are established. As noted above, the freedom to provide services 
is characterized by the absence of a stable and continuous participation in the economic 
life of the host Member State. The Member State in which the service is provided shall 
ensure free access to and free exercise of a service activity within its territory.360 It cannot 
                                                                
355 As held by recital 38, the concept of ‘legal person’ leaves operators, according to the Treaty provisions on 
establishment, free to choose the legal form which they deem suitable for carrying out their activity.  
356 In a case concerning the establishment of opticians, the ECJ found that imposing a given level of participa-
tion of opticians in the share capital was not proportionate for attainment of the objective of protecting 
public health: See Case C-140/03 Commission v Hellenic Republic [2005] ECR I-3177. In this case, less re-
strictive measures were deemed to be possible e.g. by requiring the physical presence of qualified, salaried 
or associated professionals in each shop, by applying rules concerning civil liability for the action of others 
or national rules requiring professional liability insurance.  
357 Such tariffs are often not necessary since rules relating to qualifications, professional ethics, organisation, 
supervision and liability may suffice in themselves to attain the objectives of the protection of consumers. 
See Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Federico Cipolla v. Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese and Stefano 
Macrino and Claudia Capodarte v. Roberto Meloni [2006] ECR I-1 1421. 
358 See Article 15 (2) of the Directive. 
359 See http://www.entemp.ie/trade/marketaccess/singlemarket/servicesDirective.htm, last consulted 19 
December 2009. 
360 See Article 16 (1) of the Directive. Article 16 (1) used to state initially (first reading): ‘Member States shall 
ensure that providers are subject only to the national provisions of their Member State of origin which fall 
within the coordinated field.’ This was referred to as the ‘country of origin’ principle. Member States were 
not allowed to restrict the freedom to provide services in the case of a provider established in another 
Member State, so the country of destination had no right to impose new regulations (Articles 17,18 and 19 
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make access to, or exercise of, a service activity on its territory subject to requirements 
which do not respect the principles of non-discrimination, necessity and proportional-
ity. It follows that this general rule is a codification of the objective justification test laid 
down in Gebhard. In this regard, host Member States are not allowed to demand that 
services providers have an establishment in their territory, in order to obtain an authori-
sation from the competent authorities, including entry in a register or registration with a 
professional body or association in their territory (except where provided for in this 
Directive or other instruments of Community law) or to impose other obligations which 
hinder service provision.361 Only requirements which are justified for reasons of public 
policy, public security, public health or the protection of the environment, and which 
are in accordance with Article 16(1), can be accepted (Article 16(3)). Member States 
should therefore refrain from applying their own requirements to services providers 
established in other Member States. However, they are allowed to maintain their re-
quirements with regard to their national operators. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
contained some derogations). Only the country of origin could supervise the provider and the services per-
formed by him. The basic principle was thus that when the requirements of the country of establishment 
were fulfilled, one would automatically be considered to fulfil the requirements of the other EU-countries 
too. However, this led to a great deal of criticism since the states which imposed the lowest level of regula-
tion could set the norm. One feared that this could lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ and it did not take long 
before the Bolkestein Directive was called the ‘Frankenstein’ Directive. Furthermore, as held by De Witte, 
‘The country of origin principle represented a substantive shift compared to the ECJ’s case law, and com-
pared to the Commission’s own approach in drafting internal market legislation. The case law of the ECJ 
does not challenge, as a matter of principle, the application of the host country’s laws and regulations. The 
principle of mutual recognition, as adopted by the Court, simply meant that the host state must take into 
account the laws and regulations to which the service provider is subject in its home state, so as not to cre-
ate unjustified double burdens. This is not the same thins as imposing, as a matter of principle, the applica-
tion of the laws of the country of origin.’ See De Witte 2007, p. 8.  
The final version of the Directive does not include the ‘country of origin’ principle as such but, instead, 
reminds Member States of the principle of free movement, while accepting inroads when free movement 
collides with other public interests. However, before making such inroads, authorities have to verify and 
recognize any protection already provided in the country of origin – under the mutual recognition princi-
ple, they need to take into account what takes places in other countries before proceeding. It was said that, 
because of this, the Directive on Services has become less liberal and that the ‘free game of the social forces’ 
is bound by more rules: See Kranenburg, ‘Minder Liberaal’, NRC Handelsblad, 15 November 2006. As held 
by De Witte, the price for the removal was the enactment of a highly complex and very confusing Article 
16, which, taken as a whole, is reminiscent of the existing case-law of the ECJ on restrictions of services, 
but with some major differences which are not well explained in the rambling preamble of the Directive. 
Article 16(3) which specifies the acceptable justifications for host country requirements does not name the 
mandatory requirements which the ECJ has recognized: See De Witte, p. 10. The country of origin princi-
ple in the Commission’s original proposal would have allowed service providers to jump over such restric-
tions when operating temporarily in another country. It was rejected for several reasons including con-
cerns about possible abuses and monitoring problems. Under the Directive that is now adopted, the barri-
ers that may remain after the screening process and the application of the freedom to provide services 
clause will still need to be challenged using the existing infringement procedures. Because the legal process 
is slow, the Directive should be bolstered by quicker and cheaper remedies in order to get the greatest 
benefit from the reform. See: ‘Economic survey of the European Union 2007: Ever closer union? Moving for-
ward in the single market’, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34111_38979998_1_1_1_1,00.html, last consulted 18 
August 2009. 
361 See for more examples Article 16 (2) of the Directive. 
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Very important within the scope of this thesis is that Article 17 provides that Article 16 
shall not apply to matters covered by Title II of Directive 2005/36/EC. It follows that 
Article 16 will only apply to those matters not linked to professional qualifications such 
as commercial communications, multidisciplinary partnerships, tariffs, advertising, etc. 
This means that Title II of Directive 2005/36/EC fully applies, encompassing that the 
host Member State can, for example, require on an annual basis a prior declaration, 
including the details of any insurance cover or other means of personal or collective 
protection regarding professional liability, and the provider will be subject to profes-
sional rules of a professional, statutory or administrative nature, which are directly 
linked to professional qualifications. Article 17 also excludes from the application of 
Article 16, requirements reserving an activity to members of a certain regulated profes-
sion. It follows that if a Member State reserves the design of buildings to architects, the 
provisions on the freedom to provide services in Article 16 will not apply. Thus, a per-
son who is allowed to design building projects in his Member State of establishment, but 
is not qualified as an architect, will not be able to rely on Article 16 to provide architec-
tural services in another Member State where such services are reserved to architects. 
While this provides comfort to the profession, it must be recalled that the derogation 
does not apply to matters such as commercial communications, multidisciplinary prac-
tices, tariffs, etc., for which the provisions of Article 16 apply.362 In these cases the meas-
ures applicable in the host Member State will not be affected. In exceptional circum-
stances Member States may also take measures relating to the safety of services (Article 
18). 
Section 2 of Chapter IV deals with the rights of service recipients. As held by Article 19, 
Member States may not impose on a recipient, requirements which restrict the use of 
services supplied by a provider established in another Member State. In this way the 
general conditions of access to a service are not allowed to contain discriminatory provi-
sions (Article 20). Member States have to ensure that recipients can obtain, in their 
Member State of residence, information relating to the requirements applicable in other 
Member States in terms of the access to, and exercise of, service activities, and in par-
ticular, those relating to consumer protection, information on the means of redress 
available in the case of a dispute between the provider and the recipient, and the contact 
details of associations or organisations, including the centres of the European Consumer 
Centres Network, from which providers or recipients may obtain practical assistance 
(Article 21). 
 
In order to eliminate obstacles to the free movement of services, Directive 2006/123/EC 
provides for the free movement of services which means that Member States have to 
respect the right of service providers to provide services in a Member State other than 
that in which they are established, as well as the right of recipients to avail themselves of 
                                                                
362 Matters covered by the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC that lay down administrative formalities of the 
competent authorities of the Member State where the service is provided with which the beneficiary must 
comply as well as matters covered by Directive 96/71/EC (posting of workers)are likewise excluded. With 
regard to posted workers, the rules of the host Member State (where the employee is sent to work) are ap-
plicable.  
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services from other Member States which will bring about increased competition in 
different sectors of the economy to the benefit of consumers.363 
4.2.5. Quality of services 
In Chapter V, the Directive sets out a range of provisions that Member States can im-
plement in order to encourage service providers to improve the quality of their services. 
A high quality of service is aimed for by encouraging, among other things, self-
regulation through the elaboration of European Codes of Conduct. However, only a few 
provisions of Chapter V are obligatory in nature, such as the requirement to make cer-
tain information available to recipients, information on the professional body with 
which the provider is registered in case of regulated professions, the professional title, 
the Member State in which the title has been granted, the price of the services, the insur-
ance details, etc.364 In this regard, Member States have to ensure that providers supply 
the following information at the recipient’s request: the price of the service (where the 
price is not pre-determined by the provider) or the method for calculating the price or a 
sufficiently detailed estimate (if an exact price cannot be given), a reference to the pro-
fessional rules applicable in the Member State of establishment, and how to access 
them365, and information on multidisciplinary activities and partnerships which are 
directly linked to the service in question, and on the measures taken to avoid conflicts of 
interest. The provider also has to specify how to access detailed information on the 
characteristics of, and conditions for, the use of non-judicial means of dispute settle-
ment (Article 22(3)). Member States may ensure that any operator providing services 
involving a direct and particular health, safety or financial risk for the recipient or a 
third person, subscribes to appropriate professional liability insurance366, or to another 
form of guarantee which is equivalent or comparable.367 This means that such an opera-
tor must have adequate insurance cover for services provided in one or more Member 
States other than his Member State of establishment. However, since the insurance or 
guarantee should be appropriate to the nature and extent of the risk, it should be neces-
sary for the provider to have cross-border cover only if he actually provides services in 
other Member States. As held by Article 23(2), when a provider establishes himself in 
their territory, Member States may not require professional liability insurance or a guar-
antee from the provider when he is already covered by a guarantee which is equivalent, 
or essentially comparable as regards its purpose, and the cover it provides in terms of 
the insured risk, the insured sum or a ceiling for the guarantee and possible exclusions 
from the cover, in another Member State in which the provider is already established. 
Where equivalence is only partial, Member States may require a supplementary guaran-
                                                                
363 See http://www.entemp.ie/trade/marketaccess/singlemarket/servicesDirective.htm, last consulted 19 
December 2009. 
364 See Article 22 (1) of the Directive.  
365 This requirement holds with regard to regulated professions.  
366 As held by Article 23(5), professional liability insurance refers to insurance taken out by a provider in 
respect of potential liabilities to recipients and, where applicable, third parties arising out of the provision 
of the service.  
367 See recital 98 to the preamble of the Directive and Article 23 (1).  
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tee to cover those aspects not already covered. Since providers and insurance companies 
should maintain the necessary flexibility to negotiate insurance policies precisely tar-
geted to the nature and extent of the risk, Member States should not lay down more 
detailed rules concerning the insurance cover and fix, for example, minimum thresholds 
for the insured sum or limits on exclusions from the insurance cover. Furthermore, as 
indicated by recital 99, it is not necessary for an obligation of appropriate insurance to 
be laid down by law. It should be sufficient if an insurance obligation is part of the ethi-
cal rules laid down by professional bodies. There should be no obligation for insurance 
companies to provide insurance cover. 
 
Article 24 deals with commercial communications368. Member States have to remove all 
total prohibitions on commercial communications. This is specifically with regard to 
bans which forbid one or more forms of communication, such as a ban on all advertis-
ing in one or more given media (recital 100). Furthermore, Member States have to en-
sure that commercial communications by the regulated professions comply with profes-
sional rules which relate in particular to the independence, dignity and integrity of the 
profession, as well as to professional secrecy in a manner consistent with the specific 
nature of each profession and in conformity with EU law.369 In any case, professional 
rules on commercial communications shall be non-discriminatory, justified by an over-
riding reason relating to the public interest and be proportionate. As regards the content 
and methods of commercial communication, it is deemed to be necessary to encourage 
professionals to draw up, in accordance with EU law, codes of conduct at EU level.370 
 
Article 25 contains measures on multi-disciplinary partnerships. Member States have to 
ensure that providers are not made subject to requirements which oblige them to exer-
cise a given specific activity exclusively, or which restrict the exercise jointly or in part-
nership, of different activities. As will be explained in more detail hereunder, it is in the 
interest of recipients, in particular consumers, to ensure that it is possible for providers 
to offer multidisciplinary services. Nevertheless, recital 101 indicates that, with regard to 
the regulated professions, an exception might be justified in order to guarantee compli-
ance with the rules governing professional ethics and conduct which vary according to 
the specific nature of each profession, and can be necessary in order to ensure their 
independence and impartiality (recital 101). In this regard the Directive indicates that 
the prevention of conflicts of interest and the independence and impartiality required 
for certain services activities, should be protected next to the removal of restrictions on 
the free movement of the provider. It follows that Member States which allow multidis-
ciplinary activities must ensure that conflicts of interest are prevented, that the inde-
pendence and impartiality required for certain activities is ensured, and that the rules 
governing professional ethics and conduct for different activities are compatible with 
                                                                
368 The notion of commercial communication covers any form of communication aimed at promoting ser-
vices or the image of a service provider (Article 4 (12)). It thus covers advertising as well as other forms of 
commercial communication, such as business cards mentioning the title and speciality of the service pro-
vider.  
369 European Commission, Handbook on the Implementation of the Services Directive, 2007, p. 49. 
370 See Article 37 of the Directive.  
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one another. With regard to the architectural profession, this is of growing importance, 
since the design and creation of buildings becomes every day more complex due to the 
introduction of new and different techniques. 
 
To obtain a high level of quality, Article 26 indicates that Member States have to resort 
to the certification or assessment of services by independent or accredited bodies that 
will verify whether a provider has performed the services required properly and in ac-
cordance with specific standards. Another possibility in terms of ensuring quality is the 
drawing up by Member States of their own quality charter, or participation in quality 
charters or labels, drawn up by professional bodies at community level. The develop-
ment of voluntary European standards should be encouraged.371 Furthermore, Member 
States have to take the general measures necessary to ensure that providers who are 
subject to a code of conduct or are members of a trade association or professional body, 
which provides for recourse to a non-judicial means of settling disputes, should inform 
the recipient thereof.372 In the majority of the Member States, such procedures are al-
ready in place for the resolution of disputes between architects and their clients. In this 
way the number of cases that end up in front of the courts can be reduced. 
4.2.6. Administrative cooperation 
Chapter VI obliges Member States to give each other mutual assistance, and to put in 
place measures for effective cooperation to ensure the supervision of providers and their 
services (Article 28). The chapter aims to enhance trust and confidence between the 
Member States by improving the efficiency of supervision. The Member State of estab-
lishment has to supply information on providers established in its territory when re-
quested to do so by another state and has to undertake inspections, checks and investi-
gations if requested (Article 29). Articles 30 and 31 provide for a division of tasks be-
tween the Member States involved, and indicate which Member State’s requirements 
apply. Each Member State is, in principle, responsible for the supervision and enforce-
ment of its own requirements. Other Member States have to cooperate in the effective 
supervision. Article 31(1) foresees supervision with respect to national requirements 
which may be imposed pursuant to Articles 16 or 17, by the Member State where the 
service is provided, in the event of the temporary movement of the provider, while Arti-
cle 30(1) deals with supervision by the Member State of establishment in the event of the 
temporary movement of a provider to another Member State. The latter occurs if the 
Member State where the service is provided is not allowed to apply its own requirements 
to service providers because they cannot be categorized under Articles 16 or 17 of the 
Directive.373 At the request of a competent authority of a Member State, Member States 
have to supply information on disciplinary or administrative actions or criminal sanc-
                                                                
371 The Architects’ Council of Europe, which is the representative organisation of the architectural profession 
in the European Union, has already done substantial work in this area. It adopted a Code of Conduct in 
November 2005 and a Guide to Quality Management which makes it easier to apply certification or as-
sessment methods.  
372 See Article 27 of Directive 2006/123/EC. 
373 See Articles 30 (1) and 31 (2)) of the Directive. 
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tions, and decisions concerning insolvency or bankruptcy involving fraud, taken by 
their own competent authorities in respect of the provider, which are directly relevant to 
the provider’s competence or professional liability (Article 33(1)). Furthermore, with 
regard to the exchange of information, the Directive prescribes the establishment of an 
electronic system (Article 34(1)). 
 
It can be concluded that the Directive contains several measures aimed at increasing 
administrative cooperation between Member States. Whether the Member States will 
better assist each other has to be seen, since Member States were only required to im-
plement the Directive by 28 December 2009.374 
4.2.7. Convergence programme 
Due to the increase in cross-border activities, and the development of a genuine internal 
market for services, a greater convergence of professional rules at the European level is 
desirable. In this regard, Article 37(1) indicates that Member States have to take accom-
panying measures to encourage the drawing up, at Community level, particularly by 
professional bodies, organisations and associations, of codes of conduct aimed at facili-
tating the provision of services, or the establishment of a provider in another Member 
State, in conformity with Community law. By the creation of common minimum rules 
of conduct, such European codes have to ensure, in particular, independence, impartial-
ity and professional secrecy and to establish rules on commercial communications and, 
where appropriate, insurance requirements, so that the free movement of service pro-
viders is facilitated and the trust and confidence of recipients is enhanced. In this spirit, 
the Internal Market and Services Directorate-General conducted a public on-line con-
sultation from 30 May to 15 August 2007375, inviting professional organizations to pro-
vide it with information on their codes of conduct and to give their views on the best 
possible way of establishing codes of conduct at the European level. A significant num-
ber of replies were received: 172 professional organizations representing more than 25 
different service sectors and 25 Member States, with the majority coming from the regu-
lated professions. 75% of the professional organizations responded that they had a code 
of conduct. As indicated above, Directive 2006/123/EC encourages the drawing-up of 
such codes at European level, since the existence of codes of conduct at national level 
only brings about a purely national perception of the quality of services. This might 
result in market fragmentation, while European codes of conduct can help to promote a 
high quality of services and to establish a relationship of confidence between consumers 
and professionals. The Directive is based on the premise that European codes of con-
duct give consumers more freedom of choice with regard to the service provider, since 
they have the knowledge that the service providers are subject to a common European 
code of conduct. Such codes may also help to bring out the specific nature of the services 
of certain sectors, especially regulated professions, by guaranteeing that they can exer-
                                                                
374 See Article 44 (1) of the Directive.  
375 European Commission, Enhancing the quality of services in the Internal Market: The role of European codes 
of conduct, 2007. See http://www.fenca.org/uploads/Surveys/codeconduct_en.pdf, last consulted 23 De-
cember 2009. 
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cise their profession independently, and by protecting the impartiality of the rules of 
professional conduct. 
 In general, professional organisations have always played a major role with regard 
to the regulated professions by helping to provide a framework for the pursuit of the 
activities of their members. Compulsory registration or membership of the representa-
tive professional organization is a specific mode of regulation of these professions, 
which leads to the fact that these professions are generally characterized by high levels of 
self-regulation. According to the above-mentioned consultation, most professional 
organizations seem to be governed by private law. Furthermore, many professions (in-
cluding the architectural profession) have not only representative professional organiza-
tions at local and/or national level, but also at international and European levels. With 
regard to architects, reference should be made to the Architects’ Council of Europe376, 
which is the only representative organization of architects at EU level. It is based in 
Brussels and monitors relevant policy and legislative developments in the EU. In this 
way it aims to influence those areas of EU policy that have an impact on architectural 
practice, and on policies affecting the overall quality and sustainability of the built envi-
ronment. The Architects’ Council of Europe advises the Commission about issues which 
it considers to be important, indicates problems which architects often encounter, and 
gives opinions about legislative proposals, such as the proposal leading to Directive 
2005/36/EC and Directive 2006/123/EC and the Lisbon Recognition Convention. In this 
way the Architects’ Council of Europe contributes significantly to the promotion of the 
architectural profession and the protection of European architects. Professionals can 
choose to join a national professional organisation but are not members as such of the 
European organization which consists of national representatives of professional or-
ganisations of different Member States, and is organized in accordance with the princi-
ple of self-regulation.377 Although membership of professional associations is often com-
pulsory at national level, this does not exist as such at the European level. The organiza-
tions at European level are all governed by private law, and many of them, including the 
Architects’ Council of Europe, have already adopted European codes of conduct.378 The 
current European codes have only declaratory value however, and can only be binding 
with regard to their members. This is the logical consequence of their status as private 
organizations. In any case, the codes of conduct must comply with EU law and, in par-
ticular, with internal market and competition law379. Ideally it should be possible for the 
European code of conduct to be transposed by the national organisations into their 
                                                                
376 The Architects’ Council of Europe was founded in Treviso (Italy) on the 11th May 1990 by the merger of 
the former Liaison Committee of the Architects of the United Europe and the former Council of European 
Architects. 
377 Members are the regulatory and professional representative bodies of all European Union Member States, 
Accession States, Switzerland and Norway. Through them, the Architects’ Council of Europe represents 
the interests of over 480,000 architects in Europe. See http://www.ace-cae.org/, last consulted 19 December 
2009. 
378 The deontological code of the ACE of 19 November 2005 is not legally binding. 
379 The Commission held, for example, with regard to the Belgian architects’ fee system, that agreements are 
‘particularly serious’ considering that, through its very nature, the object of an agreement fixing the price 
of goods or services is to restrict competition on the market. See decision of 24 June 2004. 
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national codes, in order to guarantee its effectiveness.380 However, as stipulated in recital 
14 of the Directive, the European Codes do not replace the national codes, but only 
complement them.381 
4.2.8. Conclusion 
While Directive 2005/36/EC focuses on the recognition of professional qualifications 
with regard to market access to regulated professions, Directive 2006/123/EC concen-
trates on matters relating to the quality of services. The Directive focuses on the prohibi-
tion of national measures restricting either establishment or free movement of services 
and relies almost exclusively on negative as opposed to positive integration. The core 
provision of Directive 2006/123/EC is Article 16(1), which provides that Member States 
have to respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State other than 
that in which they are established.  Since Member States are still allowed to impose cer-
tain requirements if justified for public interest reasons (Article 16(3), and in certain 
specific cases (Article 17 and 18), the Directive strike a certain balance between guaran-
teeing the rights of service providers to free access and free exercise of a service activity, 
whilst allowing Member States the right to invoke their most essential requirements in 
certain clearly-defined circumstances. According to former Commissioner McCreevy, 
this will definitively improve legal certainty for service providers and consumers.382  
Since the Directive makes it easier for service providers to establish themselves any-
where in the EU, saving time and money, it provides a welcome boost to cross-border 
service provision. The Directive is underpinned by obligations on Member States to co-
operate with and assist each other, to ensure that businesses are properly and efficiently 
supervised across the EU while avoiding the duplication of controls. To achieve its aims, 
Member States have to simplify the procedures and formalities which are applicable to 
the access to certain activities and the exercise of these. Discriminatory measures and 
other requirements have to be eliminated from national legislation, and Member States 
                                                                
380 Member States or national professional organisations can always stipulate more detailed rules in order to 
provide greater protection. 
381 On an international level, reference should be made to the International Union of Architects which was 
founded in Lausanne in 1948, to unite the architects of the world without regard to nationality, race, relig-
ion, or architectural doctrine, and to federate their national organisations. The Union, which is an inter-
governmental organization, means the key professional organizations of architects in 124 countries and 
territories and represents, through these organisations, more than 1,300,000 architects worldwide. In 1999 
the Union established an accord on Recommended International Standards of Professionalism in Archi-
tectural Practice, which is an advisory document that contains standards and practices that should best 
serve community interests, define what is considered best practice for the profession, and express the stan-
dards to which the profession aspires. It is an advisory document containing principles of professionalism 
and professional standards in the interest of public health, safety, welfare, and culture, and supports the 
position that interrecognition of standards of professionalism and competence is in the public interest as 
well as in the interest of maintaining the credibility of the profession. The global principles and standards 
of the UIA are aimed at the thorough education and practical training of architects so that they are able to 
fulfil their fundamental professional requirements. See http://www.uia-architectes.org/texte/england/-
Menu-1/0-pourquoi-new.html, last consulted 19 December 2009. 
382  Statement of McCreevy on the vote of the European Parliament on the Services Directive, 15 November 
2006. See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/687, last consulted 19 
Decemer 2009. 
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have to accept any document, including copies, from another Member State which 
proves that a certain requirement has been fulfilled. In general this would include that, if 
a Member State invokes that only registered professionals are allowed to perform a pro-
fession, proof of an individual’s registration should be sufficient without having to de-
liver proof of the specific qualifications as well. However, Article 5(3) does not apply to 
the documents enumerated in Article 7(2) and 50 of Directive 2005/36/EC which refers 
to Annex VII (Article 5(4)). It follows that attestations of professional competence or 
evidence of formal qualifications and attestations of professional experience can there-
fore still be asked for, while the host State is allowed to invite the applicant to provide 
information concerning his training to the extent necessary in order to determine the 
existence of potential differences (Annex VII point 1b). Market entry regulations re-
garding the protection of the architectural title generally demand such qualifications. 
 
The Directive also takes into account the rights of the recipients of services: they must 
be able to use services from other Member States without being hindered by restrictive 
measures or discriminating behaviour on the part of their own government. Member 
States shall ensure that they can obtain information relating to access to services, means 
of redress, etc. To establish mutual trust, Member States shall ensure that information 
on providers and their services will be made available, and that there will be stronger 
mutual assistance between national authorities to promote the effective supervision of 
services. It follows that service providers can be confident that they are dealing with fair 
and transparent authorisation regimes and that there are swift and simple procedures. 
They will be able to obtain information and complete administrative formalities through 
points of single contact in any Member State and, in addition, in electronic form. This 
will simplify, accelerate and reduce the cost associated with the setting up of a new busi-
ness, and will obviate the need to deal with different levels of authority. 
The Directive sets out what kind of restrictions the Member State where the services are 
provided (the host States) may still impose (Articles 16 and 17) and what manner of 
supervision can be exercised, either by the State of establishment (Article 30), or by the 
host State (Article 31). Member States are thus not prevented from supervising compa-
nies and workers operating on their territory. The Member State where the service is 
provided can enforce working conditions, including minimum wages which means that 
companies posting workers to another Member State will not benefit from bringing in 
‘cheap’ workers from other Member States. ‘Social dumping’ will therefore be avoided. 
However, as held by Heremans, the list of limitations and exceptions to its scope as well 
as the weakening of the country of origin principle to a ‘freedom to provide services’ 
principle, can be expected to have heavily reduced the integrative potential of this in-
strument.383  
 
The Directive also provides for harmonization in certain areas of legislation such as 
professional insurance, dispute settlements, quality of services, etc. In sum, it wants to 
cut the administrative burden and strengthen the position of service providers by re-
moving discriminating measures and regulations that hinder cross-border service activi-
                                                                
383  Heremans 2010, p. 198. 
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ties. By creating mutual trust between Member States, it aims to facilitate and to increase 
cross border provision, and the receipt of services, so that the cross-border competition 
in service markets increases, consequently bringing down prices and improving quality 
of choice for consumers.384 In order to have a smooth and workable system, the Directive 
provides for single points of contacts which can be seen as single desks at which service 
providers can complete all the administrative procedures relevant to their activities, 
preferably by electronic means. According to Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, the 
Services Directive provides a real added value to the Internal Market, cutting red tape, 
removing barriers, and improving legal certainty for businesses and consumers. It will 
remain to be seen how far the Directive will fulfil its promises, and effectively boost 
economic growth.385 The Services Directive entered into force on 28 December 2006. 
According to Article 44(1), Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 28 Decem-
ber 2009. 
5. Academic recognition 
In paragraph 3.3, the meaning of academic recognition as opposed to professional rec-
ognition was explained. Academic recognition refers to recognition decisions that allow 
a person to pursue or continue a course of study, or confers the right to use a national 
academic title or degree from the host country on the basis of a title or degree acquired 
in the country of origin. Since it covers a totally different aspect of law and has nothing 
to do with the recognition of professional qualifications, it will not be discussed exten-
sively within this thesis. However, it cannot be ignored either, since it has an influence 
upon the free movement of architects in the European Union. 
 
As stated before, individual Member States are responsible for the efficient functioning 
and quality of their education system. According to Article 165 TFEU (Article 149 EC), 
the Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing 
their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the con-
tent of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and lin-
guistic diversity. Union action shall be aimed at developing the European dimension in 
education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the 
Member States; encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter 
alia, the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study, promoting cooperation 
between educational establishments, and developing exchanges of information and 
experience on issues common to the education systems of the Member States. In this 
                                                                
384 See for more information http://www.entemp.ie/trade/marketaccess/singlemarket/servicesDirective.htm, 
last consulted 19 December 2009. 
385 It is expected that the overall economic growth potential of EU countries shall improve along three main 
channels: the service sector will be better capable of exploiting scale economies through production in 
other EU markets; the competitive selection process will become stronger and will cause under-performing 
firms to exit sooner; and the influx of more productive foreign subsidiaries raises the overall productivity 
of domestic service industries.  
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regard the Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries, 
and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport and, in 
particular, the Council of Europe. However, in order to contribute to the achievement of 
these objectives, the European Parliament and the Council shall adopt incentive meas-
ures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. It 
follows that there are no Union provisions imposing the mutual recognition of diplomas 
except for certain regulated occupations that are discussed under the heading of profes-
sional recognition. Nevertheless, the European Commission has encouraged mutual 
recognition for academic purposes between the various education systems in Europe 
through such Community programmes as Erasmus. A tangible result of the effort to 
promote understanding of the academic recognition of qualifications, under the Eras-
mus programme, is the network of national information centres for the recognition of 
diplomas (NARIC). 386 Universities, which are autonomous institutions, are entirely 
responsible for the content of their curricula, and for awarding diplomas and certificates 
to students. The diplomas and certificates are recognized by the authorities of the Mem-
ber State concerned. 
 
However, over time, the ECJ has developed case law which does not necessarily respect 
this strict division of power and is applicable to those who are in the process of becom-
ing fully-fledged professionals. 
 Examples of cases are Morgenbesser387, Commission v. Austria388 and Commission v. 
Belgium389. In the first case, the question was asked whether EC law precluded a Member 
State from refusing a person from registering in a register of trainee lawyers based on 
the mere fact that the person’s law degree was not conferred by a university of the host 
state. The ECJ held that trainees cannot be assimilated with ‘true’ lawyers since an addi-
tional step was still needed in order to qualify as a lawyer. Trainees could not be re-
garded as a separate profession and Directive 89/48/EEC could not be invoked to claim 
free movement rights. Nevertheless the ECJ held that candidates who had already fin-
ished their theoretical studies but were in the course of a traineeship which needs to be 
finished before they can pursue a regulated profession, and consequently are not fully 
fledged professionals yet, should obtain an individual review of the qualifications and 
knowledge they already possessed. It followed that the national authority was not al-
                                                                
386 http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/rec_qual/recognition/in_en.html, last consulted 23 December 2009. 
387 Case C-313/01Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di Genova. As held above, in 
Morgenbesser, the ECJ has extrapolated its ruling on Vlassopoulou so that it also applies to candidates from 
a regulated profession who cannot yet be considered as a produit fini, i.e. that they are fully qualified in a 
regulated profession in another Member State. It follows that the candidate is entitled to a fair assessment 
of his or her qualifications, taking into account all the relevant knowledge and experience obtained by that 
candidate (also by means of courses and other practical experience). After such a comparison has been 
conducted, the national authority will then make a decision on what the candidate still has to do in order 
to obtain recognition.  
388 Case C-147/03 Commission v. Austria [2005] ECR I-5969.  
389 Case C-65/03 Commission v. Belgium [2003] ECR I-6427. The case is similar to Case C-147/03. The Court 
held that, by failing to take the measures necessary to ensure that holders of secondary education diplomas 
obtained in other Member States can gain access to higher education organised by Belgium’s French 
Community under the same conditions as holders of the certificat d’enseignement secondaire supérieur 
(CESS), the Kingdom of Belgium had failed to fulfil its obligations. 
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lowed to refuse the registration of Ms. Morgenbesser on the sole ground that she did not 
have a diploma conferred, ratified or recognized by a university of the host Member 
State. With this judgement, the ECJ indicated that the Vlassopoulou principle has to be 
applied in cases where the migrant is not yet fully qualified, so also in cases when a 
purely academic qualification is at stake. This can bring about the situation that, in the 
future, anyone can rely on this judgement at any stage of qualification for a certain regu-
lated profession, and can rely on Vlassopoulou.  
 Very recently, the ECJ reiterated in Pesla390, which dealt with the same issue, its 
ruling in Morgenbesser and stated that the knowledge attested by the diploma granted in 
another Member State and the qualifications and/or work experience obtained in other 
Member States, together with the experience obtained in the Member State in which the 
candidate seeks enrolment, must be examined. However, the mere fact that legal studies 
relating to the law of one Member State may be regarded as comparable, from the point 
of view of both the level of training received, and the time and effort invested to that 
end, to studies seeking to provide the knowledge attested by the qualification required in 
another Member State, cannot of itself lead to an obligation to give priority, not to the 
knowledge required by the national provisions of the Member State in which the candi-
date seeks to benefit from the professional training required in order to enter the legal 
professions, but to knowledge which relates essentially to the law of another Member 
State, as attested by the qualifications obtained in that latter State. The ECJ indicated 
that Article 39 EC is to be interpreted as meaning that the knowledge to be taken as a 
reference point for the purpose of assessing the equivalence of training following an 
application for direct admission to a legal traineeship for the legal professions, without 
taking the exams he would otherwise have to sit, is that attested by the qualification 
required in the Member State in which the candidate seeks to be admitted to serve such 
a legal traineeship.391 
 The cases Commission v. Austria and Commission v. Belgium deal with the right of 
holders of secondary education diplomas obtained in other Member States to gain ac-
cess to higher education.392 The ECJ decided that recognition of academic diplomas 
forms a part of access to higher education, which is subject to EU law. In sum, candi-
dates may never be automatically denied on the basis that they do not have the correct 
qualifications. Member States are limited when it comes to the recognition of academic 
degrees, since they have to show, in each individual case, that their rules are necessary 
and proportionate to attain the aim pursued. It follows that the assumption that the 
Union has no competence to legislate in the area of education, will increasingly be under 
pressure.393 If education is seen as a basis, the legislative competence to act will be con-
tained in Article 114 TFEU (Article 95 EC) which indicates that the European Parlia-
ment and the Council shall adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions 
                                                                
390 Case C-345/08 Krzysztof Peśla v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, judgement of 10 Decem-
ber 2009.  
391 See also Case C-119/09 Robert Koller v. Rechtsanwaltsprüfungskommission beim Oberlandesgericht Graz, 
which is still pending.   
392  See also Case C-73/08 Nicolas Bressol and others and Céline Chaverot and others v. Gouvernement de la 
Communauté fançaise [2010], to be published. 
393 See also Garben 2008.  
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laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have, as 
their objective, the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 394 Since, as 
held above, the failure to recognize a diploma obtained in another EU Member State for 
academic purposes might constitute an infringement of one of the fundamental free-
doms, and since academic recognition is a pre-condition for student mobility, which is 
an explicit EU competence, it can be noted that the EU does have competence in the 
area of education. This is strengthened by the fact that the Union has created Directives 
2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC regarding the admission of students and researchers 
holding the nationality of third-countries. 
 
The Member States have decided to standardize rules in this area in a process that takes 
place outside the realm of the EU, the so-called Bologna Process. The Bologna Declara-
tion is a key document which marks a turning point in the development of European 
higher education. It was signed by 29 countries in 1999, and is currently ratified by 48 
signatories. The Bologna Declaration is not just a political statement, but a binding 
commitment to an action programme at intergovernmental level. Each Member has 
freely taken up the obligation to reform its own higher education system or systems, in 
order to create overall convergence at the European level. By the creation of a European 
space for higher education, the employability and mobility of citizens will be enhanced, 
and the international competitiveness of European higher education should increase. 
The Bologna process aims at creating convergence, and is not a path towards the stan-
dardisation or uniformisation of European higher education. It reflects a search for a 
common European answer to common European problems. The process originates 
from the recognition that, in spite of their valuable differences, European higher educa-
tion systems are facing common internal and external challenges related to the growth 
and diversification of higher education, the employability of graduates, the shortage of 
skills in key areas, the expansion of private and transnational education, etc. The Decla-
ration recognises the value of coordinated reforms, compatible systems and common 
action. It contains a set of specified objectives: the adoption of a common framework of 
easily understandable and comparable degrees395; the introduction of a system of two 
main cycles (undergraduate/graduate) in all countries, with first degrees no shorter than 
three years and relevant to the labour market; a credit system (such as the European 
Credit Transfer System) also covering lifelong learning activities; a European dimension 
in quality assurance, with comparable criteria and methods; the elimination of remain-
ing obstacles to the free mobility of students (as well as trainees and graduates) and 
teachers, as well as that of researchers and higher education administrators. The signa-
tory countries are committed to attain the Declaration’s objectives by means of inter-
                                                                
394 With regard to ‘real’ students who are still studying, Directive 93/96/EEC was created after the ECJ ruled 
upon their rights in Case C-152/83 Sandro Forcheri and his wife Marisa Forcheri, née Marino v. Belgian 
State and asbl Institut Supérieur de Sciences Humaines Appliquées – Ecole Ouvrière Supérieure [1983] ECR 
02323; Case C-293/83 Françoise Gravier v. City of Liège [1985] ECR 00593 and Case C-375/89 V.J.M. 
Raulin v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen. This Directive has now been replaced by Directive 
2004/38/EC. In Case C-109/04 Karl Robert Kraneman v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [2005] ECR I-02421 
the ECJ held that trainee lawyer can also benefit from the free movement of workers.  
395 This should also be achieved by the International Diploma Supplement. 
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governmental cooperation in collaboration with higher education institutions and asso-
ciations.396 
 
The Bologna Process aims to facilitate the recognition of qualifications by the issuing of 
a Diploma Supplement which indicates the higher education system in which the di-
ploma was earned, and the overarching qualifications framework. Furthermore, net-
works have been set up to facilitate mobility. In this way the academic recognition of 
foreign qualifications is carried out by ENIC/NARIC centres and Higher Education 
Institutions (HEI’s).397 It should be noted however that the Bologna Process has no le-
gally binding effect. Nevertheless, a part of the Process concentrates on diploma recog-
nition which is covered by the Lisbon Recognition Convention (LRC) -a Treaty con-
ceived in the framework of the Council of Europe, which does have binding effect.398 The 
LRC, was elaborated by the Council of Europe and UNESCO in 1997.399 The core of the 
convention is to give every applicant appropriate access to an assessment of his/her 
foreign academic qualifications, and that such foreign qualifications have to be recog-
nised unless substantial differences can be demonstrated to exist in regard to the length 
of study, curriculum content, etc. The Convention therefore adopts the idea of accep-
tance, and aims for fair and transparent recognition procedures. Each party must pro-
vide appropriate information on their education system, qualifications and institutions. 
In the event of refusal, the burden of proof lies upon the host country. 
 
The Bologna Process entails that everybody is entitled to an assessment of an application 
for recognition of qualifications, solely on the basis of the knowledge and skills achieved, 
and that Member States may not discriminate against an individual in this respect on 
any ground such as the applicant’s gender, race, colour, disability, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status, or on the grounds of any other circumstance 
not related to the merits of the qualification for which recognition is sought. (Article 
                                                                
396 The importance of tackling professional recognition is also visible in the tendency to integrate recognition 
into trade agreements, by considering education and, therefore, qualifications as services. Such initiatives 
are being undertaken in the framework of the General Agreements on Trade and Services (GATS), and 
also of regional agreements (NAFTA for North America). This will not be further discussed within this 
thesis.  
397 In 1984, the National Academic Recognition Information Centres (NARICs) were established on the 
initiative of the European Commission. In 1994 the Council of Europe and CEPES, the higher education 
department of UNESCO, formed the European Network of Information Centres on Recognition and Mo-
bility (ENIC). Both networks identify recognition problems or issues and, if possible, try to solve them. 
With regard to professional recognition, competent authorities are very often not linked to NARIC/ENIC 
but to professional associations.  
398 The Lisbon Convention dates, however, from before the Bologna Process, and is independent from it in 
terms of legal structure.  
399 The Lisbon Recognition Convention has to be ratified by all countries participating in the Bologna Proc-
ess. Greece and Italy have not yet ratified the Convention. However, at the European Council meeting in 
Feira in March 2000, contrary to the agreement reached in Bologna, the Member States could not come to 
an agreement for the ‘Establishment of a European Area of Education’. The Member States considered 
their sovereignty in general educations matters too important, while the European Council announced in 
March 2000 the Lisbon Strategy proclaiming the European knowledge-based society.  
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III.1(2) LRC).  Signatories therefore commit themselves to recognising higher education 
diplomas from other Member States (Article VI.1 Lisbon Treaty). This recognition may 
only be withheld if there are substantial differences between the qualifications with 
regard to which recognition is sought and the qualification obtained. It is the national 
recognition authority that decides whether substantial differences exist, and it remains 
to be seen how strict these authorities will be, since this will determine whether or not 
the Lisbon Convention will be a success or a waste of effort. It should be noted that the 
Bologna Process does not guarantee the free movement of students. At this moment it 
only provides for the same terminology in the signatory states, but contains no coordi-
nation of the content of studies and thus no coordination of access for students. The 
content of the curriculum is still in the hands of the universities, academies and 
schools.400 Students must thus rely on the acquis communautaire and the rights of free 
movement conferred on them within the framework of the EU. However, the applica-
tion of the Morgenbesser ruling does not formally lead to academic recognition. The ECJ 
does not deliver a certificate of recognition, but only states that, in a certain cases, the 
refusal of recognition goes against EC law. As noted by Claessens401, this seems to have 
particular effect on the prospective professional however, since it leads, or must lead, to 
a decision of a national authority, stating what the candidate must do in order to achieve 
access to the profession, or to one of its preparatory stages. The LRC, on the other hand, 
states that recognition can be withheld in cases where substantial differences exist which 
suggests that a negative answer without clarification on what needs to be done in order 
to obtain the recognition sought (as is the case with the application of the Vlassopoulou 
formula), can follow (Article IV(1) LRC). 
 
The processes of academic recognition and de jure professional recognition are separate, 
in that while a decision on academic recognition is made under the Intergovernmental 
Lisbon Convention, using procedures which have been developed to satisfy that Con-
vention, the decision on de jure professional recognition is made on criteria specified at 
EU level, and is made by a separate authority legally recognized for that purpose. Thus, 
academic recognition may determine that a foreign academic award satisfies all the 
criteria necessary for the level of qualification claimed for it while, at the same time, the 
professional recognition process may decide that the particular body of knowledge 
which has been thereby acquired by the holder is not sufficient for de jure professional 
                                                                
400 Orbasli and Worthington (1995) have conducted research on architectural education in the European 
Union. They compared higher professional training courses in architecture and town planning in different 
educational institutions in the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Spain. 
Also ENHSA (European Network of Heads of School of Architecture) has made reports on the shaping of 
the curriculum in the European Higher Architectural Education Area, the curricula, and emerging chal-
lenges for the content of architectural studies. See http://www.enhsa.net. The EAAE (European Associa-
tion of Architectural Education) is an international non-profit association which is also committed to the 
exchange of ideas and people within the field of architectural education and research. See for more infor-
mation about architectural education http://www.eaae.be/eaae2/info.php?mainType=about&help=about, 
last consulted 17 December 2009. 
401 Claessens 2008, p. 299. 
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recognition.402 Although some signatory countries specifically underlined that the Lis-
bon Convention should be seen purely in terms of the framework of academic recogni-
tion, it is also very useful with regard to professional recognition. As noted before, pro-
fessional recognition relates to the methodologies and procedures for evaluating creden-
tials for work purposes, and is quite an intricate matter. The system of professional 
qualifications reflects both the national system of education and the organization of 
professions, industries and professionals themselves. Professional requirements can be 
set under national law, or by professional organizations. Academic recognition and 
professional recognition have therefore different objectives, and may require different 
approaches and instruments.403 However, they do share a methodology for evaluating 
the educational component of the credential or qualification.404 Of course, what is deci-
sive in the end is the objective of the evaluation: further study or work. In the latter case, 
the employer might have specific questions for the credential evaluator.405 It is yet to be 
seen whether the case law of the ECJ will be of direct influence on the development of 
the European Area of Higher Education as provided for in the Bologna Process. 
6. Competition law 
6.1. Introduction 
Next to the fact that regulations can limit the free movement of professionals, they can 
also restrict free competition in the European Union. With the adoption of the Single 
European Act in 1986, which promoted an increased degree of European economic 
integration through both free movement and competition, competition policy has a 
crucial role to play in EU law.406 As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the non-
discrimination principle as contained in Articles 18, 21, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU (Article 12, 
18, 39, 43 and 49 EC) and the application of these Articles by the ECJ, have removed 
numerous limitations in the area of the free movement of professionals. Since the 1990s 
                                                                
402 Glanville 2004, p. 2. The holder of a Master’s degree in International Law in London will be well qualified 
to undertake Doctoral studies in International law in Belgium, and might even become a professor in In-
ternational Law in the Law Faculty of a Belgian university, but it is very unlikely that he or she would be 
considered equally qualified to set up an attorney’s office in Belgium, interpreting Belgian domestic law. In 
other words, the Master’s degree could be granted full academic recognition as a degree in Law, but would 
not receive the de jure professional recognition which would allow the holder to practise domestic Belgian 
law. They are separate recognition decisions and, in consequence, may conflict with one another. 
403 In some countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, most academic qualifications also serve as 
professional qualifications without additional requirements. In other countries such as the UK, profes-
sional qualifications are usually acquired upon completion of specific professional training that takes place 
outside and after university.  
404 Divis 2004, p. 1. The question of professional practical training was not raised in Bologna and the system 
of lifelong learning has hardly developed. 
405 The international Diploma Supplement is another instrument which is mainly developed in the field of 
academic recognition, but is also very useful for professional recognition. It was developed in 1999 by a 
joint working group of the European Commission, the Council of Europe and UNESCO, and explains the 
qualifications and the courses involved in terms that are both understandable and useful for both academic 
admissions officers and employers or their Human Resource Development departments.  
406 Jones & Sufrin 2004, p. 36.  
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-after the formal establishment of the internal market in 1992- the Commission and the 
Court have made decisions in respect of professional regulation and competition law.407 
As suggested by Wendt, the establishment of the internal market can therefore be un-
derstood as a catalyst, not only for an intensified application of the free movement guar-
antees, but also for an emerging application of competition law to the regulated profes-
sions.408 While the free movement provisions in the Treaty only cover cases in which a 
transboundary element is present, this is not a necessary requirement for the competi-
tion rules to be applicable. It follows that even if no borders are crossed, and profession-
als rules are imposed within one Member State only, EU competition law can be appli-
cable. This is, however, only the case if the rules have an impact on the EU market and 
affect trade between Member States.409 Since EU competition policy is also important for 
practising architects, I will now discuss the key features of this policy. The reader should 
note, however, that I do no aim to present a complete analysis of the influence and ef-
fects of competition law on the architectural profession, since this does not fall within 
the scope of this thesis, and is already covered by the book written by Wendt, The Ten-
sion Between Rules Regulating the (Liberal) Professions and EC Competition Law – Rea-
son and Passion in Discussing Professional Regulation. A discussion of competition law is 
of particular importance in the light of the economic analysis of the regulation of archi-
tects presented in Part III of this thesis. As will be explained in Part III, the public inter-
est approach towards regulation is based on the perceived shortcomings of the market 
system, such as a lack of competition, which leads to less social welfare and therefore 
justifies the creation of regulation. 
6.2. The affectation of trade by undertakings 
As held by Article 3(3) EU (article 2 EC), the Union has to work for the sustainable 
development of Europe, based on balanced economic growth and price stability and a 
highly competitive social market economy aiming at full employment and social pro-
gress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. 
Article 119 TFEU (Article 4 EC) indicates that, to achieve this aim, the Member States 
and the Union have to adopt an economic policy which is based on the close coordina-
tion of Member States’ economic policies, on the internal market, and on the definition 
of common objectives, and should be conducted in accordance with the principle of an 
open market economy with free competition. This implies that there should be equal 
chances for all the market participants, without certain persons or undertakings having 
an advantage over their competitors, nor abusing their economic power.410 
 
                                                                
407 See for example Commission Decision CNSD, 1993; Case C-35/96 Commission v. Italian Republic (CNSD 
II) [1998] ECR I-3851.  
408 Wendt 2009, p. 29. 
409 See Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  
410 Case C-18/88 Régie des télégraphes et des téléphones v. GB-Inno-BM SA [1991] ECR I-5941, paragraph 
25. 
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Article 101(1) TFEU (Article 81(1) EC) contains the general rule that the restriction of 
competition is not allowed in the EU. All agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States, and which have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market, shall be prohibited as incompati-
ble with the common market. Such agreements or decisions will automatically be void 
(Article 101(2) TFEU) (Article 81(2) EC). Only if such an agreement, decision or prac-
tice contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, may it be allowed. This is only the case if it does not impose on the undertak-
ings, restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, or 
which afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question (Article 101(3) TFEU) (Article 81(3) EC).411 
 As the Court has observed in Portelange412, Article 101 TFEU is arranged in the form 
of a rule imposing a prohibition (paragraph 1) with a statement of its effects (paragraph 
2), mitigated by the exercise of a power to grant exceptions to that rule (paragraph 3). 
The prohibition of the distortion of competition implies that there should be a workable 
degree of competition within the market which is necessary to ensure the observance of 
the basic requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, in particular 
the creation of a single market achieving conditions similar to those of a domestic mar-
ket. In this regard, the nature and intensiveness of competition may vary to an extent 
dictated by the products or services in question, and the economic structure of the rele-
vant market sectors.413  Since collusive behaviour is in principle held to be incompatible 
with the common market, it can be said that there is a link between competition policy 
and the goal of market integration.  Hence, competition policy is often seen to comple-
ment the free movement provisions by eliminating private market-dividing practices 
which endanger the market integration objective pursued by removing public obstacles 
to trade.414 
 It follows that Article 101 TFEU is as such thus not applicable to state legislation. 
However, as will be demonstrated, professions are often defined by self-regulation 
which may fall within the scope of EU competition law. I will now discuss the different 
requirements of Article 101 TFEU in more detail. Article 102 TFEU (Article 82 EC), 
which has not yet been sufficiently considered by the EU institutions, will not be dis-
cussed within the scope of this thesis. However, as demonstrated by Wendt, where ap-
                                                                
411  Under the competition law rules, the private actor can defend the economic rationality of his prima facie 
anti-competitive action.   
 As held by Heremans, the lack of economic grounds of justification seems to deprive private actors of an 
important legitimate route of defence within the free movement analysis.  The deferent attitude which the 
Court generally displays when scrutinizing the justifications invoked by Member States does not seem ap-
propriate in respect of self-interested private action.  Rather than adapting the free movement acquis to a 
different type of addressees, it makes sense to subject their actions solely to the traditional competition law 
analysis.  See Heremans 2010, p. 122. 
412 Case C-10/69 Portelange v. Smith Corona Marchant International [1969] ECR 309. 
413 Case C- 26/76 Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission of the European Communities 
[1977], ECR 1905. 
414  Heremans 2010, p. 235. 
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plied by practitioners of free professions, professional regulations can lead to both in-
strumental use of market power and market structure abuses.415 With regard to the lat-
ter, it might be argued that the rules created by undertakings and their application by 
the profession can constitute the abuse of a dominant position. It will generally not be 
necessary to prove whether a particular professional self-regulation has the purpose of 
strengthening the collective dominant position of the profession’s members, as long as it 
has the natural and foreseeable effect to alter the structure of the professional service 
market. This means that the professional association has to demonstrate that it has not 
made an instrumental use of the statutory monopoly of the collectivity to provide cer-
tain professional services so that claimants do not need to demonstrate the extent to 
which such self-regulation has the effect of limiting the competitive process in profes-
sional markets. 
6.2.1. Undertakings vs. states 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits certain agreements between ‘undertakings’. The Court 
has defined an undertaking as any autonomous legal entity, constituted by a single or-
ganization of personal, tangible and intangible elements, engaged in an economic activ-
ity, regardless of its legal status (e.g. public or private) and the way in which it is fi-
nanced.416 The activity should thus, by its nature, its aims and the rules to which it is 
subject, belong to the sphere of economic activity417 and cannot be connected with the 
exercise of the powers of a public authority418. The concept of ‘economic activity’ as 
found in the Court’s definition of an undertaking, represents, according to settled case-
law, any activity consisting of offering goods and services in a given market for remu-
neration.419 However, even though the profession is regulated by the government, this 
will not remove it from competition rules unless the government regulation does not 
leave the undertakings any scope for competition. Architectural associations thus also 
fall within the ambit of the concept ‘undertaking’, since architects provide their services 
for remuneration in markets.420 
                                                                
415 Wendt 2009, pp. 251-312. 
416 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-
5751; Case C-19/61 Mannesmann AG v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community 
[1962], 675; Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser c. Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21; Case C-244/94 
Fédération française des sociétés d’assurances and Others [1995] ECR I-4013, paragraph 14; Case C-55/96 
Job Centre (II) [1997] ECR I-7119, paragraph 21. The concept of ‘undertaking’ thus covers any type of 
company, individuals, public bodies and some systems of social insurance but not bodies vested with pub-
lic authority in their exercise of that authority. 
417 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, paragraphs 18 and 19. 
418 Case C-364/92 Sat Fluggesellschaft [1994] ECR I-43, paragraph 30; Case C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli [1997] 
ECR I-1547, paragraphs 22-23. The exercise by a professional association of regulatory authority delgated 
to it by the State, does not qualify as the exercise of public authority. See Case C-309/99 Wouters, Savel-
bergh, Price Waterhouse Belastingsadviseurs NV and Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advoca-
ten [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraphs 57-58. 
419 Case C-118/85 Commission v. Italy [1987] ECR 2599, paragraph 7; Case C-35/96 Commission v. Italy 
(CNSD II), paragraph 36. 
420 As held in Becu members of the liberal professions, insofar as they are not employees, are engaged in an 
economic activity because they provide services against remuneration on markets: Case C-22/98 Becu 
[1999] ECR I-4449. See, for example, also Article 1 of the Belgian Competition Law Act of 15 September 
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As will be demonstrated hereunder, the application of the competition rules to the lib-
eral professions mostly arises as a result of restrictive regulations created by professional 
associations in their own interest. However, these associations often pretend that the 
regulations to be adopted are being used to support the public interest. Although Article 
101 TFEU is, in itself, concerned solely with the conduct of undertakings, and not with 
laws or regulations emanating from Member States, that Article -read in conjunction 
with Article 4(3) EU (Article 10 EC)- nonetheless requires the Member States not to 
introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative or regulatory nature, 
which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings.421 As 
held by Article 4(3) EU, Member States must take all appropriate measures to ensure the 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty, or resulting from action taken by 
the Union’s institutions. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s task and 
shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives 
of the Treaty. Since the single market system which the Treaty seeks to create, excludes 
any national system of regulation hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or poten-
tially, trade within the Union422, the Court has ruled on several occasions that Articles 
3(3) EU jo 4(3) EU jo 101 TFEU are infringed where a Member State requires or favours 
the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 101 
TFEU, or reinforces423 their effects, or where it divests its own rules of the character of 
legislation by delegating to private economic operators, responsibility for taking deci-
sions affecting the economic sphere.424 In this regard it should be noted that Article 3(3) 
EU (Article 2 EC) only provides that the activities of the Union shall include a system 
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted, without providing for 
the abolition of all anti-competitive state measures, even if they jeopardize the single 
market system, while Article 4(3) TFEU only indicates that Member States have to re-
spect the obligations of the Treaty. There is therefore no negative integration provision 
in the treaties explicitly prohibiting such measures. Nevertheless, Articles 3(3) EU jo 
4(3) EU jo 101 TFEU are the basis for the state liability doctrine which means that 
Member States are, in principle, not allowed to enact measures enabling private under-
takings to escape from the constraints imposed by Article 101 TFEU by invoking the 
public interest. However, if a state does require the adoption of a certain agreement 
which, in principle, would fall within the ambit of competition policy, it can place pri-
vate undertakings outside the reach of Article 101 TFEU if these undertakings are not 
associated in the legislative or regulatory process. Nevertheless, in the event that state 
authorities assume full responsibility (no delegations, no agreement of an undertaking), 
                                                                                                                                                             
2006, B.S. 29 September 2006 and the ruling of the Belgian Supreme Court of 7 May 1999, J.L.M.B. 2000, p. 
224. See also Thirion, 2000, p. 293.  
421 This was first decided in Gb-Inno-BM, paragraph 31. See also: Case C-267/86 Van Eycke [1988] ECR 4769, 
paragraph 16; Case C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801, paragraph 14; Case C-153/93 Delta Schiffahrts- und 
Speditionsgesellschaft [1994] ECR I-2517, paragraph 14; Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto [1995] 
ECR I-2883, paragraph 20; Case C-35/96 Commission v. Italian Republic [1998] ECR I-3851, paragraph 53.  
422 Case C-13/77 Gb-Inno-BM, paragraph 31. 
423 A state reinforces the effects of a pre-existing agreement only if it incorporates either wholly or in part the 
terms of these agreements: See Case C-13/77 GB-INNO-BM, paragraph 18. 
424 Van Eycke, paragraph 16; Reiff, paragraph 17-19, 24; Joined Cases C-140/94 to C-142/94 DIP and Others 
[1995] ZCR I-3257, paragraphs 18-19.  
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any abusive company behaviour remains unlawful even if it was encouraged by such a 
state measure. It follows that even where the State requires the undertakings to engage 
in anti-competitive conduct, if the undertakings remain at least partially capable of 
autonomously restricting competition -for example because it enjoys a margin of discre-
tion in the implementation of the national legislation- both the undertakings and the 
State can be held liable.425 State legislation which requires economic actors to engage in 
anti-competitive conduct may itself infringe Articles 3(3) EU jo 4(3) EU jo 101 TFEU or 
102 TFEU. Furthermore, Article 106(1) TFEU explicitly holds that a Member State shall 
neither enact nor maintain in force, any measure contrary to the rules contained in the 
Treaty, in particular to those provided for in Article 18 TFEU (Article 12 EC) and 101 to 
109 TFEU in the case of public undertaking, and undertakings to which Member States 
grant special or exclusive rights. 
 When comparing the prohibition for states to limit free movement in the Union 
and the competition provisions in the Treaty, it should be noted that the Court appears 
to rely essentially on the complementarity between market integration and undistorted 
competition objectives, as it sees the Treaty’s provisions pertaining to competition as 
levers for market integration.426 As indicated in paragraph 3.2., the provisions on free 
movement explicitly prohibit (negative integration) Member States from impeding the 
free flow of goods, persons, services or capital. Anti-competitive state measures conse-
quently constitute unlawful obstacles to market integration. As suggested by Gyselen, 
given the prominent reference to the single market system in its judgement, and the 
Treaty provisions explicitly prohibiting state measures which interfere with market 
integration, either directly (free movement provisions) or indirectly (competition), the 
Court seems to have had a constitutional lacuna in mind in GB-INNO-BM. It must have 
taken the view that state measures which interfere with the system of undistorted com-
petition can be just as harmful for the single market system, so that there has to be a 
basis in the Treaty for challenging these measures. The ECJ found this basis in Article 
3(1)(g) EC jo Article 10(2) EC (Article 3(3) jo 4(3) EU) which serves as an implied con-
stitutional limitation on anti-competitive state measures. As maintained by Gilliams, 
since public authorities may have a variety of public interest reasons for introducing 
regulation that have a restrictive effect on competition, and since Article 3(3) EU does 
not call for such regulation to be prohibited, it seems difficult to argue that state meas-
ures that are compatible with the four freedoms are prohibited by Article 4(3) EU, solely 
                                                                
425 In this regard the European Court of First Instance held in Spedizionieri Doganali (Case T-513/93 Consig-
lio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v. Commission of the European Communities, [2000] ECR II-
01807) that an association can be considered liable despite the legislative framework where the law pro-
vides for the Association to set, for example, a fee scale. This is because the association used its margin of 
discretion in the application of the law in such a way that a restriction of competition could result from its 
own conduct. To the extent to which such an organization has room for manoeuvre in performing the ob-
ligations imposed on it by the national legislation, within which it could and ought to have acted in such a 
way as not to restrict the existing level of competition, the restrictive effects on competition resulting from 
a tariff set by it may originate in its conduct. Depending on the legislative framework in which the profes-
sional association operates, if an anti-competitive practice can be identified, either the Member State or the 
Association or both can, in some circumstances, be found responsible for it.  
426 See GB-Inno-BM SA; Gyselen 2004, p. 359. 
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on account of their restrictive impact on competition.427 To turn all anti-competitive 
state measures into potentially unlawful acts -on the sole basis of these provisions and in 
the absence of an express Treaty provision specifically prohibiting such measures- 
would ignore the fact that all other state measures impeding market integration are only 
unlawful under Article 3(2) EU jo 4(3) EU an express Treaty provision which specifi-
cally prohibits such measures (such as the free movement provisions).428 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the competition rules apply if professional regulations 
restrict competition appreciably. However, such regulations will escape the competition 
rules if they pursue a clearly articulated public interest purpose. It is possible that a dele-
gation of rule-making power by public authorities to professional associations consti-
tutes an infringement by the delegating Member State of Article 4(3) EU. However, that 
does not exclude action from being taken on the basis of Article 101 or 102 TFEU 
against the beneficiary of the delegation (for example the professional association) as 
well, unless certain behaviour is imposed upon the association.429 Restrictive measures 
that are attributable to the public authorities, or which implement clearly articulated 
public interest considerations, will escape the applicability of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, and will -except in quite rare circumstances- not be prohibited by Article 4(3) 
EU. It follows that Article 4(3) EU does not preclude restrictive arrangements that are 
not already caught by Article 101 and 102 TFEU, except if the public measures simply 
reproduce a prohibited agreement, unnecessarily cover a prohibited agreement with the 
cloak of public authority, or entirely delegate to a private body the power to set binding 
parameters for competition in the market.430 
6.2.2. Agreements – Decisions – Concerted practices 
As held by the Court of First Instance in Hercules431, for there to be an ‘agreement’ 
within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, it is sufficient that the undertakings in ques-
tion have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves in the market in a spe-
cific way. In this regard, Article 101 TFEU makes no distinction as to whether the par-
ties are at the same level in the economy (so-called horizontal agreements) or at differ-
ent levels (so-called vertical agreements).432 It follows that even if there is no abuse of a 
                                                                
427 Gilliams 2004, p. 306.  
428 Gyselen 2004, p. 383. 
429 Gilliams 2004, p. 315 for an overview of the different possibilities for division of public/private responsibil-
ity. 
430 See especially Case C-35/96 Commission v. Italian Republic (CNSD). 
431 Case T-7/89 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v. Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR II-
1711 
432 Article 101 (1) TFEU does not only comprise any possible competition between the parties to the agree-
ment, but also any possible competition between one of them and third parties. This must be all the more 
the case since the parties to such an agreement (e.g. the producers) could attempt, by preventing or limit-
ing the competition of third parties (e.g. the distributors) in the product, to set up or preserve to their gain 
an unjustified advantage detrimental to the consumer or the user, contrary to the general objectives of Ar-
ticle 101 TFEU. See Case C-32/65 Italian Republic v. Council of the European Economic Community and 
Commission of the European Economic Community (“Challenge to Regulation 19/65”) [1966] ECR 389, pp. 
407-408. 
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dominant position, an agreement between businesses operating at different levels may 
affect trade between Member States and, at the same time, have as its object or effect, the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, and thus fall under the prohibition 
of Article 101 TFEU. It follows that such agreements cannot be legally binding. In as-
sessing an agreement under Article 101 TFEU, account should be taken of the actual 
conditions under which it functions, in particular the economic context in which the 
undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the agreement, and the actual 
structure of the market concerned.433 In this regard it should be noted that agreements 
containing obvious restrictions of competition such as price-fixing, market-sharing or 
the control of outlets434 may be weighed against their claimed pro-competitive effects 
only in the context of Article 101(3) TFEU435, with a view to granting an exemption from 
the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU.436 
 A ‘decision’ by associations of undertakings, on the other hand, in particular refers 
to an association’s recommendations to its members, which can lead to an assimilation 
among the members of competitive parameters such as price, capacities and commer-
cials relations with third parties (as in a collective boycott). 
 A ‘concerted practice’ can be defined as any direct or indirect contact between such 
operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market 
of an actual or potential competitor, or to disclose to such a competitor the course of 
conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt, or contemplate adopting on the 
market, where the object or effect of such contact is to create conditions of competition 
which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question, regard 
being had to the nature of the products or services offered, the size and number of the 
undertakings and the volume of the said market.437 In order to prove that there has been 
                                                                
433 Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services and Others v. Commis-
sion of the European Communities [1998] ECR II-3141, paragraph 136; Case C-399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and 
Others v. Coberco [1995] ECR I-4515 paragraph 10; Case T-77/94 VGB and Others v. Commission [1997] 
ECR II-759 paragraph 140; Case C-234/89 Delimites [1991] ECR I-935 paragraph 31; Case C-250/92 
Gottrup-Klim v Dansk LandbrugsGrovvareselskab AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641 paragraph 31. In Société Tech-
nique Minière the ECJ held in this regard that, in order to decide whether an agreement containing a 
clause ‘granting an exclusive right of sale’ is to considered as prohibited by reason of its object or of its ef-
fect, it is appropriate to take into account in particular the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the 
products covered by the agreement, the position and importance of the grantor, and the concessionaire in 
the market for the products concerned, the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its 
position in a series of agreements, the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership 
or, alternatively, the opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the same products by way 
of parallel re-exportation and importation: See Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v. 
Maschinenbau Ulm Gmbh (M.B.U.) [1966] ECR 235, p. 250. 
434 These are specifically referred to in Article 101 (1) TFEU.  
435 The Commission’s Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) EC which were issued in connection with 
the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, state that, in order to benefit from an exemption 
under Article 81(3) EC, the restrictive arrangement must produce efficiency gains: it must contribute to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. A 
claim on which restrictions are based on fair competition is not valid. The protection of fair competition is 
a task for the legislator, and not for undertakings.   
436 Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v Commission [1995] ECR II-1063, paragraph 109. 
437 Case T-25/95 Cimeteries CBR SA et al. V. Commission of the European Communites [2000] ECR II-491;  
Case C-49/92 Commission of the European Communities v Anic Partecipazioni SpA [1999] ECRI-04125, 
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a concerted practice, it is not therefore necessary to show that the competitor in ques-
tion has formally undertaken, in respect of one or several others, to adopt a particular 
course of conduct, or that the competitors have colluded over their future conduct on 
the market.438 It is sufficient that, by its statement of intention, the competitor should 
have eliminated or, at the very least, substantially reduced uncertainty as to the conduct 
expected of the others on the market.439 
 In any case, agreements, decisions and concerted practices have to be capable of 
constituting a threat, direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between 
member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a 
single market between states. Even if an agreement encourages an increase, even a large 
one, in the volume of trade between states, this is not sufficient to exclude the possibility 
that the agreement may affect such trade as in the manner described above.440 
6.2.3. Affectation of trade 
The requirement that Articles 101 TFEU is applicable in the case of affectation of trade 
between Member States, indicates the boundary between the areas respectively covered 
by EU law and the law of the Member States. EU law covers any agreement or any prac-
tice which is capable of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member States 
in a manner which might harm the attainment on the objectives of a single market be-
tween the Member States, in particular by sealing off national markets or by affecting 
the structure of competition within the common market.441 If an agreement, decision or 
practice is capable of affecting trade between Member States, it must have an influence, 
direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States, so 
that the attainment of a single market between Member States may be hindered. More-
over, that influence (effect) must not be insignificant.442 In the case of services, it may 
consist, as the ECJ has held, in the activities in question being conducted in such a way 
that their effect is to partition the common market, and thereby restrict freedom to 
provide services, which constitutes one of the objectives of the Treaty.443 However, since 
the overall majority of competition restrictions in the professional services area have 
their origin and effect in a single Member State and markets for professional services 
have largely remained local,444 administrative enforcement falls mainly to national com-
petition authorities, and private enforcement of these rules can be achieved in the na-
                                                                                                                                                             
paragraph 117; Case C-199/92 Hüls v. Commission of the European Communities [1999] ECR I-4287, 
paragraph 160; Case C- 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission of the European Communties 
[1975] ECR paragraph 174; Case C-172/80 Züchner [1981] ECR 2021 paragraph 14; and Case C-7/95 John 
Deere v Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 87. 
438 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85 A. 
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission of the European Communities [1988]ECR 5193. 
439 Case T-4/89 BASF v. Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR II-1523, paragraph 242; 
Hercules, paragraph 140. 
440 Joined Cases C-56/64 and C-58/64 Établissements Consten S.A.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh v. 
Commission of the European Economic Community [1966] ECR 299, p.341. 
441 Case C-22/78 Hugin v. Commission [1979] ECR 1869, paragraph 17. 
442 Case C-306/96 Javico [1998] ECR I-1983, paragraph 16.  
443 Case C-30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479, paragraph 24. 
444 Ehlerman, 1993, p. 143.  
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tional courts.445 As indicated in Chapter II of this thesis, according to the Mirza & Nacey 
research, in Europe only 6% of architectural practice revenue is generated by work un-
dertaken outside the home country. It should be repeated however that this is just esti-
mation based on the result of questionnaires. However, it should be noted that archi-
tects from Member State A who establish themselves in Member State B can be consid-
ered as architects of Member State B who in turn can perform services in Member State 
C. Due to globalization and the knowledge-based economy more and more services will 
be performed internationally. Since national regulations restricting competition gener-
ally also apply to foreign service providers and generally cover the whole territory of the 
Member State, they generally have at least a potential appreciable effect on trade be-
tween Member States. The ECJ has consistently held that a restriction of competition 
which extends to the whole territory of a Member State affects interstate trade within 
the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU because it has, by its very nature, the effect of rein-
forcing the compartmentalisation of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the 
economic interpenetration which the Treaty is designed to bring about.446 In this way, 
trade between Member States may be affected by a measure which prevents an under-
taking from establishing itself in another Member State with a view to providing services 
there.447 It follows that intra-state restrictions of competition can affect interstate trade 
even if they do not hinder such trade, i.e. even if they do not foreclose interstate compe-
tition, so that Article 101 TFEU is applicable to them.448 It is thus for national courts to 
determine, having regard to the economic characteristics of the relevant market, 
whether there is a sufficient degree of probability that a certain rule will actually prevent 
operators established in Member States other than the Member State in question, either 
from providing their services in that Member State, or from establishing themselves 
there. 
6.3. Common examples of restrictions to trade 
As noted above, in March 2000 the Lisbon European Council adopted an economic 
reform programme to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world by 2010. In improving the competitiveness of the EU econ-
omy, professional services were held to play an important role. A large-scale research 
                                                                
445 In Fiammiferi, the Court held that where undertakings engage in conduct contrary to Article 81(1) and 
where that conduct is required or facilitated by State measures, a national competition authority has a duty 
to disapply those state measures and to give effect to Articles 81 and 82. Private enforcement in national 
courts does not only cover Articles 81 and 82 as they apply to undertakings and associations of undertak-
ings, but is also possible against Member States under Articles 86(1) in conjunction with Articles 82/81 or 
against them under Articles 3(1)(g), 10(2) in conjunction with Articles 81/82. See Case C-198/01 Consorzio 
Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) [2003] ECR I-08055. 
446 Case C-35/96 Commission v. Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, paragraph 48; Case C-35/99 Arduino [2002] ECR I-
1529, paragraph 33; Wouters paragraph 95. 
447 See, to that effect, Case C-161/84 Pronuptia [1986] ECR 353, paragraph 26.  
448 Gyselen 2004, p. 386. Gyselen refers to the Commission’s Guidelines on the ‘affect on trade’ concept in 
which the Commission holds that cartels covering a single Member State are capable of reinforcing the 
compartmentalisation of markets because their participants normally need to take action to exclude com-
petitors from other Member States. This applies mutatis mutandis to anti-competitive state measures. 
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project on competition in professional services was conducted on behalf of the Euro-
pean Commission.449 In this way the Commission aimed to determine whether the cur-
rent regulations related to professional services serves the interests of consumers, and is 
thus the most efficient and least restrictive in terms of competition, or whether better 
regulations, more closely adapted to the modern world, could help spur economic 
growth, and deliver better services and value for consumers.450 The Commission based 
this research on an independent study which was carried out by the Institute for Ad-
vanced Studies in Vienna, which contained a schematic overview of regulations in the 
then 15 EU member States with regard to six professions, including architects. For each 
of these professions an overview was presented of all the rules restricting entry to the 
profession and the rules restricting market conduct. In this way regulations concerning 
price fixing, recommended prices, advertising regulations, entry requirements and re-
served rights and regulations governing business structure and multi-disciplinary prac-
tices as categories of regulation which are possible to restrict competition, were identi-
fied.451 
                                                                
449 Paterson, Fink & Ogus 2003. See for more information: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/-
professional_services/studies/studies.html, last consulted 1 December 2009. 
450 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professional_services/overview_en.html, last consulted 
1 December 2009. 
451 In its report, the Commission also mentioned the reactions of the respondents to the findings of the IHS. 
With regard to architects, the majority of respondents supported appropriate entry regulation to ensure 
that architects are competent to carry out their functions and to respect safety standards. However, the 
Commission argued that few respondents commented in detail on the extent to which licensed or certified 
architects should hold exclusive or reserved rights. Likewise, very few discussed the regulatory framework 
in countries such as Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, where unqualified practitioners are permitted 
to offer a range of architectural services. The Architects’ Council of Europe, for example, commented that 
control mechanisms are essential because the quality of architectural services is only discernible after the 
construction process. 
With regard to price fixing, the majority of the respondents argued in favour of price regulation and rec-
ommended prices for architectural services. Most suggested that these regulations are necessary to ensure 
quality. Unrestricted price competition would force prices to levels at which it would be impossible to re-
spect quality and safety standards. According to the Architects’ Council of Europe, for example, reasonable 
fixed prices are necessary to ensure that professionals compete on quality rather than on price. Without 
fixed prices, service providers would be tempted to offer the lowest price in order to obtain contracts, lead-
ing to a reduction in the quality of construction. The Architects’ Order of Belgium argued that fixed prices 
are necessary to allow architects to make a reasonable profit and to exercise their functions honourably 
and with dignity. They suggested that price competition would force architects to use inferior materials 
that would reduce the strength and security of buildings. In the Commission’s view, however, none of the 
respondents explained why price regulation, as opposed to other mechanisms such as planning permission 
procedures, construction standards and monitoring, should offer an effective means of quality control. No 
reason was given to indicate why price regulation should be expected, in itself, to improve or safeguard 
construction standards, nor was any explanation given as to why architects subject to price regulation 
would not have strong motivations to reduce quality in order to maximise profits. 
No evidence was provided to suggest that standards are higher in the minority of Member States that have 
minimum or fixed fees. A large majority of respondents were also in favour of recommended prices for ar-
chitectural services. However, few commented in detail on the justification for this type of regulation. As 
held by the Commission, few of the respondents commented on the concern that recommended prices 
might facilitate collusion. Likewise, they did not explain why consumers should need recommended prices 
for architects’ services, despite the fact that they do not rely on recommended prices when purchasing 
other complex products. In this regard, the Bundesarbeitskammer, an Austrian consumer organisation, 
even suggested that the Austrian professions sometimes lead consumers to believe that recommended 
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 In the present chapter I will discuss in more detail these examples of restrictions 
which are generally imposed by professional associations, and which are likely to fall 
within the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU. In this way it will become apparent that archi-
tects may also experience other restrictions than those directly interfering with their free 
movement rights in the practice of their profession. These restrictions are often not 
linked at all to their nationality as is required for restrictions considered within the 
framework of the free movement provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. In this regard it should also be noted that Articles 101(1) and 101(2) 
TFEU have vertical and horizontal direct effect since they are clear, precise and uncon-
ditional and do not require any further implementation by the Member States.452 In Part 
III of this thesis these restrictions will be discussed from a law and economics point of 
view. It will become clear that the ECJ also bases its decisions on economic principles. 
As stated before, the Court does not only investigate whether the undertakings are liable 
under Article 101 TFEU, but also whether the state authorities can be held responsible 
under Article 101 TFEU jo 4(3) EU. 
6.3.1. Market entry restrictions 
In its case law on the freedom of establishment, and the free movement of services, the 
ECJ has made clear on numerous occasions that the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality also has to be respected by the self-regulatory professional asso-
ciations.453 The same goes for all indirect or non-discriminatory rules such as establish-
ment454 or diploma requirements which foreigners find more difficult to obey. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
prices are fixed prices in order to avoid giving discounts. They added that Austrian architects face few in-
centives to reduced prices and costs. 
With regard to advertising, the majority were of the opinion that architects should be free to engage in 
truthful advertising. 
Finally, as far as business structure and inter-professional cooperation are concerned, the majority believed 
that there is a need for regulation to ensure transparency of ownership of architectural services companies, 
and to preserve architects’ independence from other groups. In this way, the Architects’ Council of Europe 
argued that, given the complex nature and potential impact of architectural services, it is important for cli-
ents to be aware of the ultimate ownership of architectural services companies. The Council also suggested 
that architects’ independence should not be compromised as a result of co-operation with other groups. 
However, the Commission considered that the respondents did not comment on the potential economic 
advantages of cooperation between architects and other groups such as engineers and builders. Nor did 
they comment on service provision in the majority of EU Member States where there are no significant 
regulations restricting architects’ participation in multi-disciplinary practices. 
452 Case C-127/79 BRT and SABAM [1974] ECR 51 paragraph 16 and Case C-282/95 P Guérin Automobiles v. 
Commission [1997] ECR I-1503 paragraph 39. 
453 See for example, Case C-246/80 Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie [1981] ECR 2311 in which 
it was decided that a national of a Member State who has obtained a diploma of medical doctor in another 
Member State and who may practise general medicine in that other Member State, is entitled to establish 
himself in his own country even if the Bar makes entry into the profession subject to additional require-
ments. See also Thieffry in which the ECJ held that the Bar cannot refuse permission to register for practi-
cal training to a national of one Member State who has obtained a diploma of doctor in his country of ori-
gin and which has been recognized as an equivalent qualification by the competent authority under the 
legislation of the country of establishment. 
454 The ECJ has ruled that non-discriminatory deontological rules prohibiting the keeping of more than one 
office, or the entering into partnership at more than one Bar, are incompatible with the freedom of estab-
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Gebhard, the Court even held that non-discriminatory rules restricting the right to bear 
a professional title and compulsory membership of public professional bodies must be 
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest. With regard to the entry on 
the register of a professional organisation, it has been argued that professional examina-
tions to enter the register of a professional organization should not be carried out by the 
Order itself, since the Order has an economic interest in limiting the number of success-
ful applicants.455 Membership can be denied by reason of subjective decisions (for exam-
ple good conduct-requirements) which can harm competition.456 This issue was ad-
dressed by the ECJ in Mauri457 with regard to the State examination for access to the 
Italian bar. A question was raised about the composition of the examination committee 
which consisted of five members appointed by the Minister for Justice, namely two 
judges, a professor of law and two advocates, the latter being nominated by the lawyer’s 
professional association on a joint proposal by the bar councils of the district concerned. 
The applicant was worried that the presence of the advocates was disadvantageous to 
him since they might want to restrict the access of new competitors to the profession by 
failing applicants. 
 With regard to the freedom of establishment, the ECJ considered that although an 
examination for access to the profession of advocate may indeed constitute an obstacle, 
this was not the case for the rule relating to the composition of the examination com-
mittee. Even assuming that the participation of advocates in the State examination 
committee may in itself constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment, that 
participation may be justified in the public interest, namely the need to assess as well as 
possible the aptitude and ability of persons called to practise as advocates, and is suitable 
for securing the attainment of that objective. Since advocates have professional experi-
ence, they are particularly qualified to assess candidates in the light of the specific re-
quirements of their profession. 
 With regard to the application of the competition law provisions, the ECJ held that 
including advocates as members of an examination committee may be treated as under-
takings in the sense of Article 10 TFEU. Even though Articles 4(3) EU jo Article 101 
TFEU requires Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures which 
may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings the state, in the 
case in hand, still occupied a significant position on the committee itself due to the pres-
ence of two judges who, even if they are not hierarchically subordinate to the Minister 
for Justice, must nonetheless be regarded as an emanation of the state. Since the Minis-
ter for Justice can supervise each stage of the proceedings, and can even intervene dur-
ing the proceedings in that he also appoints the members of the committee and chooses 
the examination subjects, the state had not given up its powers. Furthermore, a negative 
decision could be subject for proceedings before the administrative courts. The ECJ 
                                                                                                                                                             
lishment. See Case C-96/85 Commission v. France [1986] ECR 1475 and Klopp. Even if such restrictions 
would be acceptable for reasons of public interest, they will probably not satisfy the proportionality test.  
455 OECD Competition Policy and the Professions. Paris: OECD, 1985, p. 35. 
456 In this regard, Van den Bergh has held that an economic analysis of the proportionality requirement may 
be useful. Van den Bergh 1999, p. 99.  
457 Case C-250/03 Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di avvocato presso la Corte 
d’appello di Milano [2005] ECR I-01267. 
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therefore concluded that Article 101 TFEU did not preclude the rule at issue. This line 
of reasoning has often been repeated by the ECJ. 
6.3.2 Market conduct restrictions 
1. Price regulations 
a.  Fixed prices 
In most EU Member States, the fees charged for professional services are negotiated 
freely between practitioners and their clients. However it occurs that fixed maximum 
and minimum prices are applied. In this regard reference should be made to Article 101 
TFEU which explicitly prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by asso-
ciations of undertakings and concerted practices which directly or indirectly fix pur-
chase or selling prices, or any other trading conditions which may affect trade between 
Member States and have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition within the internal market. Such agreements will be void ab initio. 
Since the absence of fixed prices in the architectural profession is common, it can be 
concluded that fixed prices are not essential regulatory instruments, and that other less 
restrictive means can be used to maintain high standards. However the Commission 
and the ECJ have decided upon numerous cases involving price fixing, some with regard 
to the architectural profession. 
 
BNIC458 concerned an agreement signed by the representatives of dealers and wine-
growers fixing a minimum price for wines for distillation and the manufacture of co-
gnac throughout the whole of France. They agreed that any contract concluded in 
breach of this agreement would be void, and this agreement was made generally binding 
by an order issued by the Minister for Agriculture. An action was brought against Mr. 
Clair who bought cognac from various wine-growers at prices lower that those laid 
down by the Order. The Court held that the agreement fell under Article 101 TFEU 
since it was negotiated and concluded by persons who were, although appointed by the 
public authorities, generally proposed for appointment by the trade organizations di-
rectly concerned. For this reason they should be regarded as representing those organi-
zations in the negotiation and conclusion of the agreement. The Court considered that 
an agreement fixing a minimum price for a product, even if it is submitted to the public 
authorities for the purpose of obtaining approval for that minimum price, so that it 
becomes binding on all traders in the market in question, is intended to distort competi-
tion, and is therefore contrary to EU competition law. Since minimum prices prevent 
operators from competing by setting prices below the minima laid down, they constitute 
a significant restriction of competition. Therefore, they deny consumers the opportunity 
to acquire the goods or services concerned at the best price. Furthermore, minimum 
                                                                
458 Case C-123/83 Bureau National Interprofessional du Cognac v Guy Clair [1985] ECR I-391, paragraph 22. 
  Public Regulation of Architects at European Union Level  
176 
prices artificially reinforce the barriers to entry for operators wishing to enter the mar-
ket since they deprive the latter of a fast and effective means of penetrating the market.459 
 
In CNSD460, the public authorities required the Italian National Council of Customs 
Agents (CNSD) -a private undertaking- to conclude price-fixing arrangements (mini-
mum and maximum tariffs) for the services of customs agents. CNSD, a body governed 
by public law, was thus responsible for setting the tariff for the services provided by 
customs agents. This tariff was approved by a decree of the Italian Minister for Finance. 
The Court held that even though customs agents can be qualified as liberal profession-
als, they do fall under the concept of an undertaking, since this covers any entity en-
gaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is 
financed. An activity consisting of offering goods and services in a given markets is thus 
an economic activity. As indicated above, the public law status of a national body such 
as the CNSD does not preclude the application of competition rules, since the legal 
framework within which agreements are made, and such decisions are taken, and the 
classifications given to that framework by the various national legal systems, are irrele-
vant for the application of Article 101 TFEU. In this regard it should be noted that the 
members of the CNSD were the representatives of professional customs agents and 
nothing in the national legislation prevented the CNSD from acting in the exclusive 
interests of the profession. Since the tariff created by CNSD was made mandatory by a 
national decree, Italy did not only require the conclusion of an agreement contrary to 
Article 101 TFEU, but also assisted in ensuring compliance with it. The ECJ confirmed 
thus that by adopting and maintaining this Decree in force, which in granting the rela-
tive decision-making power required the CNSD to adopt a decision consisting of setting 
a compulsory tariff, Italy had failed its obligations under the Treaty and was liable under 
Article 3(3) EU jo 4(3) EU jo 101 TFEU. 
 
As held before, the ECJ has also dealt with price fixing in the architectural profession. 
Giuseppe Conte v. Stefania Rossi461 dealt with Italian legislation providing for minimum 
tariffs in respect of the services provided by engineers and architects. Initially those 
tariffs were fixed directly by the legislator. Article 2 of the fee scale annexed to Law No 
143/49 of 2 March 1949462, approving the professional scale of fees for engineers and 
architects, provided for four types of fees which were fixed: (a) by percentage, that is on 
the basis of the value of the work to be done; (b) by unit, that is on the basis of the unit 
of measurement; (c) by time, that is on the basis of the time spent; and (d) by discretion, 
meaning that they are left entirely to the professional. With regard to the latter possibil-
ity, Article 5 of the fee scale annexed to Law No 143/49, which was of particular impor-
tance in the main proceedings, listed the services for which fees could be set at the dis-
                                                                
459 See, to this effect, Commission Decision 95/188/EC of 30 January 1995 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty (IV/33.686 – Colegio Oficial de AGhentes de la Propriedad Industrial (COAPI) 
(OJ 1995 L 122, p. 37, paragraph 38 of the account of the facts). 
460 Case C-35/96 Commission v. Italy, paragraphs 2-9, 41, 59, 55, 57 and 59. 
461 Case C-221/99 Giuseppe Conte v. Stefania Rossi [2001] ECR I-09359. 
462 Gazetta Ufficieal della Repubblica Italiana no 90 of 19 April 1949, p. 3. 
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cretion of the professional. Subsequently, Law No 143 of 4 March 1958463 provided that 
the scales of fees and emoluments for engineers and architects, and the criteria for the 
reimbursement of expenses, were to be laid down by decree of the Minister for Justice, 
by agreement with the Minister for Public Works, on a proposal from the National 
Councils of the Associations of Engineers and Architects. However, the law held that the 
fee scales laid down according to this new procedure were not applicable to the services 
referred to in Article 5 of the scale annexed to Law No 143/49.  Architects thus still en-
joy discretion in setting their fees in respect of those services. 
 In case of professional disputes such as disputes on architectural fees, the Associa-
tion Council, which is composed of members elected by registered architects, has to give 
its opinion.464 Hereafter, an architect can lodge an ex parte application to obtain an en-
forceable court order against his debtor in the event that his fees are not paid. The archi-
tect has to add his fee invoice to his application which must be endorsed by the opinion 
of the competent professional association unless the fee is fixed on the basis of manda-
tory tariffs. In accordance with the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is bound 
to follow the opinion of the professional association as regards the sums claimed – the 
correction of clerical errors aside – unless the court dismisses the application on the 
grounds that it is insufficiently substantiated. However, in the event that the defendant 
does not agree, he may apply within the time limit to have the order set aside and an 
ordinary civil procedure inter partes has to be followed. In this regard it should be noted 
that the opinion of the architectural association only binds the court seized of the dis-
pute at the first ex parte stage of the procedure. If the debtor initiates an inter partes 
procedure to have the order set aside, the opinion of the association is thus no longer 
binding on the court. 
 Since the national court still has the final say in an independent way, the ECJ held 
that the opinion of the architectural association which is related to individual services 
provided by a specific practitioner, cannot constitute a decision by an association of 
undertakings which may, in itself, restrict or distort competition within the meaning of 
Article 101 TFEU. It follows that Article 4(3) EU jo 101 TFEU does not preclude na-
tional legislation which, in the context of a summary procedure for the recovery of debts 
relating to the fees of an architect, requires the court seized of the dispute to follow the 
opinion of that association in relation to the settlement of those fees, insofar as that 
opinion ceases to be binding, where the debtor initiates proceedings inter partes. Since 
the services in respect of which the procedure for the recovery of debts was imple-
mented were not subject to an obligatory tariff, while each practitioner had freedom to 
set its relevant fee, the ECJ held that the Italian legislation did not promote the creation 
of anti-competitive agreements. Articles 4(3) EU and 101 TFEU therefore did not pre-
clude national legislation which provides that the members of a profession may set, at 
their discretion, the fees for certain services which they perform. 
 
Arduino was about a public authority requiring a private undertaking, the Italian Coun-
cil of the Bar (CNF), to conclude price-fixing arrangements for the services provided by 
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its members, and reinforce the effect thereof. The Italian law spelled out which criteria 
the Council of the Bar needed to take into account, and the Minister had to approve 
these tariffs. CNF was only responsible for producing a draft tariff which, as such, was 
not compulsory, and did not have to take into account public-interest criteria. Even 
though the Minister could only reject or endorse the CNF’s proposal, and even though 
there was little doubt that his decree was merely a rubber stamp, by refusing to approve 
the draft tariff with the consequence that the old tariff remained applicable, the Minister 
could prompt the CNF to amend its draft along the lines he indicated, so that the state 
still had the final say, as opposed to the situation in CNSD where the public authorities 
did not assume full responsibility for the restriction of competition, since they wholly 
relinquished, to private economic operators, the powers of the public authorities as 
regards the setting of tariffs. Since in Arduino the Italian State had not waived its power 
to make decisions of last resort, or to review implementation of the tariff, it had not 
delegated its responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere. In other 
words, the Italian State had not divested its own rules of the character of legislation by 
delegating to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the 
economic sphere. The state also did not require or encourage the adoption of decisions 
contrary to competition law. Accordingly, the Court decided that, since the final respon-
sibility was assumed by the public authority (a genuine state measure), Article 101 
TFEU was not applicable, and that the state measure was lawful.465 In the case of such 
genuine state measures, the presence of public interest grounds is a given which means 
that neither the Commission nor the Court should inquire these grounds when assess-
ing such measures under EU competition law.466 
                                                                
465 See also Fiammiferi, paragraphs 70-79. In this case a production quota system pursuant to which the 
match manufacturers belonging to the German consortium of domestic match manufacturers (CIF) were 
entitled to production volumes which corresponded to their existing market share. The national legislation 
did not preclude the match manufacturers from engaging in autonomous conduct provided for a quota 
system. However since the quota system did not impose any calculation criteria, the members of the quota 
allocation committee were acting exclusively in their own interests while the public authorities had no ef-
fective means of controlling the decisions of the committee and had no say at all in the committee which 
was composed solely of CIF members. The Italian public authorities therefore did not assume full respon-
sibility for the restriction of competition. They only rubber-stamped the decisions made by the committee. 
The Court held that national legislation precluding undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct, 
does not shield these undertakings forever against the constraints of Article 81 and 82 EC, and held that 
any provision of national law which contravenes Community legislation should be disapplied, not only by 
the national courts, but also by the National Competition Authority. Undertakings may even face penalties 
for conduct subsequent to the decision to disapply the national legislation, once the decision has become 
definitive in their regard, while a Member State that requires the adoption of anti-competitive agreements 
infringes Article 10 and 81 EC. As held by First 2004, p. 262, Fiammiferi looks first at the extent to which 
anticompetitive conduct is compelled by the state. Compulsion is important, not only because it removes 
discretion from a party with respect to its conduct, making liability for that conduct unfair, but also be-
cause compulsion demonstrates clearly a state policy to displace competition with regulation. Fiammiferi 
looks at whether discretionary conduct can be blamed on the party, or is attributable to the state. The con-
sequence of the judgment is that when a decision by a national competition authority to disapply national 
legislation has become definitive, the State compulsion defence is no longer available. For the period prior 
to the decision to disapply the legislation, the State compulsion defence is valid, and the undertakings en-
joy immunity from fines and also immunity from damage claims.  
466 It can be questioned why the Court, in its Arduino judgement, did not indicate that Italy’s regulation of 
lawyers’ fees would have to be disapplied in the future as well. According to the ECJ, in Arduino the price 
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Cupola467 concerned an Italian Royal Decree stating that the criteria for determining fees 
and emoluments payable to lawyers in respect of civil and criminal proceedings and 
out-of-court work are to be set every two years by the National Lawyers’ Council (CNF). 
When this Council has decided on lawyers’ fees, the scale must be approved by the Min-
ister of Justice for it to be binding. According to the scale, the fees have to be based on 
the monetary value of disputes, the level of the court seized, and the duration of the 
proceedings. In the case under consideration, parties had, however, made a flat-rate 
agreement about the remuneration of the lawyer which was not based on the scale. The 
Court held that the draft scale of fees which was created by the CNF did not encompass 
that the Italian State had waived its power to make decisions of last resort, or to review 
the implementation of that scale. This was confirmed by the fact that Italian legislation 
foresees that courts may depart from the maximum and minimum limits, and by the 
fact that the Minister has the power to have the draft amended by the CNF. The Court 
thus held that Articles 4(3) EU and 101 and 102 TFEU do not preclude a Member State 
from adopting a legislative measure which approves, on the basis of a draft produced by 
a professional body of lawyers such as the CNF, a scale fixing a minimum fee for mem-
bers of the legal profession, from which there can generally be no derogation. However, 
the Court indicated that the prohibition of derogation, by agreement, from the mini-
mum fees set by a scale such as that lay down by the Italian legislation, was liable to 
render access to the Italian legal services market more difficult for lawyers established in 
a Member State other than the Italian Republic. Indeed, it deprived such lawyers of the 
possibility, by requesting fees lower than those set by the scale, of competing more effec-
tively with lawyers established on a stable basis in the Member State concerned, and 
who therefore have greater opportunities for winning clients than lawyers established 
abroad. Since it was likely to restrict the exercise of their activities providing services in 
that Member State, the prohibition amounted to a restriction within the meaning of 
Article 56 TFEU. The Court also stipulated that the prohibition limited the choice of 
service recipients in Italy, because they could not resort to the services of lawyers estab-
lished in other Member States who would offer their services in Italy at a lower rate than 
the minimum fees set by the scale. Nevertheless, the protection of consumers and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
fixing was the result of the state’s action, rather than the action of the bar Association. This was due to the 
fact that public Ministries reviewed and approved the fee schedule. In Fiammiferi, quota allocations and 
transfers were approved by public ministries as well, but it was held that public authorities did not have an 
effective means of controlling decisions taken by the quota-allocation committee, of which four of the five 
members were from the industry, with the result that the decisions could be made exclusively in the pri-
vate interest. This, however, was also the case for the bar association’s fee schedule in Arduino, but this was 
not taken into account by the ECJ. It is obvious that the last word has not been said yet. As held by First 
2004, the more recent Fiammiferi case indicates that the Court may now be more inclined to place anti-
competitive conduct within the control of competition law, even though that conduct is subject to some 
degree of state control but there is no real framework (yet): See First 2004, p. 11. In any case, it seems that 
the ECJ is wiling to accept public interest justifications for professional regulation without either a close 
evaluation of the anticompetitive effects of such regulation, or an effort to assess how strong those justifi-
cations are in relation to the anticompetitive effects. Without further development, the result may be to al-
low the liberal professions great latitude to engage in self-regulation that furthers the private economic in-
terests of the profession itself. 
467 Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Federico Cipolla v. Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese and Stefano Macrino 
and Claudia Capodarte v. Roberto Meloni [2006] ECR I-1 1421.  
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safeguarding of the proper administration of justice are objectives to be included among 
those which may be regarded as overriding requirements relating to the public interest, 
capable of justifying a restriction on freedom to provide services468 on condition that the 
national measure at issue in the main proceedings is suitable for securing the attainment 
of the objective pursued, and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
that objective (see Article 56 job 52 TFEU). The ECJ held that it is a matter for the na-
tional court to decide whether, in the case at issue, the restriction on freedom to provide 
services introduced by that national legislation fulfils those conditions. When deciding, 
the national courts has to take into account whether there is a correlation between the 
level of fees and the quality of the services provided by lawyers and whether, in particu-
lar, the setting of such minimum fees constitutes an appropriate measure for attaining 
the objectives pursued, namely the protection of consumers and the proper administra-
tion of justice. Although it is true that a scale imposing minimum fees cannot prevent 
members of the profession from offering mediocre quality services, it is conceivable that 
such a scale does serve to prevent lawyers, in a context such as that of the Italian market 
which is characterised by an extremely large number of lawyers who are enrolled and 
practising, from being encouraged to compete against each other by possibly offering 
services at a discount, with the risk of deterioration in the quality of the services pro-
vided. This has to be seen in the light of the problem of information asymmetry469 in the 
field of lawyers’ services, which is an economic argument. In this regard, the ECJ held 
that the national court will also have to determine whether professional rules in respect 
of lawyers, in particular rules relating to organisations, qualifications, professional eth-
ics, supervision and liability, suffice in themselves to attain the objectives of the protec-
tion of consumers and the proper administration of justice. It was thus concluded that, 
in principle, legislation containing an absolute prohibition of derogation, by agreement, 
from the minimum fees set by a scale of lawyer’s fees such as that at issue for services 
which are court services reserved to lawyers, constitutes a restriction on freedom to 
provide services laid down in Article 56 TFEU. However, it is for the national court to 
determine whether such legislation, in the light of the detailed rules for its application, 
actually serves the objectives of protection of consumers and the proper administration 
of justice which might justify it, and whether the restrictions it imposes do not appear 
disproportionate in the light of those objectives. 
b. Recommended prices 
Even the circulation of recommended tariffs by a trade organization is liable to prompt 
the relevant undertakings to align their tariffs, irrespective of their costs. Such a method 
dissuades undertakings whose cost prices are lower, from lowering their prices, and thus 
creates an artificial advantage for undertakings which have the least control over their 
                                                                
468 See, to that effect, Case C-3/95 Reisebüro Broede [1996] ECR I-6511, paragraph 31 and Case C-124/97 
Läärä and Others [1999] ECR I-6067, paragraph 33. 
469 This entails that professionals have more or better information at their disposal than their clients with 
regard to the particular services. The economic effects of such information asymmetry will be described in 
detail in Part III of this thesis.  
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production costs.470 Since Article 101(1) TFEU also applies to associations of undertak-
ings insofar as their own activities or those of the undertakings affiliated to them are 
calculated to produce the results which it aims to suppress,471 even a recommendation 
without binding effect cannot escape its application where compliance with the recom-
mendation by the undertakings to which it is addressed has an appreciable influence on 
competition in the market in question.472 In the case of advisory prices, profession mem-
bers are, in theory, still free to set their prices, although the chance of collective pricing 
behaviour is rather high.473 Recommended prices can mislead consumers as to what is a 
reasonable price for the service they are receiving, and as to whether or not this recom-
mended price is negotiable. As indicated by the Commission Staff Working Document 
of September 2005, the key justifications given for maintaining recommended fee scales 
centre on the need to provide a guide to consumers on likely costs and protect against 
what is termed ‘unfair’ competition between practitioners. However, recommended fees 
and reference scales can still act to facilitate price co-ordination. There are other less 
distorting ways to provide consumers with a ‘guide’ to prices. For instance, active moni-
toring by consumer associations on pricing and the collection and publication of survey 
based historical price data by independent organisations. Ways can also be developed to 
provide customers with costs of the professional service ex ante, at the moment of giving 
the mandate.474 Indeed, the fixing of prices, even those which merely constitute a target, 
affects competition, since such target prices enable all the participants in a cartel to pre-
dict, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what the pricing policy pursued by their 
competitors will be. Even if such an agreement only extends over the territory of one 
Member State, it has, by its very nature, the effect of reinforcing the compartmentaliza-
tion of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration 
which the Treaty is designed to bring about, and protecting domestic production.475 
 
While in the late 1990s recommended prices were abolished for architects in France476 
and while in the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading came to the conclusion 
that the Royal Institute of British Architects’ (RIBA) indicative fee guidance could facili-
tate collusion477, in 2003 the European Commission sent the Belgian Architects’ Associa-
tion a warning that its recommended minimum fee scale could constitute a violation of 
                                                                
470 Commission Decision 96/438/EC of 5 June 1996 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty (IV/34.983 – Fenex), OJ L 181 , 20 July 1996, pp. 28-36. 
471 Case C-71/74, Frubo v. Commission, [1975] ECR 563; Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and 
Others v. Commission [1980] ECR 3125.  
472 Case C-96/82 NV IAZ International Belgium and others v Commission of the European Communities 
[1983] ECR 3369.  
473 Philipsen 2003, p. 36. See also Commission Decision of 30 June 1993 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/33.407 – CNSD), OJ L 203 , 13 August 1993, pp. 0027 – 0033. 
474 COM(2005) 405 final p.21. 
475 Case C-8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission of the European Communities [1972] 
ECR 977. 
476 The French Conseil de la Concurrence also prohibited the French Architects’ Association from further 
elaborating and distributing fee scales: See Decision no. 97D45 of 10 June 1997 and Communication from 
the Commission – Report on Competition in Professional Services /*COM/2004/0083 final*/ 
477 However, the Office of Fair Trading adopted the RIBA’s new fee guidance based on historical information 
and the collation of price trends that do not provide a lead on the current year’s prices.  
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EU competition rules.478 This fee scale found in 1967 its origin in Article 12 of the Asso-
ciation’s Code of Ethics, which new version was given binding force by Royal Decree in 
1985.479 This Article held that depending on the form in which he exercises his profes-
sion, an architect shall be remunerated by fees or a salary that enable him to earn his 
living and carry on his profession with honour and dignity. They must enable him to 
cover his expenses, and in particular his professional liability insurance. The National 
Council shall set the minimum fee scales by means of standards made binding in accor-
dance with Article 3. Anyone infringing these provisions shall be liable to the discipli-
nary penalties provided for in Article 21 of the Act of 26 June 1963. The National Coun-
cil shall also propose reference scales for salaries. In this regard the report to the King 
explaining the Association’s need to have the 1985 Code approved, stated that in order 
to take account of the evolving nature of the profession, the Code of Ethics may subse-
quently be clarified by means of rules made compulsory by Royal Decree discussed in 
Cabinet. This will be the case, in particular, for the provision setting a minimum fee 
scale. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Code held more particularly that the Code may be 
clarified by means of binding rules approved by Royal Decree discussed in Cabinet, on a 
proposal from the National Council of Association, or by means of recommendations 
issued by the National Council of the Association. Based on these provisions, the dis-
puted fee scale for architects was created in 1967 and the document was called ‘Ethical 
Standard No 2’. 
 Article 1 of Ethical Standard No 2 immediately exposed the aim of the fee scale: the 
determination of minimum remuneration for self-employed architects.480 Fees were to 
be calculated as fixed percentages of the expenditure on the building work.481 Following 
this, the National Council drew up and published a standard architect-client contract482 
which stipulated, in Article 10, the express agreement of the parties that the fees are to 
be fixed and paid in accordance with Ethical Standard No 2, a copy of which would be 
attached. A Royal Decree making the text of Ethical Standard No 2 binding, was never 
adopted, since the then Minister for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, the Profes-
                                                                
478 The Commission held also, on other occasions, that Article 81 EC fully applies if a Member State gives 
authority to a professional association to fix prices, thereby violating Article 3 (g), 10 and 81 EC. See for 
example Consiglio nazionale degli spedizionieri doganali: Decision of 30 June1993. [1993] OJ L 203; Colegio 
Oficial de Aghentes de la Propriedad Industrial: Decision of 30 January 1995 [1995] OJ L 122. When profes-
sional associations promulgate fee schedules on the basis of such authority, they will not be immune from 
antitrust scrutinisation. In both decisions, price fixing was held to be illegal. 
479 Article 39 of the Architects’ Order Act empowers the Crown, at the National Council’s request, to give 
binding force to the Code of Ethics by means of a Royal Decree discussed in Cabinet. This happened on 5 
July 1967 while the new Code of Ethics was given force by Royal Decree in 1985. 
480 The reference is to Articles 7 and 10 of the 1967 Code of Ethics, defining independent and salaried archi-
tects.  
481 When the Commission asked the Association’s provincial councils to produce copies of the 20 most recent 
contracts in which fees were lower than those determined by the scale, the provincial councils in Namur 
and Hainaut – the only councils who replied that they were in possession of copies of contracts – each sent 
20 contracts. Although the Commission had asked them to produce contracts in which fees were lower 
than those determined by the scale, most of the contracts in fact stipulated fees equivalent to those deter-
mined by the scale. In all, over three quarters (32 out of 40) of the recent contracts examined referred ex-
plicitly to the scale. While it is true that this was only a limited sample, there is nothing to indicate that the 
situation might be different in the other regions. 
482 This was approved at its meeting of 27 September 1968. 
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sions and the Self-employed did not find this advisable. This was clearly against the 
Association’s intention. 
 After becoming aware of the fee scale’s difficult and disputed status, in 2002 the 
Belgian Architectural Association published a statement indicating that since both the 
Belgian Competition Council and the Court of Justice of the European Union seem to 
be taking a particular interest in the compatibility with the competition rules of fee 
scales drawn up by regulated professions, the fee scale should be understood as a guide-
line. Furthermore, in 2003, the steering committee of the National Council decided to 
delete all reference to the fee scale with immediate effect, and to rescinded the second 
paragraph of Article 30 of the Code of Ethics which held that the architect must abstain 
from participating in any public or private invitation to tender aimed at encouraging 
architects to compete on the of their services.483 
 This however did not stop the Commission from finding that the fee scale had vio-
lated EC competition law. It considered that Ethical Standard No 2 was a decision by an 
association of undertakings which might affect trade between Member States, and which 
had, as its object, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market.484 
 Firstly, the Commission held that the Architects’ Association was an association of 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. Even though it has public-law 
status, and even though ten of twenty of the members of the national Council are ap-
pointed by the Government, the Association did not perform a special duty to protect 
the general interest in accordance with criteria laid down by law. On the contrary, the 
Association was able to act in the exclusive interest of the profession, and the minimum 
fee scale constituted the expression of the intention of the members of the profession, 
and was clearly intended to govern the behaviour of the members of the Association.485 
                                                                
483 On 4 May 2000, the Association’s Dutch-speaking Appeal Board delivered two decisions finding that this 
second paragraph of Article 30 of the Code of Ethics was null and void under Article 2 of the Belgian Act 
of 5 August 1991, consolidated by the Royal Decree of 1 July 1999, concerning the protection of economic 
competition. In these two decisions, the Appeal Board explicitly acknowledged that the provision appre-
ciably restricted competition between architects. The Association denied any link between the scale and 
the second paragraph of Article 30 of the Code of Ethics; but the fact that it did not inform all its members 
of the finding by the Dutch-speaking Appeal Board, is a further indication that is was pursuing a policy of 
avoiding all forms of price competition. 
484 Commission Decision of 24 June 2004. 
485 At the time Ethical Standard No 2 was created (1967), there was no legislation giving the Association the 
task of formulating the rules and practices determining the method by which architects’ fees were to be 
calculated as fixed percentages of the expenditure on the building work.485  Furthermore, Article 12 of the 
Code of Ethics of 1985 which stated that minimum fee scales had to be created did not appear in the 1967 
Code. Despite the absence of a Royal Decree which would make the text of Ethical Standard No 2 binding, 
the Association published the standard, circulated it, and updated it in 1978 and 2002. In this regard it 
should be noted that there was no evidence that the standard was simply a codification of existing rules 
and practices. Although the preamble stated that the standard set out the existing rules and practices, in 
reality it contained statements that had an intentionally rule-making tone, such as: ‘The Code of Ethics 
stipulates that all architects are obliged to set their fees at a level determined at the very least by the rele-
vant rules and practices accepted by the authorities of the Association’; ‘It is the responsibility of the au-
thorities of the Association to state the rules and practices determining the method for calculating archi-
tects’ fees’ and ‘Rates lower than those set out below will not enable the architect to perform all the duties 
incumbent upon him conscientiously and responsibly. If he failed to apply them, he would run the risk of 
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Unlike the scale set in the Arduino486 case, Ethical Standard No 2 was more than a mere 
preparatory act. The scale created an artificial link between the total cost of building 
work and the architect’s fees. In this regard the Commission held that, while it is true 
that the cost of the work is a determining factor in the insurance premium to be paid by 
the architect, there is no other direct link between the cost of the work and the archi-
tect’s costs, or any necessary link with the value added by his services. According to the 
Commission, fees charged for professional services should reflect the architect’s skills, 
efficiency and costs, and perhaps his fame or notoriety, and should not be dependent 
solely on the value of the works or the price asked by the entrepreneur. The architect 
should be able to determine his fee independently of competitors, and in agreement 
with the client only. Important in this regard is that Article 12 stipulated that an archi-
tect may incur disciplinary penalties if he infringed the 1985 Code of Ethics. The Com-
mission therefore concluded that Ethical Standard No 2 was a decision of a prescriptive 
character, and not a descriptive codification, and could not be considered to be a State 
measure or simply as an act preparatory to a State measure. As indicated by the Com-
mission, even though referred to as a ‘guideline’, an act described as a recommendation 
may be contrary to Article 101 TFEU, whatever its legal status, if it aims to coordinate 
the conduct of the members of an association in accordance with the terms of the rec-
ommendation.487 Since all participants can predict, with a reasonable degree of certainty, 
what the pricing policy pursued by their competitors will be, especially if the provisions 
on target prices are backed up by the possibility of inspections and penalties, profes-
sional organisation are liable to prompt the relevant undertakings to align their tariffs, 
irrespective of their costs.488 This dissuades undertakings whose costs are relatively low 
from lowering their prices and thus creates an artificial advantage for undertakings 
which have the least control over their production costs489 and can mislead consumers as 
                                                                                                                                                             
neglecting his client’s interests … He would thereby be undermining the honour and dignity of the profes-
sion of which the Association is guardian.’ In any event, it was unlikely that a straightforward codification 
of existing practices would produce so detailed a scale. 
486 As held above, in the Arduino case, the professional association’s part in the fixing of scales was limited to 
producing a draft that the responsible Minister was free to modify. Without the Minister’s approval, the 
draft tariff did not come into force, and the earlier tariff remained applicable. Without approval, therefore, 
the draft could not affect the market. The Court concluded that there had not been any contestable delega-
tion of authority to the operators. 
487 See Court of Justice in Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer [1987] ECR 405, paragraph 32; see also 
Joined Cases 209 to 215 and Van Landewyck, paragraph 86. The question whether a decision has the objec-
tive of restricting competition depends therefore on a number of factors. Its objective may be deduced 
from the terms of the decision, its aims, the legal and economic context, and the conduct of the parties. See 
IAZ International paragraphs 22-25. See also Court of Justice in Joined Cases 29 and 30/83 Compagnie 
Royale Asturienne des Mines and Rheinzink [1984] ECR 1679, paragraph 26 and the Commission Guide-
lines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101, 27. April 2004, p. 97, paragraphs 21 and 
22. 
488 See Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren, paragraph 21. As held by the ECJ in Belasco, even though fixed 
prices might not have been observed in practice, the decision to fix them has the objecive of restricting 
competition. See Case 246/86 Belasco [1989] ECR 2117.  
489 Such a risk is not, however, inherent in the circulation of information that would help the undertakings to 
calculate their own cost price structures so as to enable them to establish their selling prices independently. 
See Commission Decision 96/438/EC in Case IV/34.983 – Fenex, OJ L 181, 20 July 1996, p. 28, paragraphs 
60-65. 
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to what is a reasonable price for the service they are receiving, and as to whether this 
recommended price is negotiable.490 The establishment of a (recommended) minimum 
fee scale can therefore not be considered as necessary in order to ensure the proper 
practice of the architect’s profession. Whilst recommended prices do not automatically 
and always restrict competition, information on prices can be provided in other ways, 
such as the publication of information collected by independent parties (such as con-
sumer organisations) concerning prices generally applied, or information based on a 
survey. These methods can constitute a more reliable yardstick for consumers and may 
lead to fewer distortions in terms of competition.  The minimum fee scale drawn up and 
circulated by the Association between 12 July 1967 and 21 November 2003 therefore 
violated Article 101(1) TFEU.  
c.  Conclusion 
Professions do not hesitate to use price fixing.  They claim that minimum and even 
maximum or recommended prices are adopted to safeguard high quality services. If  
professionals are not able to compete on prices, their argument runs that they will con-
centrate on providing high quality services rather than reducing quality to offer their 
services at lower cost.  However, fixed fees do not generally trigger innovation and pre-
vent that tariffs are adapted to various levels in quality.  Due to the fact that consumers 
are generally not able to assess the exact quality level of the services rendered (they did 
e.g. not receive the same education as architects), there is a risk that low level services 
are provided in case a maximum price has been determined.  It follows that competition 
on quality is in principle hardly triggered in professional services. Minimum prices on 
the other hand prevent professionals from competing by setting prices below the mini-
mum laid down.  It follows that compulsory tariffs have as their object the restriction of 
competition and deny consumers the opportunity to acquire the services at the best 
price. Furthermore, fixed prices can also prevent new operators to enter the market 
since they are restricted to sell their services at a lower (or higher) price.  Even recom-
mended prices may be violating free competition if they aim to coordinate the conduct 
of the members of a professional association.   It follows that regulations are not only 
able to limit the free movement of professionals, but can restrict free competition as 
well.  If professional associations have created certain rules that hinder competition, 
national courts should disapply these rules unless they can be justified in accordance 
with Article 101(3) TFEU and are proportional.  
2. Advertising restrictions 
Advertising is a very important means of creating genuine outlets for all goods and 
services throughout the Union, and is used to promote the quality and price of a prod-
uct. In this way it also increases competition. The ECJ has also delivered judgement in 
cases where Article 101(1) TFEU was said to be infringed due to advertising restrictions. 
 
                                                                
490 As held above, shortly after the scale was drawn up, the Association drafted a standard contract in which 
the only option for determining fees was a reference to the scale; this too attests to its intention to restrict 
competition on prices between its members by drawing up a minimum fee scale. It circulated this standard 
contract for eighteen years.  
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In Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office491 (EPI), the 
Institute established a Code of Professional Conduct for its members. This Code stated, 
in Article 2(b)(1), that comparison of the professional services of one member with 
those of another is forbidden. The Court referred to Council Directive 84/450/EEC492 as 
amended by Directive 97/55/EC493 which provides in Article 3(a) that comparative ad-
vertising494 is to be permitted on condition, inter alia, that it is not misleading.495 The 
Court thus concluded that when it is fair and in accordance with the appropriate rules, 
comparative advertising makes it possible in particular to provide more information to 
users and thus help them choose a professional representative in the Community as a 
whole, whom they may then approach. Even though Article 7(5) of this Directive states 
that Member States are authorised to maintain or introduce provisions prohibiting 
comparative advertising of professional services in compliance with the provisions of 
the Treaty, a simple prohibition of comparative advertising restricts the ability of more 
efficient professional representatives to develop their services, with the consequence, 
inter alia, that the clientele of each professional representative is crystallised within a 
national market. Fair and appropriate comparative advertising therefore has favourable 
effects on competition, while the prohibition of any form of that method of advertising 
entails a restriction on competition. The Court concluded therefore that where it is not 
shown that the absolute prohibition of comparative advertising is objectively necessary 
in order to preserve the dignity and rules of conduct of the profession concerned, the 
rule at issue violates Article 101(1) TFEU. This was in line with the opinion of the 
Commission which stipulated that the prohibition of comparative advertising restricts 
the ability of more efficient representatives to develop their services, to the detriment of 
                                                                
491 Case T-144/99 Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office [2001] ECR II-
1087. 
492 Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising, OJ L 250, 19 Sep-
tember 1984, pp. 17-20.  
493 Directive 97/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Directive 
84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising, OJ No L 290, 23 
October 1997, p. 18.  Directive 84/450/EEC is now repealed by Directive 2006/114/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising 
(codified version) [2006] O.J. L149/22. 
494 Comparative advertising is defined as ‘any advertising which explicitly or by implication identifies a com-
petitor or goods or services offered by a competitor’ (Article 2 (c) Directive 2006/114/EC).  
495 Articleof the Directive 2006/114/EC indicates in what circumstances comparative advertising is permitted. 
This is the case when it is not misleading, compares goods or services meeting the same needs or intended 
for the same purpose, is objective, does not discredit or denigrate trade marks, does not take unfair advan-
tage of the reputation of a trade mark, does not present goods or services as imitations of goods or services 
bearing a protected trade mark, and does not create confusion among traders. In order to make sure that 
consumers can and must make the best possible use of the internal market, the basic provisions governing 
the form and content of comparative advertising should be uniform. However, as held by by Article 8 (4): 
‘Nothing shall prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing bans or limitations on the use of 
comparisons in the advertising of professional services, for regulating the exercise of a professional activity 
under the law of the Member States for regulating the exercise of a professional activity’. It follows that na-
tional differences can become common in this regard. If the conditions of the use of comparative advertis-
ing in the Member States are harmonized, this will help demonstrate objectively the merits of the various 
comparable products, the more so as advertising reaches beyond the frontiers and is received on the terri-
tory of other Member States.  
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less efficient representatives. Moreover, such prohibitions are not necessary to ensure 
professional responsibility, independence or secrecy, or to prevent false or deceptive 
statements or conflicts of interest, or to ensure that members of a professional associa-
tion comply with the rules of professional conduct, which would not, in themselves, 
restrict competition.496 The members of a profession should have the freedom to actively 
seek out clients without thereby directly jeopardising the quality of the personal rela-
tionship between service providers and their clients. Providing information on the ser-
vices on offer, where it is accurate and precise, and comparative advertising, where it 
compares representative and verifiable aspects and is not misleading, are means of in-
creasing user information to the benefit of the users, and are important elements of the 
competitive process. They allow users to distinguish between the alternatives which exist 
at the time of obtaining a service, and to make a rational choice of service provider, 
whether it is within their national frontiers or elsewhere in the Community. They also 
make it easier for new operators to establish themselves in the market and stimulate 
innovation in the means of providing services.497 
 It follows that a general prohibition of comparative advertising is not allowed.498 
However, under limited circumstances, professional associations can forbid this kind of 
publicity when it is deemed necessary to safeguard the dignity and the deontology of the 
free profession.499 Since the architectural profession functions effectively without the 
need for any significant sector-specific advertising restrictions in a large number of 
Member States, sector specific advertising restrictions in these professions may not be 
essential for protecting consumers from misleading claims.500 
                                                                
496 Arguments that such restrictions are necessary in order to ensure the profession’s reputation do not justify 
obstructing access to clear and accurate information with regard to the services in question, how much 
they cost and the conditions on which they are supplied, so as to enable the client to choose freely which 
supplier of services to engage. Furthermore, advertising covers not only accurate information for the user 
but also a promotion of the services on offer, including comparison with a competitor or with the services 
of competitors. 
497 Commission Decision of 7 April 1999, IV/36.147 EPI code of conduct, paragraphs 40-43. 
498 In this regard it should be noted that consumer protection is one of the goals of the Union (see Article 3 
EU and 169 TFEU. The right to information is held to be one of the most important rights of consumers: 
see paragraph 3 (d) of the Annex to Council Resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme of 
the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy (OJ C 92, 
25.04.1975, p. 1) in which the right of information is held to be one of the basic rights of consumers. This 
right is confirmed in paragraph 40 of the Council Resolution of 19 May 1981 on a second programme of 
the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy (OJ C 133, 
03.06.1984, p. 1) which deals specifically with consumer information. 
499 See for example Article 6 §4 of the Belgian “Wet betreffende de misleidende en vergelijkende reclame, de 
onrechtmatige bedingen en de op afstand gesloten overeenkomsten inzake de vrije beroepen.”  
500 See Communication from the Commission – Report on Competition in Professional Services 
/*COM/2004/0083 final*/. In the 1990s, restrictive advertising rules were removed from the architectural 
profession in Denmark.  
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 With regard to misleading advertising501 reference should also be made to Council 
Directive 84/450/EEC (now replaced by Directive 2006/114/EC) which indicates that 
this may cause a consumer to take decisions prejudicial to him when acquiring goods or 
other property or when using services. The Directive holds that Member States have to 
ensure that adequate and effective means exist for the control of misleading advertising, 
so that legal or administrative action can be taken.502 Finally, reference should also be 
made to the Services Directive which has already been discussed. Article 24 of Directive 
2006/123/EC holds that Member States have to remove all total prohibitions on com-
mercial communications by regulated professions. They have to ensure that commercial 
communications by such professions comply with professional rules, in conformity with 
Community law, which relate, in particular, to the independence, dignity and integrity 
of the profession, as well as to professional secrecy, in a manner consistent with the 
specific nature of each profession. Professional rules on commercial communications 
shall be non-discriminatory, justified by an overriding reason relating to the public 
interest and be proportionate. 
3. Structural restrictions 
Wouters was decided on the same day as Arduino, which was discussed before. In this 
case, two Dutch lawyers, Mr. Wouters and Mr. Savelbergh separately applied to the 
National Dutch Bar Association (NOVA) for authorisation to enter into a partnership 
with Dutch accountancy practices. NOVA refused since its 1993 Regulation on Joint 
Professional Activity concerning partnerships with other professions, banned multidis-
ciplinary partnerships (MDPs) between attorneys and accountants.503 NOVA held this to 
                                                                
501 In the preamble, misleading information is qualified as the making of a representation in any form in 
connection with a trade, business, craft or profession in order to promote the supply of goods or services, 
including immovable property, rights and obligations which, in any way, including its presentation, de-
ceives or is likely to deceive the persons to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason 
of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect their economic behaviour or which, for those reasons, injures or is 
likely to injure a competitor.  
502 Directive 2006/114/EC does not exclude a voluntary control by self-regulatory bodies (Article 6). Since 
Article 8 (1)holds that the Directive shall not preclude Member States from retaining or adopting provi-
sions to ensure a more extensive protection with regard to misleading advertising for consumers, persons 
carrying on a trade, business, craft or profession, and the general public, Member States’ provisions on 
misleading advertising diverges significantly. As held above, since these disparities cause uncertainty and 
create many barriers causing additional costs, Directive 2005/29/EC deals with unfair commerical prac-
tices, as created. According to Article 5, unfair commercial practices shall be prohibited. A commercial 
practice shall be unfair if: (a) it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and (b) it materi-
ally distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the product of the aver-
age consumer whom it reaches, or to whom it is addressed, or of the average member of the group when a 
commercial practice is directed to a particular group of consumers. Commercial practices shall be in par-
ticular unfair if they (a) are misleading as set out in Articles 6 and 7, or (b) are aggressive as set out in Arti-
cles 8 and 9. Section 1 of Chapter II contains more detailed rules on misleading commercial practices. Sec-
tion 2 deals with aggressive commercial practices.  
503 In this regard it should be noted that structural restrictions are liable to limit, not only the internal compe-
tition i.e. the competition between practitioners within the same professional group, but also the external 
competition with other -but comparable- professions by means of a broad definition of professional mo-
nopoly 
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be necessary in order to protect the confidential lawyer/client relationship.504 When 
adopting deontological rules, NOVA did not have to take into account specified public-
interest criteria, but had to adopt regulations to ensure the proper practice of the profes-
sion. In this regard the ECJ held that NOVA, which consisted exclusively of members of 
the Bar elected solely by members of the profession, did not fulfil a social function, nor 
exercised the powers of a public authority (the Dutch public authorities had not defined 
the essential principles of what constitutes the ‘proper practice of the profession’) but 
was acting purely as a regulatory body. For these reasons it had to be regarded as an 
association of undertakings composed only of bar members (and not of government 
representatives) and thus falling within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.505 In the first 
place, the ECJ found that the areas of expertise of NOVA members and of accountants 
could be complementary. Since legal services frequently require financial advice, a MDP 
between NOVA members and accountants would make it possible to offer a wide range 
of services. This would bring about a ‘one-stop shop’ advantage, while the resulting 
economies of scale might have a positive effect on the cost of services.506 The Dutch ban 
on MDPS was thus liable to limit production and technical development within the 
meaning of Article 101(1)(b) TFEU. As held by the Court, unreserved and unlimited 
authorization of multi-disciplinary partnerships between different professions can lead 
to an overall decrease in the degree of competition prevailing in the market, as a result 
of the substantial reduction in the number of undertakings present in that market. Nev-
ertheless, insofar as the preservation of a sufficient degree of competition in the market 
for legal services can be guaranteed by less extreme measures than national rules which 
prohibit absolutely any form of multi-disciplinary partnership, whatever the respective 
sizes of the firms of lawyers and accountants concerned, those rules restrict competition. 
According to the ECJ, competition in legal services can, in principle, be guaranteed by 
less restrictive measures than a complete ban on accountant/lawyer MDPs. Therefore 
the regulation could have an adverse effect on competition, and was likely to affect trade 
between Member States since it also applied to foreign lawyers and accountancy firms 
seeking to form partnerships with practitioners in the EU. However, the ECJ held that 
account should also be taken of the decision’s objectives (overall context), which are 
here connected with the need to make rules relating to organisations, qualifications, 
professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate con-
                                                                
504 According to Siragusa, this refers to the existence of a margin of discretion on the part of bar associations 
in deciding what they deem appropriate and necessary to protect the proper practice of the profession in 
their respective Member States, in light of their respective national legal context and of the prevailing per-
ceptions of the profession in their respective Member State: See Siragusa 2004, p. 585. As stated above, 
professional associations are normally better placed to fully evaluate whether a restrictive professional 
regulation is necessary to protect the core values of the profession. As stated by Gilliams 2004, p. 316, 
paragraph 97 of the judgment should not be seen as a ‘rule of reason’. A ‘rule of reason’ approach may be 
compared to the application of Article 81(3) EC, since Article 81(3) EC concerns the balancing of the re-
strictive effects of an arrangement against efficiency benefits that may be expected to result from the ar-
rangement. This does not happen in Wouters. It only created a limited ‘subject matter’.  
505 If the State wants professional association regulation to be State measures, then it must define the public-
interest criteria and the essential principles with which the association’s rules must comply, and it must re-
tain its power to adopt decisions in the last resort.  
506 Wouters, paragraph 87. 
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sumers of legal services and the sound administration of justice are provided with the 
necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience, and that it has then to be 
considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in 
the pursuit of those objectives. In the Netherlands, the lawyers’ duty to act on behalf of 
their clients in complete independence and in their clients’ sole interest, their duty to 
avoid all conflicts of interest, and their duty to observe strict professional secrecy, were 
not imposed on accountants. Since the Dutch rules on professional conduct require the 
members of NOVA to remain independent, while accountants are not subject to such 
requirements, the Court ruled in paragraph 109 that NOVA was entitled to consider 
that the objectives pursued by the 1993 Regulation could not be attained by less restric-
tive means that a ban on MDPs.507 The NOVA could thus have reasonably considered 
that the regulation, despite the effects restrictive of competition that are inherent in it, 
was necessary for the proper practice of the legal profession as organized in a Member 
State.508 Since Article 101(1) TFEU was not infringed, the state liability issue was not 
relevant.509 It should be noted that the Court also made reference to the provisions on 
free movement. The abolition as between Member States of obstacles to the freedom of 
movement for persons would be compromised if the abolition of state barriers could be 
neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associa-
tions or organisations not governed by public law.510 The Court held that the provisions 
concerning the right of establishment and/or freedom to provide services are applicable 
to a prohibition of MDPs between members of the bar and accountants, such as that laid 
down in the 1993 Regulation, and that that regulation constitutes a restriction on one or 
both of those freedoms.511 However, due to the reasoning laid down in paragraph 97, 
that restriction would be justified. 
 
                                                                
507 Wouters did not escape the application of the competition rules due to its author or due to any action 
undertaken by the public authorities, but due to the subject matter of the regulation and the goals pursued 
by it. In Klopp, the Court already held in paragraph 17 that although Member States may regulate the exer-
cise of the legal profession in their own territory, they could not require a lawyer to have only one place of 
establishment within the EEC. 
508 It should be repeated that, in defining the criteria for the application of Article 101 (1) TFEU to a specific 
case, account should be taken of the economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or 
services covered by the agreements, the structure of the market concerned, and the actual conditions in 
which it functions. See Oude Luttikhuis, paragraph 10. It should be noted that with regard to the freedom to 
provide services, the Court recognized already in 1974 in Van Binsbergen that the specific nature of certain 
services can create a need for professional regulatin that might supersede the free movement objective: ‘Tak-
ing into account the particular nature of the services to be provided, specific requirements imposed on the 
person providing the service cannot be considered incompatible with the treaty where they have as their pur-
pose the application of professional rules justified by the general good -in particular rules relating to organi-
zation, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability-….’. See paragraph 16. 
509 See also Gilliams 2004, p. 313.  
510 See Walrave and Koch, paragraphs 17, 23 and 24; Case C-13/76 Dona [1976] ECR 1333, paragraphs 17 and 
18; Bosman, paragraphs 83-84; Angonese paragraph 32.  As has been indicated above, in its case law on the 
free movement of persons and services, the ECJ moved beyond the application of an extensive state con-
cept and explicitly recognized the applicability of those provisions to certain private measures.  In Walrave 
the Court held that not ony merely action of public authorities but also rules of any other nature aimed at 
collectively regulating gainful employment and services can infringe Article 56 TFEU.  See paragraph 3.2.1. 
511 Wouters, paragraph 120-123; Van den Bossche 2004, p. 831. 
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With this judgement, the Court seems to refer, on the one hand, to one of the advan-
tages of self-regulation: the specific knowledge of professional bodies (private interest). 
On the other hand, by relying on the Bar’s judgement, the ECJ explicitly acknowledged 
that competition is not the only goal, and its judgement introduces elements other than 
pure competition concerns that should be taken into account when assessing whether an 
agreement falls under Article 101 TFEU prohibition (principles of independence, confi-
dentiality and loyalty towards consumers) which can be qualified as public interest con-
cerns.512 However, since NOVA did not have to take public interests into account, the 
reason given by the ECJ can only, with doubt, be qualified as a public interest exception. 
It should be noted that Article 101(1) TFEU does not specifically foresee that public 
interest exceptions and the exceptions enumerated in Article 101(3) TFEU are limited.513 
In this regard, reference should be made to the Commission’s Guidelines on the applica-
tion of Article 101(3) TFEU which were issued in connection with the entry into force of 
Regulation 1/2003/EC which provides for the full application of the EU rules by the 
Commission, but also by the competent national instances (competition authorities and 
courts). According to these guidelines, in order to benefit from an exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, the restrictive arrangement must produce efficiency gains: it must 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting tech-
nical or economic progress.514 Restrictions which are based on fair competition are thus 
neither valid under Article 101(3) TFEU since broad public interest concerns are not 
covered nor under Article 101(1) TFEU, since this Article does not foresee in a rule of 
reason. Furthermore, despite the fact that the regulation restricted competition, the 
Court held that it did not go beyond what is necessary in order to ensure the proper 
practice of the legal profession, and was not caught by Article 101(1) TFEU. The Court 
                                                                
512 Forrester 2004, p. 282. 
513 In Wouters the ECJ did not engage in the balancing of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, and 
therefore did not indicate that a balancing between competition rules and other values should be resorted 
to. Instead, the ECJ looked at loyalty, independence and other values which are not linked to competition. 
It follows that the non-economic norm (in Wouters, the protection of the legal profession’s independence) 
was not brought into the substance of Article 101 TFEU (in its first or in its third paragraphs), thus blur-
ring its purity, but was taken into account at a preceding stage, leading to an exception from the ambit of 
Article 101 TFEU as a whole, subject to a control of proportionality.  
514 Before Regulation 1/2003/EC entered into force, agreements which were liable to restrict and affect trade 
between Member States had to be notified to the Commission in order to qualify for an exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. The Commission had an exclusive power to authorize such agreements if the condi-
tions of Article 101(3) TFEU were met. Since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003/EC, the application 
of Article 101 TFEU is in the hands of the national authorities and national courts. If agreements fall under 
the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU, a prior decision is no longer needed. According to Komninos 2004, 
when the Commission still had a central role in EC competition law, it hesitated with regard to the intro-
duction of a more economic approach or of a fully fledged rule of reason in Article 101 (1) TFEU (as op-
posed to Article 101(3) TFEU) since the rule of reason would have led to an indirect transfer of competen-
cies from the Commission to national competition authorities and courts, while the Commission aimed 
for a uniform approach with regard to these matters. The fear was also that this might lead to a renation-
alisation of competition enforcement in Europe, since agreements benefiting from rules of reason would 
be granted a negative clearance under Article 101 (1) TFEU rather than an exemption under Article 101(3) 
TFEU, thus inviting the application of stricter national competition law. It followed that a rule of reason 
was not introduced in Article 101 (1) TFEU. With regard to Article 101 (1) TFEU, the burden of proof lays 
on the Commission, national authorities or third parties, while this lies on the undertakings with regard to 
Article 101(3) TFEU. See Komninos 2004, pp. 452, 460-461. 
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did not explain why the ban could not be narrower. In any case, the Court provides little 
by way of limiting principles for when a public interest justification will take place out-
side the scope of Article 101 TFEU, either with regard to the types of professions in-
volved or the types of professional restraints.515 It will therefore be for the court hearing 
the case (and not the professions themselves) to decide whether or not the rule of pro-
fessional conduct at issue is in the public interest.516 However, I agree with Gilliams, the 
lawyer who represented Mr. Wouters before the ECJ, that in a democratic system it 
should be for the public authorities to define what constitutes the public interest. It 
would be more in line with competition law, if the ECJ would make a genuine economic 
analysis instead of an analysis of factors which are, in principle, not related to competi-
tion law. If state measures restrict competition to an appreciable extent, and produce an 
appreciable effect upon interstate trade, these anti-competitive state measures can be 
saved only by the grounds of efficiency gains as mentioned in Article 101(3) TFEU. 
There is, in principle, no room for non-economic, public interest justifications like those 
mentioned in Article 36 TFEU or the mandatory requirements of Cassis de Dijon. If an 
analysis of non-economic factors is deemed to be necessary, it is up to the legislators to 
decide. This would, in any case, be more democratic. 
 
When comparing Wouters with Arduino, it can be stated that the price fixing in Arduino 
was not subject to public interest criteria, nor was it done by an independent group. In 
that case the Italian Minister of Justice was required to approve the regulation before it 
could enter into force, whereas the Dutch regulation in Wouters entered into force 
unless annulled by government decree. Nevertheless, the Court did not focus on this 
difference in Wouters. This is odd, since Ministers of Justice in Italy are generally in-
clined to approve bar association fee fixing, while bar regulation in the Netherlands can 
be closely reviewed and sometimes annulled. Taking Wouters together with Arduino 
thus yields an unsatisfying articulation of the principles for deciding when regulations of 
professional associations will be attributable to the association rather than being viewed 
as a state measure under Article 4(3) EU jo 101(1) TFEU. As held by First, the factual 
distinction between the two cases indicates that it might take very little to turn such 
rules into government action. 517 Although Wouters drew attention to the composition of 
the bar association and the lack of articulated public interest criteria to guide its deci-
sion, Arduino held these were not critical. Considering that the two cases were decided 
on the same day, it is difficult to conclude that more is required than simply an affirma-
tive government review prior to implementation. 
                                                                
515 First 2004, p. 245. 
516 It could be questioned whether the courts are best placed to answer such a question. However the courts 
will only have to decide in cases in which the public interest goals have not been sufficiently determined by 
the public authorities, but even then decisions will only be made on a case by case basis which can lead to 
discrepancies. In the event that these goals are defined already, the courts do not have to undertake this 
task. In any case, the public interest concept is not privatised to the benefit of the professions. The ECJ did 
not say that legislation to permit MDPs is unlawful. It only said that the Dutch rule prohibiting MDPs was 
not unlawful. It can thus be acceptable for some Member States to authorise MDPs between lawyers and 
accountants, while others might not. See Forrester 2004, p. 283. 
517 First 2004, p. 247. 
  Chapter 3  
193 
6.4. Conclusion 
Next to the fact that regulations can limit the free movement of professionals, they can 
also restrict free competition within the European Union. While the free movement 
provisions in the Treaty only cover cases in which a transboundary element is present, 
this is not a necessary requirement for the competition rules to be applicable. It follows 
that, even if no borders are crossed and professional rules are imposed within one 
Member State only, EU competition law can be applicable. This is, however, only the 
case if the rules have an impact on the EU market and affect trade between Member 
States.518 
 EU competition rules of the Treaty are applicable to regulations created by under-
takings unless they can be attributed to the State, which is the case if the state imple-
ments or complies with sufficiently clearly articulated public policy goals, while the 
public authorities have maintained power to adopt decisions in the last resort. In this 
regard, rubberstamp approvals and practices whereby the authorities of a Member State 
can only reject or endorse the proposals of professional bodies without having the pos-
sibility to alter their content or substitute their own decisions for these proposals, are 
unlawful state measures since, in those cases, the public authorities do not assume full 
responsibility for the restriction of competition. As held by Gilliams, this does not mean, 
however, that a state measure adopted pursuant to lobbying is immune from challenge 
under Article 4(3) EU or under the Treaty provisions relating to the free movement of 
goods and persons, and the freedom to provide services. It does mean, however, that the 
Treaty’s competition rules cannot be applied to that regulation or, stated differently, that 
the professional association, for purposes of the regulation at issue, is not to be consid-
ered as an association of undertakings.519 After Wouters it seems that restrictions of 
undertakings which cannot be attributed to public authorities and which relate to mat-
ters for which the public authorities have not set a sufficiently clearly articulated public 
policy, may nevertheless escape the application of the competition rules if these rules 
pursue the public interest. It remains to be seen how this principle will develop in the 
future. National competition authorities and courts are obliged to set aside national 
rules where these influence the market conduct of economic entities. 
7 Conclusion 
In the European Union, numerous efforts have been made to ensure that architects can 
freely move without being denied access to another Member States, especially on the 
grounds of the possession of different qualifications. The general non-discrimination 
principle contained in Article 18 TFEU and the free movement rights of workers and 
self-employed professionals have provided European architects with a legal framework 
to move within Europe without having to face direct or indirect restrictions based upon 
                                                                
518 See Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  
519 Gilliams 2004, pp. 306-307. 
519 See Wouters and Fiammiferi. If the state measure is invalidated or disapplied on the basis of Article 4 EU, 
the ‘state compulsion’ defence ceases to apply as from the time that the relevant state measure is declared 
contrary to Article 4 EU. 
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their nationality. A lot of problems have been solved over time which can specifically be 
attributed to the case law produced by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
which has held that the free movement Articles in the Treaty have direct effect. In this 
way, many problems have been solved, but case law demonstrates that Member States 
are often still reluctant to accept foreign diplomas. This is due to the fact that each 
Member State is allowed to decide if and how it regulates a profession, so that the quali-
fications which are needed to practise the profession of architect -if any- are quite dif-
ferent and diverse in each Member State. It follows that generally Member States will 
demand a certain level of qualification before an individual is allowed to work as an 
architect on their territory. In this regard, Directives have been created on the mutual 
recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualification on the 
basis of Articles 46, 47 and 56 jo 62 TFEU. These Directives are only applicable with 
regard to regulated professions which state that there is a statutory requirement to hold 
a diploma or other occupational qualification in order to pursue the profession in ques-
tion. For architects, Council Directive 85/384/EEC regulates the mutual recognition of 
architectural qualifications. A Directive dealing with minimum harmonisation of educa-
tion has not been provided for, due to the large differences in educational requirements 
and a lack of agreement between the Member States. However, due to the limited scope 
of the vertical harmonisation method, and the difficult and time-consuming negotia-
tions, an attempt has been made to create an environment of mutual trust in terms of 
foreign diplomas so that there would be no need for harmonization. Horizontal Direc-
tives were created based on the premise that the programmes of study and training 
through which people in the various Member States prepare themselves for a particular 
regulated profession are, in principle, of equal validity. However, for the professions 
which were already covered by the sectoral Directives, the system did not change, and 
the sectoral Directives remained in force. This changed however in 2005 with the entry 
into force of Directive 2005/36/EC which was inspired by the Lisbon strategy to pro-
mote a more dynamic and competitive economy in Europe. This Directive replaced 
fifteen existing horizontal and vertical Directives in the field of the recognition of pro-
fessional qualifications, by combining them in a single text. The Directive is thus only 
applicable to regulated professions. For architects, Chapter III of Title III provided for a 
system of automatic recognition if one’s qualifications were enumerated in the annex to 
the Directive. If this was not the case, Chapter I would be applicable, which grouped the 
various national education and training systems according to a number of levels. Quali-
fications which attest a level of professional qualifications at least equivalent to the level 
immediately below that required in the host Member State will have to be recognized. 
This is without prejudice to the possibility for the host Member State to require com-
pensation measures (an aptitude test or an adaptation period at the choice of the profes-
sional concerned) if there are substantial differences between the qualifications obtained 
and demanded. In such a case, Member States must always ascertain whether the 
knowledge acquired by the applicant in the course of his professional experience in a 
Member State or a third country, is of a nature to cover, in full or in part, the differ-
ences, and any consequent compensation measure has to be proportional. Professionals 
who cannot invoke the Directive can still try to rely on the principles provided for by the 
ECJ in Gebhard and Vlassopoulou. In this way Member States are obliged to examine 
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whether the work experience gained in another (Member) State corresponds to the 
experience required under national law. As held by Article 2(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC, 
each Member State may permit Member State nationals in possession of evidence of 
professional qualifications not obtained in a Member State, to pursue a regulated profes-
sion on its territory in accordance with its rules. Member States are therefore not 
obliged to let such professionals carry out activities in their territory. Article 3(3) of 
Directive 2005/36/EC on the other hand, deals with nationals of third counties, and 
indicates that the evidence of formal qualifications issued by a third country shall be 
regarded as evidence of formal qualifications if the holder has three years’ professional 
experience in the profession concerned on the territory of the Member State which 
recognised that evidence of formal qualifications. In all other cases, the third-country 
national has to rely on the case law of the ECJ in Tawil-Albertini and Hocsman which 
extended the Vlassopoulou principle to qualifications obtained outside the European 
Union. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Community became 
responsible for the development of a common EU immigration policy and was compe-
tent to draft legislation regarding the position of third-country nationals. Legislation on 
the free movement of third-country nationals was based upon Articles 63(3)(a) and 
63(4) EC (Article 79(2) TFEU). Legal migration of third-country nationals to the EU is 
regulated on the basis of five Directives which have already entered into force and one 
draft Directive: Directive 2003/86/EC on the right of family reunification; Directive 
2003/109/EC on the status of long-term residents; Directive 2004/114/EC on the condi-
tions of admission of students, pupils, unremunerated trainees and volunteers; Directive 
2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-country national researchers; 
Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nation-
als for the purposes of highly qualified employments; draft Directive on a single permit 
and a common set of rights. 
 Directive 2004/38/EC confers extensive rights upon third-country family members 
of EU citizens who made use of their right of free movement. All these Directives con-
tain a right for third-country nationals to participate in the labour market of the host 
Member States after a certain period of time, and/or under certain conditions. 
 In accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/109/EC, Member States are 
obliged to grant long-term resident status to those third-country nationals who have 
resided in their territory legally and continuously for a period of five years.520 As held by 
Article 11(1)(a), long-term residents shall enjoy equal treatment with nationals as re-
gards access to employment and self-employed activity, provided such activities do not 
entail even occasional involvement in the exercise of public authority, and conditions of 
employment and working conditions, including conditions regarding dismissal and 
remuneration. Furthermore, Article 11(1)(c) indicates that equal treatment should also 
be granted regarding the recognition of professional diplomas, certificates and other 
qualifications, in accordance with the relevant national procedures. 
Furthermore, according to Directive 2003/86/EC, third country nationals eligible for 
family reunification will have, in principle, the same rights as the sponsor -i.e. a third 
country national residing lawfully in a Member State and applying, or whose family 
                                                                
520 Article 5 of Directive 2003/109/EC contains the conditions which need to be fulfilled.  
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members apply, for family reunification to be joined with him/her- to any employment 
and self-employed activity.521 
 Positive as this may be, due to the inability of the Council of Ministers to come to 
an agreement on the Commission’s proposal on a Directive for economic migration in 
2001, there is currently no general instrument regulating the conditions for first entry 
and residence of third-country national labour migrants to the EU territory. 
 However, in 2007, the Commission adopted another proposal for a Directive on the 
conditions for entry and residence of third-country nationals for highly qualified em-
ployment. Directive 2009/50/EC, which has to be implemented in national law by 19 
June 2011, applies to third-country nationals pursuing highly qualified employment, 
which is defined as genuine and effective work under the direction of someone else for 
which a person is paid and for which adequate and specific competence, proven by 
higher professional qualifications, is required. The Directive does not create a right of 
admission as such, since Member States retain the competence to control how many and 
which type of qualified workers to admit to their labour markets, which indicates that 
they are allowed to apply quotas.522 Under the rules set by the Directive, especially Arti-
cle 14, EU Blue Card holders will enjoy equal treatment with nationals of the member 
state issuing the Blue Card as regards working conditions, including pay and dismissal, 
education, training, the recognition of qualifications, and several other rights. Member 
States are even free to adopt more favourable rules for any purpose of employment (Ar-
ticle 3(4)). After eighteen months of legal residence, Blue Card holders may also take up 
highly qualified employment in another Member State.523 A new application for a second 
Blue Card has to be made however, and the same conditions for entry have to be ful-
filled. However, the Directive does not give them a right to admission so that Member 
States can still refuse them on the basis of their national labour market situation. 
 Finally, the Draft Directive on a single permit for third-country nationals to reside 
and work in the territory of a Member State, and on a common set of rights for third 
country workers legally residing in a Member State, that was put forward by the Com-
mission on 23 October 2007, applies to third-country nationals seeking to reside and 
work in a Member State and single permit holders who are defined as third-country 
nationals who have been issued a single permit, i.e. a valid residence permit issued by 
the authorities of a Member State granting a right of residence for the purpose of em-
ployment. Applicants will have to submit a single application for obtaining the right to 
reside and to work in a Member State. However, the competence of the Member States 
with respect to the admission of third-country nationals to their labour markets will not 
be affected. Third-country nationals obtain the right to enter and to stay in the Member 
State issuing the permit, and have free access to the entire territory of that Member State 
within the limits provided for by national legislation. Furthermore, they have the right 
to exercise the employment activity authorized under the single permit. A right of 
                                                                
521 The requirements which need to be fulfilled for family reunification can be found in Articles 7 and 8 of 
Directive 2003/86/EC. These will not be discussed within this thesis.  
522 See Article 6 and recital 8 of the preamble to the Directive.  
523 Article 16 of the Directive allows highly skilled migrants to accumulate periods in two or three Member 
States in order to fulfil the five-year residence requirement to obtain long-term residence status. This is a 
derogation from Directive 2003/109/EC. 
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movement to other Member States is not included. Moreover, equal treatment shall be 
enjoyed in respect of working conditions, education, recognition of qualifications, and 
some other rights. Equal treatment as regards the recognition of diplomas is only 
granted in accordance with national law. Recital 15 of the preamble even refers to Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC, and holds that qualifications obtained by single permit holders in an-
other Member State should be recognized in the same way as for Union citizens, which 
means that, in principle, access to the same profession shall be granted on an equal foot-
ing with nationals of the host Member State. However, since Article 12 of the Directive 
does not specifically mention Directive 2005/36/EC, and since most third-country na-
tional workers are likely to have qualifications obtained in a third country and reside in 
their Member State of admission and are therefore dependent upon the national legisla-
tion of that Member State with regard to the recognition of their qualifications, it re-
mains to been seen whether Directive 2005/36/EC will be taken into account. What the 
effects of this Directive will be on the migration of third-country architects once it en-
ters into force, has to be awaited. Since the ECJ is only competent to rule upon these 
matters since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we will have to wait to see how 
these Directives will be applied by the Member States, and how they will be interpreted 
by the ECJ. In any case, it should be concluded that the absence of a general policy for all 
types of workers demonstrates the unwillingness of Member States to give up their sov-
ereignty with regard to immigration matters. However, the Directives prove that pro-
gress in this area is being made since they all contribute to the fair treatment of third-
country nationals by restricting the discretionary powers of the Member State to a cer-
tain extent, and by providing minimum standards. 
 
While Directive 2005/36/EC focuses on the recognition of professional qualifications 
with regard to market access to regulated professions, Directive 2006/123/EC concen-
trates on matters relating to the quality of services. The main focus of the Directive is on 
the prohibition of national measures restricting either establishment or free movement 
of services and relies thus on negative integration as opposed to positive integration.  
The core provision of Directive 2006/123/EC is Article 16(1) which provides that Mem-
ber States have to respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State 
other than that in which they are established. Since Member States are still allowed to 
impose certain requirements if justified in terms of the public interest (Article 16(3) and 
in certain specific case (Article 17 and 18), the Directive strikes a certain balance be-
tween guaranteeing the rights of service providers to free access and free exercise of a 
service activity, whilst allowing Member States the right to invoke their most essential 
requirements in certain clearly-defined circumstances. As held by former Commissioner 
McCreevy, this will definitively improve legal certainty for service providers and con-
sumers. Since the Directive makes it easier to establish anywhere in the EU, saving time 
and money, it provides a welcome boost to cross-border service provision. The Directive 
is underpinned by obligations on Member States to co-operate among, and assist each 
other, to ensure that businesses are properly and efficiently supervised across the EU 
while avoiding the duplication of controls. To achieve its aims, Member States have to 
simplify the procedures and formalities which are applicable to the access to certain 
activities and the exercise of these. However, attestations of professional competence, or 
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evidence of formal qualifications and attestations of professional experience, can still be 
demanded, since the Directive holds that it does not affect the provisions of Directive 
2005/36/EC. The Directive sets out what kind of restrictions the Member State where 
the services are provided (i.e. the host States) may still impose (Articles 16 and 17), and 
what manner of supervision can be exercised, either by the state of establishment (Arti-
cle 30) or by the host State (Article 31). Member States are therefore not prevented from 
supervising companies and workers operating on their territory. The Member State 
where the service is provided can enforce working conditions, including minimum 
wages which means that companies posting workers to another Member State do not 
benefit by bringing in ‘cheap’ workers from their Member States. Social dumping will 
therefore be avoided.  However, the list of limitations and exceptions to its scope as well 
as the weakening of the country of origin principle to a ‘freedom to provide services’ 
principle, can be expected to have heavily reduced the integrative potential of this in-
strument. 
 The Directive also provides for harmonization in certain areas of legislation such as 
professional insurance, dispute settlement, quality of services, etc. In order to have a 
smooth and workable system, the Directive provides for single points of contacts which 
can be seen as single desks at which service providers can complete all the administra-
tive procedures relevant to their activities, preferably by electronic means. As both Di-
rective 2005/36/EC and Directive 2006/123/EC are cross-sectoral Directives dealing 
with the free movement of individuals and services respectively, a certain amount of 
cooperation between the national contact points (Directive 2005/36/EC) and the points 
of single contact (Directive 2006/123/EC) is desirable. However, it seems that national 
contact points and points of single contact do not (yet) have not yet established regular 
relationships due to budget restraints and the fact that they are located in different min-
istries which traditionally do not work together.524 
 
Next to the fact that regulations can limit the free movement of professionals, they can 
also restrict free competition within the European Union. While the free movement 
provisions in the Treaty only cover cases in which a transboundary element is present, 
this is not a necessary requirement for the competition rules to be applicable. It follows 
that even if no borders are crossed, and professionals rules are imposed within one 
Member State only, EU competition law can be applicable. This is, however, only the 
case if the rules have an impact on the EU market and affect trade between Member 
States. EU competition rules of the Treaty are applicable to regulations created by un-
dertakings unless they can be attributed to the State, which is the case if the state imple-
ments or complies with sufficiently clearly articulated public policy goals, while the 
public authorities have maintained power to adopt decisions as a last resort. In this 
regard, rubberstamp approvals and practices whereby the authorities of a Member State 
can only reject or endorse the proposals of professional bodies, without having the pos-
sibility to alter their content or substitute their own decisions for these proposals are 
unlawful state measures since, in such cases, the public authorities do not assume full 
                                                                
524 Report of the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department Eco-
nomic and Scientific Policy A, Recognition of Professional Qualifications, September 2009, p. 49. 
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responsibility for the restriction of competition. After Wouters, it seems that the restric-
tion of undertakings which cannot be attributed to public authorities and which relate 
to matters for which the public authorities have not set a sufficiently clearly articulated 
public policy, may nevertheless escape the application of the competition rules if these 
rules are in the public interest. It remains to be seen how this principle will develop in 
the future. Regulations or agreements which may hinder competition are often linked to 
market entry, but also to market conduct such as price fixing, advertising restrictions 
and restrictions on business structure. As held by Article 15(1) of Directive 
2006/123/EC, Member States have to examine whether, under their legal system, certain 
requirements are imposed and to ensure that these requirements are compatible with 
the non-discrimination, the necessity and the proportionality principles. Such require-
ments relate, for example, to quantitative or territorial restrictions, in particular in the 
form of limits fixed according to population or of a minimum geographical distance 
between providers, and fixed minimum and/or maximum tariffs with which the pro-
vider must comply (Article 15(2) of the Directive). In any case, national competition 
authorities and courts are obliged to set aside national rules where these influence the 
market conduct of economic entities. 
 
Finally, it should be noted however, that the recognition of professional qualifications is 
a different process from that of academic recognition. Academic recognition still falls 
within the Member States’ sovereign powers. However, over time, the ECJ has devel-
oped case law which does not necessarily respect this strict division of power, and is 
applicable to those who are in the process of becoming a fully-fledged professional. The 
Member States have decided to standardize rules in this area, in a process that takes 
place outside the realm of the EU, the so-called Bologna Process, which is a binding 
commitment to an action programme at intergovernmental level that is not legally bind-
ing. The Process aims to create convergence, and is not a path towards the standardisa-
tion of European higher education. The Lisbon Recognition Convention, which is a 
Treaty conceived in the framework of the Council of Europe, does have binding effect, 
and aims to give every applicant appropriate access to an assessment of his/her foreign 
academic qualifications, and holds that such foreign qualifications have to be recognised 
unless substantial differences can be demonstrated in regard to the length of study, cur-
riculum content, etc. The Convention therefore adopts the idea of acceptance, and aims 
for fair and transparent recognition procedures. The Lisbon Recognition Convention 
aims to create convergence in Europe, and indicates that Member States may not dis-
criminate against an individual for not possessing a national diploma. Since it does not 
foresee the harmonisation of architectural studies, and since recognition may be with-
held in the event of substantial differences, it remains to be seen whether this Conven-
tion will genuinely contribute to free movement. 
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THE REGULATION OF ARCHITECTS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES 
1. Introduction 
In this Part, the regulation of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands will be dis-
cussed. In the first instance one might think that it is odd that two countries which are 
so closely related, and which even used to form one single state, have been chosen for a 
comparative research. True as this might be, the reader will soon discover that the regu-
lation of architects in these neighbouring states is anything but comparable, and some-
times even contradictory, making this research all the more interesting. 
 
As noted in Part I of this thesis, the European Union has created a Directive on the 
mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualification 
in architecture, including measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of es-
tablishment and freedom to provide services (Directive 85/384/EEC) which is now re-
placed by Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications. How-
ever, due to the large difference in educational requirements and the lack of agreement 
among the Member States, no legislation was created at EU level to coordinate national 
provisions in respect of the activities of architects. It follows that there is no harmonisa-
tion of minimum standards to be observed regarding training courses, while the mem-
ber states have freedom of organisation as regards teaching, due to Article 165 TFEU. 
Next to the organisation of the educational process, the regulation of the profession also 
falls within the competence of the Member States. This means that the states do not 
have to introduce or maintain professional or title protection, or any other type of regu-
lation. They only have to guarantee that no unjustified restrictions are imposed with 
regard to the recognition of qualifications which are obtained in another Member States, 
and the free movement of architects. 
 
It follows that architects need to be well informed in case they are involved in a cross-
border project, and also their clients need to be aware of the legal consequences of the 
engagement of a designer from their own or from another country from within or even 
without the EU. 
Chapter 4 
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In the following paragraph, I will offer a brief overview of the history of The Low Coun-
tries. Subpart A) discusses the public law regulation of architects in Belgium in Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6 and deals with the private law regulations. Subpart B) discusses, in 
Chapters 7 and 8, the public and private law in the Netherlands, while subpart C) pre-
sents a comparative overview of all regulations in each state. Subsequently, subpart D) 
offers a brief overview of the regulations in several other EU Member States. 
2. The Low Countries: a brief historical overview 
The Low Countries are the historical lands situated around the low-lying delta of the 
Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt and Ijssel rivers, including the modern countries of Belgium and 
the Netherlands. Since the 15th Century they formed a unit after the marriage of Duchess 
Maria of Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and were governed by the Habsburg regime. Maximilian was succeeded by his grand-
son, Charles V, who donated the Low Countries to his son, Philip II of Spain. During 
the reign of the latter, internal unrest arose. This was due to the fact that Philip, who was 
a catholic, aimed to exterminate Protestantism by sending an army under the leadership 
of the Duke of Alva. The southern catholic part of the country supported Philip, while 
the northern part aimed to establish an independent republic. As a result, the Eighty 
Years War started in 1568. The northern part signed the Union of Utrecht in 1579 
which was a written declaration promulgated by several regions in which they agreed to 
expel the Spanish ruler. In 1581, the States-General formally pronounced that they 
would not obey Philip II anymore (Act of Verlathinge) and the independent Republic of 
the Seven United Provinces was established. This was composed of the northern regions 
of Friesland, Gelderland, Groningen, Holland, Overrijssel, Utrecht and Zeeland. 
 
Even though the northern provinces were occupied with the task of preparing for and 
making war, the most important activity of the state as a whole was to stimulate trade 
and to find measures to defend itself against the danger posed by flooding.1 As stated 
above, several big rivers tended to flood in the Low Countries, while the north and the 
west is bordered by the North Sea and often suffers from flooding. For this purpose, 
architects and engineers were needed and played an important role in society. The Re-
public of the Seven United Provinces grew so strong on a military, economic and politi-
cal level, that it became an international superpower. There were numerous guilds that 
had a monopoly position to regulate all sorts of aspects of the profession life of archi-
tects. Even though a formal education system did not exist, the guilds organised the 
transfer of knowledge and skills of those participating in the building process by letting 
students imitate their masters. During the second half of the 17th Century however, the 
Republic’s position became weakened due to bad economic policy and numerous wars. 
In 1795, French troops invaded the republic and established a new one: the Batavian 
Republic2. The guilds were worried that new and unknown techniques would be intro-
                                                                
1 Dankelman 1999, p.85.  
2 The Batavian Republic was proclaimed on 19 January 1795 and ended on 5 June 1806 with the accession of 
Louis Bonaparte to the throne of the Kingdom of Holland.  
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duced, and tried to maintain their own position by preventing renovations and technical 
modernizations. Due to their misuse of power, and the fact that the working class was 
fed up with the bad working conditions, they revolted against the social power of the 
guilds. Consequently, the guilds were abolished altogether in 1798. As a consequence, 
the position of the independent architect did not exist following the abolition of the 
guilds which meant that the functions of architect and builder were merged into one. 
However, at the beginning of the 19th Century, the architectural profession revived once 
more. During the period of French domination, an organised education system for ar-
chitects was set up, and in Delft, the very first academy for architecture was established. 
Nevertheless, due to the vehement opposition of other actors who were involved in the 
building process, the architects did not manage to separate themselves as a professional 
group. It followed that no efforts were made to create public legislation to regulate the 
profession. 
 In 1816, the northern and southern parts of the Low Countries gained their inde-
pendence from France and were united after the Congress of Vienna. The United King-
dom of the Netherlands was created which was composed of modern Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The Kingdom was able to repulse new French attacks on its territory. 
However there was no strong internal cohesion due to differences in history, language, 
culture, mentality and religion. The United Kingdom lasted until 1830, the year in 
which the southern provinces revolted to form the separate state of Belgium. 
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PUBLIC LAW IN BELGIUM 
1. The situation before the Architects Act of 1939 
As noted in Chapter 4, after the abolishment of the guilds by the French rulers at the 
end of the 18th Century, the combination of the professions of architect and entrepre-
neur within one person was very common. The profession of architect was thus exer-
cised by persons who also practised the profession of entrepreneur. This combination 
also existed before the creation of the guilds. Especially in the 15th Century, when busi-
ness flourished, architects did not only design and plan, but also furnished all the neces-
sary means such as materials and even workers. In the Renaissance, when there was a 
tendency to long for antiquity, an aim was made to rule out all commercial activities and 
a proper education system for architects was created with the help of the elite.1 In this 
way, Colbert created the ‘Académie Royale d’Architecture’ in 1671 in Paris. However, the 
merging of the professions could not be ruled out since even the new educated architects 
were still fulfilling the task of entrepreneur. After the French Revolution, in the name of 
liberty and equality, it was normal that anyone could work as both an architect and an 
entrepreneur, regardless of that person’s particular qualifications. The Napoleonic 
Code2, which was introduced in many countries occupied by the French during the 
Napoleonic Wars, including Belgium and the Netherlands, is a child of the French 
Revolution. This is strongly reflected by its content: the titles of architect and entrepre-
neur were used as synonyms. The Napoleonic Code therefore did not protect the archi-
tectural profession. 
 
It was only in the second half of the 19th Century that, under pressure from architects 
who had graduated from the schools of architecture3 and who had formed professional 
                                                                
1 Rigaux 1975, p. 21. 
2 Code Napoleon, promulgated on 21 March 1804. On 3 September 1807 the Act received the official name 
Code Napoleon. The Dutch text was established by Acts of 30 December 1961and 30 April 1962, Official 
Gazette 18 May 1962. 
3 In the 19th Century, architectural education was provided in academies and drawing-schools. The estab-
lishment of such institutions in Antwerp, Bergen, Bruges, Brussels, Ghent, Leuven, Liège, Mechelen and 
Tienen were a real preparation for the profession. Initially, these academies provided a traditional ‘Beaux-
Chapter 5 
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associations, that organisations of architects aimed to give back the profession its speci-
ficity, together with its liberal, intellectual and artistic character.4 The associations advo-
cated a law which would make a distinction between the intellectual and artistic work 
(design) on the one hand, and executive work on the other. In this way the first Belgian 
association of professional architects was founded in 1848 in the form of ‘The Royal 
Association of Antwerp’s Building Masters’. In the course of time more professional 
societies were created. Without there being a legal framework, membership of a profes-
sional society reflected a sign of quality to the outside world.5 In 1895, the conference of 
French architects held at Bordeaux, adopted, for the first time, a formal report on the 
tasks of architects which were clearly separated from those of entrepreneurs. This report 
was presented by Guadet, the General Inspector of Public Buildings, in the name of the 
Central Society of Architects6. Later the Royal Federation of Belgian Architectural Socie-
ties also promulgated a comparable deontological code for its members.7 Furthermore, 
in 1905, the various Belgian architectural associations united and formed ‘The Royal 
Federation of Belgian Architectural Associations’, which represented the architects on a 
national level, with the aim of promoting architecture and the profession of architect, of 
protecting the profession and the professional, social and cultural interests of its mem-
bers on a national and international level, and of coordinating the actions8 of its mem-
bers.9 The members’ main concern was to stay independent, and to have the opportunity 
to practise their profession without the commercial preoccupations the building con-
tractors have to deal with. Consequently, specific case law saw the light of day. By inter-
preting the contracts in the light of the will of the parties (Article 1156 CC), and by 
supplementing it with clauses commonly used in the field, judges could no longer con-
fuse the two professions which increasingly marked their differences.10 In this way, the 
separate tasks of the professionals, and the different contractual responsibilities, were 
judicially recognised. Due to the efforts of the Royal Federation of Belgian Architectural 
Associations, the foundations of the Architects Act of 193911 (AA) – which constituted 
the first legal recognition of the profession of architect – and the Architects’ Order Act 
                                                                                                                                                             
arts’ education. Later, a more technical approach was taken, and in 1835 a special school for civil construc-
tion was created in Ghent. In 1862, a special section was created for engineer-architects. See 
http://www.fab-arch.be/architectuur/historische_context.php, last consulted 16 October 2009. At the be-
ginning of the 20th Century the profession of architect only had an artistic or moral value.  
4 Rigaux 1975, p. 22. 
5 Most of these associations were recognized however by the Act of 31 March 1898 dealing with professional 
associations. 
6 This report is still called the ‘Code Guadet’. See: Liet-Veaux 1963, n° 20. 
7 Delvaux 1968, t. I, n° 221. 
8 For example, actions against disloyal competition by officials of the provinces; actions against simple 
drawers who were asked to make studies for the restoration of historical buildings; actions regarding the 
fixing of prices; actions with regard to the nomination of architects as experts in court cases; actions re-
garding intellectual property; etc. See http//www.fab-arch.be/architectuur/historische_geboorte.php , last 
consulted 16 October 2009. Before the creation of the Royal Federation of Belgian Architectural Societies, 
the prohibition of publicity and the fixing of prices was already rooted in the professional codes of most 
associations.  
9 See http//www.fab-arch.be/architectuur/historische_geboorte.php, last consulted 16 October 2009.  
10 Rigaux 1975, p. 222. 
11 Wet op de bescherming van de titel en van het beroep van de architect, 20 February 1939, Official Gazette 
25 maart 1939. 
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of 196312 (AO) were laid down, for the 1939 Act made the existing deontology created by 
the Royal Federation legally binding. It follows that the 1939 Act codified a distinction 
which already existed fifty years earlier in the form of a deontological rule, inspired by 
the natural principle of independence, by creating, in Article 6, an incompatibility be-
tween the two professions. Finally the Architects Activities which were deemed to have 
only a civil and not a commercial character, were formally distinguished from the tasks 
carried out by entrepreneurs through a protected title.13 
 
However, even nowadays, after the introduction of the Architects Act, the Belgian Civil 
Code (CC), which is a direct translation/copy of the French Napoleonic Code, is not 
very clear on this matter. As held above, before 1939 the legislators did not acknowledge 
the specificities of the tasks carried out by architects, and saw the tasks which are nowa-
days separately carried out by architects and entrepreneurs, as the practice of one pro-
fession. In this regard it should be noted that even today, the professions of architect 
and entrepreneur are used as synonyms in the Belgian Civil Code.14 This can, for exam-
ple, be seen in Article 1792 CC, which states that both will be held liable for defaults in 
the building for a period of ten years after completion of the work: 
 
“When a building, erected against a fixed price, perishes in whole or in part due to a 
default in the building itself or the unsuitability of the soil, the architect and the en-
trepreneur are liable for a ten year period.” 
 
as well as in Article 1793 CC which holds: 
 
“Whenever an architect or entrepreneur erects a building against a fixed price, and in 
accordance with a plan which was agreed on between him and the building master, he 
cannot ask for an increase in salary …” 
 
                                                                
12 Wet tot Instelling van een Orde van Architecten, 26 June 1963, Official Gazette 5 July 1963. 
13 Delvaux 1968, t.I, n° 213, 4°; Liège 2 April 1959, Jur. de Liège, 1958-1959, p. 23. Reference should be made 
to Article 1 of the Belgian Commercial Code which states that merchants are those who engage in com-
merce and who make it their profession. Article 2 describes which acts qualify as commercial acts. As op-
posed to commercial obligations, the professional obligations of the architect have a civil character. The 
obligations of the building master have mostly a civil character, unless he contracted within the framework 
of his business or industry. This is particularly so when the building is constructed to be sold, or when the 
building is used for business. The nature of the relationship has consequences for the competence of the 
court. As held by Article 573, 1° of the Judicial Code, the tribunal of commerce is competent for disputes 
among merchants. It follows that contestations between a non-merchant and a merchant fall under the 
competence of the civil court. Accordingly, the civil court is competent for all the contestations regarding 
the interpretation or the execution of the contract of architecture. However, if the other party holds the 
opinion that the dispute is about a commercial debt, the architect has the possibility to raise the issue be-
fore the tribunal of commerce (Article 573, 2° Judicial Code). If the architect performs commercial activi-
ties in spite of the prohibitions named in Article 6 AA and Article 10 Deontological Code, the tribunal of 
commerce is competent to examine his case. 
14 Minvielle 1921, n° 66. 
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Before 1939, these Articles were created at a time in which construction activities were 
regulated by freely negotiable contracts15. Even though they mention each profession 
separately, they were indicating that architects and entrepreneurs are both sufficiently 
able and qualified to erect a building.16 Since its content has never been amended, they 
should now be interpreted in the light of Article 6 of the Architects’ Act. 
 
Due to the work of the professional societies which did their utmost to stress the differ-
ences between the profession of architect and that of entrepreneur, the architects’ goals 
were attained by the three main innovations that the 1939 Act established: 17 
- the creation of a monopoly to exercise the profession of architect (Article 1) 
- an enumeration of projects for which the involvement of an architect is obligatory 
(Article 4) 
- a fundamental guarantee that architects work independently (Article 6), i.e. the 
incompatibility of the profession of architect and entrepreneur. 
 
It follows that nowadays the profession of architect is a regulated profession in Belgium. 
The content and peculiarities of the profession will be discussed in the following para-
graphs. 
2. The Architects’ Act (AA) 
The Architects’ Act aims to guarantee the safety of inhabitants and the health and 
beauty of buildings, to preserve Belgium’s artistic patrimony, and to protect the capital 
invested in the building by the building master.18 To preserve these interests, the legisla-
tor has granted architects19 a monopoly to design buildings which they have to use in 
accordance with the public interest. Important in this regard is that the Architects’ Act is 
of ‘public order’ which means that contractual clauses which are in violation of the Act’s 
provisions have to be declared void and without effect.20 The court has to pronounce the 
nullity ex officio.21 
 
                                                                
15 Article 1792 Code Napoleon was in its turn inspired by the Lex Omnes promulgated by Emperor Theodo-
sianus I in 382 B.C. .: Van den Berg, 1998, part B, stipulation 1. 
16 A person could thus perform architectural as well as entrepreneurial tasks without having to demonstrate 
any qualification. See Rigaux 1975, pp. 21 and 33; Soinne, La responsabilité des architecte et entrepreneur 
après la réception des travaux, t. I, p. 37. 
17 Rigaux 1975, p. 37. 
18 Explanatory Memorandum, Gedr. St., Kamer, 1936-37, nr. 236. 
19 The Architects’ Act only concerns the profession of architect stricto sensu. This means that it does not 
regulate the profession of interior architect, town planner or garden and landscape architect. The Associa-
tion of Belgian Interior Architects introduced a request to obtain title protection on 26 January 2007. So 
far (21 October 2009), there has been no Royal Decree to ratify this request. 
20 Ann. Parl., Chambre, Session 1936-1937, pp. 1775, 1777 ; Ghent 1 April 1966, R.W., 1965-1966, col. 1855. 
21 Court of First Instance Liège 27 September 1968, R.J.I., 1971, 35. 
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Articles 1, 7, 8 and 12 of the original version of the Architects’ Act22, or Articles 1, 7, 8 
and 2 of the new version23, state who is allowed to use the title and/or to practise the 
profession of architect. 
 
Before the 2006 Act concerning the Practice of the Profession of Architect within the 
Framework of a Legal Person entered into force, Article 1 §1 AA stipulated: 
 
“No one is allowed to use the professional title of architect OR to practise the profes-
sion without being in the possession of a diploma which indicates the successful com-
pletion of the exams which are mandatory to obtain the diploma.” 
 
It seems that the term ‘architect’ can be defined in two ways: a) by reference to the di-
ploma which permits the use of the title; b) by the legal conditions which have to be 
fulfilled in order to lawfully exercise the profession and to exclusively undertake archi-
tectural tasks. 
 
The new version of Article 1 §1 AA states: 
 
“No one is allowed to use the professional title of architect without being in the pos-
session of a diploma which demonstrates the successful completion of the exams which 
are required to obtain the diploma.” 
 
It is immediately noticeable that Article 1 §1 AA no longer prohibits the practice of the 
profession of architect without being in the possession of the required diploma. It there-
fore seems possible to practise the profession without having a particular diploma. As 
noted above, this amendment appeared as a result of the 2006 Act concerning the Prac-
tice of the Profession of Architect within the Framework of a Legal Person. This Act, as 
well as its implications, will be discussed in detail hereunder. 
 
First the implications of the architectural title and the practice of the profession will be 
discussed in the light of the architects’ monopoly. 
2.1. The architects’ monopoly 
1. Design and supervision 
Article 4(1) AA holds that the involvement of an architect is mandatory for the design of 
the plans and the supervision of the execution of the building works for which a prelimi-
nary building permit is required by law, decree or regulation. This provision gives an 
‘absolute’ monopoly position to architects. This means that no one has the right, not 
even for his or her personal use, to fulfil the tasks which only an architect is allowed to 
                                                                
22 By this is meant the Act as it entered into force in 1939. 
23 The Act was amended after the adoption of the 2006 Act concerning the Practice of the Profession of 
Architect within the Framework of a Legal Person: Wet betreffende de uitoefening van het beroep van ar-
chitect in het kader van een rechtspersoon, 15 February 2006, Official Gazette 25 April 2006.  
  Public Law in Belgium  
214 
carry out.24 The Constitutional Court held that Article 4 AA and Article 1792 CC do not 
violate the equality and non-discrimination principle laid down in Articles 10 and 11 of 
the Belgian Constitution insofar as the architects’ liability which stems from these 
clauses is carried by the natural person using the architectural title.25 Persons using the 
title are thus liable for their professional actions. According to the 1936/1937 bill, the 
protection of the architect’s function was, in the first place, necessary to protect the 
public interest. The safety of the building and of the people occupying it, the aesthetics 
of the building, hygiene, the conservation of the countries’ artistic possession, the con-
tribution to the artistic possession of the county, and the financial means that were 
vested in the project by architects were also taken into account.26 
 
It is important to note that the architects’ monopoly does not cover all the activities 
which are associated with the regular tasks of an architect. As held above, it is limited to 
the design of plans and the supervision of the execution of works which require a build-
ing permit.27 It is thus limited to important projects for which the intervention of an 
architect constitutes a guarantee for public and private interests. It follows that the ar-
chitectural title does not have any legal effect on the right to fulfil all the other tasks 
which are generally carried out by an architect but which do not fall under the monop-
oly such as town planning activities, estimations, expertise, etc. Furthermore, construc-
tions which do not require the involvement of a professional architect can be designed 
by anyone.28 The Royal Decree of 16 December 197129 regarding the determination of 
                                                                
24 Court of First Instance Bruges 24 February 1966; T. Aann. 1966, 161; Res Jur. Imm. 1966, 161. 
25 Constitutional Court 10 October 2001, A.A. 2001, afl. 4, 1663; A.J.T. 2001-02, 781; Official Gazette 1 
December 2001; Cah. dr. immo 2002, afl. 1, 10; JLMB 2001, afl. 42, 1816 annotated by B. Louveaux, Juris-
tenkrant 2001 afl. 36, 4; R.J.I. 2001, 106; Burssens 2001, no. 106. 
26 Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill on the Tiel and Profession of Architects, no. 236.  
27 See the law of 29 March 1962 on the Organisation of Spatial Planning and Town Planning, Official Gazette 
12 April 1962. The building permit should be distinguished from all other accessory authorizations which 
are necessary for a particular building, for example those regarding conformity: Flamme and Lepaffe 1966, 
n° 327. Article 20 of the Deontological Code holds that the architectural contract has to enumerate pre-
cisely whether the architect is charged with one of the following tasks: designing the provisional plan (in-
vestigation of the location and the rules of town-building, investigation of the soil, sketch, description and 
estimate, model, advice on building-materials, installations etc., quality and design); assistance in making 
up all the official documents (dossier to get the building permit, administrative and non-administrative 
rights, building contract); drawing up the final plan; drawing up the specification plans; making the speci-
fication (descriptive, quantitative and budgetary); drawing up the work plan; elaborating a budgetary esti-
mation; activities concerning the tender; management (assisting the principal, leading and controlling the 
construction site, controlling and correcting the plans and documents drawn up by third parties, co-
ordinating construction activities); administration of the project; completion and delivery; examining the 
accounts (terms of payment, approval of accounts and final accounts).  
28 Furthermore, drawing plans without the intention of a concrete execution do not fall under the privilege of 
the architect. Anyone is allowed to make plans which are general, abstract and not related to a precise 
situation. Only architects, members of the Order, are allowed to draw plans regarding the construction of a 
particular project on a particular place which needs an administrative authorisation for building to take 
place. See Rigaux, 1975 p. 73. 
29 Royal Decree on the determination of works and actions which are exempt from either the involvement of 
an architect, or the acquisition of a building permit or the corresponding advice of the authorized official, 
Official Gazette 19 January 1972. In the light of Article 6 §1, I, 1° of the Special Law regarding the Reforma-
tion of the Institutions of 8 August 1980 which makes matters relating to spatial planning and urbanism 
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works and actions which are exempt from either the involvement of an architect, or the 
acquisition of a building permit or the corresponding advice of an authorized official, 
enumerates in detail for which projects the involvement of an architect is not compul-
sory. Examples are, dependent on the Region, actions which do not involve construction 
problems, or the stability of the building; certain tasks related to the outside of a build-
ing; small constructions like carports, greenhouses, annexes to a house, lanterns, etc. 
 
Article 4(3) AA makes it possible for the King to distinguish the obligation to involve an 
architect from the obligation to be in the possession of a building permit.30 The former is 
especially concerned with the quality improvement of buildings, the latter with urban-
ism and spatial planning. In this regard it should be mentioned that, in 1939, a building 
permit was required in exceptional cases, while nowadays it is exceptional if a building 
permit is not required.31 
 
Article 4(2) AA states that exemptions to the monopoly as described in Article 4(1) AA 
can be granted by the Provincial Governor after the College of Alderman of the munici-
pality where the project is to be constructed made a proposal to this end.32 This ‘pro-
posal’ is not merely an advice. If the College arrives at a negative decision, the governor 
cannot decide differently.33 
2. Penalties 
Violations to the architects’ monopoly are penalized by Article 53 of the Architect’s 
Order Act which imposes a criminal sentence upon persons who design plans without 
being registered on a tableau of the Order, or included in a list of trainees, and are not 
                                                                                                                                                             
fall under the responsibility of the Regions, after several amendments this decision was finally annulled 
and substituted for the Flemish Region by the Decision of 29 May 2009, Official Gazette 25 August 2009; 
for the Walloon Region by Chapter 4 of the Walloon law book on spatial planning, urbanism and patri-
mony of 14 May 1984 Official Gazette 25 May 1984; and for the Brussels Capital Region by the Decision of 
the Brussels Capital Region of 29 June 1992 Official Gazette 1 July 1992, after several amendments was fi-
nally annulled and substituted by the Decision of 13 November 2008, Official Gazette 12 December 2008. 
30 Delvaux, t. I, 1968, n° 241, quoting Debecker, La protection du titre et de la profession d’architecte, 1941. 
31 Examples include, dependent on the region, certain types of small buildings; the renewal of certain foun-
dations, and silos.  
32 Due to this Article it is possible for the governor to allow a civil engineer to construct his own house 
without the involvement of an architect: See Council of State, 20 June 1985, R. W., 1985-86, 880; Arr. R. v. 
St. 1985; Council of State 28 April 1981, Pas. 1984, IV, 43; Arr. R. v. St. 1981, 582; R.A.C.E.1981. However 
the governor is not allowed to ask the engineer to fulfil the same requirements as the architect, such as the 
registration with the Order, traineeship, etc: Council of State 1 June 1979, A.P.M. 1979, 3; Arr. R. v. St. 
1979, 648; R.J.I. 1980, 11; T.B.P. 1980, 69. Contrary to Article 4(3), this exemption is not limited to projects 
of limited importance: Council of State 24 January 1955, R.J.I., 263; Council of State 9 June 1970, 
L’Entreprise et le Droit, 1972, 257, annotation De Caluwé. Nevertheless, exceptional circumstances are re-
quired: see judgement. However, if the engineer works as an official of the city, he is compelled to involve 
an architect since Article 5 AA is applicable (this will be further discussed hereunder).  
33 Council of State 8 December 1967, Arr. R. v. St. 1967; T.B.P. 1969, 125; R.A.C.E. 1967; Pas. 1968, IV, 70; 
R.J.D.A. 1968, 202; R.J.I. 1969, 123; R.J.I. 1971, 39; Rev. dr. commun 1968, 16. 1970, L’Entreprise et le Droit, 
1972, 257, annotation De Caluwé. 
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otherwise authorised to act as an architect.34 It follows therefore that each plan has to be 
signed by a registered architect.35 The signature on the plan signifies that it was designed 
‘by or under the supervision’ of the architect, for example by persons working according 
to his instructions and who are controlled by him.36 If a plan is designed by someone 
who is not an architect and who does not work under the supervision of an architect, 
while an architect puts his signature on the plan after getting some remuneration, the 
real designer of the plan does not only violate Article 53 AA, but he also violates, to-
gether with the architect, Article 196 of the Criminal Code which imposes a prison sen-
tence of five to ten years on persons committing forgery.37 Moreover, the architect is 
likely to suffer a (severe) deontological sanction as well38, such as the striking out of his 
name from the register due to manifest ‘dishonourable’ behaviour.39 In accordance with 
Article 2 AO, the Order has to report every violation of the laws and regulations protect-
ing the title and the profession of architect to the judicial authorities. 
 
The two traditional tasks of architects have inspired the definition of architect in the 
works of the Liaison Committee of Architects of the Common Market and are repro-
duced in the preamble to the Act of 26 June 1963 on the institution of the Architects’ 
Order.40 In case a certain construction requires a building permit and falls within the 
ambit of Article 4(1) AA, a registered architect should be involved who satisfies all the 
conditions of the Architects’ Act or who fulfils the requirements of Article 8 §2(1) or (2) 
of the Architects’ Order Act. These requirements will now be discussed in paragraphs 
5.2.2 and 5.2.3. 
2.2. The right to use the title 
1. Introduction 
Article 1 §2 AA states that Belgians and nationals of EC/EEA Member States can use the 
title of architect in Belgium if they are in the possession of a diploma, certificate or other 
title as described in the annex 1b to the Act. This annex is adopted in accordance with 
Council Directive 85/384/EEC41 and amended in accordance with the provisions of 
Directive 2005/36/EC and Directive 2006/100/EC. The Act of 21 November 2008 
amended the Architects’ Act and the Architects’ Order Act and implemented the 2005 
and 2006 Directive with regard to the architectural profession.42 Since Directive 
2005/36/EC should have been implemented in national legislation by 20 October 2007, 
                                                                
34 On numerous occasions this has been confirmed by the Supreme Court and the Council of State: see for 
example, Supreme Court, 4 May 1970, Pas., 1970, I, 753; Council of State 21 February 1962, Arr. Et Avis 
Cons. Etat, 1962, 150. 
35 Supreme Court, 4 May 1970, Pas., 1970, I, 753. 
36 Ghent 23 February 1973, L’Entreprise et le droit, 1974, 153. 
37 Article 196 Criminal Code. See Ghent, 17 April 1967, R.W., 1966-1967, col. 2056. 
38 Council of Appeal Ghent, 8 February 1966, R.J.I., 1968, p. 43; Council of Appeal Liege, 7 March 1973, not 
published. 
39 See Conseil Ordre Brabant Francophone, 8 February 1972. 
40 See also Doc. Parl., Senate, Session 1961-62, Session of 3 July 1962, n° 299, p. 2. 
41 The annex was adopted by Royal Decree of 6 July 1990, Official Gazette 28 July 1990. 
42 Official Gazette 11 February 2009. 
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Belgium clearly failed to implement the Directive on time. By a ruling of 9 July 2009, the 
Belgian State was condemned by the Court of Justice of the European Union for this 
failure.43 Even before Belgium amended the Architects’ Act for it to be in line with Euro-
pean Union law, architects could already rely on the Directive due to its vertical direct 
effect after the deadline for transposition had passed. It follows that, after 20 October 
2007, qualifications obtained by EU/EEA nationals that are listed in Annex V or VI of 
the Directive can no longer be scrutinized, since persons holding such qualifications 
automatically obtain the title of architect without any further procedural matters. The 
same goes for qualifications listed in Annex VII to the EEA Agreement. 
 Since the use of the title is connected to the possession of a diploma or attestation, 
only natural persons can use the title of architect in Belgium. Obviously, legal persons 
are not able to obtain a diploma or pass an exam.   
  
2. Requirements 
a. Belgian qualifications 
Just as in the Netherlands, where a division is made between a theoretically-based uni-
versity education and a more practical education at a Dutch academy, the architectural 
education in Belgium is organised at two levels which both offer a five-year course: the 
architectural specialisation in civil engineering education which leads to the title of ‘civil 
engineer-architect’ (university) and the education at an academy (non-university) which 
leads to the diploma of ‘architect’. Since the importance and seriousness of the archi-
tects’ function was increasingly better understood, the Act of 18 February 1977 on the 
reorganisation of the architectural education44 was introduced. This Act foresees that all 
architectural education (thus also those at the academies) has to be of university level.45 
Nevertheless, the institutional distinction is still made. 
 
The following institutions award the diploma of ‘architect’ in Belgium: 
 
In the Flemish Community 
- ‘Artesis Hogeschool, Departement Ontwerpwetenschappen, Afdeling Architec-
tuurwetenschappen, Henry van de Velde’, Antwerp. 
- ‘Hogeschool voor Kunsten en Architectuur’, which was created in 2008 and is com-
posed of  several pre-existing academies. These are, with regard to architecture, the 
Saint-Lucas  institutes of Brussels (Dutch speaking) and Ghent. 
- ‘Provinciale Hogeschool Limburg’, Hasselt. 
 
In the Walloon Community 
- ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture de la Communauté Française La Cambre, Brussels 
(Henri van de Velde) 
                                                                
43 Case C-469/08 Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium, ECR OJ C 6, 
10.01.2009, ECR 2009.  
44 Official Gazette 12.03.1977 
45 See also: Council of State 24 May 1988, A.P.M. 1988, 86; Arr. R. v. St. 1988; T.B.P. 1989, 259. 
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- ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture Saint Luc’, Brussels (French speaking), Tournai 
and  Liege 
- ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture Lambert Lombard’, Liège 
- ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture’, Mons 
- ‘Institut Victor Horta’, Brussels 
The last three institutions form ‘L’Institut Supérieur d’Architecture Intercommunal’ 
(I.S.A.I). 
 
▫ As stated above, there are educational programmes at Belgian universities leading to 
the title of ‘civil engineer-architect’. These programmes involve, in addition to architec-
tural education, courses on the composition of the soil, land building materials, con-
struction technologies, the physical aspects of buildings, town planning, the environ-
ment, etc. They can be followed at the following institutions: 
 
In the Flemish Community 
- ‘Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit Ingenieurswetenschappen, Afdeling Ar-
chitectuur’ 
- ‘Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Ingenieurswetenschappen, Afdeling Architec-
tuur’ 
- ‘Universiteit Gent, Faculteit Ingenieurswetenschappen, Afdeling Architectuur’ 
 
In the Walloon Community 
- ‘Université de Liège, Faculté des Sciences Appliquées, Etude Ingénieur-Civil Archi-
tecte’ 
- ‘Université de Mons, Faculté Polytechnique, Etude Ingénieur-Civil Architecte’ 
- ‘Université Catholique de Louvain’, Faculté d’architecture, d’ingénierie architectu-
rale, d’urbanisme et d’aménagement du territoire. 
 
In the light of the Bologna process, the Decree of the Flemish Community on the Re-
structuring of Higher Education in Flanders was created on 4 April 2003. To make it 
easier for students to navigate through different programmes of study and to follow 
extra courses, the degrees of ‘Bachelor’ and ‘Master’ were introduced. In addition, acad-
emies were required to associate themselves with a university in order to lift the educa-
tion system of the academies to a higher level. It follows that academies are only allowed 
to offer academic courses if they cooperate with a university46. In this way the ‘Artesis 
Hogeschool Antwerpen’ associated with the ‘Universiteit Antwerpen’ in 2003, and their 
cooperation was called ‘Associatie Universiteit & Hogescholen Antwerpen’. The ‘Ho-
geschool voor Kunst en Architectuur’ was created in 2008 and abolished the ‘Ho-
geschool voor Wetenschap en Kunst’ which consisted of establishments in Brussels 
(Saint-Lucas) and Ghent (Saint-Lucas). These establishments form part of the new 
Academy which is associated with the ‘Katholieke Universiteit Leuven’. Likewise, the 
‘Provinciale Hogeschool Hasselt’ cooperates with the ‘Universiteit Hasselt’ to form the 
                                                                
46 See chapter VI of the Decree. 
  Chapter 5  
219 
‘Associatie Universiteit-Hogescholen Limburg’. The Decree entered into force on 1 
January 2003. 
 
In the Walloon Community, the Decree on the Organisation of the Transfer of Higher 
Architectural Education to the University was promulgated on 30 April 2009. It also 
aims to create an architectural education of university level by the integration of the 
academies and universities. A pluralistic and emancipating education system will have 
to strengthen and deepen the knowledge of the professionals involved, and allow them 
to respond to the increasing complexity of the architectural tasks. It indicates that: the 
‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture Saint-Luc de Bruxelles’ will be integrated into the 
‘Université Catholique de Louvain’47 (Chapter II); the ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture 
Saint-Luc Tournai’ will also be integrated into this university (Chapter III); the ‘Institut 
Supérieur d’Architecture Victor Horta’ will be integrated into the ‘Université Libre de 
Bruxelles’ (Chapter IV); the ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture de la Communatuté 
Française La Cambre’ will be integrated into the ‘Université Libre de Bruxelles’ (Chapter 
V); the ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture Lambert Lombard’ will be integrated into the 
‘Université de Liège’ (Chapter VI); the ‘Institut Supérieur d’Architecture Saint-Luc de 
Liège’ will be integrated into the ‘Université de Liège’ (chapter VII); the ‘Institut 
Supérieur d’Architecture Intercommununale d’Enseignment Supérieur d’Architecture’ 
in Mons will be integrated into the ‘Université de Mons’ (Chapter IX). The Decree will 
enter into force on 1 January 2010. 
 
The Architects’ Act has not yet taken these recent changes into account. Furthermore, 
the qualifications which are mentioned in annex 2a to the Architects’ Act which have 
been obtained not later than during the academic year 1987/1988, also allows the use of 
the title. Since this is not applicable to those who currently want to obtain qualifications, 
this will not be discussed further. 
 
▫ Furthermore, as stated in annex 2a to the Architects’ Act, persons holding a university 
diploma of civil engineer together with a certificate of traineeship delivered by the Ar-
chitects’ Order, can also use the title of ‘architect’ in Belgium in the event that these 
qualifications are not obtained later than during the academic year 1987/1988. Since 
there is no express clause in the Directive dealing with this type of qualification, profes-
sionals falling within this category have to apply the general system dealt with by Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC to obtain recognition of their qualifications at EU level. 
 
▫ Lastly, persons having obtained a diploma in architecture awarded by the Central 
Examination Commission or by an examination commission instituted by the State for 
the granting of the architects’ title, can also benefit from the use of the title (Article 1 
                                                                
47 Due to the 2009 Decree the ‘Faculté d’architecture, d’ingénierie architectural, d’urbanisme et 
d’aménagement du territoire’ was created. Prior to that, the education was provided at the ‘Ecole Poly-
technique de Louvain, Département Architecture, urbanisme, génie civil et environnemental, Etude Archi-
tecte et Ingénieur Civil-Architecte’.  
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§2(1) jo annex 2a). Such an examination cannot have been completed later than the 
academic year 1987/1988. 
 As stipulated in Article 7 AA, professionals who do not possess the required di-
ploma but who can be distinguished due to their experience, can be allowed to use the 
title if they pass a test organised by the Central Examination Commission. This will be 
further discussed under d. Also, for these architects, the general system of Directive 
2005/36/EC has to be used. 
b. EC/EEA qualifications 
As stated above, Article 1 §2 AA states that Belgians and nationals of EU/EEA States can 
use the title of architect in Belgium if they are in the possession of a diploma, certificate 
or other title as described in annex 1b. This annex contains a list of the EU diplomas of 
the twelve States which formed the EU before 1995, and which are automatically recog-
nized in Belgium. This was added to the Architects’ Act by Royal Decree of 6 July 199048 
which was created to fulfil Article 1 of the Act of 4 July 198949 which implemented Di-
rective 85/384/EEC and which states that the King (i.e. the government) has to amend, 
abolish or supplement the Architects Act for it to be in line with the Directive. The An-
nex was further updated by implementation of the provisions of Directive 2005/36/EC 
as amended by Directive 2006/100/EC, and is fully in line with Annex V.7.1. of Directive 
2005/36/EC. As noted in Part I of this thesis, this annex contains a list of 14 Member 
States: this is the (old) EU 15 except for Luxemburg in which there is no institution 
where architecture is educated. In accordance with Article 21 of the Directive, the quali-
fications enumerated therein have to be recognised automatically since these are 
deemed to comply with the conditions which must be fulfilled by the training to become 
an architect, and which are mentioned in Article 46 Directive 2005/36/EC. 
 
Article 1 §2/1 AA which was added to the Architects’ Act by the Act of 21 November 
2008, holds that the Belgian State recognises the evidence of formal qualifications as an 
architect that is awarded by other Member States, and attests to a course of training 
which began no later than the reference academic year in annex 2a, even if they do not 
satisfy the minimum requirement mentioned in annex 1a. Article 1 §2/1 AA is the im-
plementation of Article 49(1) of Directive 2005/36/EC, while annex 2a is a copy of An-
nex VI. Annex 1a is the implementation of Article 46 of Directive 2005/36/EC, and gives 
an overview of the general requirements that the architectural training must have. The 
Belgian State gives the same legal effects to these titles with regard to the entry and exer-
cise of the professional practice of architect on its territory as to the academic titles de-
livered by itself.50 It follows that the implementation, although too late, is in line with 
                                                                
48 Official Gazette 28 July 1990. This Royal Decree was amended by Royal Decree of 3 October 1990, Official 
Gazette 9 October 1990, which was on its turn annulled by decision nr. 37.308 of the Council of State of 25 
June 1991, A.P.M. 1991, 95, Official Gazette 21 August 1991, 18.051 and eventually amended by Royal De-
cree of 29 March 1995, Official Gazette 26 July 1995. 
49 Official Gazette 13 September 1989. 
50 The Article adds that the declarations issued by the competent authorities of the Federal Republic of 
Germany which serve as proof of the respective equality of the educational titles issued by the competent 
authorities of the German Democratic Republic after 8 May 1945 to the titles mentioned in annex 2a, will 
be recognised under these conditions. This is in line with Article 49 (1) Directive 2005/36/EC 
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European legislation, except for the fact that Annex 1a does not contain a derogation for 
the training provided by the German ‘Fachhochschulen’ as meant in Article 47(1) Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC, nor for training as part of social betterment schemes or part-time uni-
versity studies as mentioned in Article 47(2). However annex 2a also foresees that the 
training provided by the German ‘Fachhochschulen’ will be accepted if this training was 
followed by a four-year period of professional experience in Germany. This is in line 
with Article 47(1) of the Directive. 
 
Furthermore, the new Article 1 §2/2, also incorporated by the Act of 21 November 2008, 
holds that, notwithstanding Article 1 §2/1 AA, the declarations issued to the nationals of 
Member States by Member States which have regulations for the access and practice of 
the profession of architect at the following dates will be recognised: 
1°  1 January 1995 for Austria, Finland and Sweden 
2°  1 May 2004 for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia 
3°  1 January 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania 
4°  5 August 1987 for the other Member States51 
The declaration has to confirm that its possessor has obtained the permission to use the 
title of architect on this date at the latest, and that he has practised the profession for 
three consecutive years during the five years which preceded their issue. 
 This Article correctly implements Article 49(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC as amended 
by Directive 2006/100/EC, and is thus in line with European law. 
 
As held by Article 1 §3 AA, Belgians, as well as nationals of other EU or EEA Member 
States who satisfy the requirements as described in the annex, can use the title (and 
abbreviation) they obtained in their state of origin in the original language as well. 
 
Article 1 §5 AA stipulates that, in certain cases, Articles 13-17 of the Act of 12 February 
2008 instituting a new General Framework for the recognition of EC-qualifications52 are 
applicable. These Articles implement the General System of Recognition under Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC regarding the freedom of establishment.53 The General System is appli-
cable when: 
1°  the applicant does not satisfy the requirements for effective and lawful professional 
practice as intended in paragraphs 2/1 and 2/2; (implementation of Article 10(b) 
Directive 2005/36/EC) 
2°  the applicant holds evidence of formal qualifications which are not mentioned in 
annex 1b; (implementation of Article 10(c) Directive 2005/36/EC) 
                                                                
51 This is the date at which Directive 85/384/EEC should have been implemented in the (old) EU-15. Bel-
gium only transposed the Directive by Royal Decree of 6 July 1990 and 12 September 1990. 
52 Official Gazette 9 April 2008. 
53 Article 13 of the Act is the implementation of Article 11 of the Directive; Article 14 of the Act is the im-
plementation of Article 12 of the Directive; Article 15 of the Act is the implementation of Article 13 of the 
Directive; Article 16 of the Act is the implementation of Article 14 of the Directive; Article 17 of the Act is 
the implementation of Article 15 of the Directive. 
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3°  the applicant holds evidence of formal qualifications as a specialist which follows 
the training leading to the possession of formal qualifications mentioned in annex 
1b, and solely for the purpose of the recognition of the relevant speciality, notwith-
standing the requirement mentioned in annex 2 b for qualifications delivered by the 
former Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, the former Soviet-Union, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslavia and Slovenia54 (implementation of Ar-
ticle 10(d) Directive 2005/36/EC) 
Articles 13-17 of the Act of 12 February 2008 implement Articles 11-15 of Directive 
2005/36/EC correctly. 
c. Non EC/EEA qualifications 
As held above, Articles 13-17 of the Act of 12 February 2008 implement the General 
System of Recognition. Article 1 §5, 4° AA holds that the General System is also applica-
ble when the applicant satisfies the requirement of Article 2 §3 of the Act of 12 February 
2008, instituting a new General Framework for the Recognition of EC-professional 
qualification, which equalises formal qualifications issued by a third state if the holder 
has three years of professional experience on the territory of the Member State which 
has recognised the formal qualifications and, in the event that the Member State con-
firms this professional experience (Article 3(3) jo 2(2) Directive 2005/36/EC). In this 
regard it should be noted that, contrary to the EC/EEA diplomas enumerated in the 
abovementioned annexes to the Architects’ Act which automatically permit the use of 
the title, the Belgian competent authorities will ‘examine’ the diplomas, certificates and 
other titles which fall under the ambit of Directive 2005/36/EC but which are obtained 
outside the European Union, if they were recognized by another Member State. In these 
cases, the training/experience obtained in another Member State will also be evaluated 
(Article 1 §4 AA). In this regard it should be repeated that the Directive is not applicable 
to third-country nationals. 
d. Earned rights and examinations 
As held by Article 7 AA, Belgian nationals born before 1907 can continue using the title 
of architect even if they do not possess the required diploma. This is possible if they are 
known for practising the profession or if they were actively involved in designing plans 
for another architect for more than ten years. However, this latter group of professionals 
has to pass an exam organised by the Central Examination Commission. The same goes 
for Belgians born between 1907 and 1917. If they have not disposed of the required 
diploma, they can continue to use their title as long as they can prove to a commission 
that they have sufficient practical experience. If they do have a certain diploma or cer-
tificate of studies in building arts, they can be exempt from this proof as long as they can 
provide a certificate of competence. Since only a very small category of professionals 
falls under this provision, it will not be further discussed in this thesis. In any case, these 
professionals can, in my opinion, not use the automatic recognition system as provided 
for in Chapter III of Title III of the Directive. Article 48 of the Directive only refers to 
persons who are authorised to use the title pursuant to a national law which gives the 
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competent authority of a Member State the power to award that title to Member States’ 
nationals who are especially distinguished by the quality of their work in the field of 
architecture. I do not believe that Article 7 AA, or any other Article, refers to such per-
sons. 
 
Also persons having obtained a diploma in architecture awarded by the Central Exami-
nation Commission or by an examination commission instituted by the State for the 
granting of the architects’ title, can benefit from the title use. As stipulated in Article 7 
AA, professionals who do not possess the required diploma, but who can be distin-
guished due to their experience, can be allowed to use the title if they pass a test organ-
ised by the Central Examination Commission. Also, for these architects, the general 
system of Directive 2005/36/EC has to be used. 
3. Penalties 
Those who can use the title, are allowed to make their activities known to the public in a 
discrete manner (publicity) and are even obliged to mention their name on a plate at the 
building site during the construction works (Article 13 Deontological Code). 
 Article 10(1) AA stipulates that the unauthorised use of the professional title of 
architect can lead to fines of between 200.00 and 1,000.00 Euros. When one does not ask 
for the cooperation of an architect even though this is required by law (i.e. when a build-
ing permit is required), a fine of 200.00 to 1000.00 Euros can be imposed upon the 
building master. Persons or institutions awarding diplomas while not being authorized 
to distribute documents which grant the title of architect, risk getting a fine of 200.00 to 
1,000.00 Euros and/or a prison sentence of 8 days to 3 months (Article 11). Due to the 
revaluation of money these amounts have to be multiplied by 5.5.55 Furthermore, fake 
diplomas will be destroyed. In the event that a legal (non-natural) person practises the 
profession, the legal person will be held responsible for the payment of the fines and the 
restoration measures to which the organs or directors are condemned (Article 12 AA jo 
Article 53 AO). This will be further discussed hereunder. The penalties discussed in this 
section should be distinguished from those discussed in paragraph 5.2.1 above. This 
section deals with the unauthorised use of the title. The other types of penalty do not 
condemn the unauthorised user of the title, but condemn the practise of the profession 
in itself in the event that one is not authorised thereto. It is clear that the Architects’ Act 
really aims to protect the title of architect. Every abuse or misuse of the title is sanc-
tioned by criminal law, and can lead to a criminal punishment. However, the right to 
use the title does not in itself allow one to practise the profession. The reason is that, 
according to Article 5 AO, one has to be registered in order to practise. 
This will be discussed in paragraph 5.2.3. 
4. Academic titles 
As held by Article 1 §6 AA, architects whose professional qualifications are recognised 
have the right to use their academic titles which are conferred on them in their Member 
State of origin, and possibly an abbreviated form thereof in the language of the Member 
                                                                
55 See Article 1 of the Law of 5 March 1952 on the ‘opdécimes op de strafrechtelijke geldboeten’.  
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State of origin. It should be noted that this provision has to be separated from the other 
Articles which were discussed above and which all deal with the use of professional 
titles. Article 1 §6 AA is an implementation of Article 54 of Directive 2005/36/EC. 
2.3. The right to practise the profession 
There is no legal document which explicitly defines what the ‘practise’ of the profession 
of architect exactly means. This is due to the fact that, in 1939, architects were deemed 
to know everything concerning real estate. Nowadays the object of the monopoly is 
defined and strictly interpreted56. However, clients are becoming increasingly demand-
ing: they expect their architect to be a good negotiator, that their financial interests are 
being taken care of, that the works are coordinated when other building actors such as 
promoters or safety coordinators are involved, etc. 
 
As laid down by Article 5 AO: 
 “No one is allowed to practise the profession of architect in whatever capacity in Bel-
gium, without being registered on one of the Order’s tableaux57 or on the list of train-
ees, or without fulfilling the requirements of Article 8 §2(1) or (2) AO.” 
 
Furthermore, Article 4 AO states: 
 “No one will be registered on a tableau or on the list of trainees without fulfilling the 
requirements of the Act of 20 February 1939 on the protection of the title and the pro-
fession of architect.” 
 
It follows that, to be registered, one has to meet the requirements of the Architects’ Act. 
The Order will not register a new member if it is aware of the fact that the applicant 
does not live up to all the conditions stipulated in the Architects’ Act, such as the prohi-
bition with regard to being an entrepreneur or a public official58. By being registered, 
one automatically fulfils all the conditions imposed by the Architects’ Act. 
 
Article 8 §1 AO holds that, just as with regard to Belgian nationals, nationals of other 
EEC or EEA States, as well as other foreigners authorised to practise the profession of 
architect in Belgium according to Article 8 AA, who want to practise the profession of 
architect and establish themselves temporarily or permanently in Belgium, have to apply 
for registration on a tableau or list of trainees of the Order at the competent council. 
The same goes for the legal persons mentioned in Article 2 §2 AA. One can only be 
registered on the tableau after having completed a traineeship of two years at the office 
                                                                
56 Council of State 18 January 1966, Arr. et Avis Cons. Etat, 39 ; Supreme Court 17 February 1969, Pas., 
1969, I, 536 ; J.T., 1969, p. 480; Council of State, 25 January 1962, Arr. R.v.St. 1962; R.A.A.C.E. 1962; La 
Construction 1962, 48; Pas. 1963, IV, 4; R.J.D.A. 1962, 155; R.J.I. 1962, 172; Supreme Court 18 December 
1967, Pas., 1968, I, 516. 
57 Tableaux are lists (per province) on which the Order’s members are registered after the fulfilment of the 
traineeship. 
58 See Articles 5 and 6 Architects Act. 
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of an architect who has already been registered on the tableau for at least ten years (Arti-
cle 50 AO). A trainee will therefore always be registered on the list of trainees. 
 
To practise the profession, it is thus necessary to: 
- be registered (and thus be a member of the Architects’ Order) and to fulfil all the  
requirements of the Architects’ Act OR 
- fulfil the requirements of Article 8 §2(1) or (2) AO. 
 
There are different categories of persons who can practise the profession of architect. 
These will now be discussed. However, first some general remarks have to be made with 
regard to the practise of the profession. These apply to all the categories under discus-
sion: 
 
Firstly, as held by Article 6 AA, the practice of the profession of architect is incompati-
ble with the practice of the profession of entrepreneur. This Article, which lays down the 
independence of architects and which is of public order59, should be seen in the light of 
the architects’ monopoly in Belgium. Since Article 4 AA requires the involvement of an 
architect for the design of plans and the supervision of building works for which a build-
ing permit is required, the entrepreneur and architect cannot be the same person due to 
their opposing interests60: the person who constructs a house cannot be the same as the 
one who controls the constructor.61 The advantage architects gain by their monopoly is 
thus compensated for by the prohibition to be a building contractor. In this way, every 
association of an architect and a building contractor and any subordination is directly 
contrary to Article 6 AA.62 It is argued that economic dependence stands in the way of 
an honourable exercise of the profession since it prevents the architect from freely ap-
preciating the collective interest and the interests of his clients. Any (appearance of) 
collusion between the architect and the entrepreneur -for example when the entrepre-
neur collects the honorarium of the architect63, when the building contract stipulates 
that the entrepreneur has the right to choose the architect himself64 or when the entre-
preneur agrees to give advantages (such as commissions) to the architect65- is held to be 
immoral and, more importantly, illegal. Since the Architects’ Act does not only protect 
the architect but also his (inexperienced) clients, the architect cannot limit his advice to 
the technical, functional and legal aspects of the building process. The financial aspects 
are also covered by his examination. Professionals such as the entrepreneur, who only 
have commercial interests, are deemed to be not suitable for this task. It follows that a 
maximal independence and objectivity is guaranteed so that the building master can be 
                                                                
59 Every contract which is at odds with it, is void and of absolute nullity: Flamme & Lepaffe 1966, n° 373 bis.  
60 Vergauwe, Le droit de l’architecture, De Boeck-Wesmael, Brussels, 1991, pp. 44-45.  
61 Doc. Parl., Sénat, 1937-1938, n° 25, p. 2. 
62 Supreme Court 26 January 1978, Arr.Cass. 1978, 780 ; R.W. 1978-79, 665 ; T. Aann. 1979, 416, annotated 
by Flamme; Pas. 1978, I, 759; Brussels 31 October 1961, Pas., 1962, II, 267. 
63 Court of First Instance Brussels 6 April 1964, Pas., III, 25. 
64 Supreme Court 24 September 1976, Arr.Cass. 1977, 98; R.W. 1976-77, 2269; Pas. 1977, I, 101 ; J.T. 1977, 
471 ; Rev. not. b. 1977, 602; Brussels 11 December 1984, Ann dr.Lg 1986, 128, annotated by Y. Hannequart. 
65 Brussels 25 March 1970, Pas., 1970, II, 155, J.C.B., 1973, I, 161. 
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sure that the architect will make the best choices concerning the necessary building 
techniques and materials.66 The liberal character of the architectural profession refers 
therefore to the absence of any subordination in the relationship with the building mas-
ter.67 Furthermore, it involves the pursuit of social interests such as the safety of build-
ings, a better use of the environment, a better quality of equipment, good comfort and 
hygiene – and not of personal ones. However, this does not mean that the profession 
cannot be lucrative. Of course every professional has to earn money. Nevertheless the 
architect, under the supervision of the Order, has to refrain from actions which are at 
odds with his conscience. 
 The present architects’ Deontological Code68 confirms, in Article 10, 1° and 11, the 
incompatibility of the two professions. Some exceptions can be found in Article 10, 2°- 
4°.69  It can be said that the Architects’ Act and the Deontological Code do not only 
regulate market entry but also -to some extent- market conduct in the form of business 
structure restrictions. 
 
Secondly, professionals authorised to use the title of architect, but who are not registered 
by the Order, are not allowed to be in charge of building projects or to design plans for 
buildings which require a building permit. These architects are not subject to the in-
compatibility rules (these concern the practice of the profession) and do not have to 
comply with any rules of the Order. The architects’ deontology does not concern them. 
Professionals who carry the diploma of architect can thus establish themselves as an 
entrepreneur and use the title of architect, as long as they do not carry out, when using 
this title, tasks which fall within the architect’s monopoly. In this way, clients can be sure 
that when they need an architect for a project which requires a building permit, they are 
assisted by a person who has the required technical competence, and belongs to a pro-
fessional Order with a rigorous deontology.70 
 
Thirdly, the profession of architect cannot be practised by architects who are not cov-
ered by professional liability insurance (see Article 2 §4 and 9 AA). This will be dis-
cussed in detail in subsection 4. 
 
Finally the Act of 21 November 2008 added that those whose professional qualifications 
are recognised need to have appropriate language skills to be able to practise the profes-
sion in Belgium (Article 2 §5 AA). This is an implementation of Article 53 of Directive 
2005/36/EC. 
                                                                
66 The independence of the architect has always been acknowledged by the Council of State (see for example 
Council of State, 3e Ch., 22 January 1974, n° 16204) as well as by other tribunals (see for example Brussels 
13 May 1970, J.T., 1670, 547; Brussels 3 February 1972, J.C.B., 1972, I, 416. 
67 Liège 3 January 1964, R.J.I., 1964, 193. 
68 Deontological Code of 16 December 1983 created by the National Council of the Architects’ Order, rati-
fied by Royal Decree of 18 April 1985, Official Gazette 8 May 1985. 
69 The Order of Architects can determine other incompatibilities than the one described in Article 6 AA, as 
long as they find their origin in the protection of the independence and the dignity of the architect: See 
Council of State 18 January 1974, T. Aann. 1974, 30, annotated by Flamme; T.B.P. 1975, 102; Pas. 1976, IV, 
19. 
70 Rigaux 1975, pp. 29-30. 
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1. Natural persons 
a. EC/EEA nationals 
Article 2 §1 (the old Article 12) AA indicates who is allowed to practise the profession of 
architect. It concerns: 
 
1°  persons who are authorized to use the title of architect according to Article 1 
2°  engineers who were certified according to the Acts on Academic Degrees 
3°  engineers who obtained their diploma at a Belgian university or an assimilated insti-
tution 
4°  military officers belonging to the Royal Engineers or the Artillery who attended an 
application school 
 
The categories of professionals that are authorised to use the architectural title were 
discussed in paragraph 5.2.2. Of course, they are also allowed to practise the profession. 
 
Article 2 §1 AA therefore extends the monopoly to engineers and certain military offi-
cers holding a Belgian diploma.71 Just like all other applicants, they have to fulfil a train-
eeship of two years before they can be registered on the tableau (Article 50 AO).72 It 
should be noted that, in 1939, the legislator only meant to extend the monopoly to civil 
engineers. The holders of these diplomas were deemed competent to deal with technical 
and scientific questions concerning the building art.73 The Supreme Court decided, 
however, that the Architects’ Act does not give a precise description of the required 
engineering ‘branch’ nor of the required knowledge or level of experience, so that the 
fact of being an engineer in whatever branch suffices to allow that individual to practise 
as an architect.74 However, only professionals holding an engineering diploma which is 
enumerated in annex 2a can also use the architectural title. 
 
It is important to note that Article 2 does not explicitly or implicitly allow the combina-
tion of the profession of architect and engineer.75 It only holds that the holder of an 
engineering diploma is allowed to practise the profession of architect.76 Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that it is impossible to practise the function of architect and engineer 
at the same time. However, the Council of the Order has the right to refuse an architect 
                                                                
71 Supreme Court 22 September 2005, Juristenkrant, 2005, ed. 118, 11: an engineer holding the diploma of 
civil electric engineer can practise the profession of architect. 
72 Supreme Court 21 April 1969, Arr. Cass. 1969, 779; J.T. 1969, 565; Pas. 1969, I, 730 ; R.J.I. 1970, 7. 
73 Council of State 26 June 1986, R.A.C.E., 1986. 
74 Supreme Court 22 September 2005, Juristenkrant 2005, ed. 118, 11; Pas. 2005, ed. 9-10, 1712. The Court 
held that Article 1 of the Act on the Academic degrees of 21 May 1929 (Official Gazette 25 May 1929) and 
Article 1 of the Regent’s Decision of 31 December 1949 (Official Gazette 1 March 1950) enumerate engi-
neering education in other branches which also give rise to academic degrees. 
75 Supreme Court 23 March 1973, Arr.Cass. 1973, 736 – 738; Pas. 1973, I, 700. 
76 Council of State 9 February 1971, R.J.I. 1973, 165; Supreme Court 9 February 1971, Arr.Cass. 1971, 555; 
R.W. 1971-72; Pas. 1971, I, 527; R.J.I. 1973. 
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the authorisation to practise both professions at the same time, if he does not dispose of 
the time required to fulfil his functions with due care.77 
 
Article 8 §2(2) AO concerns EC or EEA nationals who normally practise their profes-
sion in their home member state. If they want to perform a temporary service in Bel-
gium and head in this regard for the first time to Belgium, they are obliged to notify the 
Architects’ Order by making a written declaration which contains information on their 
insurance coverage or comparable individual or collective forms of professional liability 
protection. The requirement that information on insurance coverage has to be given was 
added by the Act of 21 November 2008 which implements Article 7(1) of Directive 
2005/36/EC. The Architects’ Order will register them in the ‘Services Register’. The 
following documents have to be added to the declaration: 
1°  an attestation which indicates that the professional practises legally in his member 
state of establishment; 
2°  an attestation which indicates that the professional is in the possession of one of the 
diplomas, certificates or other titles which are enumerated in the annex to the Ar-
chitects Act; 
3°  in case neither the profession nor the education which gives access to the profession 
is regulated in the Member State of establishment, an attestation which stipulates 
that the service provider has practised the profession for at least two years during 
the ten years which preceded the service provision78 
4 °  an attestation of professional indemnity insurance, which covers the ten year liabil-
ity risk. This attestation can be issued by an insurance company of another Member 
State if it indicates that the insurer respects the legal and administrative conditions 
concerning the character and extent of the coverage which are in force in Belgium 
5°  an attestation of nationality of the service provider79 
These requirements can also be found in Title II of Directive 2005/36/EC on the free 
provision of services. Article 15 of the Act of 21 November 2008 indicates that Title II of 
the Act of 12 February 2008 instituting a new General Framework for the Recognition of 
EC professional qualifications is applicable on service providers who come to Belgium 
to practise the regulated profession of architect in a temporary and incidental manner. 
Title II of the latter Act implements Title II of Directive 2005/36/EC.80 Within the 
framework of this Act, the Architects’ Order is the competent authority.81 
 
                                                                
77 Supreme Court 23 June 1970, Arr.Cass. 1970, 1000; R.W. 1970-71, 603; Pas. 1970, I, 942. 
78 Before implementation of Directive 2005/36/EC by the Act of 21 November 2008, it was only foreseen that 
an attestation which stipulates that the professional has at least two years of professional experience was 
needed for every professional.  
79 This requirement was introduced by the Act of 21 November 2008 implementing Directive 2005/36/EC for 
the architectural profession.  
80 Article5 (1) of the Directive is implemented by Article 7 of the Act; Article 5 (2) and (3) of the Directive is 
implemented by Article 6 and 7 (2) of the Act; Article 6 of the Directive is implemented by Article 8 of the 
Act; Article 7 of the Directive is implemented by Article 9 of the Act; Article 8 of the Directive is imple-
mented by Article 10 of the Act; Article 9 of the Directive is implemented by Article 11 of the Act. 
81 See also De Graeve 2009, vol. 2, p. 181. 
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Professionals falling within the ambit of Article 8 §2(2) AO, even if not registered, have 
to obey the deontological rules which apply in Belgium (Article 8 §2(5) AO). It follows 
that the registration, as meant in Article 5 AO jo Article 8 §2(2) AO, is not just a formal-
ity. The Order has to verify the title of the candidate carefully, and has to make sure that 
there is no incompatibility or any deontological requirement standing in the way.82  
b. Non EC-EEA nationals 
As held by Article 8(1) AA, professionals who are not an EU or EEA national can prac-
tise the profession in Belgium and can enjoy the benefits of the Architects’ Act, as long 
as their state of origin has created reciprocal benefits. As stated in Part I of this thesis, 
Directive 2005/36/EC is not applicable to third country nationals. An administrative 
authorisation is not necessary. However, a mere reciprocity ‘by fact’ does not suffice.83 
 
Furthermore is it possible that foreigners can obtain permission to practise as an archi-
tect in Belgium by Royal Decree (when there is no reciprocity) (Article 8(2) AA). An 
application has to be sent to the Ministry of Public Education and the permission can be 
limited in time. The preparatory works indicate that this possibility has to be limited to 
exceptional circumstances, for example when the involvement of a foreign specialist is 
really necessary.84 As long as the exceptional character of the authorization is mentioned, 
the permission as such can be described in a general way, and does not have to be lim-
ited to a particular project or be restricted in time.85 A Royal Decree which grants a defi-
nite permission for all projects is therefore illegal.86 
 
Professionals falling within the scope of Article 8(1) AA or 8(2) AA have to register to 
practise just like EC/EEA nationals. However, in the case non EC or EEA nationals who 
only want to practise the profession occasionally in Belgium, and to provide a service, 
they have to get permission of the Order’s Council which is territorially competent (Ar-
ticle 8 §2(1) AO).87 In such case they do not have to register. 
 
Just like professionals falling within the ambit of Article 8 §2(2) AO, those to whom 
Article 8 §2(1) AO applies have to obey the deontological rules which apply in Belgium, 
even if they are not registered (Article 8 §2(5) AO). The authorisation as described in 
Article 8 §2(1) AO is thus also not just a pure formality. The Order has to verify the title 
of the candidate carefully and has to make sure that there is no incompatibility or any 
deontological requirement standing in the way. 
 
                                                                
82 Rigaux 1975, p. 85. 
83 In the Netherlands the profession of architect is not regulated as in Belgium. A Belgian professional can 
practise there without any authorisation. This possibility, based on mere fact, is not sufficient: see Council 
of State 22 December 1961, R.J.D.A., 1962, p. 184. 
84 De Becker 1941, p. 135 ; Delvaux 1968, t. I, n° 243.  
85 Council of State 4 August 1970, Arr. et Avis Cons. Etat, 1970, 758; Supreme Court 15 February 1971, R.J.I., 
1972, 141. 
86 Council of State 10 December 1952, Arr. R. v. St. 1952; R.A.C.E. 1952; Pas. 1954, IV, 41; R.J.I. 1953, 159. 
87 The place of performance of the architectural services indicates which council is territorially competent.  
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It should be noted that, with regard to the use of the title, Article 1 §4 AA indicates that 
the Belgian competent authorities have to examine the qualifications which fall under 
the ambit of Directive 2005/36/EC but which have been obtained outside the European 
Union, if they were recognized by another Member State. With regard to the practise of 
the profession by non EC-EEA nationals which is of relevance within this paragraph, 
Article 8(1) AA indicates that reciprocal benefits should be granted, or that a Royal 
Decree should allow this practice (Article 8(2) AA). These requirements render the free 
movement of third-country nationals who are in possession of the necessary qualifica-
tions useless if there is no reciprocity. This is not in line with the provisions of Directive 
2004/38/EC or with the principles laid down in the Directives on legal migration as 
discussed in paragraphs 3.2.2 and 3.3.2 of this thesis and do not require any reciprocity. 
Indeed, third-country nationals to whom one (or more) of these Directives is applicable, 
should be treated equally with EU nationals. It follows that, if an EU national in the 
possession of a third-country diploma is allowed to practise the profession of architect 
due to the application of Article 3(3) jo 2(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC, a third-country 
national who falls within the scope of Directive 2004/38/EC or one of the other Direc-
tives dealing with the integration of third-country nationals in the EU (or one of the 
Association Agreements) should be treated equally if these Directives provide for equal 
treatment with regard to access to the profession. This is also confirmed by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Gül. 
2. Natural persons practising the profession within the framework of a company or association 
As held above, when the Architects Act was created, only natural persons could practise 
the profession.88 This did not change after the new Deontological Code of 198589 permit-
ted the practice of the profession within the framework of a professional civil90 company 
or association.91 Often several architects set up a company of means, which meant that 
                                                                
88 This followed from the then present text of Articles 1 (1), 2, 7, 8 and 12 AA and Articles 4, 5 and 8 AOA. 
See also Ghent 18 June 2004, T.B.O. 2004, 238. 
89 Article 5(3) Deontological Code. This Royal Decree of 18 April 1985 by which the Deontological Code 
created by the National Council of the Archtitects’ Order was given legal force, annulled the former Royal 
Decree of 5 July 1967, Official Gazette 19 August 1967, which ratified the preceding and first Deontological 
Code. The former Code was replaced due to the judgement of the Supreme Court of 23 June 1970. The 
Court held that the Royal Decree of 5 July 1967 was illegal since it was approved without a second investi-
gation by the Council of Ministers. Furthermore the Council of State of 18 January 1974 annulled Articles 
13.2 and 14.1 of the 1967 Deontological Code since these Articles prohibited the registration of engineers 
with an assimilated diploma who were in the possession of a labour contract and worked with a person 
practising a profession which was considered to be incompatible with the profession of architect. There-
fore, the Order asked for the approval of a new Code which would stipulate that architects could practise 
their profession in the form of a professional civil company. Furthermore, the new Code states that – with 
the exception of incompatibilities – paid participation of architects in industrialized constructions and 
their cooperation with building contractors should be authorized by the Order. The relationship of archi-
tect and technical advisor is also clarified by the Code, and the calculation of the honorarium of the archi-
tect is based on the work done. To safeguard the dignity of the members of the Order, the insurance for 
professional liability, including the ten year liability, became compulsory. See Council of State 18 January 
1974, T. Aann. 1974, 30, annotated by Flamme; T.B.P. 1975, 102; Pas. 1976, IV, 19. 
90 Commercial companies are not allowed.  
91 The National Council of the Order informally already allowed architects to be part of a professional asso-
ciation or company with legal personality since 2 February 1979. They could also unite with persons prac-
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they shared the means necessary for the practice of the profession. The revenues of the 
individual architects were not brought into the company. This form of cooperation, 
which is still used today, is convenient for the purchase of professional rooms and office 
equipment and for the joint use of personnel. In these cases, the company or the associa-
tion is not registered as an architect on the list/tableau of the Order. Instead, it is the 
natural persons forming part of the association.92 This means that even if the legal per-
son concluded the architectural contract, the architect-natural person who executed the 
contract for the account of the legal person, can also be held personally liable for the 
defaults in the execution. His personal wealth is therefore also at stake.93 Consequently, 
in the event that a building is affected by a certain fault, the architect-natural person will 
be held responsible for the professional failure. 
 
On 28 November 1997, the National Council of the Order approved a Recommenda-
tion94 concerning this possibility. 
 Article 4 of the Recommendation stipulates that architects can opt for a company or 
association with or without legal personality. It is important that the objective of the 
company should be the practice of the profession of architect, and all the related and 
compatible disciplines (Article 5.2). Multi-disciplinary companies/ unions are therefore 
allowed. Furthermore, only civil companies are allowed which means that commercial 
companies are excluded.95 The Order considers the architectural profession, not as a 
commercial profession, but as a moral and honourable one which should be practised in 
accordance with the public interest. As held by Article 5.4.2., the partners/associates 
have to be actively involved and have to contribute to the company’s objective. Even 
legal persons can be members or shareholders as long as they do not possess the major-
ity of the shares. Furthermore, all shares have to be ‘nominal’ (Article 5.5.). While most 
members have to be physical persons, most board members have to be architects (Arti-
cle 5.6.1). Moreover, decisions relating to the practice of the profession can only be 
taken by architects (Article 5.6.2.2). These measures aim to avoid situations in which 
non-architects will control the architectural profession. 
 
It is forbidden for the statutes of the company or union to violate the Deontological 
Code. The architect can only work within a company or union after the competent Pro-
vincial Council has stated that the statutes are in conformity with the Deontological 
Code (Article 7.1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
tising a related and compatible profession. De Caluwé 1989, pp. 1-28. The contract or statutes of the com-
pany cannot violate the deontological rules. This will be looked after by the competent Provincial Council 
of the Order in advance. 
92 The statutes of the company or association are not allowed to violate the Deontological Code. Further-
more, the architect can only work in a company or association after the competent Provincial Council has 
stated that the statutes are in conformity with the Deontological Code. 
93 Brussels 17 March 2004, R.R.D. 2004, ed. 113, 333. 
94 The Order’s Recommendations are pronounced on the basis of Article 3 of the Deontological Code which 
foresees that the Deontological rules can be worked out by binding norms, approved by Royal Decree at 
the suggestion of the National Order, or by recommendations of the National Order. 
95 The civil company can however have a form as provided for in the Act on Commercial Companies. 
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As held by Article 6.1.5, the statutes (in the case of a company, with or without legal 
personality) or the association contract has to state that every architect-partner or archi-
tect-associate has to insure his civil and professional liability. The architects’ insurance 
obligation will be further discussed hereunder. However, the Article does not impose an 
insurance obligation on the company/association itself. 
 
Since the Recommendation is not ratified by Royal Decree, it has no coercive force. 
Therefore it contains merely guidelines for architects wishing to work within the 
framework of a company. Due to the Act of 15 February 200696 on the practice of the 
profession of architect by a legal person, this recommendation will probably be revoked 
or drastically changed.97 At the moment of writing, this has not happened. As will be 
explained hereunder, the 2006 Act foresees in the possibility of legal persons practising 
as an architect. Nevertheless, architects will still have the possibility to practise their 
profession within the framework of a legal person as meant in the Deontological Code 
of 1983 and the 1997 Recommendation. The 1997 Recommendation will continue to be 
applicable for every company of association of architects which does not meet the re-
quirements of the Act. 
3. Legal persons 
a. Situation before the Laruelle Act 
The 2006 Act concerning the practice of the profession of architect within the frame-
work of a legal person98 (hereafter called: Laruelle Act (LA)) extends the categories of 
persons who are allowed to practise the profession of architect. For the very first time, a 
free profession can be practised by a legal person in Belgium. 
 
Previously, only natural persons could practise as an architect since the practice of the 
profession was linked to the possession of the required diploma99 (old Article 1 §1 AA). 
Belgium was the only state of the EU (when it was comprised of 15 member states100) 
with the exception of Italy101, which did not allow a legal person to practise the profes-
sion of architect. When creating the Act in 1939, the legislator held that certain profes-
sional competences could only be given to natural persons. 
 
As noted above, this situation did not change after the Deontological Code of 1983 per-
mitted the profession to be practised within the framework of a professional civil com-
pany or union, since it was not the company or the union but still the natural person 
who was registered as an architect on the list/tableau of the Order. Consequently, the 
                                                                
96 Wet betreffende de uitoefening van het beroep van architect in het kader van een rechtspersoon, Offical 
Gazette 25 April 2006. This Act is also called ‘Wat Laruelle’. It was named after the Minister of Independ-
ent Professions.  
97 Burssens 2007, p. 21. 
98 Act of 15 February 2006 on the Practice of the Architectural Profession within the Framework of a Legal 
Person, Official Gazette 25 April 2006. 
99 Ghent 18 June 2004, T.B.O. 2004, 238; Rigaux 1993, p. 185. 
100 Additional research should be done on the situation in the new Member States. 
101 In Italy, however, the ten year responsibility only rests on the entrepreneurs and not on the architects. 
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natural person was held liable, and all his wealth was at stake when facing professional 
faults. Nevertheless, since building projects mostly have a substantial dimension, it is an 
illusion to think that the architect’s personal wealth could cover the damage. On the 
other hand, all the other building partners, such as the promoters, the entrepreneurs 
and the engineers have the possibility to ‘hide’ behind a legal person, and can safeguard 
their personal wealth by the formation of a professional company with legal personality. 
In this way only the capital of the company would be at risk whenever a professional 
fault occurred, while the professional’s personal wealth was exempt from any claim. The 
Constitutional Court held that this distinction was compatible with Articles 10 (equal-
ity) and 11 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Constitution. It stated that the differ-
ence in treatment with regard to the professional liability could objectively and reasona-
bly be justified due to the legal monopoly which was given to the architect by the Archi-
tects Act and his compulsory intervention.102 Nevertheless, a study of the Research Cen-
tre for Insurances CEA Belgium demonstrated that this situation was disadvantageous 
for Belgian architects when compared to architects of the other (old) 14 EU Member 
States:103 it often happened that in case of an in solidum conviction, the architect was the 
only party the creditor turned to get damage compensation, since he was the only build-
ing partner that was deontologically obliged to obtain professional liability insurance. 
 The Laruelle Act brought about two important changes in the Belgian regulation of 
architects: the practise of the profession of architect by legal persons, and a legal obliga-
tion for architects to buy professional liability insurance. The first novelty will now be 
discussed. 
b. The Laruelle Act 
Since the entry into force of the 2006 Act concerning the Practice of the Profession of 
Architect within the Framework of a Legal Person (the Laruelle Act), it is possible for a 
legal person with legal personality104 which fulfils the requirements as mentioned in 
Article 3 §2 LA (i.e. Article 2 §2 AA) to practise the profession of architect. It follows 
that associations which do not have legal personality cannot practise the profession. 
 
As held above, due to the Laruelle Act, Article 1 of the Architects’ Act has been 
amended. While this Article used to state that no one was allowed to use the title or to 
practise the profession without being in the possession of the required diploma, the 
diploma requirement is now limited to the use of the title. The reason is that legal per-
sons are not able to obtain a diploma while the new Act makes it possible for them to 
practise the profession. 
 
                                                                
102 Constitutional Court 10 October 2001, Official Gazette December 2001, 41279; J.L.M.B. 2001, 1816, anno-
tated by B. Louveaux; Uytterhoeven 2004, pp. 193-197. 
103 Bill on the Practice of the Profession within the Framework of a Legal Person, explanatory memorandum, 
Gedr. St. Chamber 2004-2005, nr. 1920/2, p. 4. 
104 A company only gets legal personality after its deed of erection has been deposed at the clerk’s office of the 
court of commerce where the company has its legal seat ( see Article 2 §4 (1 jo) AA and Article 68 Com-
pany Code).  
  Public Law in Belgium  
234 
The title of the Laruelle Act is somewhat misleading. This is due to the fact that the 
possibility for legal persons to practise the profession themselves is much more far-
reaching than the practice of the profession ‘within the framework of a legal person105’ as 
indicated in the title. This latter possibility has already been discussed under 2. 
 
The concept of legal personality means that the company has to be seen as an independ-
ent legal entity, not depending on its partners with its own wealth, distinct from that of 
the individual partners. This means that the creditors of the company can only claim 
compensation from the company’s wealth and that the architect-natural person’s wealth 
cannot be claimed against in terms of damage compensation. 
 
Since the entry into force of the Laruelle Act, Article 1 of the Architects Act is only con-
cerned with the architects’ title and no longer with the practice of the profession, since it 
states that no one is allowed to use the title of architect without being in possession of 
the necessary diploma. It follows that the possession of a diploma is not always a neces-
sary condition for practising the profession. 
 
Since the architectural contract is concluded with the architect-legal person, the natural 
persons who are an organ or mandatory of the legal person can, in principle106, not be 
held liable by the legal person’s co-contractor, since there is no contractual or legal rela-
tionship between the building master and the architect-natural person. Furthermore, 
the building master can, in principle107, neither institute an extra-contractual claim 
against the architect-natural person, unless his fault is a shortcoming to the general 
standard of care (and not the failure of a contractual obligation) and the damage caused 
due to the extra-contractual fault is different from the damage which results from the 
failure of the contractual obligation.108 It follows that, due to this new possibility, the 
architects-natural persons can protect their personal wealth from claims based on their 
professional liability. 
                                                                
105 As held above, this latter possibility was already created by the 1985 Deontological Code. 
106 In case of certain ‘imperfect’ legal persons, the partners are personally and even jointly and severally liable 
for the company’s obligations (see Article 201 and further of the Company Act). Since the entry into force 
of the Laruelle Act, the partners can only be held personally liable if the company itself is convicted. The 
‘imperfect’ legal persons under Belgian law will not be further discussed within this thesis. 
107 It is therefore not wise to choose a company with unlimited and joint and several liability.  
 The extra-contractual liability of the legal person for faults of his organs or mandatories, excludes the 
personal liability of the natural person (Article 1384 CC). See also Supreme Court, 11 April 1989, Arr.Cass. 
1988-89, 318. However if an architect-natural person commits a tort in his capacity of board member, he 
can be held personally liable, even if the legal person can be held liable as well, based on Article 1384 CC. 
The legal person can be held criminally liable if there is a connection between the crime and the legal per-
son’s aim, its interests or if the crime is committed for its account (Article 5 (1) Criminal Code). See also 
Supreme Court 9 Novmeber 2004, NJW 2005, 796, annotated by E. Brems. If the legal person is held liable 
due to a fault committed by a natural person solely, only the one who committed the most serious fault 
will be convicted. (Article 5 (2) Criminal Code). In such a situation, the judge will take into account the 
degree of autonomy of the natural person involved: See Constitutional Court 10 July 2002, R.W. 2002-03, 
857). Only if the natural person committed the crime intentionally, can he be convicted together with the 
legal person (Article 5 (2) Criminal Code in fine). Examples are working without insurance, not respecting 
town planning regulations, etc. 
108 Supreme Court, 7 November 1997, Arr.Cass 1997, 457. 
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Before the Laruelle Act entered into force, the Order could, on the basis of its deonto-
logical competence, create all the rules on how to practise the profession when a legal 
person was involved. The Laruelle Act now determines the main rules itself. Neverthe-
less, the National Council of the Order was given the task of executing the new Act, and 
was asked to give concrete indications on how legal persons could practise the profes-
sion. Therefore, on 27 April 2007, the National Council created a Recommendation 
concerning the practise of the profession within the framework of a company or associa-
tion Recommendation on the practise of the architectural profession by legal persons. 
For the same reasons as those stated above with regard to the title of the Act, the title of 
this Recommendation is also confusing. This Recommendation is applicable to all archi-
tects-legal persons and their architects-partners who practise the profession. The 1997 
Recommendation will only be applicable to architectural associations (without legal 
personality) and architectural companies which do not fulfil the requirements of the 
Architects’ Act.109 The 2007 Recommendation is based on Article 3(2) of the Deonto-
logical Code and contains some closer rules with regard to the legal person’s practice. It 
has not been ratified by a Royal Decree. Its most important provisions will be referred to 
in the following section. 
 
A legal person can only practise the profession if the following conditions are fulfilled 
(Article 3 §2 LA – Article 2 §2 AA): 
 
“1° All the business managers, directors, members of the board -more generally all inde-
pendent mandatories, practising in name and for the account of the legal person- are 
natural persons authorized to practise as architect according to Article 2(1) and registered 
on one of the tableaux of the Order of Architects.” 
With this stipulation, the legislator aimed to make sure that everyone with a right of say 
in the company has the required diploma and is registered. In this way the company will 
not be controlled by non-architects.110 This Article is repeated in Article 10.1 of the 2007 
Recommendation on the Practise of the Profession of Architect within the Framework 
of a Legal Person, which was created to make application of the Laruelle Act and its 
encompassing Royal Decree easier. The management functions can therefore not be 
fulfilled by legal persons. Also foreign architects who practise the profession in Belgium, 
and move their seat temporarily or permanently to Belgium, and who are registered in 
accordance with Article 8 §1 AO can thus have such a position. The question has been 
asked whether this provision violates Article 49 EC on the free provision of services, 
since EU and EEA professionals who do not move their seat to Belgium and are thus not 
registered on a tableau of the Order, but only on the register of service providers (Article 
8 §2(2) AO), cannot have a management function within a (temporary) Belgian com-
pany which they have erected with other Belgian architects.111 In order to be in line with 
the EC-Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, this Arti-
                                                                
109 Uytterhoeven 2008, p. 16. 
110 Lamon 2006, pp. 1-3.  
111 Uytterhoeven 2008, p. 22. 
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cle should therefore be amended. Of course, for non EU/EEA nationals who fall under 
Article 8 §2(1) AO, this causes a problem as well. 
 
“2° The objective and activity of the legal person have to be limited to the provision of 
services belonging to the practise of the profession of architect and cannot be irreconcilable 
with this.” 
Since the objective and activity of the legal person has to be limited to the provision of 
architectural services112, the architectural company will have a civil character since the 
services which are offered also have a civil nature.113 The description of the company’s 
aim is more limited than the description of Article 5(2) of the 1997 Recommendation. 
Previously, the aims of the company were, next to the practise of the architectural pro-
fession, the practise of all disciplines which were related and not incompatible with the 
profession. When reading the Act strictly, one has to conclude that, at present, multi-
professional companies cannot practise the profession of architect. Even though an 
architectural company has partners who are compatible professionals, these partners 
cannot practise their profession in the name and for the account of the architectural 
company. The reason for this is that the company can only practise the profession of 
architect and no related profession. Nevertheless, as held by Burssens, one can deduce 
from the Preparatory Works that the legislator intended that multi-professional compa-
nies could also practise the profession.114 Therefore he concludes that the Provincial 
Councils have to decide on a case by case basis whether the activities of the professional 
legal person can be qualified as architectural ones.115 
 
3° “When the legal person is formed as a public limited company or a limited partnership 
on shares, the shares have to be nominal.” 
This requirement aims to make the division of shares transparent, and intends to pre-
vent non-architects from controlling a legal person. 
 
4° “At least 60%116 of the shares as well as 60% of the voting rights have to be in the posses-
sion, directly or indirectly, of natural persons authorized to practise the profession of ar-
                                                                
112 Architectural services are not limited to those services which fall under the architects’ monopoly. The term 
refers to all act which are ‘usually’ performed by architects. See Supreme Court 25 June 1973, J.T. 1974, 
247. The fact that non-architects can be a partner, indicates that a broad interpretation is given to the con-
cept of ‘architectural services’ 
113 Article 3 (2) Company Act. 
114 Burssens 2007, pp. 13-15 . The fact that only 60% of the shares have to be owned by architects is explained 
by the possibility to take into account the present reality, for example the existence of multi-professional 
companies. Furthermore, if the aim and activity of the company has to be limited to architectural activities, 
the inclusion of the phrase that the objective of the company cannot be incompatible with the architectural 
profession, would have been useless. 
115 Interior advice or stability studies are carried out by interior architects or engineers, but can also be done 
by architects. Multi-professional companies of architects and engineers or interior architects should thus 
be possible according to Burssens. 
116 Originally the Act demanded that 67% (the bill foresaw 80%) of the shares and the voting rights had to be 
in the possession, directly or indirectly, of natural persons authorized to practise the profession of architect 
and registered on one of the Order’s tables. Even before the Act entered into force, the percentage had al-
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chitect according to Article 2 §1 and registered on one of the tableaux of the Order of Ar-
chitects; all the other shares can only be in the possession of natural persons or legal per-
sons who practise a reconcilable professions and have reported themselves to the Council 
of the Order of Architects.” 
The National Council’s Recommendation of 27 April 2007 contains some more detailed 
provisions on the division of the shares. As held by Article 8. 2 of this Recommendation, 
the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ refers to the fact that the said 60% of the shares can 
also be owned by another legal person-architect. As opposed to the stipulation in the 
1997 Recommendation (Article 5.4.2), the partners do not have to cooperate through 
the practice of their profession in order to accomplish the aims of the company. They 
only cannot practise an incompatible profession117. However, as held by Article 8.1.1 in 
fine of the 2007 Recommendation, architects-public officials cannot own shares or vote 
except if their public task is educating. This provision directly follows from Article 5 AA 
which forbids functionaries and officials of the State, the provinces, the municipalities 
and public institutions, to operate as architect outside their function. Next to the profes-
sion of entrepreneur (Article 6 AA), this is therefore another example of professions that 
are incompatible with the profession f architect. The reason for this is that there is a risk 
that architect-officials can obtain the required building permission more easily or obtain 
an unfair advantage. Due to this incompatibility, the public interest118 as well as the par-
ticular interests of the profession are protected.119 An exception is made for architects 
who work in the above-mentioned capacity to teach architecture (Article 5(2) AA)120 or 
for architect-officials who design plans and supervise the execution of the building 
works concerning their own house.121 
 
5° “The legal person is not allowed to own shares in other companies/legal persons than 
those of an exclusive professional character. The social object and the activities of those 
companies cannot be irreconcilable with the function of architect.” 
It is therefore possible for an architectural company to own shares in another architec-
tural company, a multi-professional company or an engineering company. 
                                                                                                                                                             
ready been amended by Articles 169 and 170 of the Act of 20 July 2006 containing diverse provisions (Offi-
cial Gazette 28 July 2006). 
117 As held by Article 1.6 of the 2007 Recommendation, an incompatible profession refers to every profes-
sional activity which is neither legally nor deontologically linked to that of an architect. 
118 Supreme Court 25 April 1960, R.J.I., p. 311; Pas.1960, I, 988. 
119 The prohibition concerns also the functionaries and officials working part-time and not performing any 
‘architectural’ acts during their official working time: See Supreme Court 10 April 2006, T.B.O. 2007, ed. 2, 
113, annotated by W. Mertens, R.A.B.G., 2006, ed. 11, 795, annotated by B. Maes. 
120 Supreme Court, 28 February 1984, AR 4256, nr. 76, unpublished. 
121 Article 5 AA has to be interpreted independently from Article 4: See Council of State 23 June 1970, Arr. Et 
Avis Cons. Etat, 1970, 645. Article 4 AA holds that the cooperation of an architect is only required for the 
drawing up of the plans, and the supervision of the execution of the building project. Article 5 AA however 
underlines the incompatibility for every activity which is related to the profession of architect with a public 
function. In most cases, the violation consists of a functionary asking an independent architect to sign his 
plans, or to cover for him in another way when necessary. By his signature his colleague violates the provi-
sions as well. Both are guilty of forgery: Supreme Court 25 April 1960, Pas. I, 988; Ghent 5 February 1966, 
R.W., 965-66, col. 1952. Furthermore, the functionary is liable to be sanctioned for violation of Article 53 
AO. 
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6° “The legal person is registered on one of the tableaux of the Order or Architects.” 
The legal person has to be Member of the Order (Article 9(1) in fine AO). 
As already held under 1°, only legal persons with a permanent or temporary seat in 
Belgium can be registered (Article 8 AO). Architects who are empowered by Article 8 
§2(1) (non EC/EEA temporary service providers which generally practise abroad) and 8 
§2(2) AO (EC/EEA nationals who generally practise in their home state and temporarily 
provide a service in Belgium) to practise the profession, are not registered on one of the 
Order’s tableaux. This can constitute a problem since Article 2 §2 6° AA states that only 
legal persons who are members of the Order can practise the profession.122 However, 
Article 38, 7° AO states that it is the task of the National Council of the Order to register 
the nationals and legal persons of EC/EEA Member States in the Register of Service 
Provisions. The Explanatory Memorandum indicates that it was the meaning of the 
legislator to register EC/EEA legal persons in the Register of Service Provisions which 
indicates implicitly that these legal persons can then practise the profession of architect 
in Belgium. If this would be otherwise, Articles 38, 7° and 8 §2(2) AO would be mean-
ingless, and even in violation with Article 49 EC. Furthermore these stipulations would 
then violate the equality principle as well, since natural persons can practise the profes-
sion without being an Order’s member, as long as they are subscribed in the Register of 
Service Provisions. Consequently, Article 8 §2(2) AO has to be amended so that legal 
persons are mentioned as well.123 Of course, for non EC/EEA falling under the ambit of 
Article 8 §2(1) AO, this causes a problem as well. 
 
It is important to note that the legal person has to be registered on one of the tableaux of 
the Architects’ Order (Article 3 §2 6° LA – i.e. Article 2 §2, 6° AA) and is thus be a 
member of the Order. This means that that legal person has to respect the Order’s deon-
tology, and that disciplinary sanctions can be imposed upon that legal person (Article 21 
AO). However, the legal person cannot be elected as member of a Council and cannot 
vote for other candidates. Furthermore, the independent architects who intervene in 
their capacity of business manager, director or member of the board in the name of, and 
for the account of, the legal person, have also to be personally registered. 
 
As held by Article 6.1 of the 2007 Recommendation, the legal person’s name has to 
contain the words ‘architect’ and ‘civil company’ and has to refer to the ‘form/type’ the 
civil company has. 
 
If the legal person stops fulfilling the requirements of practising the profession of archi-
tect due to the decease of a natural person as meant in 1° or 4°, it has a period of 6 
months to live up to the abovementioned stipulations once more. During that period 
the legal person can still practise the profession of architect (Article 2 §2 AA in fine). 
This transitional period is, however, not applicable in the case of suspension, cancella-
tion or discharge of a business manager, director or board member. In such a case, an 
                                                                
122 Kohl 2006, p. 35.  
123 Uytterhoeven 2008, p. 32. 
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immediate replacement has to be found so that the interests of its clients are not endan-
gered (Article 11.1 Recommendation 27 April 2007). 
 
According to Article 3 §3 LA (i.e. Article 2 §3 AA), a trainee can only form a legal per-
son or be a partner, business manager, director or board member, when he practises the 
profession together with his patron or with a registered architect. This is exactly the 
opposite of what the 1997 Recommendation on the practise of the profession within the 
framework of a legal person provided for. In 1997 the Order feared the imbalance be-
tween the power of the patron and that of his trainee, so that it was forbidden for him to 
be part of a company or association to which his patron also belonged (Article 5.4.2). 
With this provision, the legislator wanted to make sure that a high level of quality was 
provided for clients. 
 
A legal person can only practise the profession of architect if the requirements discussed 
in this paragraph are fulfilled. Furthermore the statutes of the legal person have to be 
approved by the Architects’ Order (Article 12.2. Recommendation of 27 April 2007) and 
deposited at the Court of Commerce of the place of subscription of the legal person.124 
They have to indicate that the legal person and its partners will not violate the Deonto-
logical rules. In this way all partners, even those who are not architects, have to obey the 
deontological rules. Furthermore, the legal person has to be registered with the Order 
and needs to be covered by professional liability insurance. This latter obligation will 
now be discussed. 
4. Professional liability insurance 
As held above, architects are not allowed to register unless they are covered by profes-
sional liability insurance. The insurance obligation, which is laid down in the Architects 
Act, is applicable to natural as well as to legal persons practising the profession. How-
ever, this obligation did not always exist as such. I will now discuss the content and 
development of the insurance obligation of architects. 
a. Deontological insurance obligation 
As held by Article 15 of the 1983 Deontological Code: 
“The Architect, whether he works alone or in a company or union, is obliged to insure his 
civil professional liability, including his ten year responsibility. 
This insurance can be a part of an obliged global insurance of all building partners. 
It will have effect during ten years after the reception of the building works as long as those 
works have taken an end at the moment of the insured’s decease.” 
 
This Deontological obligation was created to protect the architect against insolvency, 
and was inspired by the values related to the honour and dignity of the profession. Since 
the Deontological Code did not provide for details on the insurance obligations and the 
extent of the coverage, the National Council of the Order made a Recommendation with 
regard to insurance obligations on 26 March. The Recommendation’s aim was to make 
                                                                
124 This is required by Article 2 (4) of the Company Act. 
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it easier for architects to obey their deontological obligations by laying down minimum 
standards which have to be fulfilled by every insurance contract (Article 1). Hereunder 
the most important provisions of the 1993 Recommendation will be discussed. 
 
Article 3 of the Recommendation states: 
“ The insurance has to cover all the architect’s liabilities, notably 
3.1. his contractual liability before the reception of the works, under reservation of what 
will be précised hereunder 
3.2. his ten year liability, which starts to run from the moment of reception   
The policy can indicate that the provisional reception is the starting point of the ten year 
period. 
3.3. his ‘quasi-delictual’ responsibility towards third parties and towards the building 
master which is not limited in time” 
 
The provisions of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 concern the architects’ contractual liability, while 
Article 3.3 deals with the non-contractual professional liability. These concepts will be 
further explained hereunder. 
 
The only type of insurance contract which lives up to the requirements of the Deonto-
logical Code, is the ‘professional liability insurance contract’. Only this type of contract 
covers all architectural activities (Article 2). The architects’ professional liability can be 
covered in the form of a ‘career’ policy or a ‘single building/single project’ policy. As the 
name implies, the latter policy only covers the activities on one building project. The 
career policy, on the other hand, is the most beneficial insurance contract for the archi-
tect as well as for the insurer. All damage is covered as long as the insurance policy is 
active and not suspended. This type of insurance contract is tacitly renewed every year, 
while the premium is adapted yearly in accordance with damage cases and administra-
tive costs. 
 
Article 5 of the Recommendation holds: 
“5.1. With regard to the application in time of the insurance contract, it is necessary that 
all the damage cases which occur during the contract are covered. 
The damage cases are covered even if the causal facts occurred before the conclusion of the 
contract, with the exception of the facts known by the architect before the conclusion of the 
contract. (‘anterior risk’ principle) 
Damage cases which occur during the contract but for which a claim is only instituted 
after the contract has expired, are also included. 
5.2. Damage cases which occur after the contract has expired, but which find their origin 
in a causal fact which occurred during the contract, also have to be insured (‘posterior risk’ 
principle).” 
 
Damage caused by the architect’s deceit or severe fault, the non-execution of the con-
tract, the infringement of the stipulations on time, type and technical parts of the con-
struction, as well as by some other damage causing facts, is not covered (Article 8 Rec-
ommendation). 
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Article 9 states that the architect has the possibility to determine the upper limit of his 
insurance in accordance with the financial extent of his designs, as a function of the 
risks he incurs, and the amount of exemption he deems bearable. It further states that it 
is desirable that the upper limit of the insurance is fixed at least 10 million Belgian 
Francs (247,893.52 Euros) per damage case, and 20 million Belgian Francs (495,787.05 
Euros) for material damages and 50 million Belgian Francs (1,239,467.62 Euros) per 
year per damage case for physical damage. Experience has shown however, that a cover 
of +/- 250,000 to 350,000 Euros is often not enough due to the high extent and costs of 
building works. 125 In such cases it would be wise for the architect to buy a higher cover-
age in order to protect his personal wealth. 
 
Due to the fact that the architect’s personal wealth would generally not be able to cover 
substantial damage claims, the building master’s guarantee was situated in the insurance 
contract.126 
 It followed that, in order to protect consumers, judges mostly held that the deonto-
logical insurance obligation had the value of a legal obligation.127 Furthermore, the Or-
der made observance mandatory for its members. 
 
In this regard, the provisions of the State Insurance Act (SIA)128 should be referred to 
since it is applicable to every insurance contract which covers the insured for compensa-
tion claims due to damage causing events as described in the contract, and which pro-
tects the insured’s wealth within the limits of the coverage against all debts which arise 
from an established liability (Article 77). 
 
Article 78 SIA, which contains another sort of posterior risk principle, stipulates: 
“ §1. The insurance covers damages which occurred during the contract and is extended to 
claims which are instituted after its expiration. 
§2… . Parties can agree that the insurance only covers claims which are instituted in writ-
ten during the duration of the contract for damage which occurred during that same pe-
riod. 
 In this case claims to obtain compensation which are instituted in written against the 
insured of the insurer within 36 months after the end of the contract, will also be taken 
into account if they are related to 
- damage which occurred during the contract and which is not covered by another  
insurer after the expiration of the contract (the damage is thus caused during the con-
tract, but the client only complains after the contract has ended) 
                                                                
125 Daelman 2007, p. 38. 
126 If the solvency of the architect was the decisive factor with regard to the signing of an architectural con-
tract, every building master would have to worry in advance about the personal assets of the architect, 
rather than about his professional qualities. Is also seems difficult to combine the protection of the inter-
ests of the client with the protection of .the architect’s own wealth. See Louveaux 2001, p. 26. 
127 Daelman 2007, p. 33. 
128 Wet op de Landsverzekering 25 June 1992, Official Gazette 20 August 1992. 
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- acts or facts which occur during the contract and are reported to the insurer which 
can give rise to damage (the causal fact occurred during the contract and the damage 
occurred within 36 months after the contract (if there is no damage one cannot insti-
tute a claim)” 
 
It follows that, if the insurance contract only covers damage which occurred during the 
contract, and for which a claim is instituted during the contract, the architect will be 
covered for 36 months (3 years) after the end of the contract if the requirements of Arti-
cle 78 §2 SIA are fulfilled. Unless the architect pays a ‘posterior risk premium’, he will 
therefore only be covered for the three years after the end of the contract, which nor-
mally falls together with three years after the end of his activities. Consequently, all the 
building works which are less than 7 years of age face a non-insured risk period if the 
architect does not take additional measures.129 As an architect approaches the end of his 
career, it is therefore best to cover this risk period by paying an extra ‘posterior risk’ 
premium. Since the Laruelle Act and its encompassing Royal Decree contains detailed 
provisions on specific architectural insurance, the State Insurance Act will not be further 
discussed. 
 
Article 15 of the Recommendation contains some practical provisions and stipulates 
how the Order can control its members’ observance of the (deontological) insurance 
obligation. The architect has to inform his Order immediately in the event of suspension 
or withdrawal of his insurance contract. However, as held by Daelman, the deontologi-
cal obligations are not controlled very punctually by the Architects’ Order.130 
 
Due to the fact that the situation of Belgian architects was not very beneficial -as noted 
above, their personal wealth was always at stake while they were ‘deontologically’ 
obliged to buy an insurance policy- the 2006 Laruelle Act aimed to create a more bal-
anced liability regime which also offered more guarantees for the building masters.131 
This Act will now be discussed in detail. 
b. Insurance obligation laid down by the Laruelle Act 
Due to the creation of the possibility that legal persons can perform architectural ser-
vices, for the very first time architects are able to pass their professional responsibility to 
a legal person. This means that the architects-natural persons’ personal wealth is no 
longer completely and automatically at stake whenever they commit a professional er-
ror.132 For architects, this might be a relief. Article 2 §4 AA – Article 3 §4 LA should 
protect their clients. It stipulates: 
 
                                                                
129 Daelman 2007, p. 36. 
130 Daelman 2007, p. 38. 
131 Bill on the Practice of the Profession of Architect within the Framework of a Legal Person, Explanatory 
Memorandum, Gedr. St. Chamber 2004-2005, nr. 1920/1, pp. 4-5. 
132 It is still possible however that the architect-natural person can be held liable (together with the legal 
person on the basis of Article 1382 CC) in terms of his directors’ liability. The architect-natural person can 
also incur criminal liability (Article 5 Penal Code). 
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“No one is allowed to practise the profession of architect without being covered by an 
insurance as provided by Article 9 AA.” 
 
Furthermore, Article 9(1) AA (Article 4 LA) states: 
“Every natural and legal person authorised to practise the profession of architect and 
whose liability, including the ten year liability, can be linked to his professional acts or the 
acts of his employees, has to be covered by an insurance. This insurance can be included in 
a global insurance of all building partners.” 
 
As opposed to the 1985 deontological insurance obligation which was created to protect 
the architect against insolvency, and which was inspired by the values related to the 
honour and dignity of the profession, the legal insurance obligation was created in the 
first place to protect clients/consumers. By demanding that the legal person has to be 
insured, the legislator made sure that the new possibility (the practice of the profession 
by a legal person) does not affect consumers’ protection negatively. Consequentially, 
more and more recourse is taken to insurance companies. Since judges take this devel-
opment into consideration, case law shows that they tend to be more lenient towards 
claims instituted by consumers, causing a broader interpretation of the concepts of 
‘fault’, ‘causality’ and ‘damage’. In this way, an increased liability system is created which 
is not beneficial for the architect.133 However, as held by the recent Recommendation on 
the Obliged Insurance of 24 April 2009, the legal insurance obligation does not nullify 
the deontological insurance obligation. The Recommendation gives some clearer rules 
on the insurance obligations in accordance with Article 3, 2° of the Deontological Code. 
 
The architect-natural person and the architect-legal person both have to be registered 
on a list/tableau of the Order. However, it is not necessary for them to be separately 
insured, since the legal person’s insurance will cover all architects and functionaries 
which work in its name and for its account (Article 4 LA). A separate insurance is how-
ever required if they continue to undertake certain projects personally. 
 
The business managers, directors, members of the board – more generally all independ-
ent mandatories who act in the name of, and for the account of the legal person, are 
jointly and severally liable for the payment of the insurance premiums (Article 4(3) LA 
– Article 9(3) AA). Since they also have to be registered, they have to abide by the pro-
fessional ethics. Furthermore, if the legal person is not covered by insurance, the man-
datories are jointly and severally liable towards third parties for the damage arising out 
of the ten year responsibility (Article 9(4) AA – Article 4(4) LA). The joint and several 
liability are thus not applicable to defects which fall under the regular liability regimes 
for small hidden defects after the acceptance of the work, or to defects which fall under 
the regular contractual liability regime before acceptance or the extra-contractual liabil-
                                                                
133 Fontaine 1996, p. 292. This tendency already started since the Deontological insurance obligation was 
introduced. Since the entry into force of the Laruelle Act, insurance premiums have increased. See 
htpp://www.protect.be/_CLIENTS/Protect/Documenten/2007-2-27-(121511)_De%20Tijd.pdf, last con-
sulted 27 December 2009. 
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ity regime.134 Furthermore, as held by Article 6 LA (Article 11(4) AA), those who prac-
tise the profession without being insured are liable for a fine of 200.00 to 1,000.00 Eu-
ros135. Natural persons can also be liable for a prison sentence. Of course, disciplinary 
sanctions can also be imposed. 
 
It is important to note that the insurance obligation does not only cover acts which 
belong to the architects’ monopoly, but also ones which are generally made by architects 
without being reserved to them, such as town planning activities, estimates, expertise, 
etc. As held by Ramboer, other persons who fulfil such activities are not obliged to buy 
insurance.136 
 
A contract with an architect who is not lawfully insured is void, since this contract is 
concluded with a person who is not allowed to practise the profession. 
 
As held by Article 4 LA, the architects’ insurance can be part of the global insurance of 
all the building partners. It is thus possible that other partners are also insured for their 
professional liability. Nevertheless, with the exception of the safety coordinator, the 
architect is the only building partner who is legally obliged to buy professional liability 
insurance.137 On 12 July 2007138 the Belgian Constitutional Court held that, due to this 
fact, the chance that damage compensation will de facto be claimed from the architect in 
the event of a conviction in solidum is much higher than that of the other building part-
ners. The Court held that there is no objective and reasonable justification for this dif-
ference in treatment. However, the Court held that the discrimination is not a conse-
quence of the insurance obligation of architects as foreseen by the law, but is due to the 
fact that there is no comparable insurance obligation for the other building partners – 
even the building master is not obliged to buy insurance. According to the Constitu-
tional Court, only the legislator can solve this problem. Until now the legislator has not 
acted upon the Council of State’s suggestion. However, the benefits of a global manda-
tory insurance are proven by the situation in France. In this state, all building partners139 
-even promoters- are lawfully obliged to buy insurance to cover a ten year period which 
starts to run after receipt of the finished work. This mandatory insurance regime is laid 
down in Article 4 of the Spinetta Act of 4 January 1978.140 The Spinetta Act aimed for a 
                                                                
134 Burssens 2007, p. 27. This will be explained in more detail hereunder. 
135 Augmented with ‘updecimes’. 
136 Ramboer 2008, p. 109. Other persons who fulfil such activities are not obliged to buy insurance. 
137 According to figures of Joint Stock Company Protect, experts and market leaders in the insurance of 
professional liability of designers in Belgium, only 0.02 per cent of entrepreneurs are covered by ten year 
professional liability insurance. Information Session Protect.  
138 Constitutional Court 12 July 2007, A.GrwH 2007, afl. 3, 1163. 
139 Sub-contractors as well as fabricators and suppliers of building materials which can bring about a joint 
liability are excluded. Their liability is not limited to ten years after receipt of the finished work. 
140 The benefits which are brought about for the victims are not created by the Spinetta Act but by case law. 
Likewise, Article 1792 of the French Civil Code was adapted after an abundance of case law held that every 
building partner is liable by law for building damage and now stipulates: “Tout constructeur (The concept 
of ‘constructeur’ is interpreted as ‘someone who executes a part of the building work’ and can thus be 
translated as ‘particpant of a building work’. Even fabricants, sellers or promoters fall under this concept) 
d’un ouvrage est responsable de plein droit, envers le maître ou l’acquéreur de l’ouvrage, des dommages, mê-
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better protection of consumers. The Act makes sure that the building master -who has 
to buy an insurance to cover any damage- is compensated quickly141 and in full142. Con-
sequently, the Act’s first objective is fulfilled. Due to the absence of any exemptions, the 
building master will turn immediately to the insurance company without any hesitation. 
This has caused the number of reported cases of damage to increase as well as pushing 
up the expenses of the insurance companies which, in turn, brings about an increase in 
the premiums which have to be paid. Nevertheless, the division of risk is spread in a 
much better way than was the case before the ten year insurance obligation was intro-
duced. Due to the insurance obligations of all building partners, architects are less ex-
posed to the risk that they will be convicted in solidum. As held by Maurin, a previous 
Secretary General of the ‘Association Française des Assureurs Construction’, the archi-
tects’ share has decreased from 16 to 4%.143 The Spinetta Act has led to better protection 
for the consumer and a better division of liabilities. 
 
As noted above, in Belgium, only the architect and the safety coordinator144 are obliged 
to buy insurance. They can insure their liability either for their whole career, per build-
ing, or within the framework of a more or less extensive global insurance. As already 
indicated, the insurance has to cover the individual’s contractual liability (until the mo-
ment of provisional delivery), his ten year liability which starts to run at the moment of 
provisional delivery as well as his extra-contractual liability (see Article 77 State Insur-
ance Act). The career policy is still the most beneficial type of contract for the insured 
and the insurer. The yearly premium which has to be paid covers any damage cases 
which occur during that same year. Therefore, it is less expensive than the French sys-
tem. However, due to the Laruelle Act, the insurance contract will automatically have to 
cover the ten year responsibility of the legal person, even in cases of liquidation or bank-
                                                                                                                                                             
me résultant d’un vice du sol, qui compromettent la solidité de l’ouvrage ou qui, l’affectant dans l’un de ses 
éléments constitutifs ou l’un de ses éléments d’équipement, le rendent impropre à sa destination.” 
 The constructors’ liability by law is presumed (the building partners are thus in the possibility to demon-
strate that their responsibility is not involved). The building partners therefore carry the burden of proof. 
The presumed liability of these building partners ends ten years after delivery in the event of damage to the 
firmness of (a part of) the building work, or when the building is rendered unoccupiable in terms of its 
use. The building parts which do not fall under the ten year liability principle have to be guaranteed for 
two years, while the entrepreneur has to guarantee a perfect finalisation within one year (he has to repair 
all the defects which were reported by the building master at the moment of reception). See Maurin 2002, 
pp. 1-65. 
141 The building master buys the insurance. His insurer will pay the damage compensation immediately if 
there are concerns, even before the liability of the involved building partners are determined. Afterwards 
the building master’s insurer will deal with the insurer of the responsible party. 
142 Supreme Court, 12 May 1993, civ I, Bull civ I, n° 25. The insurer has to compensate for the material dam-
age in full. 
143 Maurin 2002, p. 30. 
144 Royal Decree 25 January 2001 on the temporary and mobile building sites. The safety coordinator has to 
ensure that the necessary health and safety measures are taken and that they are observed. As held by Arti-
cle 16 (1) the building master or the director of the project (i.e. mostly the architect) which makes the de-
sign, has to appoint a safety and health coordinator during the execution phase of the building work if it is 
planned that several entrepreneurs will work on the building site. The safety coordinator, as well as the ar-
chitect, is also obliged to buy insurance. 
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ruptcy, and of natural persons in case of death. This will necessarily raise the pre-
mium.145 
 
The creation of an insurance obligation for all building partners at the same time is 
difficult for the Government, since this involves the authority of several Ministers. Due 
to the express wish to compensate victims at all costs, those who are most solvent will be 
held responsible very easily, in solidum convictions are very common in Belgium. To 
compensate victims in any situation, a liability regime without fault has more or less 
originated in fact.146 By safeguarding consumers from instituting several claims against 
possible insolvent debtors, the in solidum conviction which was originally created as an 
exception in case one was unable to distinguish the responsibilities of different building 
partners, has become current practice. In this way, all convicted partners have to repair 
the damage in full, but it is mostly the architect who is turned to since he is insured 
anyway. For architects the problem is not solved however by transforming the deonto-
logical insurance obligation into a legal obligation. In both instances there is still the risk 
that the architect will be the one paying due to an in solidum conviction in the event that 
the entrepreneur is insolvent or not insured. A solution could be to introduce a legal 
insurance obligation for all parties, including the building master, such as is laid down 
by the Spinetta Act in France. Another solution is to oblige the building master to con-
tract only with registered entrepreneurs. In this way a first step might be taken in terms 
of quality improvement. It is also possible to contractually agree that the architect will 
not be held liable in solidum.147 
 
To conclude, it has to be mentioned that the Laruelle Act has no influence on contracts 
which were concluded under the old regime. This means that an architect who signed a 
contract in name, and for the account of his company, is still personally (or together 
with the company) liable, even if the company is afterwards registered on one of the 
Order’s tableaux.148 However, if the building master has agreed in writing, the rights and 
obligations which arise out of a contract concluded by an architect-natural person, can 
be transferred to an architect-legal person (Article 16(5) LA). In these cases the architect 
will no longer be personally liable. The architects-natural persons and the architects 
working within the framework of a legal person can thus exclude their personal liability. 
However, in this regard, it is important that the insurer of the architect-legal person 
admits the anteriority rule, since this is not obligatory. 
 
The Laruelle Act does not regulate the insurance obligations in detail. Therefore, Article 
4(2) LA, states that the King will decide upon: 
- the minimum level of coverage 
- the amount of possible exemptions 
- the duration in time of the coverage 
                                                                
145 AR-CO News, Insurer in the building industry, Number 7, Special Edition, p. 3.  
146 Rigaux 1993, p. 338. 
147 In solidum convictions do not have a public order character. See http://www.interfidesko.be/archit.htm, 
last consulted 21 October 2009. 
148 Burssens 2007, p.28. 
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- the risks which have to be covered 
 
These elements, which were previously covered by the Order’s 1997 Recommendation, 
are at present thus decided upon by the King. The provisions of the Royal Decree with 
regard to obligatory insurance as provided for in the Act of 20 February 1939 on the 
Protection of the Title and the Profession of Architect149 (Royal Decree Laruelle), will 
now be discussed in more detail. 
c. The Royal Decree Laruelle 
As held by Article 16(1) LA, the Laruelle Act would enter into force on a date to be de-
termined by the King and at the latest on the first day of the sixth month after the Act 
would be published in the Belgian Official Gazette. Furthermore, according to Article 
16(2) LA, the Act could not enter into force before the entry into force of a Royal Decree 
on the rules and conditions of the obligatory liability insurance. This Royal Decree of 25 
April 2007 is known as the Royal Decree Laruelle (RDL) and laid down the minimum 
insurance conditions.150 After the Laruelle Act was enacted, it therefore took more than a 
year before the Royal Decree was created. This was due to the fact that several parties 
were involved in the process, each with opposing interests. As suggested by Uytterho-
even151, firstly the consumers looked for high and extensive minimum guarantees. Sec-
ondly, the architects did not want the content of their deontological obligation to 
change. Thirdly, the insurance sector, which falls under the competence of the Ministry 
of the Economy, held that certain damages could not be insured. Fourthly, it was 
thought that a control mechanism had to be set up which needed the involvement of the 
Cabinet of Administrative Simplification, and that the Commission of Insurance had to 
give its advice as well. 
After a compromise had been reached, the King decided that the date of entry into force 
of the Act and the Royal Decree would be 1 July 2007 (Article 8 RDL). 
 
Article 1 RDL states: 
“Every insurance agreement which is endorsed by the Act of 20 February 1939 on the 
Protection of the Title and the Profession of Architect has to contain coverage which is 
at least in accordance with the minimum requirements as determined by this Deci-
sion.” 
 
All insurance policies have therefore to fulfil the requirements of the Royal Decree Laru-
elle. The insurance companies are not allowed to offer other contracts. 
 
Furthermore, Article 2 RDL holds: 
“The insurance covers the civil liability which results from the activities of the archi-
tect as long as these activities are related to work and performances executed in Bel-
gium.” 
                                                                
149 Official Gazette 2 June 2007. 
150 Royal Decree of 25 April 2007 on the Compulsory Insurance as provided for in the Act of 20 February 
1939 on the Protection of the Title and the Profession of Architect, Official Gazette 23 May 2007. 
151 Uytterhoeven 2008, p. 108. 
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The contractual liability, including the ten year liability, as well as the extra-contractual 
liability have thus to be insured. This was already provided for by the Order’s 1993 Rec-
ommendation and is reaffirmed in the Recommendation of 24 April 2009. Foreign ar-
chitects who provide services in Belgium, also fall under this obligation. Since Belgian 
architects active abroad are not included, they have to buy extra insurance. 
 
Article 3 RDL stipulates which persons have to be covered by the insurance contract: 
“Every natural or legal person authorised to practise the profession of architect and 
mentioned in the insurance contract as well as his appointees are covered. Mandato-
ries, trainees and other co-workers of the architect which are authorised to practise the 
profession, as long as they work for the account of the architect, are considered to be 
appointees of the legal person. Furthermore, the directors, board members and all the 
other organs of the legal person which administer and control it are covered whenever 
they work for the account of the legal person within the framework of the architect’s 
profession.” 
 
As already held above, in the event that several architects work together in a company – 
with or without having created a legal person which allows them to limit their personal 
liability – it is desirable that a policy is concluded by the company for the account of the 
natural architects in which they are included as insured persons. In this way, discussions 
between insurance companies are avoided.152 
 
Article 4 RDL states: 
“The coverage of the civil liability insurance cannot be lower then 
€ 1,500,000 for damage resulting out of physical harm 
€ 50,000 for the total of material and immaterial damage 
€ 10,000 for objects which are entrusted to the insured … 
per damage case …” 
 
If these amounts are compared with the amounts indicated in the 1993 Recommenda-
tion, it is immediately notable that the upper limit of the insurance has been augmented. 
As already indicated, the 1993 amounts were often not sufficient since damage cases in 
the building sector always lead to very high compensation claims. This means that the 
premiums which have to be paid by the architect have also increased. Furthermore, as 
provided for by the Article, the coverage will be given ‘per damage case’ and not per year 
or per project as was the case before. Since more damage cases can arise per project -
bringing about a larger coverage- this will also result in higher premiums.153 
 
In contrast to Article 8 of the 1993 Recommendation, the Royal Decree Laruelle only 
excludes two events from insurance coverage: damages resulting from radioactivity and 
                                                                
152 Ramboer 2008, p. 111. 
153 Daelman 2007, p. 49. See also htpp://www.protect.be/_CLIENTS/Protect/Documenten/2007-2-27-
(121511)_De%20Tijd.pdf, last consulted 23 December 2009. 
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physical damage caused by illegal products (Article 5 RDL). Damage caused by deceit or 
a severe fault, etc. is, in principle, thereby covered, which ameliorates the architect’s 
situation. Article 8 of the State Insurance Act holds that the insurer can only exclude 
coverage in such cases if the severe fault is explicitly described in the policy (for example 
supervising a building work which has no building permit, being drunk during the exe-
cution of the profession, …). This will again have consequences with regard to the pre-
mium to be paid. 
 
As stipulated in Article 6 RDL: 
“The insurance coverage applies to claims which are instituted in written against the 
insured or the insurer during the duration of the insurance contract and which are 
based on a liability which is covered in the contract and which concerns damage 
which arose during the duration of the contract. 
 The coverage is extended to claims which are instituted within ten years after the end 
of the registration on the tableau of the Order of architects)” 
 
From now on, the coverage is thus extended to claims which are instituted within ten 
years after the end of registration. This is rather odd, since the architects’ liability has no 
connection with his registration. Furthermore, the moment that registration ends is 
often unknown, since one can stop it for personal reasons, or one can get a disciplinary 
sanction which ends registration. 
 This Article is of great importance. As opposed to Article 78 §2 State Insurance Act 
which was discussed above, and which foresees an extended coverage lasting 36 months 
after the end of the insurance coverage, there is now an obligatory insurance period 
(posterior principle) of ten years which starts to run the moment the architect’s registra-
tion has ended. Previously, a ten year insurance coverage was not obligatory and was 
only present if one paid an additional premium. Due to the Laruelle Act, the insurance 
company is now obliged to guarantee ten year coverage. This will increase the premium. 
Article 7 §2 RDL states that the architectural contract has to mention the name of the 
insurance company of the architect and his policy number. Every year the insurance 
companies have to provide a list to the Council of the Order which contains all its archi-
tect- clients. The insurance contract cannot be withdrawn by the insurance companies 
or the architect without informing the Order (Article 7 §1 RDL). Furthermore, every 
three months, the insurance companies have to communicate to the Order which insur-
ance contracts have ended or have been withdrawn or suspended. The control on the 
insurance coverage is therefore carried out by the Councils of the Order, as well as by 
the insurance companies. In this way, the legislator aims to have a full and better super-
vision possibility regarding the insurance obligation. However, since this brings about a 
considerable administrative burden, the premiums will be increased.154 
 
Finally, Article 8 RDL holds: 
“This Royal Decree as well as the Act of 15 February 2006 on the practice of the pro-
fession of architect within the framework of a legal person enter into force on 1 July 
                                                                
154 Daelman 2007, p. 52. 
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2007, with the exception of Articles 11 and 14155 of the Act. 
The stipulations in the Act and the Decision are applicable to all architectural con-
tracts which are concluded after their entry into force. 
They are also applicable to the existing insurance contracts which cover the architec-
tural contract which are concluded after the entry into force of the Act and the Deci-
sion. 
Notwithstanding the application of the stipulations in this Decision, the insurance 
companies have to adapt their contracts and other insurance documents to the stipu-
lations in this Decision at the latest on the date of adaptation, renewal, extension or 
remodelling of the running contracts.” 
 
The ‘new type’ of architectural contract which will be signed by an architect-natural 
person who acts for the architect-legal person in accordance with the Laruelle Act, could 
therefore only be concluded from 1 July 2007 onwards. The reason is that a legal person 
can only practise as architect from that date. The new Act is thus not applicable to archi-
tectural contracts which were concluded prior to 1 July 2007. In such cases, the archi-
tect-natural person is therefore still personally liable for the damage which is a conse-
quence of acts which happened before or even after this date. The same goes for con-
tracts which were concluded with a company before 1 July 2007, which currently prac-
tises the profession of architect itself. 
3. The Architects’ Order and the Architects’ Order Act 
3.1. Introduction 
In paragraph 5.2, the content of the Architects Act was discussed in detail. As was noted 
above, the Architects’ Order Act is the second Act which regulates the profession. Since 
the provisions of both acts are often connected, some provisions of the Architects’ Or-
der Act have already been discussed in the light of the foregoing. Hereunder, the tasks of 
the Order, its history and institution will be discussed in more detail. 
 
After the Second World War, the legislator aimed to improve the quality of the build-
ings on its territory. The importance of spatial and town planning as a means of realiz-
ing this aim was fully understood as well as the fact that private persons/institutions 
were needed to achieve it. To be sure that architects worked well, certain quality stan-
dards and a supervision system had to be imposed. 
 Since the Architects’ Act only protects the title and profession of architect, rules 
were therefore necessary to regulate the organization and the structure of the profession, 
and to establish a professional code. A continuous supervision of architects was neces-
sary to check whether or not they were acting in accordance with their legal duties. 
Therefore, in 1963, the Architects’ Order Act was created, together with the Architect’s 
                                                                
155 These Articles deal with the composition of the National Council of the Architects’ Order, the members’ 
contribution and the budget. 
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Order, an institution with genuine regulatory and disciplinary powers charged with the 
architects’ supervision.156 From then on, it would be illegal to practise the profession 
without being a member of this Order. 
 
Due to the creation of the Order, the professional associations can now concentrate 
more on the advancement of collegiality among architects, the permanent education of 
their members, and the improvement of the quality of architecture and the art of build-
ing. The Order, on the other hand, has autonomous powers and has to apply the legal 
requirements concerning admission to the profession and when determining the profes-
sional duties and disciplinary sanctions.157 It also has to watch over compliance with the 
protective title legislation, and has the right to report every violation to the Public 
Prosecutor. The Order can present itself as a civil party in any proceedings. 
3.2. Tasks of the Order 
The Order is a public law institution158 which exercises a disciplinary function in the 
interest of the profession in order to safeguard its collective honour. 159 It is a registration 
organisation, yet not a professional association. By the creation of the Order, the public 
interest character of the profession, which cannot be accomplished if the Order would 
not obligatory unite all its members, was recognized by law.160  
 
Since the Order possesses legal personality (Article 1 AO), it can possess property, con-
clude contracts, be represented in court, etc. Nevertheless, as held by Article 48 AO, it 
cannot possess immovables other than those necessary for its proper functioning and 
the performance of its tasks, nor accept gifts without the King’s permission. 
 
                                                                
156 The tasks of the Architects’ Order cannot be compared to those carried out by the Royal Federation of 
Belgian Architects, discussed in paragraph 10.1. The Order, instituted by public law, takes into account 
public interests. Membership of the Order is obligatory, and a contribution has to be paid by each archi-
tect. Membership of professional associations, such as the Royal Federation, is optional. See X., Info Jonge 
Architecten, Architectenunie, October 1997, p. 31. After the regionalisation of Belgium, the Royal Federa-
tion created two wings: the Dutch ‘Bond van Vlaamse Architecten’ (BVA) and the Walloon ‘Sociétés des 
Architectes Francophones’ (SAF). These societies are also referred to as private professional societies. Next 
to these associations there are several others, e.g. the Professional Union of Architects (UPA-BUA); the 
National Architectural Association (NAV) and several regional organisations.The main functions of the 
BVA are: defending the professional, social and cultural interests of its members; improving collegiality 
among its members; representation of its members towards third parties; giving information about the dif-
ferent tasks of architects to persons who want to promote architecture; giving technical advice; supplying 
artistic training; etc. The BVA does not impose disciplinary sanctions on its members. This is a task of the 
Order. 
157 Mast et all. 1999, nr. 104. As held by Article 1 of the Act on the Professional Associations of 31 March 
1898, Official Gazette 8 April 1898, professional associations have legal personality within the legal limits 
and conditions. Article 2 indicates that a professional association is only created to study, protect and de-
velop the professional interests of its members.  
158 It is established by public law. 
159 Wigny 1952, t. I, n° 247. 
160 Conclusion of the Public Prosecutor Ganshof Van Der Meersch in Supreme Court 3 May 1974, J.T., 1974, 
568-569. 
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Article 2 AO enumerates the tasks of the Architects’ Order. These are: 
- the creation of deontological rules and the supervision of their observance. 
- the supervision of the honour, discretion and dignity of its members when exercis-
ing (or regarding the exercise) of the profession. 
- informing the judicial authorities of every violation of a law or regulation which 
intends to –  protect the title and the profession of architect. 
 
Since the Order’s competence is limited to the deontological field, it is not obliged to 
assure the application of the law. However, it is possible that an illegal act affects the 
honour and dignity of the profession or that it is against the disciplinary rules. 
 
As has already been discussed in detail before, one needs to be registered or satisfy the 
requirements of Article 8 §2(1) and (2) AO, to be allowed to practise the profession. 
Registration will only take place if the professional fulfils the conditions of the Archi-
tects’ Act. In this regard it is important to note that the Belgian Supreme Court held that 
the obligation to register with the Order does not violate the constitutional principle of 
freedom of association, which is also guaranteed by Article 11 §1 of the European Con-
vention of Human Rights. The Court held that since members freely choose to register 
themselves, they have to obey the Order’s rules.161 
 
Furthermore, to be registered on the tableau, new architects have to conclude a trainee-
ship of two-years with a professional who has already been registered on the tableau for 
at least ten years (Article 50 AO).162 The traineeship will take two years, starts after the 
trainee contract has been signed163, and ends upon delivery of the traineeship certifi-
cate.164 As noted above, trainees are members of the Order and are registered on a list. 
 
The purpose of the traineeship is to give practical guidelines to persons who have re-
ceived a relatively theoretical education. As held by Article 20 of the Traineeship Regu-
lation created by the Order’s National Council on 5 February 1965, every Council of the 
Order has to supervise the traineeship. This task is delegated to a Traineeship Commis-
sion which is composed of members of the Council. Article 39 of the 1963 Act holds that 
the King (i.e. the government) can give legal force to the deontological rules and regula-
tions concerning the traineeship by means of a decision discussed in the council of Min-
isters at the request of the National Council of Architects. The Royal Decree on the 
Approval of the Traineeship Regulation was proclaimed on 13 May 1965.165 The disci-
plinary rules are therefore also applicable to trainees. 
 
                                                                
161 Supreme Court 3 May 1974 and conclusion of the Public Prosecutor Ganshof Van Der Meersch, J.T., 1974, 
p. 564 and p. 568. 
162 Article 52 AO contains some exceptions to the traineeship requirement. 
163 Section 8, 13-14 Traineeship Regulation  
164 Section 23 Traineeship Regulation 
165  Royal Decree of 13 May 1965 rendering the regulations on the traineeship compulsory, Official Gazette 26 
June 1965. 
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The Order’s Councils can permit that the traineeship be fulfilled abroad in the office of 
someone who is an architect and who can offer the same guarantees as those which are 
set for the Order’s members in Belgium (Article 50(3) AO).166 As stated previously, the 
relationship between a patron and his trainee has to be laid down in a traineeship con-
tract which has to be in accordance with the model drawn up by the competent Council 
of the Order, and has to be approved by the Minister of the Independent Professions 
(Article 13 Traineeship Regulation). The Councils of the Order can prolong the dura-
tion of the traineeship (Article 51 AO) or give an exemption for it to EU/EEA members, 
when the applicant has fulfilled certain tasks abroad which are equivalent to the tasks 
s/he has to fulfil during the traineeship. The same goes for architects who are not 
EU/EEA members but who have practised the profession abroad for more than two 
years (Article 52 AO). 
 
The trainee has the obligation to execute the tasks which are entrusted upon him (for a 
minimum of 120 hours/week), to respect the professional secrecy and to collaborate and 
respect his patron and the other members of his bureau (Articles 18-19 Traineeship 
Regulation). His patron is responsible for him with regard to third parties in terms of 
the work he imposes upon him. This is not the case however for the activities the trainee 
fulfils on his own account, and over which the patron has no permanent control (Article 
17 Traineeship Regulation). 
 
At the end of the traineeship and after the Commission has given a positive advice, the 
Order’s Council will deliver a certificate to the professional which makes is possible to 
register on the tableau (Article 23 Traineeship Regulation). 
3.3. Institutional organization of the Order 
The Architects’ Order has three specialized types of organs: the (Provincial) Councils, 
the Councils of Appeal and the National Council. Its structure is based on that of the 
Order of Medicines167, the Order of Pharmacists168, and the Order of Veterinaries169. 170 
The organs do not posses legal personality. The Council and the Council of Appeal have 
disciplinary powers while the National Council makes regulations and protects the in-
terests entrusted to the Order. Therefore, it is said that the first two organs have a cer-
tain ‘judicial’ character while the national council has an ‘administrative’ function and 
exercises public authority. This is confirmed by the fact that an appeal can be lodged 
against a decision of the National Council before the Administrative Section of the 
Council of State (Article 40 AO). 
 
                                                                
166 The Councils decide sovereign whether this condition is fulfilled: See Council of Appeal, Liege, 8 February 
1972, unpublished. 
167 Instituted by the law of 25.07.1938 
168 Instituted by the law of 15.04.1949 
169 Instituted by the law of 19.12.1950.  
170 See also Doc. Parl., Senat 1961-1962, N° 299, pp. 2-5. 
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The Provincial Councils are the local organs of the Order charged with the discipline in 
their resort.171 Their competence is limited to the persons registered on the tableau or on 
the list of trainees, as well as over the Belgian or foreign architects established in another 
state who are authorized to practise the profession in its resort. The criteria of subscrip-
tion and authorization are local, but the jurisdiction of the Councils extends to every 
activity wherever its members’ practise.172 Registration has to be asked to the Council of 
the Order of the resort where most of the professional activities take place. According to 
Article 7 there are two Councils for the province of Brabant, a French speaking one and 
a Dutch speaking one. The language of the municipality in which most of the activities 
are performed decides which one of the Councils is competent. The architects estab-
lished in the Brussels-Capital Region are allowed to choose. As described above, in the 
situations as described in Article 8(2) AO, the main place of establishment is not the 
only determining factor. Trainees are subscribed on the list held by the Council to which 
their patron belongs. After being registered, the architect gets a professional card so that 
he can prove his registration in all cases, especially when he hands over his application 
to obtain building permission (Article 41 AO). 
 The Provincial Councils of the Order decide about the admission of trainees on the 
list and of architects on the register (Article 17 AO). When doing this, they always have 
to verify first whether the professional satisfies the criteria of the Architects’ Act. No one 
is therefore registered ex officio on the tableau or on the list. Every candidate has to hand 
over his diploma and a certificate of nationality. If one has a foreign (non EC/EEA) 
nationality, the Council will check whether there is a Treaty containing a reciprocal 
agreement or whether there is a Royal Decree allowing the admission. Furthermore the 
                                                                
171 As held by Rigaux, one can ask whether the professional organization and the disciplinary powers of the 
professional authorities do not violate Article 144 of the Constitution. This provision holds that contesta-
tions about civil rights belong to the exclusive competence of the ‘judicial’ authorities. It is thus forbidden 
to create extraordinary commissions or tribunals for these matters. In principle, disciplinary sanctions are 
not considered to violate a civil right (See Supreme Court 2 June 1983, Arr.Cass. 1982-83, 1217; Bull. 1983, 
1005; J.T. 1984, 298; Pas. 1983, I, 1105; R.W. 1983-84, 2047). Also Article 6 (1) ECHR does not require that 
disciplinary sanctions such as the suspension or the deletion of the list have to be imposed by the judicial 
authorities (See Supreme Court 2 November 1989, Arr.Cass. 1989-90, 298; Bull. 1990, 262; Pas. 1990, I, 
262; R.W. 1989-90, 924; Supreme Court 14 January 1983, Arr.Cass. 1982-83, 657; Bull. 1983, 579; Pas. 
1983, I, 579; R.W. 1982-83, 2544). The Councils of the Order and the Councils of Appeal have a judicial 
function in a private order. Nevertheless, they do not have public authority. Since they obtain their power 
by law, neither an administrative court, such as the Council of Competition, nor another court can inter-
fere in the execution of the disciplinary procedures. Furthermore, Article 40 §1 (1) of the 2006 Law on the 
Protection of Economic Competition (Act of 10 June 2006 on the Protection of Economic Competition, 
Official Gazette 29 June 2006), which states that the President of the Council of Competition can take pro-
visional measures to suspend practices which restrict competition, does not allow the President to enter 
into the sphere of competence of another institution (See, for example, Brussels 14 November 1996, 
J.L.M.B. 1997, 9; Jb. Hand.Med. 1996, 816; T. App. 1997, ed. 4, 30; T.B.H. 1997, 66). His competence is re-
stricted to those measures which are strictly necessary to achieve the goal of the Competition Law, and 
does not extend to prohibit every act of a judicial or administrative authority which is liable to harm com-
petition (Supreme Court 27 November 1997, Arr.Cass. 1997, 1233; Bull. 1997, 1292; Pas. 1997, I, 1292). In 
sum, architects have to respect not only their own deontological rules but also the legal and constitutional 
principles of their national legal system (Supreme Court 13 December 1973, J.T. 1974, 60). Disciplinary 
prosecutions do not fall under the ambit of Article 144 of the Constitution, which reserves the competence 
over disputes exclusively to the judicial order. 
172 Rigaux 1975, p. 142. 
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Council will verify whether there is any incompatibility as per Article 6 AA and, when 
the registration on the tableau is asked for the first time, whether all the conditions con-
cerning the traineeship are fulfilled. A negative decision requires a two-third majority of 
the votes in the Council. However, when a candidate fulfils all the criteria to become a 
member of the Order, the Council is not allowed to limit the effect of his registration in 
any way. As soon as a member no longer fulfils the conditions, it is his obligation to 
inform the Council and ask for the striking out of his name. If he fails to do this, the 
Council has to pursue the striking out following the procedure described in Article 21 
AO. 
 
Since Article 19 AO states that the Councils are in charge of the supervision of the disci-
plinary rules, members have to practise the profession with honour, integrity and discre-
tion.173 The Council thus supervises the honour, discretion and dignity of the Members 
of the Order. It reports every violation and misuse of the title to the judicial authorities. 
Furthermore, as held by Article 20 AO, the Councils rule in disciplinary proceedings 
against its members. As already noted above, trainees and professionals fulfilling the 
requirements of Articles 8 §2(1) and (2) AO can also receive a sanction. The Councils 
can also determine the size of the honoraria at the joint request of the parties, or give 
advice to the tribunals and courts on these matters (Article 18 AO). If a party does not 
agree with the decision of the Council, it can start a procedure before the competent 
civil law court. 
 
Before a complaint is brought before a Council, the Council’s office investigates it. If 
necessary, it refers the complaint to the Council. Following Article 24 AO, a disciplinary 
sanction cannot be imposed without the person concerned being invited by registered 
post to present himself at the meeting of the Council by which his case is examined. This 
letter has to be sent at least thirty days prior to the meeting. The professionals have the 
opportunity to be represented by a lawyer.174 
 
Article 21 AO enumerates the disciplinary sanctions which can be imposed upon a pro-
fessional failing to fulfil his obligations: warning; disapproval; reprimand; suspension; 
deletion from the list. 
 
Disciplinary sanctions can only be imposed for faults which are related to the exercise of 
the profession. Since the suspension and deletion from the list are heavy punishments, a 
two-third majority is needed to impose them (Article 21 AO).175 The other sanctions 
require a simple majority. During the suspension, which cannot last longer than two 
years, the architect is not allowed to exercise the profession. However, suspension does 
not involve the striking out of one’s name on the tableau. The deletion from the list, on 
the other hand, is permanent. 
                                                                
173 Rigaux 1975, p. 154. 
174 Supreme Court 12 June 1987, Arr.Cass. 1986-87, 1258; Bull. 1133; Pas. 1987, I, 1133; T.R.V. 1988, 57, 
annotated by S. Raes. 
175 Supreme Court 1 February 1996, Arr.Cass. 1996, 145; Bull. 1996, 164; Pas. 1996, I, 164; R.W. 1996- 97, 330. 
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With regard to architects established abroad, and who are authorised to work occasion-
ally in Belgium, the only severe sanction is the withdrawal of permission (Article 21 §3 
AO). The suspension or deletion from the list is therefore not possible for this category. 
Appeal can be lodged with the Council of Appeal within thirty days. 
 
The first three sanctions will be wiped out after five years if the professional does not 
receive another sanction during this period (Article 42 §1 AO). For the other two sanc-
tions, an application for rehabilitation has to be handed in by the Council of Appeal 
(Article 42 §2 AO). When wiping off is applied, or the rehabilitation is granted, the 
consequences of the sanction are suspended (Article 42 §3 AO). The procedure which 
has to be followed before the Council of Appeal is described in Article 24 -26(3), 46 AO. 
 
There are two Councils of Appeal: one which uses the French language and is seated in 
Liege, and one which uses Dutch and is seated in Gent. The Council of Appeal decides 
with regard to an appeal which is instituted against a decision of the Council, following 
Article 17 AO (registration, authorisation to practise based on Article 8 §1 and 8 §2(1) 
AO, 20 AO (disciplinary sanctions) and 61 AO (seniority) (Article 31(1) AO). It rules in 
first and last instance over matters described in Article 44 AO (revocation of Council 
members’ mandate when criminally sanctioned) and Article 45 AO (sanction of Council 
or Council of Appeal members’ when not present at two successive meetings), as well as 
over the applications for rehabilitation as described in Article 42 §2 AO (Article 31(5) 
AO). Following Article 26 of the Royal Decree of 31 August 1963, the Council of Appeal 
is also competent in the last resort, in matters relating to the election of members of the 
Councils. As held by Article 33 AO, cassation (Supreme Court) is possible within a 
month of the notification of the decision. 
 
Article 37 states that the National Council legally represents the Order, and is entitled to 
stipulate or conclude contracts in its name. It therefore represents the material as well as 
the moral interests of the Order. According to Article 38 AO, the tasks of the National 
Council are as follows: creating disciplinary rules (such as forms and modalities of prac-
tising the profession, insurance, confidentiality, relations with the principal), making 
regulations with regard to traineeship, supervising the observance of the disciplinary 
rules (which is delegated to the provincial boards) and traineeship regulations which are 
rendered obligatory by Royal Decree, making suggestions to the public authorities on 
legal or administrative measures dealing with the profession and giving advice about the 
practise of it, making regulations of internal order of the Councils and their bureaus, 
supervising the activities of the Councils and collecting their decisions, registering the 
nationals and legal persons of an EU or EEA Member State in the register of service 
provisions, taking the necessary measures for the accomplishment of the Order’s aims 
(i.e. giving non-obligatory directions to the Order’s Councils concerning deontological 
mattes and matters relating to the surveillance of the traineeship) and the publication of 
the tableau of architects and the list of trainees on its internet site. 176 After the imple-
                                                                
176 Doc. Parl., Senat, Session 1960-1961, exposition of motifs, n° 299, p.30. 
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mentation of Directive 2005/36/EC by the Act of 21 November 2008, it was added that 
the National Council has to cooperate closely and exchange information with the com-
petent authorities from the Member State of origin or the host Member State in accor-
dance with the provisions of Title V of the Act of 12 February 2008, instituting a new 
General Framework for the Recognition of EC professional qualifications. The National 
Council has therefore a general competence over all the members of the Order and over 
all the persons authorised to exercise the profession of architect in Belgium. However, it 
is not competent to verify the observance of the deontological rules or to impose disci-
plinary sanctions. 
 
The National Council is composed of twenty members in active service. Article 34 AO 
describes the exact composition. The Dutch and French speaking sections can deliberate 
either separately or jointly (Article 35 AO). 
4. Conclusion 
The Architects’ Act lays down in detail who is allowed to use the title of architect in 
Belgium. In general it can be said that Belgian and other EC/EEA nationals need to be in 
possession of a certain diploma obtained in Belgium, which requires five years of study. 
It is also possible to obtain formal qualifications elsewhere in the EU/EEA. If these 
qualifications are listed in annex 1b or 2a to the annex which implements annex V and 
VI of Directive 2005/36/EC, recognition should be granted automatically. If this is not 
the case, an aptitude test or adaptation period can be completed in accordance with the 
Act of 12 February 2008, instituting a new General Framework for the recognition of 
EC-qualifications, which implements the general system mentioned in Chapter I of Title 
III of the Directive. Professionals who obtained their qualifications outside the EU can 
invoke Article 1 §4 AA. 
 
Architects in Belgium have a monopoly with regard to designing houses and supervising 
building works for (almost) all constructions which require a building permit. Not only 
the title but also the profession is protected. To be able to practise the profession, archi-
tects have to register with the Architects’ Order. To be registered on the tableau, a two 
year period in which professional experience is obtained, has to be completed. The Ar-
chitects’ Order issues the licence to practice, manages the architectural register, deter-
mines the duties and rights of architects, and is responsible for (the formulation and 
execution of) disciplinary rules. Only persons who are allowed to use the title can prac-
tise the profession, as well as third country nationals in cases of reciprocal allowance by 
their state, or in the event that they obtain permission by Royal Decree. This is not in 
violation of the Directive, since the latter only applies to EC/EEA nationals. 
 EC/EEA service providers will be registered in the Services Register in conformity 
with Article 8 §2(1) AO. This Article implements Title II of Directive 2005/36/EC. Third 
country nationals will have to obtain the permission of the Council of the Order located 
in the area in which the service will be provided. 
 Due to the Laruelle Act of 2006, legal persons are also allowed to undertake archi-
tectural tasks. They are, however, not allowed to use the title. It is argued that a com-
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pany can, in principle, overcome the problems faced by natural persons, such as illness 
or death. From 1 July 2007 onwards, architects can secure their personal wealth by the 
creation of a legal person which is registered as architect. Since all architects, including 
legal persons, are obliged to buy insurance, the building master has more certain that he 
will receive damage compensation (there is almost always coverage up to 500,000 Eu-
ros). Other positive aspects of the Laruelle Act are held to be:177 more continuity due to 
the fact that legal persons can practise the profession; no personal liability; more cover-
age; coverage per damage fact and not per ‘project’ or ‘per year’; ten years posterior 
coverage included instead of 36 months; fewer exclusions; application of the anteriority 
principle in the event that the architect contracts with another insurer, and adjusted 
control of the insurance obligation which makes the supervision by the Order’s Council 
easier.178 
 Nevertheless the Laruelle Act contains some negative aspects such as more admini-
stration since the ‘natural persons coverage’ can be changed into ‘legal persons cover-
age’; higher premiums179; the architect-natural person who is not involved in a legal 
person will also have to meet the higher price of his insurance; a risk that good profes-
sionals will pay the price for the faults of bad professionals; discrimination in terms of 
the other building partners continues to exist; there is a risk that the architects’ insur-
ance obligation will negatively affect the quality of the entrepreneur’s work. 
 
Overall, it can be said that Belgium has implemented Directive 2005/36/EC well, al-
though too late. However, neither the Architects’ Act, the Architects’ Order Act or the 
Deontological Code contain any provision on permanent education as intended in Arti-
cle 22 (b) of the Directive. At this moment (26 October 2009) Directive 2006/123/EC 
has not yet been (fully) implemented in Belgium. A bill180 on the amendment of the Act 
of 16 January 2003 establishing a Central Enterprise Databank and modernising the 
Commerce Register and creating Recognised Enterprise Counter and Diverse Regula-
tions on the tasks of the single contact point181 has been proclaimed at federal level in 
order to bring the Act in line with the Directive regarding the single point of contact 
requirement. The bill aimed to implement Articles 6, 7 (partially) and 8 (partially) of the 
Directive by adding to the tasks of the Enterprise Counter the task of being a single 
point of contact. Other initiatives have also been taken, mostly to incorporate existing 
acts which deal with administrative simplification into one document, but at this mo-
                                                                
177 Daelman 2007, p. 66. 
178 The insurers take part in the supervision (Article 7 §1 RDL) so that the architects’ administrative obliga-
tions become lighter. Most of these points were also referred to by Prof. Dr. R De Wit, Vrije Universiteit 
Brussels, during his lecture on the ‘Architectural Company’ at 11 January 2007 at the Vrije Universiteit 
Brussels.  
179 Daelman 2007, p.69. See also htpp://www.protect.be/_CLIENTS/Protect/Documenten/2007-2-27-
(121511)_De%20Tijd.pdf and http://www.nav.be/site2/interview-detail.php?id=13, both last consulted 23 
December 2009. See for more information also Part III of this thesis. 
180 Bill of 20 October, Parl. Doc. 2212/001 
181 Official Gazette 5 February 2003. 
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ment in time, no binding documents have yet been ratified.182 At the regional level, sev-
eral initiatives have also been taken with regard to the single point of contact.183 
 
This chapter has aimed to describe who can use the title of architect and practise the 
profession. Chapter 6 will indicate what the profession of architect really means, and 
which tasks architects need to fulfil. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
182 Telephone conversation with Mr. Jean-Marie Van De Sande, Adviser to the Directorate General on Eco-
nomic Potential, Division Services Federal Public Service Economy, Small and Medium Sized Companies, 
Medium Classes and Energy, 23 October 2009. 
183 On 16 and 23 October 2009 the Flemish Government formally approved initiatives in this regard. On 11 
December 2009 the Flemish Government decided to partially transpose Articles 6 and 8 of the Directive. 
This Decision entered into force on 28 December 2009. 
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CONTRACT LAW IN BELGIUM 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, emphasis has been put on the conditions which have to be 
fulfilled in order for one to enter the profession of architect and to practise the profes-
sion in Belgium. 
 The architects’ tasks and prerogatives were only briefly discussed by referring to 
Article 4 of the Architects’ Act which holds that the involvement of an architect is man-
datory for the design of plans and for the supervision of building works for which a 
building permit is required. 
 
In this chapter more emphasis will be placed on the content of the architectural tasks 
and the relationship of the architect with the building master, as well as with other 
building partners, especially with the entrepreneur. Even though the professions of 
architect and entrepreneur are incompatible in Belgium (Article 6 AA) these profession-
als are dependent on each other in the sense that the entrepreneur is not allowed to 
construct a house which requires a building permit without the involvement of an archi-
tect. The architect, on the other hand, will not be able to supervise the building works if 
the entrepreneur does not give him the opportunity to inspect them. Due to the fact that 
their activities are so closely related, one can therefore not just say that the task of the 
entrepreneur begins where that of the architect ends. This will be further explained 
hereunder. 
 
In this thesis the tasks of the entrepreneur will not be described in detail since my aim is 
to discuss the architectural profession. Nevertheless to understand the scope of the ar-
chitectural tasks, the main characteristics of the contractual relationship between the 
architect and the entrepreneur have to be discussed, as well as a consideration of certain 
specific tasks of some of the other building partners and of the building master himself. 
By discussing and delimiting some important duties of the parties involved, I aim to give 
the reader an idea of what the architectural profession exactly means. In this regard the 
Chapter 6 
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1975 book of Rigaux, ‘L’Architecte, Le Droit de la Profession’1 and his updated version of 
1993 ‘Le Droit de l’Architecte, Evolution des 20 dernières années’2 was of considerable 
importance since these are -to my knowledge- the only books which extensively deal 
with the profession of architect in Belgium in all its facets. This is in contrast to the 
myriad books on ‘construction law’ generally dealing with the process of the execution 
of a building construction by the entrepreneur. 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, this thesis aims to analyse and compare the public and 
private regulation of architects on a multi-national level, and to scrutinize the difficulties 
architects encounter if they want to move within the European Union. It does not there-
fore aim to offer an extensive overview of Dutch and Belgian construction law. The 
preceding chapter on public law dealt with the requirements that architects have to fulfil 
to be able to enter and practise the profession. Therefore it mainly deals with problems 
architects may encounter before they actually start to fulfil a concrete design or supervi-
sion task. The present chapter on private law, on the other hand, refers to the situation 
of the architect after access to the profession has been obtained, and discusses his tasks 
and prerogatives during and after the start of a building work. The exact ambit of the 
architectural tasks is generally laid down in a contract. That is why I have also chosen to 
discuss the position of the architect from a contract law perspective. In this regard the 
contractual liabilities of architects will also be discussed in relation to the tasks of the 
building master and other building partners. Of course it is possible that the architect is 
also liable in tort with regard to third parties (such as the entrepreneur, neighbours, 
persons renting a house, etc.). In this regard it should be noted that the extra-
contractual responsibility will only be withheld if no contractual obligations are vio-
lated.3 Since the responsibilities and tasks of architects are determined by a contract, and 
since my analysis of case law on the liabilities of architects has demonstrated that the 
overall majority of cases holding architects liable are based on their contractual liability, 
I will not discuss the liability in tort of architects or their criminal liability. 
2. The legal position of the architect 
2.1. Liberal profession 
Architects practise a liberal profession.4 As held by Article 2,1° of the Act of 2 August 
2002 on Misleading and Comparative Advertising, Illegal Conditions and Distance 
Contracts concerning the Free Professions5, “Every independent professional activity 
which comprises the provision of services or the delivery of goods and which does not qual-
ify as an act of commerce or trade as meant in the Act of 18 March 1965 on the trade 
                                                                
1 Rigaux 1975, cited above. 
2 Rigaux 1993, cited above. 
3 Supreme Court 7 December 1973, Arr. Cass. 1974, 395: Liège 22 October 2001, J.L.M.B. 2002, ed. 17, 725; 
Brussels 30 October 1957, J.T. 1958, 22; Dabin & Lagasse, 1955, p. 217. 
4 Ghent 8 February 1984, R.J.I. 1990, 237; Baert 1994 p. 439. 
5 Official Gazette. 20 November 2002 
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register and is not meant in the Act of 14 July 1991 on the Trade Practices and the Infor-
mation and Protection of the Consumer, with the exception of rural activities and cattle-
breeding can be qualified as a free profession’. It follows that a liberal professional is in-
dependent and does not engage in commerce or trade. This means that he is deemed not 
to work in his own interests, but in the interest of his client, as well as in the general 
interest. The services which are provided consist in general of intellectual performances 
for which they personally carry responsibility. Therefore free professionals should, in 
principle, have followed a certain educational path and should have obtained certain 
qualifications. It can be added that they are answerable to a disciplinary code which 
aims to guarantee and ameliorate their professionalism, the quality of their work and the 
trust of clients. 
2.2. The legal classification of the architectural contract 
Book III of the Belgian Civil Code determines, in eleven Titles, how ‘ownership’ can be 
obtained, each title explaining one way in which one can become an owner. In this way, 
Title VIII deals with ‘rent’6. It may come as a surprise that ‘rent’ is seen as a way to be-
come an owner. Within the scope of this thesis this will not be discussed in detail. Fur-
thermore, it may even come as a bigger surprise that Title VIII of the Belgian Civil Code 
holds that the relationship between the architect and his client should be qualified as a 
type of ‘rent’. According to Belgian legislation, not only goods but also work can be 
‘rented’. This is explicitly stated in Article 1708 CC. 
 
Chapter I of Title VIII contains some general provisions on rent, Chapter II contains 
provisions on the rent of goods, Chapter III on the rent of work and services and Chap-
ter IV on the rent of cattle. Since architects are human beings who, or whose perform-
ances, cannot be seen as goods or cattle, Chapter III has to be consulted to determine the 
legal classification of the architectural contract. 
 
Article 1710 CC of the Civil Code specifically deals with the rent of work. It states that a 
contract for the rent of work is a contract by which one party engages itself to do some-
thing for another party in return for the payment of an agreed price. Then, Article 1711 
CC holds that the classification ‘rent of work’ can be divided into the rent of labour and 
the rent of services. Even though the Civil Code is not very clear and precise on this 
matter, the concepts are more accurately described in legal doctrine. Rigaux holds that 
the distinction between rent of labour and rent of services is situated in the fact that the 
rent of services requires a relationship of subordination between the contracting parties, 
which means that one is ‘at another one’s service’.7 Rent of labour, on the other hand, 
refers to a contract by which a person engages himself to execute independently a mate-
rial, intellectual or mixed work for the account of another person against remuneration.8 
                                                                
6 In Dutch this is called ‘huur’; in French ‘louage’. 
7 Rigaux 1975, p. 208. 
8 De Page 1957, vol. IV, nr. 844; Mazeaud & Mazeaud 1960, vol. III, nrs. 1331 and 1956; Delvaux 1968, vol. I, 
n° 2. Flamme & Lepaffe 1966, nr.1. 
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Furthermore, Article 1779 CC states that there are three types of ‘rent of work and rent 
of services’9: the rent of employees who work for an employer10 (discussed in Section I of 
Chapter III), the rent of transporters11 (discussed in Section II) and the rent of entrepre-
neurs12 (discussed in Section III). It appears that the Civil Code uses the concepts of rent 
of work and rent of services as synonyms in this provision, while they seem to be treated 
as different concepts in Articles 1710 and 1711 CC. The confusing use of these terms, 
and the blurry design of the Civil Code, have often been criticized, since very different 
situations seem to be equalized13. Indeed, within a working relationship, two situations 
can appear: one can work for another and be completely at the other’s disposal (location 
operarum) or one can merely execute a particular task for the other (location operis 
faciendi). This distinction has not been made accurately in the Civil Code. The first 
situation belongs to Section I and refers to the classic employer-employee relationship, 
while the second situation refers to Section II or III in which there is no such relation-
ship. The difference between the location operarum and location operis faciendi is thus 
situated in the presence or absence of subordination. 
 Since the rent of services requires a relationship of subordination, one can say that 
Section I belongs to this category. Sections II and III can then be qualified as rent of 
labour in the absence of subordination. 
2.3. The status of the architect 
The Deontological Code of the Architects’ Order14 holds that an architect can work: 
- as a self-employed professional 
- as an employee who signs an employment contract and works in whole or in part 
for a natural or legal person 
- as an official of a public administration 
 
When these options are translated in the terms of the Civil Code, one can say that in his 
relationship with the client-building master, the architect can execute a contract of rent 
of labour, a contract of rent of services or when he is an official of a public administra-
tion, by executing his function.15 These options will be discussed hereunder. It should be 
remembered however, that even though the capacity in which the architect works brings 
about consequences as to the nature of the legal actions which are performed by the 
architect, the applicable social security and fiscal regime and the extension of the con-
tractual responsibilities16, it should be noted that the architect always has to fulfil his 
obligations with intellectual independence and obey the deontological and legal rules.  
                                                                
9 In Dutch: ‘Huur van werk en van diensten’. 
10 In Dutch: ‘Huur van dienstboden en werlieden’. 
11 In Dutch: ‘Ondernemers van vervoer te land en te water’. 
12 In Dutch: ‘Bestekken en aannemingen’. 
13 See for example Steyaert, De Ganck &De Schrijver 1990, pp. 8-10. 
14 See Articles 5-8 Deontological Code. 
15 Rigaux 1975, p. 204. 
16 Rigaux 1975, p. 203. 
  Chapter 6  
265 
2.3.1. The contract of the self-employed architect: rent of labour 
The legal independence of the architect in his relationship with the building master 
characterises the self-employed architect as a contract of rent of labour17: the ‘entrepre-
neur’18 is contractually obliged to realize a certain work (locatio operis faciendi) but is 
free in the organization of his work and in the choice of means to realize it.19 As held 
above, next to the rent of transporters, the rent of entrepreneurship is a type of rent of 
work in which there is no employer-employee relationship. The rent of entrepreneur-
ship is a contract by which one party, the entrepreneur, engages himself with regard to 
another party, his client, to realize a certain work against a certain price.20 The difference 
between a contract of entrepreneurship and an employment or ‘labour’ contract21 finds 
its origin in the fact that the object of the latter agreement is the execution of labour, and 
not the result of the labour itself.22 When the agreement only aims for a certain result, 
there will be no subordination.23 The absence of subordination within the relationship 
‘client-entrepreneur’ characterises the entrepreneurial contract and distinguishes it from 
an employment contract, the locatio operarum.24 
 
It is important to note that, in this context, the concept of ‘entrepreneur’ does not only 
refer to building contractors. The concept of entrepreneurship refers to everyone who 
performs a certain work/service (except the transportation of goods/persons) against a 
certain price for another one without there being a relationship of subordination. The 
Belgian legislator only aimed to include material work within the concept of entrepre-
neurship. Articles 1711(6) and 1787-1971 CC refer to raw materials which are delivered 
by the entrepreneur or his client, and which are used to create a certain material work. 
According to the legislator, the artistic and intellectual work of architects is thus not 
included. This type of work is, however, also a type of ‘rent of work’. Since architects 
mostly work with great intellectual freedom, their contracts cannot be classified under 
Section I of Chapter III -the rent of employees who work for an employer- nor do they 
belong to the category of rent of transporters as discussed in Section II. If Section III -
the rent of entrepreneurs- was also not applicable to architectural contracts, their work-
ing situation would not be regulated at all, since the Civil Code does not contain any 
other provisions on the provision of this kind of service. Therefore it was concluded that 
these contracts were an unregulated species of ‘rent of labour’ contract. Nevertheless, 
                                                                
17 In Dutch: ‘huur van werk’. See Baert 2001, p. 4. 
18 See Article 1779, 3° CC. 
19 De Page 1957, vol. IV, nr. 845, p. 970. 
20 Van Eeckhoutte 2007, p. 538.  
21 Note that the use of terms is very confusing. The concept of ‘rent of labour’ refers to a contract in which 
there is no subordination, while a ‘labour contract’ (in Dutch:’huur van arbeid’) means a subordinated re-
lationship between an employee and an employer. This ‘labour contract’ is classified under the concept of 
‘rent of services’ (in Dutch: ‘huur van diensten’). 
22 Supreme Court 3 October 1961, Pas. 1962, I, 142; Supreme Court 11 September 1978, J.T.T. 1979, 200; 
Labour Court Bergen 23 March 1976, T.S.R. 1976, 340; Labour Court Bergen 9 July 1979, R.G.A.R. 1982, 
nr. 10.454. 
23 Lenaerts 1988, nr. 19, p. 20. 
24 Rigaux 1975, p. 203. 
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Belgian legal doctrine and case law also includes intellectual work within the concept of 
entrepreneurship.25 One then speaks about entrepreneurship lato sensu.26 In this way, the 
architectural contract which is concluded between an independent architect and his 
building master is thus also a species of the ‘entrepreneurial contract’.27 Therefore these 
provisions are also applicable to the work of architects. 
 It follows that a shoemaker is an entrepreneur if he repairs his client’s shoes, but 
also that architects are their client’s entrepreneurs when designing a plan or supervising 
building work. The architectural contract is thus a type of ‘entrepreneurial contract’.28 
 
Finally it should be noted that the relationship between the building master and his 
architect is, in principle, thus not qualified as a ‘mandate’29 as meant in Article 1984 CC. 
30 The architect who is bound by a contract of rent of labour, performs intellectual or 
manual acts in his own name in return for remuneration. He represents the building 
master technically, not legally, as is the case when the architect holds a mandate.31 This 
means that when supervising the execution of building work, the architect does not 
represent the building master. However, he works in his own name for the account of 
the building master. Since an entrepreneur works for his own account and at his own 
risk, while a mandatory works for the risk and the account of his principal, the architect 
is, in principle, not allowed to conclude contracts between the building master and the 
entrepreneur in the building master’s name.32 Nevertheless, the contract of the inde-
pendent architect does not exclusively have to be a contract of rent of labour.33 A man-
date can be added for a specific task, and does not change anything in terms of the pro-
fessional obligations of the architect. It does, however, add certain private law effects, 
since the architect represents his client with regard to certain acts which are necessary in 
the construction process. Since the architect legally substitutes his client due to the 
mandate, his responsibility is increased. 
 
In any case it should be noted that even though the architect has an extensive technical 
autonomy, he cannot disrespect the wishes of the building master. Nevertheless, the rent 
of work tolerates that directives are given and that a certain control is exercised.34  
                                                                
25 Flamme & Lepaffe 1966, nr. 3 
26 De Page 1957, vol. IV, nr. 856. 
27 Ghent 16 November 1990, T.G.R. 1991, 8; Brussels, 13 March 1978, T. Aann., 1979, 264; Brussels 26 No-
vember 1965, Pas. 1996, II, 291. 
28 Nackaerts 2005, p. 108.  
29 In Dutch: ‘lastgeving’ or ‘volmacht’. If architects exceed their competence, they are strictly liable towards 
the entrepreneur if the latter suffers damages because of this action. 
30 Tilleman 1997, p. 26-28, nr. 32. 
31 Bricmont 1971, nr. 2.  
32 It is possible, however, that the architect performs a small amount of legal acts for the benefit and in the 
name of the building master. In these cases the scope of his mandate has to be interpreted restrictively.  
33 Bricmont 1971, nr. 3 ; Brussels 15 November 1973, R.J.I., 1966, n° 4268. 
34 Rigaux 1975, p. 310. 
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2.3.2. The contract of the employed architect: rent of services35 
As held by the Supreme Court, the exercise of a liberal profession is compatible with the 
status of employee.36 This is also confirmed by Article 7 of the Deontological Code. As 
stated earlier, a contract of rent of services means a relationship of subordination, for 
example a contract of employment.37 In this case the architect is thus not an ‘entrepre-
neur’ and his relationship with his employer – who does not have to be a member of the 
Order and is not obliged to respect the deontological rules – is characterized by the fact 
that the architect does not dispose of legal independence. His intellectual independence 
cannot be touched upon. In the event that the level of subordination is so high that it 
affects the personal and technical autonomy of the employed architect, the architect is 
not allowed to fulfil the tasks which fall within his legal monopoly.38 
 As held by Article 7 of the Deontological Code, the architect-employee has to have 
the opportunity to take up his responsibility due to the specificity of his profession. He 
has to make sure that the relations between his employer and the latter’s co-contractor 
do not violate the acts and regulations concerning the architectural profession. If this 
were to be the case, he has to inform his employer. 
 
Lastly, it should be remembered that it is forbidden for an architect to be employed by a 
building contractor (hereinafter: entrepreneur) or by a promoter, due to the possible 
conflicts of interests (Article 6 AA). Promoters can, however, conclude contracts with 
architects but these will only be valid as long as the architects are self-employed. Since 
this type of architectural contract is not common within traditional construction law, it 
will not be further discussed.  
2.3.3. The architect – public official 
The architect working for the public authorities does not dispose of an employment 
contract. He is thus not an employee as outlined in Article 1779, 1° CC (rent of ser-
vices), but is unilaterally appointed by the administration to fulfil a certain task and is 
subordinated to it.39 Since Article 5 AA prohibits the officials of the State, provinces, 
municipalities and public institutions from operating as architect outside their function, 
these architects have a limited competence. This incompatibility finds its origin in the 
possibility that architect-officials can obtain the required building permissions more 
easily, or obtain unfair advantages. As suggested before, an exception is made for archi-
tects who work in the above-mentioned capacity to teach architecture (Article 5(2) 
                                                                
35 The ‘rent of services’ – in Dutch: ‘huur van diensten’ – does not refer to the provision of services in general 
but to the fact that ‘one works at someone’s service’.  
36 Supreme Court 27 March 1968, R.C.J.B., 1970, p.78. 
37 Supreme Court, 12 November 1964, Pas., 1965, I, 254 ; Supreme Court 17 November 1960, Pas. 1962, I, 
334 ; Supreme Court 11 January 1962, Pas. 1962, I, 571; T.S.R. 1962, 366. 
38 Rigaux 1975, p.216. 
39 The statute of the federal officials is regulated by the Royal Decree of 3 October 1937. 
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AA)40 or for architect-officials who design plans and supervise the execution of the 
building works concerning their own house.41 
 
Since the great majority of architects working in a traditional construction process are 
self-employed, while the type of architect under consideration has limited competences, 
the status of the architect-public official will not be discussed further. 
3. Parties to the architectural contract 
The architectural contract is mostly concluded between the architect and a non-
professional building master. As indicated above, in Belgium the architectural contract 
which is concluded between a self-employed architect and his building master is seen as 
a species of the entrepreneurial contract. The ‘architect-entrepreneur’ is ‘hired’ by the 
building master to fulfil a certain task against a certain price (Article 1711(6) and 1787 
CC). As noted before, he is, in accordance with Article 4 AA, normally engaged to draw 
up the plans and to supervise the execution of the building works by the entrepreneur, 
and is thus an actor in the construction process. 
 It follows that the legal principles of construction law42 are described by referring to 
the different functions of the participants. In this way one can say that the four main 
functions of the construction process are incumbent on the person ordering the con-
struction, the person designing the construction, the person erecting the construction, 
and the person supervising the erection of the construction. 
 
Another way of considering the construction process as the source of construction law, 
is by looking at the successive phases of the process instead of at the functions of the 
actors. According to Janssen, this method can be more advantageous since, to an in-
creasing extent, functions of the construction process are often co-joined and performed 
by a single participant.43 This has resulted in the development of new, alternative con-
struction processes in addition to the traditional construction process in which the ‘de-
sign’ of the building work and the actual ‘execution’ of the building work are performed 
by different participants. Nevertheless, the traditional construction process is still con-
sidered to be the basic form, in which the initiator (i.e. the building master) or the de-
                                                                
40 Supreme Court, 28 February 1984, AR 4256, nr 76, unpublished. 
41 Article 5 AA has to be interpreted independently from Article 4: See Council of State 23 June 1970, Arr. Et 
Avis Cons. Etat, 1970, 645. Article 4 AA holds that the cooperation of an architect is only required for the 
drawing of the plans and the supervision of the execution of the building project. Article 5 AA however, 
underlines the incompatibility for every activity which is related to the profession of architect with a public 
function. In most cases, the violation consists of a functionary asking an independent architect to sign his 
plans or to cover for him in another way when necessary. By his signature his colleague violates the provi-
sions as well. Both are guilty of forgery: Supreme Court 25 April 1960, Pas., I, 988; Ghent, 5 February 1966, 
R.W., 965-66, col. 1952. Furthermore, the functionary is liable to be sanctioned for violation of Article 53 
AO. 
42 Construction law regulates the rights and obligations of persons and legal entities who perform functions 
of the construction process as well as the mutual legal relationships between those participants. Of course 
the architect is an actor in the construction process.  
43 Jansen 1998, pp. 10-12. 
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sign/managing intermediary (i.e. mostly an architect; however in some states the in-
volvement of an architect is not required) on his behalf, is deemed to have a very large 
influence on the builder’s performance of the contract. At the other end of the scale, an 
alternative construction process is to be found which recognises only a minimum 
amount of influence exercised on the process as a whole by, or on behalf of, the initiator. 
Between both ends of this scale, various examples of alternative construction processes 
are to be found, depending on the amount of influence of the initiator. In an alternative 
construction process, for example, a process in which a building promoter is involved, 
the building master normally does not conclude separate contracts with his architect 
and entrepreneur, but concludes one agreement with a building promoter. These pro-
motor agreements are thus concluded between a professional promoter and his client, 
and foresee, in principle, that the promoter will take care of the construction process 
from the beginning to the end. He will lead the technical and legal organisation of the 
project and will offer a global service package. In this way his clients do not have to 
contract with the architect and the entrepreneur separately.44 It appears that ‘building 
masters’45 who were abolished by the Architects’ Act in 1939 have been revived again. 
Even though it is still forbidden to combine the profession of architect and entrepre-
neur, the promoter hires both types of professionals, but is the sole contracting party of 
the final consumer. 
 The aim of the promoter is to have a construction erected which he subsequently 
will sell to his client. An important advantage of an alternative construction process lies 
in the period of time which is required to complete a building. This means, however, 
that the architect is not particularly occupied with the interests of the initiator but only 
with the interests of the promoter who actually functions as the architect’s building 
master. 46 Since the initiator only has to sign the promoter contract, these projects are 
often called ‘key-on-the-door projects’. It follows, therefore, that the promoter can con-
clude a contract in which he engages himself to deliver services which belong to the 
monopoly of the architect.47 Nevertheless, as suggested above, the architect engaged by 
the promotor is never allowed to lose his independence. Whatever his status is, Article 
                                                                
44 Bergen 25 June 1991, J.L.M.B. 1992, 758, annotated by B. Louveaux; Antwerp 7 November 1977, Limb. 
Rechtsl. 1979, 73. 
45 In this sentence, building master refers to ‘bouwmeester’ which was a title given to professionals who 
practised the profession of architect and entrepreneur at the same time. See paragraph 10.1. 
46 Liège 26 March 1997, T. Aann. 1998, 263. 
47 Since the initiator, whose choices are limited, contracted with a promoter, the latter can be held contractu-
ally liable towards the initiator for faults made by the architects or entrepreneurs chosen by him: The pro-
motor has an obligation of result: Ghent 1 March 1984, R.J.I. 1984, 331 and Bergen, 26 March 1999, Cah. 
dr. immo 2000, ed. 2, 19, annotated by J. Henrotte. The promoter can thus be held liable for faults in the 
conception and the execution: See Antwerp 14 November 2002, R.W. 2005-2006, ed. 17, 667; T. Aann. 
2003, ed. 2, 114. However, if the damage results from a fault of one of the constructors, the promoter can 
institute an action in recourse: Ghent 1 March 1984, R.J.I. 1984, 331 and Bergen, 26 March 1999, Cah. dr. 
immo 2000, ed. 2, 19, annotated by J. Henrotte. Brussels 15 February 1996, J.L.M.B. 1996, 1482. The ten 
year liability principle, which will be discussed later, is also applicable to the seller and the building pro-
moter. However the architect and/or the entrepreneur can also be held liable e.g. based on their ten-year 
responsibility principle, or in tort, while it is also possible that the promoter and the architect/entrepreneur 
are condemned in solidum. The liability of the promotor will not be further discussed in this thesis since it 
aims to discuss the regulations relating to architects. 
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4(2) of the Deontological Code states that the architect always has to stay independent 
so that he can practise his profession in accordance with his task of public order and 
incur liability for his own acts.48 
 
Due to the lack of control by the client in such cases, the Belgian legislators developed 
the House-building Act49 which aims to protect consumers who have concluded a con-
tract with a building promoter for the purchase of a construction which still has to be 
built, or which is being built. The Act contains certain requirements which have to be 
fulfilled and which cannot be deviated from in order to prevent the promoters’ misuse 
due to the clients’ lack of speciality, knowledge and wealth caused the fact that there was 
no coercive legislation on the content and modalities of the contracts, which were 
mostly written in the promoters’ favour.50 By requiring a predetermined price, a double 
delivery51, a limited payment in advance of a maximum of 5% of the total cost-price of 
the construction, a guaranteed security on the part of the promoter, supervision by a 
notary, mandatory stipulations in the contract, ten year liability period with regard to 
the promoter, etc., the House-building Act aims to protect the consumer and increase 
legal certainty for all parties. 
 
This thesis aims to discuss the regulation of architects and the architects’ tasks within 
the traditional construction process.52 Therefore the House-building Act will not be 
further discussed. The reason is that, even though promoter agreements and key-on-
the-door projects are becoming increasingly popular, the traditional construction proc-
ess still predominates in the private building market.53 The use of alternative construc-
tion processes cannot be considered as widespread in this market. Furthermore the 
alternative construction principles are mostly based, or dependent on, the traditional 
ones or are heavily influenced by them. Therefore they can, in any case, not be consid-
ered independently from the traditional principles.54 It follows that every time legal 
aspects of alternative construction processes are analysed, the frame of reference should 
be the traditional construction process itself. For these reasons this thesis only discusses 
the most important aspects of the traditional construction process. 
                                                                
48 Supreme Court 1 December 1994, Arr.Cass. 1994, 1038; Bull. 1994, 1031; J.L.M.B. 1995, 1078, annotated by 
F. Moises; J.T. 1995, 316; Pas. 1994, I, 1031; R.W. 1994-1995, 1377.  
 It should be noted that the architect is not allowed to contract with the promoter’s client as well. If he does 
so, his independence with regard to the promoter – being the architects’ original building master – is jeop-
ardized: President of the Council of Competition 31 October 1995, A.J.T. 1995-1996, annotated by J. Bil-
liet; J.L.M.B. 1996,263, annotated by J. Vergauwe; J.T. 1996, 346; Brussels 26 September 1979, J.T. 1980, 26. 
If the building master holds the opinion that there is a lack of independence, he has to prove this in con-
creto: Ghent 9 June 2006, N.J.W. 2007, ed. 156, 134, annotated by K. Vanhove. 
49 Act of 9 July 1971, B.S. 11 September 1971. This Act is also called the ‘Breyne Act’ after the former Minis-
ter of Household and Housing. 
50 Meulemans 2005, p. 67 
51 This will be explained in paragraph 12.5.3.2. 
52 Public procurement is thus also excluded.  
53 Janssen 1998, p. 106. 
54 Jansen 1998, p. 108. 
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4. Content of the architectural contract 
Since the ‘rent of work’ which includes the ‘rent of entrepreneurs’ is a type of contract, 
the general principles of contract law are applicable to the bilateral architectural contract 
which entails reciprocal obligations.55 This means that the contract has to be concluded 
by two or more consenting parties, that the parties have to be legally capable to bind 
themselves, that the agreement comes into existence without a substantial default of 
intention (error, deceit (dol) or violence), that the object has to be determined, and that 
the obligations have to have a legal cause (see Article 1108 CC). 
 
Since this thesis deals with the regulation of architects and their specific contractual 
obligations and liabilities, I will not explain these general principles of contract law in 
great detail. 
 With regard to the fact that both parties have to consent, the architect who holds the 
opinion that it is impossible or unsafe to build according to the wishes of the building 
master, has to refuse his cooperation, or adapt the instructions given to him before he 
enters into the contract. He has to stay independent throughout the whole construction 
process in order to fulfil his legal tasks. 
 In this regard it can be noted that Belgian legislation does not require that the archi-
tectural contract should be laid down in writing. The existence of the contract can be 
proven according to the regular rules of general contract law (Article 1315-1369 CC). 
The plan and the building permit application, both signed by the client, constitute suffi-
cient proof.56 A written contract is only necessary in the event that the building master 
wants the architect to undertake additional work and if a vast price has been agreed with 
regard to the erection of a building on the land of the building master in accordance 
with the architects’ plan (Article 1793 CC)57. Furthermore, all agreements to which the 
House-building Act is applicable, have also to be laid down in writing (Article 7 House-
building Act). Notwithstanding all these provisions, architects have a deontological 
obligation to conclude a contract in writing with their building master (Article 20 Deon-
tological Code). 
 
Of course it is strictly forbidden for the architect to intentionally mislead his contracting 
party in order to obtain an agreement or to use violence for this aim. Since there is an 
information asymmetry between both parties, the architect has the obligation to inform 
his inexperienced client. If he fails to do this, he can be held liable.58 
 
The object of the architectural contract is to determine a programme and a budget.59 
This programme is, as held above, of public interest. It follows therefore that there has 
                                                                
55 Rigaux 1975, p. 226. 
56 Antwerp 4 December 2002, N. .J.W. 2003, ed. 43, 1000, annotated by W. Goossens. 
57 It is possible to contractually agree that a written agreement is not necessary. However, this is not easy to 
prove in the event of a dispute. Laurent, pp. 79-88. 
58 Court of First Instance Brussels 21 January 1958, R.J.I., 275. 
59 Antwerp 10 November 1999, A.J.T. 1999-00, 969; Ghent 9 November 1993, A.J.T. 1994-95, 67, annotated 
by B. De Temmerman; Pas. 1993, II, 18; R.W. 1993-94, 1235. 
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to be an agreement on the work which has to be carried out by the architect within a 
certain period of time, as well as on the fact that a price has to be paid by the building 
master for the work which has been executed. Furthermore, parties have to agree on all 
other essential and substantial special conditions.60 To make sure that both parties have 
the same object in mind, the programme should be refined by the fixing of a budget. 
This budget approximates the expenses that the building master has to bear and should 
be determined before the contract is concluded. Nevertheless, the exact sum does not 
have to be determined in advance (Article 1710, 1711(6) and 1787 CC). In this way, one 
also tries to ensure that the financial resources of the building master are sufficient for 
the execution of the programme.61   
 
The legal cause is the underlying reason which causes parties to agree to, and conclude, 
the contract. As held by Article 1131 CC, an agreement without a cause or with a false or 
illicit (unlawful) cause, has no consequences and is void. This is the case when the cause 
is prohibited by law, is contrary to good morals (for example collusion between the 
architect and the entrepreneur (Article 6 AA)) or is in violation of public order. 
 
The content of the architectural contract is not limited to the provisions in the contract 
itself. Moreover, the contractual freedom and the autonomy of the parties involved is 
not even unlimited. Articles 1792 and 2270 concerning the ten year liability principle of 
the architect and the entrepreneur have coercive force as well as does Article 1793 CC 
on the proof of additional work in the event that a certain price has been agreed on.62 
These Articles which were already referred to in paragraph 5.1, will be discussed in more 
detail in paragraph 6.5.3.2. Furthermore, as held by Article 1135 CC, contracts do not 
only oblige the parties to honour what is specifically agreed to, but also encompass all 
the consequences which result from equity, usage and the law, according to the nature 
of the contract. The Civil Code’s provisions on entrepreneurship do not contain an 
enumeration of the entrepreneur’s (and thus the architect’s) tasks, nor those of the 
building master. Only by studying the general rules on entrepreneurship stated in Arti-
cle 1787 CC and further, can some important characteristics of the architectural con-
tract and the obligations of the contracting parties be derived, taking into account the 
specific demands of the profession. As will be seen, only Articles 1792 and 2270 CC 
specifically deal with building works, while the other Articles are applicable to entrepre-
neurship in general. 
 
 Lastly it should be noted that the Civil Code does not contain a definition of entre-
preneurship. Nevertheless, Article 1787 CC gives an indication. It states that if one hires 
someone to execute a certain work, one can agree that that person will only offer his 
labour or services, or that he will also deliver the materials. Entrepreneurship concerns 
thus the creation/execution of a certain ‘work’ and not the purchase/sale63 of it, even if 
                                                                
60 Brussels 24 January 1972, T. Aann. 1980, 187, annotated by De Nève. 
61 Rigaux 1975, p. 243. 
62 Baert 2001, p.32. 
63 The transfer of ownership takes place at the moment of delivery and by ‘natrekking’ in the case of immov-
ables.  
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the entrepreneur delivers the material himself.64 The result is that the entrepreneur’s 
labour is his main obligation, even if he has to deliver the materials. As held above, Bel-
gian case law and doctrine consider the architect as a type of entrepreneur. Article 1787 
CC indicates thus that the entrepreneur has to execute and deliver a certain work to his 
client. 
4.1. Obligations of the architect 
The obligations of an architect with a full mission can be summarised as follows: the 
design of a plan, the delivery of the plan to the building master, and the supervision of 
the execution of the building works within the agreed period. The intervention of the 
architect in general consists of four phases: 
 
- Provision of assistance and advice to the client 
The architect has to inform his clients about the desired methods/materials to be used, 
about the possible risks of the construction, etc. He also has to inform his client about 
the applicable legal rules, such as building prescriptions, and advise the building master 
about the choice of entrepreneur, check the latter’s registration65, and study the different 
offers made. 
 
- Determination of the programme and the budget 
The determination of the programme and the budget takes place after the architect has 
obtained information about his client’s desires. As noted above, this is the object of the 
entrepreneurial contract. The architect has to stay within the limits of the budget (Arti-
cle 16 Deontological Code) and also has to check the costs of the entrepreneur.66 In this 
regard it should be noted that Article 1793 CC indicates that neither the architect nor 
the entrepreneur can demand a higher fee unless the building master has given his per-
mission for the higher fee in writing. It follows that the architect has to warn his client if 
the agreed budget will be exceeded, and has to verify whether his client agrees with 
this.67  This determination takes place before the architect starts the actual work for 
which the legislator had given him a monopoly. These tasks are described hereunder.  
With regard to the setting of the price, reference should be made again to paragraph 
3.6.3.2 of this book where it was held that the European Commission held that the rec-
ommended fee scale that was created by the Belgian Architects’ Order in 1967 and 
which got binding force by Royal Decree in 1985, violated EC competition law.68  Rec-
ommended minimum tariffs are generally created to coordinate the conduct of archi-
tects so that architects whose costs are lower are dissuaded from lowering their prices.  
Consequently, the recommended fee scale was revoked by the Order. 
                                                                
64 De Page, 1957, nr. 870; Duranton 1844, XVII, nr. 250; Duvergier 1837, nr. 335. 
65 Supreme Court 9 June 1997, Arr.Cass. 1997, 625 ; Bull. 1997, 649 ; Fiskoloog 1998, ed. 646, 1 : J.L.M.B. 
1997, 1276. 
66 Court of First Instance Brussels 1 September 1998, T.B.B.R. 2000, 56. 
67 Liège 15 May 2008, R.G.A.R. 2008, afl. 10, nr. 14448 ; T. Aann. 2990, afl. 1, 70; Liège 6 May 1992, J.T. 1992, 
797; J.L.M.B. 1992, 1268, annotated by B. Louveaux.  
68  See also paragraph 11.3.6.4. 
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- Design of the plan 
As stated before, the architect has been given a prerogative by the Architects’ Act to 
design plans for constructions which require a building permit. He therefore has to 
assist the building master with obtaining a building permit by designing a plan which 
fulfils all the legal requirements. 
 Such a plan, of course, has to be without technical faults (stability, safety, durabil-
ity), in conformity with the legal regulations69, etc. To be able to do this, the architect has 
to make a study of the soil, the foundations and all factors which are important when it 
comes to designing a proper plan. If he is not able to do this, he has to engage an expert 
with sufficient skills. Since architects can hire engineers to perform certain specific 
technical design services for which architects are not sufficiently educated, it can be 
argued that the monopoly of the position is less strict.70 However, architects have to hire 
professionally skilled specialists. 
 The architect does not have to guarantee that a building permit will be granted 
(obligation of means); however, his design has to comply with the applicable legislation 
(obligation of result). 
 
- Supervision of the execution of the building works 
As held by Article 4 AA, the cooperation of an architect is required for the drawing up 
of the plans and the supervision of the execution of the building project. A full supervi-
sion means the verification of whether the project is built in conformity with the plans, 
according to the state of the art, with the appropriate safety requirements, with the 
building regulations, etc. However, since the architect’s tasks have a strictly intellectual 
character, he does not have to guarantee a good execution of the building contract by 
the entrepreneur in terms of the building master. He does not have any construction 
obligation and cannot even fulfil any construction tasks due to the incompatibility 
stipulated in Article 6 AA. 
 With regard to his supervisory tasks, the architect is not obliged to be present at the 
building site at all times.71 The number of verifications depends on the danger and risks 
associated with the building works, their importance, the nature of his obligations, and 
the competence of the entrepreneur, etc.72 However, at crucial moments, when impor-
tant steps are taken, the architect has to be present.73 The daily ‘supervision’ rests on the 
entrepreneur.74 In this regard it should be noted that there is no contractual relationship 
                                                                
69 See Article 17 Deontological Code; Ghent 9 December 1994, R.W. 1995-1996, 90. 
70 Supreme Court 3 March 1978, Arr.Cass. 1978, 780; R.W. 1978-79, 711; T. Aann. 1981, 262, annotated by 
Krings; J.T. 1979, 28, annotated by Krings; Pas. 1978, I, 759; , R.C.J.B. 1982, 176, annotated by M. Alexan-
dre; R.J.I. 1979, 7 . 
71 Brussels 18 October 2002, R.J.I. 2003, 195; Antwerp 14 October 2003, N.J.W. 2003, 1266, annotated by W. 
Goossens.  
72 Brussels 23 January 1975, T. Aann. 1975, 146; Herbots 1980, p. 231. 
73 Antwerp 14 October 2003, N.J.W. 2003, ed. 50, 1266, annotated by W. Goossens; R.W. 2005-06, ed. 22, 
863; TBO 2005, ed. 2, 110, annotated by M. Debaene and A. Van Grunderbeek; Ghent 18 April 1997, A.J.T. 
1999-00, 41, Brussels 23 January 1975, T. Aann. 1975, 151, Dendermonde 21 June 2001, T. Aann. 2002, ed. 
2, 159. 
74 Brussels 18 October 2002, R.J.I. 2003, ed. 3, 195: Brussels 30 September 1999, T. Aann. 2000, 146; Brussels 
3 February 1988, R.J.I. 1988, 275. 
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between the architect and the entrepreneur which means that the architect does not 
have any legal authority over the entrepreneur, only a technical one. It follows that the 
entrepreneur is free to neglect the instructions of the architect and to decide that the 
work has to be executed in a way of his own choosing.75 
 However, if the entrepreneur does not take into account the advice given by the 
architect, the architect would be wise to write down his advice and inform the building 
master about it, so that the latter is aware of the possibility of putting the entrepreneur 
in default. If the architect does not warn his client, he risks being held liable for im-
proper supervision of the building work. The architect will not be held liable, however, if 
he can prove that, although he supervised the works frequently, he could not prevent the 
damage or that he took every necessary measure to prevent it. Architects are always 
allowed to engage experts to assist them during the verification of the building works. 
 
It follows that the theory that the architect has -due to his supervising task- the obliga-
tion to make sure that the building is constructed in conformity with the project and 
without any defaults, is incorrect.76 His only occupation is to make sure that the entre-
preneur comprehends the technical documents (directions a priori) and to control the 
execution (verifications a posteriori).77 Articles 28-30 of the Deontological Code also 
mention these tasks. It should be noted that the architects’ supervision task is, in princi-
ple, an obligation of means, not an obligation of result. However, often the result is the 
only way to determine whether the supervision of the architect was sufficient. Therefore, 
the architectural obligation is often treated by courts as an obligation of result. It has 
become clear that the execution of the contract of the architect and that of the entrepre-
neur run parallel, and that the architect is the supervisor of the building works but is not 
the entrepreneur’s superior. 
4.2. Obligations of the building master 
The main tasks of the building master are the following78: 
 
- Give the architect and the entrepreneur the opportunity to execute their work. 
This means that he has to give them access to the terrain and, in the event that this is 
agreed on, to put the necessary materials at the entrepreneur’s disposal and make sure 
that all necessary permits and authorisations, such as the building permits, are available. 
If the building materials are not handed over to the entrepreneur, the architect is also 
hindered in his supervisory function. Furthermore, next to this duty to cooperate, the 
building master also has a duty to abstain from interfering in the architects’ and entre-
preneurs’ work. Since the architect does not only have to take into account the interests 
                                                                
75 The sub-contractors of the entrepreneur are also independent of the entrepreneur and are not subjected to 
his orders. 
76 Soinne 1969, p. 572. 
77 De Caluwé, annotation under Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 4 December 1970, L’entreprise et le droit, 
1972, p. 41; Flamme & Lepaffe 1966, nr. 398. 
78 Pothier 1766, nr. 404 and 410; Kluyskens 1952, IV, nr. 353. 
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of his client, but also those of society as a whole, he cannot reject his responsibility if the 
building master interferes with his work. The architect can therefore not invoke an or-
der of his client to decline his responsibility towards third parties.79 However, the archi-
tect is not liable if the building master is a specialist in his field.80 In such a case, the 
latter has to bear the consequences of his own actions. It follows that a building master-
engineer who overrides the architect’s conception of the foundations with his own 
views, is personally responsible for his decision.81 Every time the building master inter-
feres with the architect’s prerogatives, he violates the contract. The building master is 
not allowed to contract with an entrepreneur without informing and consulting his 
architect. He also has to withhold from giving instructions to the entrepreneur without 
the architect’s consent, from approving the works, accepting their delivery and from 
paying the entrepreneur’s bills, without the architect’s approval.82 
 
However, it is important for the architect, as well as for the entrepreneur, to refuse per-
forming more services, and to ask for the judicial resolution of the contract every time 
the building master does not take into account his advice.83 In such a situation, the pro-
fessional should ask to be relieved from liability.84 
 
- Provide all necessary information 
The building master has to provide the architect and the entrepreneur with all relevant 
information in order to fulfil his task properly. He has to inform the architect, as well as 
the entrepreneur, if he is aware that special precautions have to be taken. 
 
- Pay the price 
The execution of the work and the delivery within the time limits constitute the basis for 
the duty to pay, not the approval. It follows that if the building master refuses to ap-
prove the works without any justification, the entrepreneur still has the right to be paid. 
If the building only contains small defects, full payment cannot be refused, but a partial 
retention is justified. 
 As held in the preceding paragraph, it should be noted that in the event that a fixed 
price has been agreed on, as meant in Article 1793 CC, this price cannot be augmented, 
not even in the event of a rise in building material costs, an increase in wages or adapta-
tions to the plan, unless written permission is granted for these adaptations and the 
augmentation of the price has been agreed upon. Article 1793 CC is, however, only 
applicable in the event that the building master is the owner of the territory on which 
the construction is being undertaken. 
 It aims to protect the building master-owner since he may have invested a lot of his 
wealth and deserves protection. Building masters who do not own the territory do not 
need this protection since they have a sales contract and will feel less ‘obliged’ to pay an 
                                                                
79 Supreme Court 20 February 1969, R.J.I. 1969, 273. 
80 Rigaux 1975, p. 409. 
81 Brussels 22 January 1962, J.T., 1963, 11. 
82 Rigaux 1975, pp. 423-424. 
83 De Caluwé & Devogele, J.T., p. 589; Supreme Court 25 April 1991, Arr.Cass. 1190-91, 873 
84 Supreme Court 3 March 1978, R.W. 1978-79, 711. 
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additional sum. In the event that more money is asked, they will refrain from buying 
and will not lose their prior investment. However in the event that the archi-
tect/entrepreneur has to fulfil more work than was initially presumed, for example due 
to an adaptation of the plan and extra calculations due to unforeseeable difficulties with 
the territory such as subsidence, additional payment can be asked since in such a case, 
one presumes that the architect/entrepreneur could and should not have been aware of 
the said difficulty. 
 
The price does not have to be determined in advance. In principle, parties can agree to 
determine the price after the work has been executed. In the event that the contract does 
contain a provision on remuneration, the architect still has the right to be paid. In such 
a case, the budgetary limits of the client have to be taken into account. Even though the 
architect is not obliged however to ask for payment for his services,85 the Councils of the 
Order can decide that when an architect asks such a low fee that it causes him to have an 
abnormally high number of clients, the honour and dignity of the profession are 
harmed.86 In general however, the honorarium of the architect is laid down in the con-
tract and is usually proportional to the costs of the building work. With regard to the 
amount of the architects’ honoraria, it should be noted that the National Council of the 
Belgian Order of Architects has created a scale of minimum honoraria in 1967: Deonto-
logical Norm Nr. 2.87 In 2002, the Order qualified this scale as a guide, with an indicative 
value. The scale contains a table in which the architects’ honoraria are determined and 
are based on a certain percentage of the value of the works. However, this Norm has not 
been ratified by Royal Decree. It is therefore not opposable by the building master when 
not expressly included in the contract. In such a case, the honorarium of the architect 
will be determined by taking into account the work done, the difficulty and scope of it, 
and the level of responsibility of the architect.88 The Norm is thus not binding for 
judges.89 However, even though it has a mere advisory function, it was almost always 
used by architects as it was the only way to determine their salary.  
 As already indicated in Part I of this thesis, in 2004 the Court of Brussels decided 
that Deontological Norm Nr. 2 is void due to the content of European competition law 
as embraced in Article 81(2) EC.90 The reason was that the European Commission had 
                                                                
85 Ghent 9 December 1913, Pas. 1914, II, 47. 
86 Supreme Court 23 February 1978 , Arr.Cass. 1978, 743; Pas. 1978, I, 723; Council of Architects Namen, 26 
June 1976, J.L. 1972-73, 15; R.J.I. 1972, 205. 
87 See Chapter 3.6.3.2 and Chapter . 
88 Liège 23 January 1995, J.T. 1995, 385; Pas. 1994, II, 3; R.R.D. 1995, 40. 
89 Brussels 14 June 1971, J.C.B., 1971, I, 568; J.C.B., 1971, I, 568. 
 In the case of disagreement, parties can also turn to the provincial orders. However, its decision is only of 
moral value. If the parties still disagree, they can go to court. The judge, not bound by the decision of the 
Order (see Council of State 27 April 1994, Arr. R.v.St. 1994; R.A.C.E. 1994) will then determine the hono-
rarium ex aequo et bono by considering the extent of the mission, the rendered services and the assumed 
responsibility: see e.g. Brussels 14 June 1971, B.R.H. 1971, 568; J.C.B., 1971, I, 568. 
90 Brussels 28 September 2004, Jb.Hand.Med. 2004, 925. Eight years previously, this same Court held how-
ever that the president cannot prohibit the Councils from applying Article 12 of the Deontology Code, 
concretised in the Deontological Norm Nr. 2 concerning the scale of the architect’s honoraria: See Brus-
sels, 14 November 1996, J.L.M.B. 1997, 9 ; Jaarboek Handelspraktijken & Mededinging 1996, 816; T. App. 
1997, ed. 4, 30; T.B.H. 1997, 66. This was due to the fact that Article 40 §1 (1) of the 2006 Law on the Pro-
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qualified this Norm as a decision prohibited by Article 81(1) EC. This meant that na-
tional competition law is no longer allowed to lead to another conclusion and that the 
Deontological Norm Nr. 2 can no longer be expressly relied upon to determine the 
amount of the honoraria.91 
 
Every time he has made progress, the architect can ask to be paid.  
 He can only interrupt his work after having duly warned his client that this will 
happen in the event that his honorarium will not be paid (exceptio non adimpleti con-
tractus). However, when suspending his contractual obligations, he has to make a report 
of the situation, mention probable risks and remind his client of the legal obligation to 
involve an(other) architect to control the work in question.92 
 
Finally, mention should also be made of Article 1798 CC which holds that bricklayers, 
carpenters, workmen, craftsmen and sub-entrepreneurs who are involved in the erec-
tion of a building or another work which is constructed by an entrepreneur, have a di-
rect claim against the building master which cannot be higher than the amount the 
building master owes to the entrepreneur at the moment that the claim is instituted. In 
this case, the sub-entrepreneur is considered to be an entrepreneur, and the entrepre-
neur to be a building master in terms of the sub-entrepreneur’s own sub-entrepreneurs. 
The purpose of Article 1798 CC is to give the unpaid sub-entrepreneur and his own sub-
contractors more security in the event that the main entrepreneur does not pay or goes 
bankrupt. By treating the entrepreneur as a building master, he is encouraged not to 
contract with impecunious sub-entrepreneurs. In such a case, he would risk having to 
pay the sub-sub-entrepreneur93. Article 1798 CC thus aims to protect these sub-
contractors. However, the Article is also beneficial for the building master, since work-
ers who know they can turn to him are more encouraged to continue working in the 
event that the entrepreneur does not pay. As noted above, the sub-entrepreneurs and 
workers can only ask for payment of the amount which the entrepreneur still owes 
them. Furthermore their claim is limited to the amount the building master is still due 
to the entrepreneur.94 In this regard it should be noted that the workers of the entrepre-
neur have to be paid by the entrepreneur in accordance with the provisions of the con-
                                                                                                                                                             
tection of Economic Competition (Act of 10 June 2006 on the Protection of Economic Competition, Offi-
cial Gazette. 29 June 2006) which states that the President of the Council of Competition can take provi-
sional measures to suspend practices which restrict competition, does not allow the President to enter into 
the sphere of competence of another institution (i.e. the Order’s Councils).  
91 In 1995 the President of the Belgian Competition Council came already to the same conclusion since he 
held that architects can be qualified as undertakings as meant in Article 2, 1° of the 2006 Law on the Pro-
tection of Economic Competition and that a collective fixation of honoraria restricts the freedom of eco-
nomic undertakers and thus violates Article 3 of this law: See President Council of Competition, 31 Octo-
ber 1995, A.J.T. 1995-96, annotated by J. Billiet; J.L.M.B. 1996, 263; J.T. 1996, 346. 
92 Rigaux 1975, p. 482. 
93 The text of the Article makes clear that it cannot be applied by sub-sub-sub-entrepreneurs and only by 
workers of the main entrepreneur. Nevertheless, the workers of the sub-entrepreneur are protected due to 
the fact that the sub-entrepreneur can institute claim against the main entrepreneur which includes their 
wages. 
94 Dirix 1984, nr. 145; Supreme Court 21 December 2001, Pas. 2001, I, 22007; T.B.H. 2002, 443, annotated by 
W. Derijcke.  
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tract. The building master, on the other hand, only has to pay for good work. He never 
has to pay more to the workers than he has to pay to the entrepreneur in the light of the 
quality of the work performed by the latter (and his workers). 
 
- Approve and accept the works 
If the works are performed in a good and professional manner, they should be approved 
and accepted by the building master. The building master is obliged to approve the work 
as soon as possible after the entrepreneur has put the construction at the building mas-
ter’s disposal, assuming that the work has been executed properly. If the building master 
does not accept the works without any reasonable justification, he has to incur the risk 
of the perishing of the building by a fortuitous event, or in case of force majeure (Article 
1788 and 1790 CC) and the entrepreneur can demand the dissolution of the contract 
and claim damage compensation (Article 1184 CC). It should be noted that even though 
the building master has to approve the work, he is not obliged to really inspect it. How-
ever, if he approves it without inspection, he cannot complain about defects which 
might have been noticed in the event of an inspection.95 With regard to constructions 
which require the involvement of an architect, the building master is, in principle, 
obliged to get assistance from his architect with regard to the approval (Article 4 AA). 
Nevertheless, it is the building master who actually has to approve the work, not his 
architect (Article 1119 CC).96 If the House-building Act is not applicable, the approval 
can be done tacitly. If the construction was put at the building master’s disposal, and if 
he did not complain within a reasonable time, it is presumed that he has tacitly ap-
proved the building work. The use of a building work for a certain time without any 
reservations is thus seen as approval, and obliges the building master to pay.97 The pay-
ment of the price without any reservation is mostly held to indicate approval. The en-
trepreneur has to prove that approval has taken place.98 After approval, the entrepreneur 
delivers the work and the building master has to pay for it. With the approval, the build-
ing master releases the architect/entrepreneur from their liability risk (except in case of 
hidden faults, deceit and a case of defects which are so serious that (part of) the building 
can perish). This will be explained in more detail in paragraph 6.5. The building master 
cannot refuse approval in the event of small defects. In such a case, he is allowed, how-
ever, to postpone payment of a part of the price. If there is no justification for delaying 
payment, the architect/entrepreneur can put the building master in default and demand 
acceptance (and go to court for this)99, demand payment of the price as well as of possi-
ble additional costs, resolve the contract and demand damage compensation, etc. (see 
Articles 1137, 1146 and 1184 CC). 
                                                                
95 Asser-Thunissen 1994, nr. 562. 
96 Only in the event of a ‘mandate’ can the architect approve the work himself.  
97 Supreme Court 24 October 1963, Pas. 1964, I, 197.; Brussels 4 May 1995, A.J.T. 1995-96, 101. 
98 Supreme Court 8 January 1976, R.J.I. 1976, 115. 
99 Court of First Instance Dendermonde 26 April 1968, T. Aann. 1972, 12, annotated by R. Moors. 
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5. Liabilities and risks of the architect and the entrepreneur 
5.1. Introduction 
As noted above, this thesis aims to discuss the regulations pertaining to the architectural 
profession. In this regard not only are the requirements that the architect has to fulfil on 
a public level (diploma, registration, etc.) important, but also the architects’ contractual 
and other tasks which in general are defined by private law. In the preceding paragraph 
the tasks of the architect were briefly described. However, due to the lack of any clear 
provisions on the extent and true scope of the architects’ responsibilities, one is forced 
to study legal literature and case law. It then becomes noticeable that the ambit of the 
architects’ responsibilities can only be determined by looking at the tasks and responsi-
bilities of the building master and the entrepreneur. This becomes clear since Article 4 
AA states that the architect has to supervise building works, which means that he has to 
supervise the work executed by the entrepreneur. Furthermore, in the event that other 
building partners are involved, their actions should also be taken into account. It is 
obvious that the responsibilities of the building partners are often interrelated, so it is 
not always easy to determine where the responsibility of one party ends, and where the 
responsibility of another begins. This is even more so due to the fact that the Civil Code 
only contains a few provisions on this matter. It follows that, in order to get a better 
understanding of the extent of the architect’s responsibilities, it is useful to discuss the 
most important liability principles by discussing the respective Articles of the civil code, 
together with the leading viewpoints of the Belgian courts and legal doctrine. It should 
be noted that the question as to whether or not the architect is liable100, always depends 
on the circumstances of the case under consideration. As noted above, only the position 
of the self-employed architect will be discussed.101 In the following I do not try to pro-
vide the reader with an exhaustive set of rules to determine who is liable. Instead, my 
aim is to discuss the main rules which are applied by judges to determine whether or not 
the architect has violated his contractual obligations. Again it should be repeated that 
this will only be discussed with regard to the traditional construction process. 
5.2. Proof of liability 
The architect has to work as a professional with a reasonable amount of care and atten-
tion. Therefore he only commits a fault if he does not fulfil his obligation of due dili-
                                                                
100 It should be noted that the liabilities which will be discussed within this thesis only concern contractual 
liabilities. Liabilities in tort and penal liabilities will therefore not be referred to. 
101 The architect-official working for the state and the architect-employee who has an employment contract, 
do not work for their own account, and do not carry the risks of a self-employed architect. This means that 
they are not personally contractually liable with regard to the clients of their employer, which entails that 
Articles 1792 and 2270 CC are not applicable to them. Their liability with regard to their employer de-
pends on their contract or statute. However, they are personally liable for torts towards third parties (Arti-
cle 1382-1383 CC), within the limits of Article 18 of the Labour Agreements Act. This has nothing to do 
with the ten year liability principle: See X. ‘Responsabilité des organes et des préposés des pouvoirs-
publics’, Tijdschrift voor Sociaal Recht 1988, 249. 
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gence. His creditor has to prove that he was negligent, imprudent or incompetent. How-
ever, it is very difficult for a consumer to collect ‘proof’ of negligence, or the mistakes of 
a professional ex post. Furthermore, as will be explained in paragraph 6.5.3.2, the mere 
existence of a certain fault is often seen as proof of the architect’s imprudence. It is pos-
sible that the contract foresees a certain obligation of result, especially with regard to the 
entrepreneur.102 If the contract foresees a certain result, and sometimes also if it is con-
sidered to be ‘normal’ that a building has a certain quality, for example that it is water-
proof, it is argued that the professionals have an obligation of result, and the building 
indeed has to be waterproof, at least if the professionals want to escape liability.103 This 
also is the case with regard to the stability and insulation of the works, since this is con-
sidered to be a basic element of the design which can never be neglected. It follows that, 
if one claims that the architect made a contractual fault, one has to demonstrate, in 
principle, in addition to the existence of damage, that a certain fact is ‘abnormal’, that 
there is a causal link between this fact and the architect’s behaviour, or that the architect 
can be held accountable for the ‘abnormality’ and that a pre-existing contractual obliga-
tion is violated.104 Even though the building master does not have to prove the fault of 
the architect as such, account should be taken of the fact that it is too easy -and not 
allowed- to suggest that a fault was made just because there is a defect in the construc-
tion. If this was possible, we would deal with obligations of result, which is, as stated 
above, not the case in principle. When the documents of conception are complete and 
sufficient, when the architect gives the necessary directions, and when the reports of his 
visits demonstrate a genuine and profound control, the entrepreneur, and not the archi-
tect will, in principle, be held liable for faults in the execution.105 
 
Most of the actions of the building master against the architect tend to be concerned 
with the incompatibility of the building with certain aspects the building master consid-
ers to be essential, such as the comfort or stability (firmness) of the building. Since the 
architect is substantially responsible for the design and the supervision of the building 
works, he will be held liable in the event that the building work does not live up to its 
requirement due to a fault in the design or defective supervision. The task of the archi-
tect is, however, not the delivery of the building (this is the task of the entrepreneur) but 
the provision of an intellectual effort which is so concrete and precise that another per-
son can materialize it (plan) and will materialize it (supervision) accurately. 
 
As indicated in paragraph 6.4.1, architects have an obligation of means (negligence) to 
design with due care. If they do not see themselves as being competent with regard to a 
certain specific commission, they are allowed to engage an expert.106 However, architects 
are liable if the engaged expert lacks sufficient skill. As indicated before, the architect 
will easily be held liable if the design does not guarantee the stability of the building, nor 
good insulation and water tightness, which tends towards an obligation of result. Fur-
                                                                
102 Simont & Degrave 1970, p .166; Supreme Court 30 March 1967, Pas., 1967, I, 895. 
103 See Rigaux 1993, p. 316 and 403; Van Gulijk 2009, p. 49 and p. 69. 
104 Supreme Court 15 December 1995, J.L.M.B. 1986, 780. 
105 Rigaux 1993, p. 383. 
106 Baert 2001, nrs. 1199-1200. 
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thermore, in the event that the architect exceeds the limits of his competence, he will 
also be strictly liable.107 Since the architect is a professional who certainly has to be aware 
of all building regulations108, he will be held liable if his design is not in accordance with 
the applicable legislation. This is an obligation of result. This does not mean however, 
that the architect also has to guarantee that a building permit is issued. Since the deci-
sion to refrain from granting a permit can also be based on a particular policy of the 
granting authority or for any other reason which are maybe not even known to the ar-
chitect, he only has to make sure that his design is in conformity will the publicly known 
rules. Furthermore, if the building was erected on soil which is unfit to carry the con-
struction, the architect is responsible, since he has a duty to inspect the territory and to 
determine what type of construction is desirable. The architect has an obligation of 
means, but is easily held liable if the stability or the final purpose of the building is ham-
pered by a faulty examination of the land which seems very likely because severe dam-
age will almost always occur when this obligation has not been duly performed.109 The 
architect also has an obligation to advise the building master on the selection of building 
materials. This is also sometimes considered to be an obligation of means110 which can 
also lean towards an obligation of result if the perishing or the solidity of the building is 
at stake. This means that, in general, the architect will not be liable if a normally in-
formed professional would not have noticed the fault either.111 The architect is free to 
hire an expert to assist him, and will only be liable if he should have been aware that the 
expert was not well qualified for this task. If the budget is exceeded without the permis-
sion of the building master, the architect will also be held liable. However, since archi-
tects cannot be expected to predict every situation which can have an influence on the 
price, this is deemed to be an obligation of means. This means that certain margins can 
be allowed. Finally, as held in paragraph 6.4.1, the architect has an obligation of means 
with regard to his supervisory function. He does not have to be present at the building 
site at all times. Since the architect has to assist the building master at the moment of 
reception, he is also liable in the event that he could/should have noticed certain defects 
but did not mention them. With regard to this supervision obligation, the architect is 
thus liable if the building is constructed in the wrong way or with the wrong materials, a 
fault which he could and should have noticed. However, it should be noted that the 
existence of a construction fault does not automatically lead to a presumption of fault on 
the part of the architect.112 In general it can be said that if the architect has fulfilled his 
obligations with due care, and has supervised the building works accurately, he can be 
absolved of all liability. Since the organisation of the execution is the task of the entre-
preneur sensu stricto (i.e. the building contractor)113, the architect has to reveal every 
                                                                
107 Van Gulijk 2009, p. 97. 
108 Article 17 Deontological Code. 
109 Van Gulijk 2009, p. 49 and p. 69. However it should be noted that Article 1792 CC which deals with the 
total or partial of the building only contains an obligation of means. See paragraph 12.5.3.2 of this thesis. 
110 Deketelaere, Schoups & Verbeke 2004, no. Xi.16 ; Laurent 1887, pp. 42-44. 
111 Bergen 8 October 1990, J.T. 1991, 585; RGAR 1993, nr. 12.171 
112 Brussels 25 June 1986, R.J.I. 1988, 5. 
113 This also means that he has to make sure that the building site is not dangerous for other workers or third 
parties. 
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fault in the execution of the work and demand their reparation. In this way the architect 
has to order the entrepreneur to start over and rebuild the construction or to use other 
materials. However, since the entrepreneur is not subordinated to the architect due to 
the absence of a contractual relationship, the architect cannot command him, and has to 
turn to the building master in the event that the entrepreneur does not listen to his ad-
vice. In this way the building master can remind him of his contractual obligations. On 
the other hand, if the entrepreneur discovers a fault of conception made by the architect, 
he has to notify him and refuse to execute the work until the fault has been corrected.114 
As noted by Flamme, there is thus a reciprocal control of these building actors.115 This is 
logical, since both contracts are dependent on each other while the architect and the 
entrepreneur are third parties in their underlying relationship. The non-performance by 
the architect of his supervisory obligation does not constitute a force majeure situation 
for the entrepreneur.116 Even if the building master does not engage an architect to su-
pervise the building works when this is required, the entrepreneur is liable for his own 
shortcomings. Even without supervision, he is obliged to follow the design or the build-
ing specifications and to work with due care so that his work is free of faults.117 Never-
theless, due to the building master’s obligation to engage an architect, in such cases the 
responsibility for damages is often shared between the entrepreneur and the building 
master.118 
 
It is always important to determine the nature of the fault and the one responsible for it. 
Since the Civil Code does not determine anything about the respective liabilities of the 
architect and the entrepreneur, these liabilities are often determined by the degree of the 
entrepreneur’s specialization and the delimitation of the tasks.119 Specialists are more 
readily considered to have an obligation of result. However, as noted before, in the event 
that the architects engage experts, they are liable if the hired specialist lacks sufficient 
skills. When damage arises due to the different faults of different parties which have 
concurred in such an indivisible way that it is impossible to determine which fault 
caused the damage – this means that without the fault of A the fault of B would not have 
been enough to cause damage – the building master can hold both professionals respon-
sible for the same damage.120 As held above, the architect will be held mainly liable due 
to insufficient supervision or due to faults in his design. The entrepreneur, on the other 
                                                                
114 Flamme, 1975, p. 7; Court of First Instance Arlon 28 November 1972, J.L., 1972-1973, 213; Bergen 3 June 
2002, R.G.A.R. 2003, nr.13765. 
115 Flamme 1975, p. 7 ; Arlon, 28 November 1972, J.L., 1972-1973, p. 4. 
116 Antwerp 9 October 1990, T. Aann. 1997, 164, annotated by J. Embrechts. 
117 Court of Commerce Brussels, 27 November 1970, B.R.H. 1971, 203; Supreme Court, 20 May 1965, Pas., I, 
1010; Brussels 13 May 1972 and Supreme Court 27 September 1972, unpublished. 
118 Account will be taken of the degree of competence of the entrepreneur: the more specialized and better 
equipped he is, the more he will be deemed responsible for the damages. On the other hand, if the building 
master turns to an entrepreneur who is not very competent to execute the building work, the building 
master’s responsibility will be considerably higher: See Delvaux 1968 n° 240 ; Brussels 2 December 1959, 
R.J.I., 1959, 379. Full responsibility on the part of the building master is rather rare: Brussels 20 June 1960, 
J.T., 188. When the execution of the project is not supervised, the entrepreneur has the right to ask the 
building master for the dissolution of the contract and for damages. 
119 Supreme Court 9 April 1970, Arr.Cass. 1970, 725. 
120 Brussels 19 April 1971, R.J.I., 1971, 113.  
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hand, will be held liable in the event of damage caused by defective execution such as a 
deviation from the plan, as well as damage caused by the use of defective building mate-
rials or by violation of building regulations. Furthermore, in the event of insufficient 
guarding of the building site, or a delay in the works, the entrepreneur can be held liable, 
as well as if he failed to notice defects in the architect’s plan121. If both the architect and 
the entrepreneur have violated their contractual obligations, they will be responsible in 
solidum122 and have to meet the costs of repairing the total damage.123 This means that if 
one party compensates the victim, it can start a proceeding in recourse against the other 
to get partial compensation.124 In this regard, it should be remembered that the respon-
sibilities of the architect and the entrepreneur are distinct, since they arise from different 
contractual and incompatible obligations.125 The same applies when more architects are 
involved (for example one for the conception and one for the supervision of the execu-
tion) and a fault in the conception appears. Both architects can then be held liable, since 
it is possible that the architect responsible for the execution should have noticed the 
fault and should have corrected it. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the first architect is 
considered to have decreased due to the fact that he was not able to correct some aspects 
of his plans during the execution. 
 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that it is possible to insert an exoneration clause in the 
contract. Since these clauses are an exception to the general rule that one is liable for 
one’s own faults, they have to be interpreted restrictively.126 Of course exoneration 
clauses may not violate the law, undo the contract of its objective or are applied in cases 
of deceit or malicious intent. Moreover, the architect always has to keep a minimal 
amount of responsibility; he cannot reject every intervention whatsoever. Clauses which 
limit the liability period or the amount of compensation that has to be paid, or clauses 
which exclude compensation for consequential damage, are thus valid. However, Bel-
gian case law is divided about the scope and validity of certain types of exoneration 
clauses. In its decision of 22 February 1963, the Court of Appeal of Brussels was already 
opposed to these clauses in the event that the stability of the building works was at stake, 
                                                                
121 See for example Brussels 28 June 1978, R.J.I. 1979, 139. 
122 The responsibility in solidum has to be distinguished from the legal figure of ‘passive solidarity’ among 
parties as meant in Article 1202 CC. Since the professions of architect and entrepreneur are incompatible, 
and since the object of their contract is complementary yet distinct, they can not have solidary obligations. 
See: Brussels 22 May 1902, Jur.Comm.Brux. 1906, 392; Delvaux 1968, nr. 448. In such a case, a fault of both 
the architect and the entrepreneur is necessary for the damage to arise. They are both bound to compen-
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February 1979, R.W. 1979-80, 51. The building master can turn to both professionals, but if he gets paid by 
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that the professional will only carry the consequences of his own faults: See Ar-co number 6 / 1sem 2006.  
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Pas. 1979, I, 629; Brussels 12 October 2001, A.J.T. 2001-02, 740, annotated by G. Ballon; J.L.M.B. 2002, ed. 
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124 Brussels 20 January 1956, R.J.I. 1957, 3496. 
125 Pourvoyeur 2000, p. 100. 
126 Court of First Instance Leuven 21 February 1968, R.W., 1971-1972, col. 276. 
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causing a threat to public safety.127 Furthermore, in Belgium, standard conditions which 
regulate the legal relationship between the architect and the building master and which 
possibly limits the architects’ liability, are not commonly used, and will therefore not be 
discussed.128 In any case, exoneration clauses can never be invoked with regard to third 
parties. The limitation of the liability period will be discussed in detail in paragraph 
6.5.3.2. 
 On the other hand, the architect and/or entrepreneur are allowed to take up all 
responsibility, except in the case of malicious intent or deceit on the part of the building 
master.129 It should be kept in mind that clauses to augment the responsibility of the 
entrepreneur do not lessen the architect’s responsibility.130 
5.3. Liability before and after reception of the building works 
As noted above, in the traditional building process, a building master hires an architect 
and an entrepreneur to have a building constructed according to his wishes. After the 
architect and entrepreneur have executed their tasks, the building master should regain 
possession over his territory in order to inspect whether the building fulfils his desires. It 
follows that, after the architect and entrepreneur have completed their tasks, the build-
                                                                
127 Brussels 22 February 1963, Pas. 1963, II, 274. The Court held that the ten year liability principle as stated in 
Article 1792 CC is of public order. 
128 The Royal Decree of 26 September 1996, Official Gazette 18 October 1996 lays down exist standard condi-
tions for public contracts (contracts from the government or local administrations). See also 
http://www.pinakes.be/static/pinakes_checklistoverheidsopdrachten.aspx, last consulted 15 November 
2009. These regulate the relationship of the building master and the entrepreneur. Furthermore, the Flem-
ish Building Confederation, an organisation representing around 9,000 building companies has created 
general conditions for private building works. These are not commonly used and are only applicable if 
parties agree so. Only Article 7.2 briefly refers to the tasks of the architect: the architect, as the designer of 
the building, has a full commission and thus has to supervise the building works as well. If the building 
master relieves him of certain tasks, he has to inform the entrepreneur immediately. The Article also states 
that the honorarium of the architect is never included in the amount of the offer of the entrepreneur and 
that the architect is never the mandatary of the building master, unless otherwise agreed. It is important to 
note that Article 35.1 indicates that the liabilities of the architect and the entrepreneur towards the build-
ing master are regulated by Articles 1789-1799 and 2270 CC. This means that, in general, the architect is 
the adviser of the building master and is only liable for faults in his design. The standard conditions indi-
cate, however, that in the event that both professionals are liable, the building master can demand com-
pensation from both, but only for the amount of the damage caused by them respectively. The building 
master cannot hold them liable in solidum. It follows that arbitration is also not commonly used in Bel-
gium with regard to building disputes. Most arbitration decisions are taken by ‘Cepina’, the general Bel-
gian Centre for Arbitration and Mediation. See http://www.cepani.be/NL/, last consulted 15 November 
2009). However, parties are always allowed to bring their case before another institute. There are also arbi-
tration institutes which specialise in the building industry. However, these have almost no activities and 
the same applies to the Reconciliation Commission for the Building Industry which was set up in 2001 by 
the Flemish Confederation for the Building Industry, the Royal Federation of Belgian Architectural Asso-
ciations, the consumer organisation ‘Testaankoop’, and the Building Union Federation, an association 
which provides assistance to, and represents, entrepreneurs. See further: Verbist 2003, pp. 76-87. 
129 Supreme Court 29 September 1972, Arr.Cass. 1973, 121. 
130 Supreme Court 21 September 1979, Arr.Cass. 1979-80, 84. 
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ing master is in principle invited by the entrepreneur to approve and accept the con-
struction, so that the building work can be delivered to him.131 
 To be able to receive the work, it has to be put at the disposal of the building master. 
He has to be invited, sometimes obliged, to verify it (traditio). Mostly, the architect takes 
the initiative to organise the traditio.132 The traditio contains the proof of the completion 
of the building work, and is not regulated by law unless the House Building Act applies, 
or with regard to commissions emanating from the government or local public authori-
ties133. If the construction was built on the building master’s territory, the entrepreneur 
will leave it, put it at the disposal of the building master, and hand over the keys.134 This 
is the first phase of the reception. If the traditio is accepted by the building master, the 
entrepreneur can ask to be paid. As noted above, the traditio brings about the transfer of 
risk (Article 1788 and 1790 CC and Article 5 House-building Act). 135 It should be noted 
that, since the traditio (provisional reception) does not contain a final approval of the 
work by the building master, it does not necessarily entail the end of the entrepreneur’s 
responsibility for certain apparent or hidden faults.136 This will be further discussed 
hereunder. Next, the work has to be accepted, which means that the building master has 
to express his approval of the executed work. This unilateral legal action is the second 
phase of the reception. Only the approval brings about further legal consequences be-
tween the parties.137 It can be done expressly or tacitly138, for example by the occupation 
of the work without making any reservations or complaining about any defect.139 
 
However, the building master is not obliged to accept the work if the building does not 
contain the agreed specifications, or is not fit for its intended use. Since the task of the 
architect is to supervise the building works, the architect will normally assist his build-
ing master with inspecting and approving the building works. If the building master 
decides that the building work has been executed properly, he will approve the work and 
allow the entrepreneur to deliver it. By receiving the building work, the building master 
acknowledges, after verification, the good and entire execution of the obligations of the 
locator operis (architect and entrepreneur) and accepts the work done by them.140 After 
reception of the building works by the building master, the entrepreneur does not have 
to guard the construction anymore.141 The reception of the building work constructed by 
the entrepreneur under the direction of the architect, has the same effect on both profes-
                                                                
131 As held by Article 1791 CC the approval can also take place in parts in case the creation of the work is 
divided into different parts as well.  
132 Ramboer, Evens & Van Daele 2002, p. 13. 
133 Royal Decree of 26 September 1996, Official Gazette 18 October 1996. 
134 Asser-Thunissen 1994, nr. 561. 
135 Ghent 16 January 1886, Pas. 1886, II, 108. 
136 Supreme Court 16 October 1969, R.C.J.B., 1971, 390, annotated by Glansdorff. 
137 Supreme Court 24 September 1981, R.W, 1982-83, 1062. 
138 Supreme Court 24 October 1963, Pas. 1964, I, 197. 
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sionals: a transfer of risk.142 Articles 1788 (delivery) and 1790 (reception) CC are very 
important in this regard, and lay down this transfer of risk from the locator operis to the 
building master. 
 
The moment of delivery is therefore very important, since a distinction is made between 
the moment before and after the delivery of the building works when determining the 
liabilities of the respective parties. This will be further discussed in paragraphs 6.5.3.1 
and 6.5.3.2. 
5.3.1. Liability before the reception of the building works 
As held by Article 1788 CC, if the ‘workman’ uses his own materials and the construc-
tion perishes for whatever reason before it is delivered, he carries the risk unless the 
building master is in default with regard to accepting the work: res perit domino–res 
perit debitori (Article 1788 CC). This is even so in the case of force majeure or coinci-
dence (risk for his own materials and no payment since the building work was not deliv-
ered) and is logical since the building master does not receive what he has contracted 
for. In such a case the ‘workman’ cannot ask to be paid. Since the present-day architect 
will normally not his use own materials, this Article is, in principle, only applicable to 
the entrepreneur. Whether the building master has to be put in default first depends on 
the contractual clauses. If he was at fault in accepting the works, he has to compensate 
the entrepreneur for his materials and his work. 
 
Articles 1789 and 1790 CC on the other hand are applicable to the situation in which the 
entrepreneur does not use his own materials to erect the construction. It is applicable in 
the event that the building was constructed on the building master’s territory with the 
latter’s own materials. 
 If the entrepreneur was only hired to execute the work and the building work per-
ishes before it is received due to force majeure or coincidence, the building master has to 
bear the risk of the loss of his materials: res perit domino. In all other cases, the archi-
tect/entrepreneur bears the risk in the event that the building work perishes. In this way, 
the legislator of 1804 aimed to give consumers more protection. It follows that the en-
trepreneur is liable for the building master’s damages if the building perishes due to his 
fault, whether or not this happened before or after delivery (Article 1789 CC). Since the 
professional is contractually obliged to deliver the building work in accordance with the 
wishes of the building master, he has to prove that there was a situation of force majeure 
or coincidence, which prevented him from performing his obligations correctly. The 
building master does only have to demonstrate the damage and the causal link between 
the damage and the involvement of the professional. He does not have to prove the 
professional’s fault. 
 
Whether or not the entrepreneur committed a fault before the work was received, while 
the building master was not in default in terms of approving the work (i.e. if the entre-
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preneur committed a fault or if the building  due to force majeure or coincidence), the 
entrepreneur cannot ask for payment (at the moment of delivery the contractually 
agreed performances cannot be established), unless the perishing was caused by a de-
fault in the building master’s materials (Article 1790 CC). In such a case, the payment he 
already received has to be returned. It follows that if the architect/entrepreneur has not 
committed any fault, and the building work perishes anyway before the works are re-
ceived due to the fact that the building master’s materials were defective, the archi-
tect/entrepreneur is still entitled to get payment for his work. Even though this is not 
provided for in the Civil Code, it is held that if the defect in the materials could have 
been noticed by the architect/entrepreneur who failed to inform the building master, no 
payment can be claimed, and the professional is responsible for the damage.143 In this 
regard it should be noted that if the materials provided by the building master perish, 
the contract will normally end, since it has no object anymore. If the materials do not 
perish but only the work executed does, whether or not this is imputable to the entre-
preneur, the entrepreneur has to repair it and start over without being entitled to obtain 
compensation for this, unless the perishing was caused by a default in the building mas-
ter’s materials.144 
 
It should be noted however, that none of the Articles mentioned in this paragraph have 
coercive force. It follows that parties can therefore always depart from their content by 
contract.145 They are also applicable in the relation between the entrepreneur and the 
sub-entrepreneur. 
5.3.2. Liability after reception of the building work 
The Civil Code only refers to one moment of delivery being the final reception of the 
building work. However, it is possible that, if the building does not contain any major 
faults, the building master can formulate his reservations, and provisionally accept the 
work while granting the entrepreneur some additional time to repair any defects. If 
reparation is impossible, or has not taken place within the additional time period, the 
building master can hold the architect, the entrepreneur, or both, liable. In situations in 
which specialists were involved, these can be held liable as well. Inspired by the provi-
sions of the House-building Act, parties often contractually foresee a provisional and a 
definitive reception. The definitive reception generally takes place one year after the 
provisional reception. The building master is then granted a period of one year to dis-
cover visible defects which are not serious since, after the moment of definitive recep-
tion, these defects become his risk. 
1. In principle: no liability of the architect/entrepreneur after reception 
If the building master refuses to accept the work without any justification, he commits a 
contractual fault for which the architect/entrepreneur can seek damages. The building 
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master is not allowed to refuse reception in the event of a minor defect. He then has to 
make a reservation in the report of provisional reception. If he does not do this, the 
professional can summons him to obtain payment. 
Even though the architect normally assists the building master with the approval of the 
building work, the building master decides. If the architect did not warn of any defects 
in the work or in the materials which he could/should have discovered, he will be held 
liable, even though the building master has approved the work.146 Furthermore, it should 
be noted that before the entrepreneur leaves the site, the architect has to make a verifica-
tion report to safeguard his own interests and the interests of the building master. In this 
way he can prove the effectiveness of his controls and make sure that the building mas-
ter cannot change his former decisions. The verification report is added to the reception 
report. By the reception report the building master declares that he is aware of the con-
tent of the verification report and has received the work. It proves that the architect has 
informed his client about all the important facts at the moment of approval. 
 
The entrepreneur is therefore obliged to deliver the building works, while the building 
master is obliged to approve/disapprove them. 
 With regard to building works, however, it is common that parties agree that a pro-
visional reception will take place followed by a maintenance period (mostly of one 
year147) to compensate for any difficulties which surround the verification by an inexpe-
rienced building master. The contracting parties can therefore agree to prolong the 
verification period so that the building master can test the conformity and sustainability 
of the building. In this way, the reception can be divided into a provisional reception 
and a definitive reception, separated by a prolonged verification or probationary pe-
riod.148 During this period the building master takes possession of the building and ac-
knowledges the completion of the work. He will use the period to find out whether there 
are any faults and to criticize any non-conformity.149 He is thus in the position to verify 
whether or not the building fulfils all the necessary requirements over a certain period. 
However, the professionals will no longer be liable for any visible defects.150 From the 
moment of provisional reception, the building master has to bear the risk of loss by force 
majeure or coincidence. 
If the parties agree to split the reception into two phases, they can decide which effects 
the provisional reception will bring about.151 They can, for example, decide that the pro-
visional reception will be the starting point of the ten year liability regime.152 
 
                                                                
146 Bergen 30 October 1991, R.R.D. 1992, 52. 
147 Ramboer, Evens & Van Daele 2002, p. 14. 
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  Contract Law in Belgium  
290 
After the maintenance period has ended, the final delivery/final reception takes place. 
As held by the preparatory works153, the Code Civil contains the principle that the recep-
tion ends, in principle, the contractual responsibility of the locator operis. This is op-
posed to the thirty year prescription stipulated in Article 2262 CC. The legislator had to 
reconcile two conflicting social interests: that of the building master who needs the full 
possibility to control the quality of his building, and that of the architect and the entre-
preneur who need legal security so that they cannot be held responsible forever. There-
fore the locatores operis -the entrepreneur as well as the architect154- will only be liable 
until the moment of reception by the building master, except for the situations as de-
scribed in Articles 1792 and 2270 C.C. which contain the ten-year responsibility of the 
architect and entrepreneur with regard to immovables, in case of deceit and in case of 
hidden defects. 
 It follows that if the building master approves the work, all visible defects are cov-
ered155 and the architect is no longer liable for the execution faults of the entrepreneur 
about which he has warned his building master. However, when the verification has 
been executed in a negligent way, the architect can be held responsible.156 Nevertheless, 
since the architect does not have an obligation of result, his behaviour should be com-
pared to that of a professional being normally prudent and attentive. As noted above, if 
the architect, contractually responsible for faults committed during the reception, is 
found liable, it is possible that he can institute a tort law recourse against the entrepre-
neur if the latter made a fault which a ‘reasonable’ entrepreneur would not have com-
mitted. 
 
As noted above, both the architect and the entrepreneur are no longer liable for their 
work except for hidden defects and in a case of deceit. This means that the entrepreneur 
is still liable for hidden defects even if they are not hidden intentionally. They also con-
tinue to be liable over a ten year period for visible defects which put the stability of the 
building in danger (Articles 1792 and 2270 CC).157 Visible defects158 which do not endan-
ger the stability (firmness) of the building are thus at the building master’s risk. This will 
be further discussed hereunder. It should be noted however that the act of reception 
does not release the architect or the entrepreneur from their liability towards third par-
ties.159 
It should also be noted however that one is not obliged to foresee in a double delivery. 
Only in case that the House-building Act is applicable, or if the contract foresees it, a 
double delivery and a double reception are mandatory. 
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2. Exception 1: Hidden defects 
Even though the Civil Code does not contain any provision dealing with hidden defects 
in building works, very soon after its introduction in 1804, judges held that the entre-
preneur should be liable for hidden defects -i.e. defects which are not visible to the lay-
man160- even if these defects do not endanger the stability of the building as intended in 
Article 1792 CC, since the building master would not have approved such defects if he 
was aware of them at the time of approval.161 This has often been confirmed by the Su-
preme Court.162 It follows that the architect and entrepreneur are contractually liable for 
hidden defects which render the building unfit for its intended use, or which diminish 
the opportunity to use it in such a way that the building master would not have accepted 
the work, or only against a lower price, if he had known of these defects.163 As noted 
above, the professionals have, in principle, only an obligation of means. However, the 
liability for hidden defects as well as the ten year liability period which will be discussed 
next, are based on a guarantee-obligation which is enclosed in the contract every time 
the building master has no security about the definitive quality of his building. In such 
cases, the building master only has to prove the existence of the damage, the existence of 
the defect and the accountability of the defect, to the professional. The guarantor on the 
other hand, has to prove that the defect was visible, that he is not responsible for the 
damage (for example in case of the wrong use of the building) or that there is a situation 
of force majeure or coincidence.164 
 
In the event that the building is affected with a hidden defect and does not contain the 
promised positive qualities or the qualities which can normally be expected at the mo-
ment of delivery, while these defects could and should not be noticed by the building 
master, the professional cannot hold that the building master approved the works to 
escape his liability. Moreover, the building master does not even have to prove the pro-
fessional’s ‘fault’ but only the existence of the physical defect and the professional’s ac-
countability. He can hold the architect, the entrepreneur, or both, liable (in solidum).165 
Of course, the architect/entrepreneur or both will try to prove that the building is not 
defective to escape liability.166 Their defence that no fault has been committed will not 
                                                                
160 If the defect is hidden for the building master but could have been discovered by the architect, the judge 
will decide whether it will be qualified as a defect or not. See Supreme Court 31 May 1978, T. Aann. 1983, 
30. 
161 See e.g. Ghent 12 August 1864, B.J. 1965, 919. 
162 See e.g. Supreme Court 25 October 1985, T. Aann. 1986, 204, annotated by J. Embrechts; Supreme Court 
18 May 1987, R.W. 1988-89, 1124; Supreme Court 8 April 1988, Arr.Cass. 1987-88, 1000; Supreme Court 
15 September 1994, Arr.Cass. 1995, 29. 
163 See Kluyskens 1952, IV, nr. 352; Supreme Court 18 November 1983, R.W. 1984-85, 47; Arr.Cass. 1983-84, 
323; Pas. 1984, U, 303; J.T. 1984-549; Supreme Court 25 October 1985, T. Aann. 1986, 240, annotated by J. 
Embrechts; Arr.Cass. 1985-86, 270; R.W. 1988-89, 670, annotated by C. Van Schoubroeck; as. 1986, I, 226; 
J.T. 1986, 438. 
164 Supreme Court 6 October 1961, R.W. 1961-62, 783.  
165 The sub-entrepreneur also has to guarantee his liability for hidden defects towards the entrepreneur, even 
if the works executed by him are approved by the building master and the entrepreneur. In the event of 
disagreement, the building master will turn to the entrepreneur while the entrepreneur will turn to the 
sub- entrepreneur: Supreme Court 25 October 1985, Arr.Cass. 1985-86, 270. 
166 Supreme Court 15 December 1995, Arr.Cass. 1195, 1135. 
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benefit them since the mere existence of a defect proves that they did not create a proper 
and safe building. Nevertheless, both the architect and the entrepreneur can contest 
their responsibility by proving their ‘invincible ignorance’167, force majeure or coinci-
dence. 
 
The hidden defect can be a defect in the design, the materials168, the manner of execution 
or in the information, precaution or repair duty. Not only the entrepreneur, but also the 
architect who had to notice the defect, can be held liable since the building is less fit for 
its intended use, or less durable, causing the building master to suffer damage.169 There-
fore, the building master can demand compensation or reparation or institute a pro-
ceeding against the architect/entrepreneur based on the contractual shortcoming (Arti-
cle 1146 CC). 
 
It is important to note that the guarantee for hidden defects is limited to defects which 
do not endanger the building’s stability. The reason is that defects which do endanger 
the building’s stability fall under the scope of the ten year liability period described in 
Articles 1792 and 2270 CC.170 Nevertheless, as noted above, the hidden defect has to be 
sufficiently serious so that it diminishes the building work’s quality, or makes the con-
struction unfit for its intended use so that the building master would be allowed to re-
fuse approval and reception. Furthermore, the fact that the building master did not 
notice a certain irregularity does not make this defect a hidden one. The building master 
is presumed to have examined the building with due care. Even though he is not obliged 
to inspect it, he cannot be rewarded for his lack of involvement. If he is not competent 
to verify the building himself, he has to get assistance (for example through the use of an 
expert).171 
 
The period in which the architect and/or the entrepreneur can be held liable for hidden 
defects is not defined. In any case, it is held that the building master should have a rea-
sonable amount of time to complain about defects which become visible after the work 
has been received.172 
This period is as long as is reasonably necessary to ensure that the building has been 
properly executed. The liability period is thus limited in time, and is determined by 
practice and reasonableness. Its length depends on the seriousness of the defect and the 
circumstances of the case, such as the building master’s experience and the promises of 
the architect or the entrepreneur. The judge will decide on a case by case basis.173 It is 
                                                                
167 Supreme Court, 6 October 1961, R.C.J.B, 1963, p. 5, annotated by Lagasse. 
168 In such a case, the building master can also turn to the supplier (Article 1615 CC): Ghent 26 January 1995, 
A.J.T. 1995-96, 49 
169 Supreme Court 15 September 1994, R.A.C. 1995, 29; Supreme Court 15 September 1994, R.W. 1995-96, 
454. 
170 Supreme Court 18 November 1983, R.W. 1984-85, 47. 
171 Flamme & Lepaffe 1966, nr. 503. 
172 Supreme Court, 15 September 1994, R.W. 1995-96, 454. 
173 Supreme Court 8 April 1988, Arr.Cass. 1987-88, 1000; Supreme Court 15 September 1994, Arr.Cass. 1995, 
29. Often a period of 1 or 2 months is applied. Supreme Court 8 April 1988, Arr.Cass. 1987-88, 1000; Su-
preme Court 15 September 1994, Arr.Cass. 1995, 29. If it seems that the building master has accepted the 
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held that this period can, in no event, be longer than ten years.174 The period starts to run 
at the moment of approval, or at the moment at which the building master was put in 
default to verify and approve the building works. Sometimes it is also held that the pe-
riod only starts at the moment of discovery of the defect. In any case, a possible claim 
has to be instituted within this period.175 
 
It should be noted, however, that since this liability is not one of public order, parties 
can contractually agree that the architect/entrepreneur will not, or only for a certain 
time, be liable for hidden defects.176 Such contractual clauses will have to be interpreted 
critically and can never indicate that professionals do not have to work in accordance 
with good practice. The more specialised the professional, the less he can invoke such a 
clause. 
 
In any case it should be noted that, also with regard to hidden defects, architects are 
only liable if the client demonstrates that the architect was negligent. If he has taken all 
required precautionary measures or in a case of force majeure, he cannot be held liable 
for the damages. 
3. Exception 2: Perishing of the building due to serious defects 
Articles 1792 and 2270 CC foresee a special contractual liability regime which renders 
architects and entrepreneurs liable during a period of ten years after the acceptance of 
the work, for certain serious defects caused by them, whether or not these defects were 
visible at the moment of reception.177 This is due to the fact that it is possible for the 
building master to know the existence of the defect, while he may not realize the conse-
quences of it. 
 
As held by Article 1792 CC: 
 “When a building, constructed at a fixed price, perishes totally or partially due to a 
defect in the construction, even due to the unsuitability of the land, the architect and 
the entrepreneur are liable for this during ten years.” 
 
Article 2270 CC, situated under the chapter dealing with ‘prescription’, holds: 
“After the expiration of ten years, the architects and the entrepreneurs are dismissed 
from their liability with regard to big projects which are executed or leaded by them.” 
 
These Articles were created to protect the building master and for reasons of public 
safety. Since the ten year liability period is of public order, and since the Articles have 
                                                                                                                                                             
defects, for example because he did not act for a very long time after he noticed them, his claim can be de-
clared unreceptive. 
174 Herbots, Pauwels & Degrootte 1989, p. 647; Liège, 23 April 1998, TOGOR 1999, 106, annotated by J. 
Geradin. 
175 Brussels 22 September 1994, J.L.M.B. 1996, 1476, annotated by J. Henrotte; Court of First Instance Brussels 
18 April 1989, J.T. 1989, 733. 
176 Supreme Court 15 September 1994, Arr.Cass. 1994, 748. 
177 The building promotor is also liability during ten years after reception (see Article 6 House-building Act). 
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coercive force, no agreements can be made regarding the liability period.178 The liability 
of the architect/entrepreneur can therefore not be contractually exonerated or reduced. 
This prohibition should be read in the light of Article 4 AA which provides the architect 
with a monopoly in the public interest. It is always possible to prolong this period. 
 
Even though the Belgian jurisprudence and doctrine hold that both provisions have the 
same scope and meaning, Rigaux holds that their difference is rather evident179: 
- Only Article 1792 CC mentions the condition of a construction ‘at a fixed price’ 
- Article 1792 CC holds the locator operis in any case responsible for damage caused 
by the (partial) perishing of the building due to a defect in the construction, and 
even due to the unsuitability of the soil, while Article 2270 CC does not seem to de-
part from the general principle of private law which holds that not only the damage, 
but also the fault, the accountability for it by the debtor, and the causal link between 
the fault and the damage, have to be proven. 
 
For this reason Rigaux holds that Article 2270 CC contains the general rule, while Arti-
cle 1792 CC will only be applied under certain conditions. 
 It follows that when applying Article 2270 CC, the building master has to prove the 
fault, the accountability for the fault to the architect/entrepreneur, the damage, and the 
causal link between the fault and the damage, while Article 1792 CC only requires the 
proof of the fact that the building has perished due to a defect in the construction, or the 
unsuitability of the soil. In that case, the liability of the professional is presumed. It then 
incurs on the constructor to prove that the damage arose due to a foreign cause, or due 
to invincible ignorance of the fault.180 It is thus argued that Article 2270 CC merely in-
tends to indicate the length of the prescription period for claims instituted against the 
architect and/or the entrepreneur, while Article 1792 CC indicates who is responsible in 
the event that a construction perishes. Article 1792 therefore protects the building mas-
ter since even though the work was approved by him, he still gets a period of ten years to 
turn to the architect/entrepreneur in the event that a defect has arisen, causing (part of) 
the building to perish. Article 2270 CC, on the other hand, protects the professionals. 
After the ten year liability period – the time needed to prove the solidity of the construc-
tions181 – the architect and the entrepreneur are freed from all contractual responsibil-
ity.182 
 
However, together with Laurent183, I hold the opinion that Article 1792 CC does not aim 
to establish who is responsible for what. He submits that since every architect has to act 
as a good and careful pater familias as a general rule, so that Article 1792 CC does not 
include anything new regarding the architect’s responsibilities. It only indicates that, for 
                                                                
178 Supreme Court 9 September 1965, J.T., 1965, 577 with regard to entrepreneurs; Supreme Court 17 October 
1968, Pas., 1969, I, 181. 
179 Rigaux 1975, p. 545. 
180 Dekkers 1954, II, nr. 1124 and 1128 
181 Zachariae 1907, p.24. 
182 Preparatory Works, Records of the Council of State 
183 Laurent 1887, volume XXVI, pp. 32-33, 49. 
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this type of damage (total or partial perishing of the building), architects are liable for 
ten years. It follows that Article 1792 CC only deals with the duration of responsibility. 
Article 2270 CC complements Article 1792 CC by extending it to actions other than 
building works. It includes all ‘big works’ and reparations as well. According to Laurent, 
the objective of the two Articles is thus the same: the determination of the duration of 
liability. There is no presumption of fault in either Article: the building master still has 
to prove the architect’s fault.184 It follows that the architect will, in principle, only be held 
liable for ten years if he has committed a fault. If the building perishes due to a defect in 
the building or the soil, the architect will be liable, since he should have known of such a 
defect.185 He has to investigate the soil and warn the building master in the event of a 
defect, and dissuade him from building. Article 2270 CC is applicable to all big projects 
and whether or not a fixed price was agreed on. It can therefore be concluded that with 
regard to the architect, Article 2270 CC only complements Article 1792 CC. 
 
In general, the ten year liability period starts to run at the moment of definitive recep-
tion.186 However, parties can agree otherwise, for example from the provisional reception 
onwards.187 However, if such a provision is written down in the entrepreneurial contract, 
it will not benefit the architect.188 In any case, the liability period described in Articles 
1792 and 2270 CC has the same starting point. It should be noted however, that in the 
event that the provisional reception counts as the starting point of the ten year liability 
period, this does not mean that the building master refrains from the normal conse-
quences arising out of the provisional reception which does not contain the approval of 
the work.189 Nevertheless, if parties agree that the provisional reception also counts as 
approval, visible defects which do not endanger the stability of the building are the risk 
of the building master. The architect/entrepreneur has to prove that the delay has 
elapsed. If there is no formal act of approval, factual actions such as the occupation of 
the building can also count as an act of reception. 
 
A ten year period is deemed necessary during which all defects should be noticed. In the 
event that defects are only apparent later, it is held that these are caused by old age and 
reparations. 
 
Hereunder both Articles will be discussed in detail. 
a. Article 1792 CC: 
Articles 1792 and 2270 CC used to refer to the ten year liability risk of the ‘architecte’, 
referring to the professional who combined the functions of designer and executor of a 
building work. This liability risk found its origin in the coûtume de Paris in which 
brickmen, carpenters and rooflayers were, as early as the end of the 17th Century, held 
                                                                
184 Laurent 1887, p. 68. See also Court of First Instance Liège 25 June 1996, T.Aann. 1997, 222. 
185 Laurent 1887, p. 35. 
186 De Page 1957, IV, nr. 996; Supreme Court 16 October 1969, R.W. 1969-70, 1053 
187 Supreme Court 4 March 1977, Arr.Cass. 1977, 730. 
188 Brussels 25 October 1994, R.J.I. 1995, 91. 
189 Supreme Court 21 June 1984, T. Aann. 1997, 323. 
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liable for a ten year period. The legislator of 1804 referred to the ‘architecte’ (Article 
1792 and 2270 CC) and to ‘big works’ (Article 2270 CC). Since the ‘architecte’ was re-
sponsible for the design and the execution of the construction, the Commission of the 
Year VIII aimed to express that he who is deemed competent to erect stable buildings 
should be responsible for their stability. As stated before, Article 1792 CC held that if the 
building perishes due to the unfitness of the soil or a defect in the construction, the 
‘architecte’ is liable. This was so, even if the ‘architecte’ advised the building master not 
to build on that particular piece of land, but the building was constructed anyway and 
even if the building only perished partially. As held in the meeting of the Council of 
State of 5 January 1804, the ‘architecte’ should not yield to the arguments of the building 
master, and has to understand that his work is of public nature: not only the safety of the 
building master has to be insured, but also that of the general public.190 Of course the 
same is true for present-day architects and entrepreneurs. 
 
Eventually, in February 1804, the word ‘entrepreneur’ was added to the word ‘architecte’ 
in Articles 1792 and 2270 CC at the request of the Legislative Section of the Tribunate. 
The reason was that, in certain provinces of France, the word ‘architecte’ was not used, 
while both terms were seen as synonyms anyway.191 As noted before, due to the Archi-
tects’ Act of 1939, architects can no longer fulfil entrepreneurial tasks. However, since 
the present-day architect fulfils certain functions of the former ‘architecte’, Article 1792 
is still applicable to him, even though he does not engage in a traditional entrepreneurial 
contract. 
 
Even though some case law indicates that Article 1792 CC contains an obligation of 
result which means that the architect’s fault is presumed192, it is generally accepted that 
the architect’s fault and the causal link still have to be proven.193 As noted before, this is 
also the view of Laurent. According to the Supreme Court, the building master has to 
prove that the building has perished due to a defect in the building. The architect can 
only absolve himself if he can prove that he could, and should not have been, aware of 
the defect.194. It is often said that this leans towards a presumption of fault on the part of 
the architect or the entrepreneur.195 As noted above, since the entry into force of the 
Architects’ Act in 1939, it is no longer permitted to combine the profession of architect 
and entrepreneur in one person. Nevertheless, they are still liable over a ten year period 
in the event that a building perishes. 
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To be complete, it should be added that Article 1799 CC, which states that bricklayers, 
carpenters and rooflayers who fulfil works against a fixed price, have to obey the rules 
laid down in Section III of Chapter III of Title VIII of the Civil Code. It is an addition to 
the Bill of the Commission at the request of the Court of Appeal of Lyon to oppose that 
these artisans would no longer be liable after approval (Fenet IV, 212). They are there-
fore also liable during a ten year period for the works executed by them. 
 
Fixed price 
The ‘architecte’ often agreed to fulfil a certain task against a fixed price. This meant that 
contracts were, in general, concluded by forfait which meant that unitary prices were 
agreed for different parts of the building work. The legislator of 1804 was very critical 
with regard to the building industry. Since there were no guilds anymore, there was no 
education and no supervision of the handicrafts. It followed that the skills of the profes-
sionals were not very high. To get a commission, the professionals often offered a very 
low price. However, after the work was granted, they often persuaded the unsuspecting 
building master to adapt or enlarge the building so that they were able to raise the price. 
The restoration of the handicrafts has taken more than a century, and was due to the 
revival of the professional associations and the introduction of vocational education.196 
The legislator held that the building industry had to be restored by free competition and 
fixed prices (Article 1793 CC197) but also by a limited liability period of ten years for 
large projects. 
As noted above, Article 1792 CC is only applicable in the event that a fixed price has 
been agreed upon. The building master deserves special protection since the ‘architecte’ 
was in the position to work as cheaply as possible, which often led to a low quality re-
sults. 
 
Defect in the building or unsuitability of the soil 
As noted above, Article 1792 CC deals with the situation in which there is a defect in the 
building, or that the land on which it is built is unsuitable. The Article is therefore not 
applicable to situations of force majeure (for example an unforeseeable natural disaster) 
since they do not constitute a defect in the building or the unsuitability of the soil. The 
unsuitability of the soil can also be qualified as a ‘defect in the building’ since the soil is 
held to be a part of the construction. The quality of the soil determines, for example, the 
applicable foundation system. It follows that the architect is liable in the event that the 
land is deemed to be unfit to build on since he has to take the quality of the soil into 
account. The entrepreneur, on the other hand, is not liable if he executed the work in 
accordance with the architect’s plans/instructions, except if he had noticed faults in the 
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plan, or if he could have seen that the soil was unsuitable for the execution of the build-
ing work.198 
 The entrepreneur can also be held liable in a situation in which he should have 
noticed the unfitness of the soil.199 Only in the event of invincible ignorance, coincidence 
or force majeure, can the professional escape liability (for example in case of a sudden 
subsidence). The architect has fulfilled his contractual obligations if he has taken the 
necessary precautions. 
 
As noted above, the architect is obliged to inform the building master about all the 
means which are necessary to secure the solidity of the building.200 He has to make sure 
that the building is erected in accordance with the design, the building specifications, 
the building permission and the rules of good professionalism. If he notices any faults, 
he has to warn the building master and ask the entrepreneur to repair these. 
 
Total or partial perishing of the building 
Architects and entrepreneurs are not only liable for hidden defects after the work has 
been accepted, but also for visible defects which are liable to make the building perish, 
whether or not the work has been accepted.201 It follows therefore that the architect and 
entrepreneur are, in principle, not liable for visible defects if the building work has been 
approved. This is different however if such defects affect the stability of the building. 
The liability for these kinds of visible defects is based on the fact they can affect public 
safety.202 A building perishes if it can no longer be used for its intended purpose, or 
misses certain required qualities. However, it is not necessary for it to have collapsed. 
 
The building master does not only have to prove any damage, but also the defects in the 
building or the unsuitability of the soil and the causal link.203 If he has proven that the 
perishing of the building was caused by a defect in the building, or by the unsuitability 
of the soil, the architect and entrepreneur are deemed to be responsible, based on the 
principle of peritia artis, by the mere existence of the fault, at least if the defect is ac-
countable (for example no force majeure or coincidence) to him.204 As noted above, there 
is discussion on whether or not Article 1792 CC contains an obligation of result (guar-
antee-obligation). The mere defect in the building, together with the damage and the 
accountability of the professional, are often held to be enough to hold the architect re-
sponsible.205 The architect/entrepreneur is therefore not liable if the defect is not ac-
countable to him, and in case of force majeure or coincidence, or if the building master 
caused the damage himself. Even if he can be held accountable, he can be freed from 
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liability in the event of ‘invincible ignorance’.206 However, as held above, Article 1792 CC 
does not contain a presumption of fault. 
 
It should be noted that for reasons of public safety, the ten year liability principle is also 
applicable in the relationship between the entrepreneur and the sub-entrepreneur. The 
entrepreneur can institute an action against his sub-contractor in the event that the 
defect was caused by the latter. This is due to the fact that the sub-entrepreneur is liable 
to the entrepreneur for his work.207 In the event that the entrepreneur and the architect 
could not have noticed a defect due to the sub-entrepreneur’s specialization, the latter 
will be held liable for the whole damage. In such a case, the action of the entrepreneur 
does not concern the building master, who is only contractually related to the entrepre-
neur. 
b.  Article 2270 CC 
Article 2270 CC refers to ‘big projects’. Unlike Article 1792 CC, it is not only applicable 
to ‘buildings’, but also to other large and important projects, such as monuments, canals 
and pools. . To verify under what circumstances a project is considered to be ‘big’, one 
has to determine whether the stability and safety of the construction is affected by the 
project, or whether it is an essential part of the construction and affects its intended 
purpose.208 Decorating works are therefore not included. Furthermore, Article 2270 CC 
is not only applicable in a situation in which a fixed price has been agreed upon, and 
only deals with serious faults which are defined as ‘faults that can endanger the stability 
or the solidity of the building or can render it unsuitable for its purpose’. As noted 
above, the architect has to assist the building master with the supervision of the building 
work. If he does not fulfil his task with due care, he has to indemnify the building master 
for the damage the latter has suffered.209 It follows that the ten year liability period of the 
architect and the entrepreneur softens the inconveniences which may arise for the 
building master after the definitive reception.210 His action has to be instituted within the 
same time limit. 
4. Exception 3: Deceit 
The majority of case law states that, in the event of deceit, the architect/entrepreneur 
can be held contractually liable for a twenty year period (Article 2262bis CC), notwith-
standing the ten year liability period described in Articles 1792 and 2270 CC. It is held 
that in such cases, the professional should not benefit from the liability limitation in 
these Articles. Of course, the precise consequences of deceit will be determined on a case 
by case basis. 
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5.4. The liability of the architect for subordinates and sub-entrepreneurs 
Article 1797 CC holds that the entrepreneur and the architect211 are responsible for the 
acts of the persons he ‘uses’ to fulfil a certain mission. This means that the architect and 
entrepreneur are liable to the building master for damage caused by persons whom they 
employ, as well as for sub-entrepreneurs. The architect/entrepreneur is therefore con-
tractually responsible for the good and proper fulfilment of the tasks executed by these 
persons. The building master, on the other hand, has nothing to do with sub-contractors 
or subordinates and will directly turn to the architect/entrepreneur. According to Arti-
cle 1165 BW, obligations only have consequences between the contracting parties and 
cannot cause harm to third parties. 
 Lastly, it should be noted that the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused by 
his sub-contractors to third parties, since he is not in charge of them.212 He is, however, 
liable in tort for his employees (Article 1384, 3° CC). This will be further discussed 
hereunder. 
6. Liabilities of the specialists involved 
Due to the multiplicity and the complicity of the techniques used in the building proc-
ess, an architect cannot be specialized in every aspect of the building process. Therefore, 
it is possible that the contract foresees that the architect cannot be held liable for damage 
caused by certain actions, and that a specialist will be engaged. Specialists can be hired 
by the building master, the architect or the entrepreneur. However, since the building 
master is often inexperienced, and does not know whether it is better to engage a spe-
cialist or not, the architect is obliged to inform the building master whenever he deems 
the presence of a specialist necessary for the proper fulfilment of the project. According 
to the nature and the complexity of the project, a certain specialist can then be con-
sulted, especially when the architect’s experience and education are not sufficient to 
guarantee safety. If the specialist concludes a contract with the architect himself, the 
latter is contractually responsible for his actions. 
 The architect can be held liable if his choice of specialist was not a good one.213 In 
this way, often an engineer214 will be consulted to deal with certain specific technical 
problems. As described above, the architect designs the plan, controls the execution of 
it, and gives advice to his clients with whom he normally has close contact. This is nec-
essary, since he tries to reconcile the thoughts of his clients with his own ideas. The 
engineer, on the other hand, works with techniques to ensure the stability and durability 
                                                                
211 The case law made clear that the Article was also applicable to architects. 
212 Liège 20 June 1996, J.L.M.B. 1997, 382; Antwerp 13 May 1997, T. Aann. 1998, 366; Brussels 20 January 
1989, R.G.A.R. 1991, nr. 11.764. 
213 Supreme Court 3 March 1978, Arr. Cass. 1978, 790; R.W. 1978-79, 711; T. Aann. 1981, 262, concl. Krings; 
J.T. 1979, 28, concl. Krings; Pas. 1978, I, 759; R.C.J.B. 1982, 176, annotated by M. Alexandre; R.J.I. 1979, 7. 
214 In 1947 the engineers, moved by the same motivations as the architects at the beginning of the 20th Cen-
tury, grouped themselves into professional associations. In 1947 the Royal Federation of Belgian Associa-
tions of Engineers adopted a regulation for Civil Engineers.  
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of the construction and mostly only takes into account the technical aspects of the build-
ing. 
 The architect also has to control and coordinate the specialists and verify their 
competence.215 He has to make sure that the required technical studies are carried out 
and applied.216 In principle, he is not liable for the faults committed by the specialist. 217 
However, if he fails to notice a fault of a specialist which he could, and should have, 
noticed, based on his knowledge and capability, he will be held liable anyway.218 It is held 
that architects are still held liable too often for the faults of experts due to their supervi-
sion obligation, while these experts do not notice these faults themselves.219 In such a 
case, the degree of technicality of the studies has to be compared to an architect’s nor-
mal competence. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the ten year liability period described in Articles 1792 
and 2270 CC is, according to the Civil Code, only applicable to the architect and the 
entrepreneur and not to the specialists involved. The weight on the shoulders of the 
architect is thus quite high. This is even more so since he is responsible for all the tasks 
which are not delegated to specialists: he disposes of a full and residual responsibility.220 
Where the responsibility of the specialist ends according to the object of his mission, the 
responsibility of the architect reappears.221 However, case law made Article 2270 CC and 
1792 CC also applicable to engineers, technicians, technical consulting firms and build-
ing promoters222 since they also often intervene in the building process.223 
7. Conclusion 
In Belgium, design contracts are qualified as ‘entrepreneurial contracts’ which is a speci-
fication of the more general ‘rent of labour’. As held by Article 1779 CC, the rent of 
work and services covers work provided by entrepreneurs performing in accordance 
with building specifications. The architect has to advise his client, design a plan, deter-
mine the programme and the budget, and supervise the building works. 
 
The existence of a monopoly for the architect to design and supervise building works for 
which a building permit is required, brings about a liability regime in which the archi-
tect is easily held liable for defects in the building. For the architect to be liable, a fault in 
the performance of his contractual activities, damage, and a causal link, must be proven. 
In this regard, architects are also liable if they engaged an expert who lacks sufficient 
                                                                
215 Brussels 10 April 1997, T. aann. 1997, 343; Brussels 22 May 1981, R.J.I. 1981, 269; Brussels 13 May 1966, 
R.J.I., 341; Liège 25 May 1955, J.T. 1955, 680. 
216 Council of State 13 October 1987, Arr.R v.St. 1987. 
217 Brussels 25 November 1976, T. Aann. 1981, 261. 
218 Supreme Court 1 April 1982, R.W. 1984-1985, 603; Arr.Cass. 1981-82, 963; Pas. 1982, I, 909; Bull. 1982, 
909; Credoc 1983, ed. April, 7; J.T. 1983, 309. 
219 Ramboer, Evens & Van Daele 2002, p. 52. 
220 Rigaux 1975, p. 331. 
221 Rigaux 1975, pp. 394-396. 
222 See also House-building Act. 
223 Brussels 22 January 1962,  J.T., 1963, 11; Brussels 22 February 1963, J.T., 315. 
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skills. The liability regime is next to the general provisions in the Civil Code specifically 
laid down in Articles 1787-1799 CC. In principle, the architect is not liable after the 
building works have been accepted (received) by the building master. After reception, 
the architect is still liable, but only for (small) hidden defects. The same is true for seri-
ous defects, which cause the building to perish totally or partially (Article 1792 jo 2270 
CC). These Articles are of public order, since they are said to protect public safety and 
cannot be contractually deviated from. It follows that the architectural liability cannot 
be limited. This gives protection to the building master. It follows that standard terms 
are not commonly used in Belgium, and disputes are almost always settled by judicial 
courts. For certain defects, such as problems with stability, insulation or water tightness, 
judges are sometimes more lenient towards the building master, and hold that the archi-
tect has an obligation of result. However, the myriad of case law and the legal literature 
indicate that Article 1792 CC does not contain a presumption of fault. 
 
In Belgium, the architect is often held liable in solidum with the entrepreneur. If the 
entrepreneur has made a fault in the construction, the architect is often held liable as 
well, due to defective supervision. Since the architect is the only building partner who is 
obliged to buy professional liability insurance, including decennial liability, he mostly 
suffers from huge liability claims. To cover their own losses, as well as losses of other 
building partners, clients often take out a Construction All Risks Insurance, which cov-
ers damage during the realisation of the building work. 
 
It can be concluded that the weight on the shoulders of architects is very heavy. This has 
been mitigated by the Laruelle Act which allowed legal persons (as opposed to natural 
persons only) to practise the profession of architect. This means that the creditors of the 
company can only claim compensation from the company’s assets, and that the archi-
tect-natural person’s wealth cannot be claimed from in terms of damage compensation. 
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PUBLIC LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 
1. History of the Architects’ Title Act 
Just as in Belgium, historically, the art of developing and designing buildings was often 
combined with the handicraft of carpenter, bricklayer or – more often – stonemason. 
However, in the course of the 18th Century, the phenomenon of master buildings deal-
ing exclusively with development and design appeared in Holland for the first time.1 
After the French Revolution, this evolution continued and intensified. 
 In 1842, the ‘Society for the Advancement of Architecture’ was created. Member-
ship was not open only to architects, but also to other building actors. The desire of 
most architects to exercise their profession independently from commercial relations 
with the building industry, and to unite on the basis of social standing and occupation, 
led to the creation of the ‘Association of Dutch Architects’ in 1908. Members were sub-
jected to a code of conduct, which excluded the combination of the professions of archi-
tect and contractor.2 
 After the ‘Society for the Advancement of Architecture’ modified its structure in 
1915 in such a way that only private and official architects could become members, the 
members of the ‘Association’ joined the ‘Society’ in 1919 and, in so doing, gave birth to 
the ‘Royal Society for the Advancement of Architecture, Institute of Dutch Architects’ 
which received royal patronage in 1957. This society was also called the ‘Association of 
Dutch Architects’ (Bond der Nederlandse Architecten – BNA).3 Until now, the BNA is 
still the only general professional association of Dutch architects. Its main aim is to 
protect the profession and its title. The BNA advocated legislation to realize this protec-
tion as early as 1940. However, due to the chaotic wartime situation, the matter re-
mained undiscussed. 
 In 1948, the BNA set up a private register for architects. It held that registration 
signals a certain professional quality and competence. Through membership, architects 
                                                                
1 Adriaansen, Maks & Philipsen 2005, pp. 47-48. 
2 Bond der Nederlandse Architecten, The architectural profession in the Netherlands, leaflet, August 2006, 
see http://www.bna.nl/binaries/bna-downloads-3/infoblad-the-architectural-profession-in-nl.pdf, last con-
sulted 23 December 2009.  
3 Ibid. 
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could thus distinguish themselves from the other, ‘unqualified’ professionals. In this 
way, the status of registered architects grew stronger. 
 
After the Second World War, on 27 January 1949 the Dutch government introduced a 
legislative proposal before the Second Chamber of Parliament to give the register a pub-
lic character. The enactment supplied a protection of both the title and the profession. 
‘The title and the profession of architect were reserved to officially registered persons, 
who had to comply with specific requirements of professional ability (education and 
experience) before being registered and who moreover exercised the profession inde-
pendently, i.e. not in employment, but also not in combination with a company (con-
tractor’s firm, brokerage, supplier of building materials). This requirement was directly 
associated with the reliability of the architect (the competent and professional confi-
dant). In this way, the architects in employment and those combining the profession 
with a company were implicitly put aside as unreliable.’4 Of course, vehement opposi-
tion on the part of architects-employees and architects-entrepreneurs to the proposal 
occurred5. Furthermore clients did not want to be obliged to engage an architect. It 
followed that the government finally revoked the proposal in 1960, since it feared that 
other professions would be disadvantaged by the protection enjoyed by the independent 
architects. Furthermore, since the state itself was, to a large extent involved in the build-
ing process through the creation of all sorts of building regulations, the protection of 
architects was not considered to be really necessary. Besides, the private initiatives of the 
BNA made public regulations less urgent.6 
 
In 1957, the BNA made a new proposal which was reduced to the protection of the title 
– at least on paper. Apart from the requirements regarding the necessary education, 
requirements were set out with regard to the practical experience and to the way of 
exercising the profession which had to be fulfilled in order to be registered as an archi-
tect: although being in employment was authorised, commercial interest in the execu-
tion of constructions, in deliveries for constructions, or in the trade of real estate, was 
prohibited. A certain professional protection was therefore still included, since those 
combining the profession of architect with one of these activities could -according to the 
bill- continue to work but they were not entitled to call themselves architect. Of course 
this prejudiced the competitive position of that category of architects.7 Nevertheless, the 
government still held the opinion that the proposal was too heavy-handed. 
 
It was only at the end of the 1960s that the need for legislation on the use of the title of 
architect was generally accepted. Dutch architects needed an official ‘name’ for their 
profession in order to get easy access to the profession in other EC Member States. On 
30 March 1971, the Kleijn-Commission was instituted by the Minister of Public Ac-
commodation and Spatial Planning, engineer W.F. Schut. The Commission was chaired 
                                                                
4 Adriaansen, Maks & Philipsen 2005, pp. 48-49. 
5 There was objection to the professional or monopoly protection. 
6 Dankelman 1999, p .88. 
7 Adriaansen, Maks & Philipsen 2005, pp. 48-49. 
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by Prof. A. Kleijn and had to draft legislation in order to protect the title of architect. On 
27 April 1972, the Kleijn-Commission held that title protection was desirable. 
 
However, after the proposal was made, the Cabinet decided in 1974 that legislation was 
only necessary if it was indispensable on the EEC-level – in the EEC the Directive on the 
free movement of architects was under construction – and if garden and landscape ar-
chitects were included as well. Eventually, in 1975, it was formally stated that legislation 
was necessary to protect the titles of architect, town planner, garden and landscape ar-
chitect and interior architect. 
 
An interdepartmental consultation group was set up to prepare the bill based on the 
Kleijn draft. In 1977 the Council of State gave advice and on 12 May 1980 the bill was 
presented to the Second Chamber. Due to Cabinet changes and formations, the proce-
dure came to a deadlock after the Second Chamber had made its final report in 1982. 
The first Lubbers-cabinet wanted to deregulate. The deregulating commission instituted 
by the Lubbers-cabinet -the Geelhoed-commission- was of the opinion that there were 
not enough public inducements to create regulations with regard to all categories of 
architects. Therefore, in March 1984, it advised the Cabinet to revoke the bill. However, 
it added that if the EEC-Directive on the free movement of architects came into exis-
tence, a justified need could arise to harmonise with the legislation of other EEC-states 
in which the legal protection of architects did already exist. 
 
Even though there were numerous opponents holding that registration was only a ques-
tion of status, a breakthrough arose thanks to the progress of the European Community 
in its work concerning the European recognition of architects. After the Architects’ 
Directive saw the light on 10 June 1985, and due to the professional associations insist-
ing on the continuation of the parliamentary treatment of the bill, the Cabinet decided 
in December to continue with the bill’s treatment and to use it as framework for the 
implementation of the Directive. Regarding the professions of town planner, garden and 
landscape architect and interior architect, the proposed national legislation was main-
tained as well, due to its connection and the social equality between the four disciplines. 
Finally, on 9 September 1986, the Second Chamber voted in favour of the bill, followed 
by the First Chamber on 7 July 1987. 
 On 1 October 1988, the legislation entered into force and the architects obtained the 
protection of their title through public legislation: see Article 23(1) jo Article 2 of the 
Architects’ title Act8 (ATA).9 It followed that the private BNA register disappeared as the 
architects’ register’ in 1988. Article 23 however entered into force five years after the 
other provisions of the Act. A five year period was deemed necessary to give non-
registered professionals the opportunity to successfully complete the Examination, as 
described in Article 25, or to fulfil one of the other educational requirements which 
make registration -and the use of the title- possible. This will be further discussed in 
paragraph 6.2.2.1. 
                                                                
8 Official Gazette 1988, p. 439.  
9 Adriaansen, Maks & Philipsen 2005, pp. 47-50 and Groeneveld 2007, pp. 11-26. 
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2. The Architects’ Title Act 
The explanatory memorandum to the Act of 7 July 1987 containing Regulations on the 
Protection of the Titles of Architect, Town Planner, Garden and Landscape Architect 
and Interior Architect10 (Architects’ Title Act – ATA) indicates that it aims to improve 
the living quality and the professional skills of architects11. It was held that “Although the 
Directive does not pronounce itself on the desirability to protect the title of architect and 
does not contain an obligation to make any regulations in this regard, it is necessary -not 
only to prevent unclearness and misunderstandings but also to have uniform regulations- 
to give those who fulfil the European requirements to use the title to the exclusion of all 
others.” Since these professionals are considered to have a high level of responsibility, 
legislation was needed to bring to an end, the existing situation in which anyone could 
make use of these titles. By the creation of legislation which protects the title, one could 
distinguish certain professionals from others and guarantee that some of them have the 
skills which are required to practise these professions. In this way consumers are -at 
least to some extent- protected against male-fida professionals, and the spatial quality of 
the environment can also be better protected. Another aim of the ATA is therefore to 
ensure consumer protection, and to ensure competent professional practice. Finally the 
ATA also carries out the EU Architects Directive. The Act entered into force on 1 Octo-
ber 1988, with the exception of Article 23, which entered into force 5 years later.12 
 
I will now discuss what the Architects’ Title Act exactly entails. In this regard it should 
be noted that in the following I will only discuss the situation of architects stricto sensu. I 
will therefore not deal with the situation of town planners, garden and landscape archi-
tects and interior architects. Directive 85/384/EEC was not applicable to these latter 
categories, while they fall under the general system of Directive 2005/36/EC (Chapter I 
of Title III). As held above, they are not included in the Belgian Architects’ Act or in the 
Belgian Architects’ Order Act. 
2.1 No monopoly – no protection of the profession 
In the Netherlands there is no public legislation which gives architects a monopoly to 
provide certain services. The Act of 7 July 1987 only regulates the use of the title of ar-
chitect. However, it does not create a monopoly or give the profession as such an official 
status. The architects’ profession is therefore not protected. This means that anyone can 
perform architectural services and that the building master is not obliged to get assis-
                                                                
10 Wet van 7 juli 1987 houdende regelen omtrent de bescherming van de titels architect, stedebouwkundige, 
tuin- en landschapsarchitect en interieurarchitect, Official Gazette 1987, 347. 
11 Explanatory Memorandum to the Architects’ Title Act, Parliamentary Documents Lower House 
1979/80.16.191, no. 3. 
12 Article 42 ATA states that a Royal Decree will determine when the Architects’ Title Act will enter into 
force with the exception of Article 23 which will enter into force five years later. The Royal Decree of 20 
September 1988, Official Gazette 1988, 439, stipulates that the Architects’ Title Act entered into force on 1 
October 1988. 
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tance from an architect or any other expert.13An explanation can be found in the fact 
that architects mostly practise their profession as part of a team of engineers, construc-
tors and financial experts on the one hand, while on the other hand the practice of the 
profession in the building process is well regulated through public regulations such as 
the Housing Act14, the Building Decree15, the Spatial Planning Act16, the Monuments and 
Historic Buildings Act17.18 These instruments contain strong regulations on construction 
requirements, quality demands and safety demands.  The Building Decree contains 
details requirements which buildings need to satisfy.  Furthermore, designs will be ex-
amined by welfare commissions (welstandscommissies) which are composed of archi-
tects, town planners and regular citizens and advise the municipality. They approve 
building applications and decide whether the proposed construction is of sufficient 
quality and whether it fits in with the surroundings.  This system of public building and 
housing inspection seems to control the public order aspect, instead of protecting the 
function of the profession of architect.19 As a result, anyone may perform the function of 
an architect, provided that the design complies with the requirements of the Building 
Decree, regardless of whether or not this person carries the title of architect.20 
2.2. Title protection: natural persons and legal persons 
As indicated before, until 1988 there was no public legislation which distinguished the 
professional group of architects from other professions in the building industry. By 
virtue of the Architects’ Title Act, only architects, whether Dutch or foreign, registered 
in the legal register, may call themselves ‘architect’. It follows that the use of the title of 
‘architect’, abbreviations of it (for example ‘Arch’), or words relating to the profession 
(such as architectural office), is forbidden when one is not registered in accordance with 
the Architects’ Title Act.21 The requirements for registration will now be discussed. 
 
                                                                
13 Council of Arbitrationfor the Building Industry 8 April 2002, nr. 21.877, unpublished. 
14  Act of 28 September 1992, amending the Housing Act of 1901, Stb. 1991, 439 (Woningwet). 
15  Building Decree of 7 August 2001, Stb. 2001, 410 (Bouwbesluit). 
16  Spatial Planning Act of 20 October 2006 containing new rules on spatial planning,  Stb. 2006, 566 (Wet op 
de Ruimtelijke Ordening).  
17  Monuments and Historic Buildings Act of 23 December 1988, Stb. 1988, 638 (Monumentenwet). 
18 The precise content of these acts will not be discussed in this thesis.  See Priemus et al 2001, p. 24; Van 
Gulijk 2009, p. 76. 
19 Van Gulijk 2009, p. 34. 
20 Article 40 of the Housing Act as well as the Building Decree foresee that if a building permit is required for 
a building, preventive inspection by the government is allowed. Even if a building permit is not necessary, 
the initiator of the work has to comply with the Building Decree as well, and may be liable if inspection af-
ter realisation of the building shows that the quality requirements of the Building Decree have not been 
(duly) met. 
21 Since Article 23 is the core of the Architects’ Title Act because it determines who has the right to use the 
title of architect, and what can be done against persons who use it illegally, it has given rise to numerous 
court proceedings. See for example Nijmegen 13 September 1996, nr. 4432/95/21; Harderwijk 18 Septem-
ber 1996, nr. 603/96. 
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As held by Article 23(1), the title of architect or an abbreviation of it, either without a 
more detailed description, either in a compound of words in which the title or an abbre-
viation of it are mentioned, can only be used by those registered under this title. 
 
As held by Article 24(1) ATA, without prejudice to Article 23(1), professionals that fulfil 
the requirements mentioned in Article 9(1) i, j, k, l, m or n, are allowed to use their legal 
title or the abbreviation of their title which is used in another involved state in the offi-
cial language(s) of that state.22 EU or EEA states, as well as Switzerland, are considered to 
be involved states (Article 1 ATA). The Bureau23 can decide that in such cases, the name 
and place of establishment of the institute or the Examination Commission which 
granted the title, has to be mentioned (Article 24(2) ATA). 
 
Article 23 entered into force five years after the other provisions of the Act. A five year 
period was deemed necessary to give non-registered professionals the opportunity to 
successfully complete the Examination described in Article 25, or to fulfil one of the 
other educational requirements which make registration -and the use of the title- possi-
ble. It follows that from 1 October 1993 onwards, one is not allowed to use the title 
without being registered. 
 
With regard to legal persons, it should be noted that the Articles of the Architects’ Title 
Act which are currently in force, only foresee the registration of natural persons which 
suggests that, in principle, only natural persons can make use of the title of architect. It 
follows that a legal person has to refrain from using the title, with or without a more 
detailed description, in abbreviated form or in a compound word. This is due to the fact 
that it would be too easy for natural persons who are not allowed to use the title, to es-
cape the prohibition of Article 23(2) ATA by practising the profession in the form of a 
legal person. As held by the District Court of Wageningen, if the name of a legal person 
contains the word ‘architect’, a wrongful impression that those who work for the legal 
person will fulfil the requirements of the Architects’ Title Act.24 It is thus forbidden to let 
consumers believe that the director, as well as other persons who work for the legal 
person, are architects.25 However, it has been held that it would go too far if legal persons 
were forbidden to use a name which contains the word architect in all circumstances. 
                                                                
22 Before the ATA was amended due to the implementation of Directive 2005/36/EC, Article 24 (1) referred 
to other indents of Article 9. It was then amended due to the implementation of Article 7 (2) of Directive 
89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas 
awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years’ duration, by the gen-
eral Act of 15 December 1993 on the regulations concerning a general system of recognition of higher edu-
cation diplomas obtained in the Member States of the European Community which involves a professional 
education of at least three years, which entered into force on 19 January 1994. This Act has been annulled 
and replaced since 21 December 2007 by the Act of 6 December 2007 holding general regulations on the 
recognition of EC-professional qualifications, Official Gazette 2007, 530 (General Act EC-professional 
qualifications). Note that the ‘letters’ indicated in Articles 9 and 24 ATA will be changed by the entry into 
force of the 2010 amendment. 
23 The tasks of the Bureau and its aims will be explained hereunder in paragraph 10.2.1.1.  
24 District Court Wageningen 21 January 1998, nr. 79 784 CV 1272/1996. 
25 Zutphen 10 July 1997, nr. 9303 HA ZA 97-214. 
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According to the explanatory memorandum of the Architects’ Title Act, a legal person 
can be allowed to use the title if the purpose of the act, i.e. consumer protection, is re-
spected. It is thus possible for a legal person to use the name of a registered architect, if 
that architect is the director of the legal person which performs architectural activities.26 
Since the title protection serves two goals, namely the quality of living and the protec-
tion of consumers, it is important that all architectural activities are performed by or 
under the leadership of a natural person-architect.27 It is not required however that all 
board members, or a certain number of them, be in possession of the professional title.28 
In this regard the court of Zutphen held that a legal person is allowed to use the title if 
the natural person who is a director of the legal person is registered as an architect, and 
if the majority of natural persons working for the legal person are also registered.29 The 
fact that a legal person employs architects is not sufficient, since these architects are 
subordinated to the partners, and have no genuine influence.30 Even if registered archi-
tects are leading the legal person de facto, a wrong impression is given to the public 
when the person leading the legal person de iure is not in the possession of the title, 
while his personal name is indicated in the name of the legal person.31 Cooperation with 
another architect, whether this is a registered natural person or a registered legal person, 
does not exempt one from having to be registered oneself.32 Architects have the respon-
sibility to prevent, at all costs, their name being used illegally on sign boards.33 It follows 
that even though the Architects’ Title Act does not contain any provision on the use of 
the architectural title by legal persons, case law has filled this void, even before the 
amendment to the Architects’ Title Act of 4 March 201034 was proclaimed.  Due to the 
2010 amendment, the new Article 23a ATA specifically codifies the decisions of the 
court of Zuthpen and the court of appeal of Amsterdam mentioned above.  The 2010 
Act has not yet entered into force35 
                                                                
26 District Court Utrecht 13 May 1998, nr. 94 416-CV-97-116. 
27 Eindhoven 5 June 2003, case nr. 259612, 3603/02; Court of Appeal ‘s-Gravenhage 18 July 2003, 02/325. 
28 Supreme Court 15 December 2000, NJ 2001, 57; RvdW 2001, 8. 
29 Zutphen 10 July 1997, nr. 9303 HA ZA 97-214. 
30 Breda 28 October 1998, nr. 100 924/CV/98-1834. 
31 Court of Appeal Amsterdam 8 January 2004, 1529/02. 
32 Alkmaar (Den Helder) 8 July 2004, 153390. 
33 Almelo 12 June 2002, nr. 46570 HA ZA 773-2001. 
34  Act of 4 March 2010 amending the Architects’ Title Act (professional experience, life-long learning for 
town planners, garden and landscape architects en interior architects, amdements related to the Frame-
work Act on Independent Agencies and some other amendments), Official Gazette 2010, 130.  In this 
book, reference will be made to the Architects’ Title Act as it is currently applicable. Mention will be made 
of the most important amendments imposed by the 2010 Act. 
35  Article VIII of the Act of 4 March 2010 indicates that it will enter into force on a date that will be deter-
mined by Royal Decree.  The Act will probably enter into force in several stages. 
  Public Law in the Netherlands  
312 
2.2.1. Registration by the Foundation Bureau Architect’s Register 
1. Introduction 
As provided for in Article 3(1) ATA, the Minister of Public Housing, Spatial Planning 
and Environmental Management -the VROM Minister- created the ‘Foundation Bureau 
Architects Register’ -hereafter: the Bureau.36 
 
The initial provisions of the bill foresaw a separate legal person, the ‘Bureau Architects’ 
Register’, which could act independently regarding all aspects for which the law did not 
require a direct responsibility from one or more Ministers. The Director and the staff of 
this bureau were government officials. To have some democratic control on the man-
agement of the register and the administration of the Bureau, the bill stated that the 
director of the Bureau would be appointed and could be removed by the VROM Minis-
ter, and had to obey the instructions of the Minister and justify his acts in writing every 
year. Furthermore the Minister could make rules with regard to the financial manage-
ment of the Bureau. To give the professionals and their clients more direct control, the 
bill foresaw the creation of a Council of Supervision. The majority of the members of the 
Council of Supervision were persons practising or having practised one of the profes-
sions at issue. The Council of Supervision could ask the Director for advice and, more 
importantly, could object to his decisions. Furthermore, the Director was obliged to 
listen to the Council on the tariffs, and had to give an annual justification of the Bu-
reau’s acts to the Minister. 
 Due to the Second Chamber approved amendment of 9 September 198637, the ‘Bu-
reau Architects’ Register’ was changed into the ‘Foundation Bureau Architects’ Register’ 
which was created by the VROM Minister. The staff no longer had to be composed of 
government officials. The Bureau as it currently stills exists, is an independent agency of 
private law. The overall aim of privatisation played an important part in this.38 Inde-
pendent agencies have a public or administrative function. They practise on a national 
level, and are not directly subordinated to a Minister. The ministerial responsibility is 
limited to what is determined in the act of establishment. In general, the Minister is 
responsible for the creation of the agency’s policy and will control the execution of it. 
The Bureau has legal personality and a legal task and does not receive financial support 
from the government. The General Administrative Act 39 is applicable to its actions. As 
held by Article 4(1) ATA, the VROM Minister appoints and removes the Chairman and 
the members of the board, after consulting the Ministers of Agriculture, Nature and 
Food Quality and Education, Culture and Science. The appointment or dismissal of the 
board’s Director needs the permission of the VROM Minister (Article 5 ATA). The 
‘democratic control’ which is required, since registration is obligatory to use the title, is 
nowadays fulfilled by the board of the Foundation which replaced the Council of Super-
vision. The majority of the board’s members are persons practising or having practised 
one of the relative professions (Article 4(2) ATA). It can advise the Director of the Bu-
                                                                
36  As indicated above, this Article will be deleted after the entry into force of the 2010 amendment. 
37 Amendment De Beer, Kamerstukken II 1985/89, 16 191, nr. 14; handelingen II 1985/86, p. 5736. 
38 Groeneveld 2007, p. 36. 
39 Act of 4 June 1992, containing general rules of administrative law (Algemene wet bestuursrecht). 
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reau and is able to turn to the VROM Minister to object to the Director’s decisions. 
Furthermore, as held by Article 8(1) ATA, the VROM Minister still has to approve the 
reports and balance-sheets on a yearly basis. It follows that even though the Foundation 
Bureau Architect’s Register is an independent agency, the VROM Minister has the final 
responsibility of control. The Bureau is thus an independent executive institution, and 
not a professional organisation. 
 However due to the Act of March 2010, which has not yet entered into force, the 
Foundation Bureau Architects’ Register  will be replaced by the Bureau Architects’ Reg-
ister which will be an independent agency of public law (see new Article 2a ATA).  The 
Framework Act on Indepedent Agencies, which harmonizes the position and direction 
of independent agencies, will be applicable.  This entails that the VROM Minister will 
get more possibilities to control the Bureau.  Not only will the Minister be responsible 
for approving the budget, he will also have the possibility to create policy rules concern-
ing the tasks carried out by the Bureau, to annul its decisions and to intervene in the 
event the Bureau neglects its tasks.40 
2. Tasks 
Article 2(1) ATA states that there is an architects’ register, which will be called ‘the reg-
ister’ further on in this Act. On request, persons fulfilling the requirements which are 
laid down by, or pursuant to, this law will be inscribed in this register in their quality of 
architect, town planner, garden and landscape architect or interior architect (Article 
2(2)). 
 The most important task of the Bureau is to administer the register (Article 3(1) and 
(2) ATA). The VROM Minister and the Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Qual-
ity, as well as the Minister of Education, Culture and Sciences, can give directions on the 
institution of the register (Article 2(3)). It follows that the Bureau does not have discre-
tionary freedom to decide who will be registered. 
 
After the amendment of the Architects’ Title Act by the Act of 12 June 2008, which 
implements Directive 2005/36/EC, Article 3(3) ATA, now foresees that the Bureau is the 
competent authority as meant in the Directive. With regard to the former Directive 
85/384/EEC, the Ministerial Regulation of 10 March 1989 on the appointment of the 
competent authority for the issuing of diplomas, certificates etc. in the area of architec-
ture, has already appointed the Bureau as such. In this capacity it closely cooperates with 
the competent authorities of other involved states, and provides to, or requests from 
those authorities, information on disciplinary measures, penal sanctions or other serious 
matters if these are deemed necessary to judge the legality of the entry to the profession 
                                                                
40 The board of the Bureau will have three members at most. The Minister of VROM appoints the chairman; 
one member is appointed by the Minister at the recommendation of the collected professional organisations, 
and one member may be appointed from the circle of those included in the Architects Register who are not a 
member of a professional organisation. The board draws up governance rules. In those rules the participation 
of professional organisations and those who are registered but are not a member of a professional organisation 
must be given form and attention has to be devoted to the way in which the individual identity of the various 
disciplines is guaranteed in the preparatory trajct of the various rules to be determined by the board. See 
Article 5 of the 2010 Act. 
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of a person who is registered in accordance with Article 13, or who has based an applica-
tion on this Article. Article 13 ATA stipulates that anyone who wants to be registered 
has to fill in a form and make a request to the Bureau (Article 13). If one fulfils the legal 
requirements, registration cannot be refused. Registration of persons not fulfilling the 
requirements has to be refused. These requirements will be discussed hereunder. In its 
capacity of competent authority, the Bureau also checks whether the information given 
by other competent authorities is correct, and indicates possible remarks and conse-
quences. Most importantly, the Bureau receives the necessary documentation or infor-
mation which is necessary to register as an architect, and hands over declarations to 
architects about the period in which they were working, in the event that these are re-
quested. The Bureau also provides information on Directive 2005/36/EC, and provides 
in this regard, assistance to persons with regard to the practise of the profession (Article 
3(3) ATA). 
 
Another important task of the Bureau is to provide the assistance as meant in Chapter 
VI of this law (Article 3(2) ATA). This means that the Bureau has to give persons who 
fulfil the requirements of Article 9(1) g, (see Article 25) and those who fulfil the re-
quirements of Article 9(1) c, while being registered but not fulfilling Article 4(2) of the 
Architects’ Directive, the opportunity to take part in Examinations (Article 25). This will 
be further discussed hereunder. 
 
The Bureau does therefore have a registration function. It informs every requesting 
person in writing on whether a certain person is inscribed in the register, and which title 
he possesses, upon payment of the fee as described in Article 7 ATA (Article 22(1) 
ATA). After the receipt of this information, the requesting person can ask to inspect 
(inzage verkrijgen) the documents which gave rise to the inscription (Article 22(2) 
ATA). 
 
The Bureau, as well as legal persons with full legal competence which aim to serve the 
interests of the registered professionals, or of the final consumers of the goods and ser-
vices provided by those professionals, can claim the condemnation of those who use a 
title in violation of Article 23(1) ATA41 (Article 23(2) ATA). This possibility is also open 
to every person who is entitled, according to paragraph one, to use a title, as long as the 
title used is the same as the one under which the claimant is registered (Article 23(3)). 
The district judge is competent to decide upon these claims in the first instance (Article 
23(4)). As held by Article 23(5), Article 23(1-4) is not applicable to architects of yachts 
and nautical architects. The reason is that their working field falls outside the scope of 
the built environment. Therefore it is held that persons using the title of ‘information 
architect’ also falls outside the field of the Architects’ Title Act. It follows that whenever 
this title is used, the Bureau will take the necessary measures to prevent it. If its warning 
does not cause the user to refrain from illegal use, a judicial procedure can be started 
and a daily fine of 5,000 Euros can be imposed. 
                                                                
41 See paragraph 7.2.2. 
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Article 9 ATA contains the requirements which need to be fulfilled before one can regis-
ter. These will now be discussed. It should be noted that Article 9 ATA will be amended 
following the entry into force of the 2010 amendment to update the Architects’ Title Act 
and to bring it in line with the modern educational programmes. 
3. Requirements for registration 
Subscription in the register will be granted to those who fulfil one of the following re-
quirements: 
a. Dutch qualifications 
 
a.42 being in the possession of: 
1° a Master’s43 degree in the field of architecture obtained at a university mentioned in the 
annex to the Law on Higher Education and Scientific Research 
2° a certificate of construction sciences44 in the field of the technique connected to a univer-
sity mentioned in the annex to the Law on Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
 Since Dutch students often have the possibility to choose between a range of courses 
within a certain branch of education, the education received by these students can have 
a very different content while they all get the same or a comparable diploma. As held by 
Article 9(2) ATA, the VROM Minister can establish further rules on the direction which 
one who fulfils the requirements of Article 9(1) sub a or c, has to give to its education, in 
order to be able to register. At this moment the ‘Detailed Regulation Organization Ar-
chitect, Town planner, Garden- and Landscape-Architect and Interior Architect’45 of 14 
April 2006 contains such additional rules. These more detailed rules enumerate the 
competences (knowledge, insights, skills) which new professionals should possess at the 
beginning of their career, and the VROM Minister is able to determine such require-
ments. It is up to the education institutes to adapt their curricula to the required criteria. 
The Detailed Rules contain a list detailing the graduation profiles which are deemed to 
fulfil these criteria. In this way, the Foundation Bureau Architect’s Register does not 
have to judge upon each individual request as to whether a certain graduation profile, 
differentiation or branch entitles one to register. It should be noted however, that he 
Architects’ Title Act does not contain the obligation to form detailed rules. It only fore-
sees the possibility. Nevertheless, as stipulated in the explanatory memorandum to the 
                                                                
42 The letter-numbering uses the same letters as those used in the Architects’ Title Act. 
43 On 9 March 2006, the Law on the Modification of the Architects’ Title Act in connection with the intro-
duction of the Bachelor-Master structure of higher education was adopted. The Act was published in Offi-
cial Gazette 188 of 20 April 2006 and was given retroactive effect as of 1 September 2002. 
44 In Dutch this is called ‘Bouwkunde’. Subsection a, 2° will be deleted following the entry into force of the 
2010 Act which updates Article 9 ATA.  However, as held by Article 29 of the 2010 Act, a person can apply 
for registration if s/he is (before the entry into force of the new Act) in the possession of Dutch qualifica-
tions that allowed him to register before the entry into force of the 2010 Act. 
45 Ministerial Regulation of 14 April 2006, Stcrt, 2006, 87; in Dutch: Nadere Regeling inrichting opleidingen 
architect, stedenbouwkundige, tuin-en landschapsarchitect en interieurarchitect. Before, the regulation of 1 
September 1988 created by the Minister of Education and Sciences, the Ministers of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment and of Welfare, Public Health and Culture, contains more detailed rules on the 
institution of the education of architect, town planner and interior architect (Strct. 1988, 190) 
  Public Law in the Netherlands  
316 
Detailed Rules of 1988, their creation was deemed necessary, since Article 9 ATA con-
tains several general graduation profiles, differentiations or branches which do not all 
aim to prepare for the professions which are the subject of the Architects’ Title Act. 
Since the Act does not contain sufficient guarantees to make sure that registration is 
reserved for experts, the creation of detailed rules was required. 
 
The Detailed Rules of 2006 added a Master’s education in the field of architecture to the 
educational programmes whose diploma or certificate gives rise to subscription in the 
architects’ register, allowing the holders to use the title of architect.46 Article 2 of the 
Detailed Rules 2006 describes which requirements certainly have to be fulfilled to be 
registered as an architect. Article 3 enumerates specifically which diplomas or certifi-
cates are considered to be appropriate.47 Degrees indicating a successful completion of 
examinations with regard to the following educational programmes satisfy these re-
quirements: 
- Master in Architecture, Direction Architecture; Master in Architecture, Building 
and Planning, Direction Architecture; Master in Architecture, Urbanism and Build-
ing Sciences, Direction Architecture at Delft Technical University following the 
successful completion of a Bachelor’s education in the field of building art, leading 
to the degree of Bachelor of Science or of another educational qualification which 
provides students with qualities (knowledge, insight, abilities) which are compara-
ble to those gained after completion of the aforesaid Bachelor’s education 
- Master in Architecture, Building and Planning, direction Architecture at Eindhoven 
Technical University following the successful completion of a Bachelor’s education 
                                                                
46 Due to the connection between the Act of 7 March 2006 on the modification of the Architects’ Title Act in 
connection with the introduction of the Bachelor-Master structure of higher education and the more de-
tailed rules 2006 (Detailed Rules 2006) the Detailed Rules should enter into force on the same date as the 
Act of 7 March 2005, or at least as soon as possible after it (Article 15 Detailed 2006). The Act of 7 March 
2006 entered into force on 21 April 2006. The Detailed Rules entered into force on 6 May 2006. Both the 
provisions of the law as well as the regulations will have retroactive effect as of 1 September 2002. This is 
the date on which the Bachelor-Master structure was introduced into higher education.  
47 Article 4 of the Detailed Rules enumerates old educational programmes at the Universities which also give 
holders the right to register (acquired rights). In this light, reference should be made to Article 10 of Direc-
tive 85/384/EEC which states that each Member State shall recognize the diplomas, certificates and other 
evidence of formal qualification set out in Article 11, awarded by other Member States to nationals of 
those Member States, where such nationals already possess these qualifications at the time of the notifica-
tion of this Directive, or their studies leading to such diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications commences during the third academic year at the latest following such notification, even if 
those qualifications do not fulfil the minimum requirements laid down in Chapter II, by giving them, as 
regards the taking up and pursuit of architectural activities and subject to compliance with Article 23 
(right of establishment and freedom to provide services), the same effect within its territory as the diplo-
mas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications which it awards in architecture. Since the 
starting point of the Nearer Regulation 1988 was that the education mentioned in Articles 10 and 11 of Di-
rective 85/384/EEC allows one to be registered, they were also enumerated in Article 4 of the Detailed 
Rules. In the light of Articles 10 and 31 (1) of the Directive, which states that Member States shall take the 
measures necessary to comply with this Directive within 24 months of its notification (i.e. 5 August 1985), 
persons holding a diploma or certificate before or on this date, or who started the required education at 
the latest during the third academic year following this date, are eligible to be registered. The qualifications 
listed in Article 11 of Directive 85/384/EEC can now be found in Annex VI of Directive 2005/36/EC. See 
also Groeneveld, p. 134. 
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in the field of building art, leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science or of another 
educational programme which provides students with qualities (knowledge, insight, 
abilities) which are comparable to those gained after completion of the aforesaid 
Bachelor’s education. 
 
It follows that graduates of such fulltime education as part of a five years’ course of 
study at the Technological Universities of Delft and Eindhoven, obtain the Dutch aca-
demic title of ‘construction engineer’ and have access to the register.48 Practical training 
is recommended but is not compulsory. This is in line with Directive 2005/36/EC which, 
however, still refers to the old name for the diplomas (before the introduction of the Ba-
Ma structure). If is accompanied by a Declaration of the Bureau indicating that the 
education fulfils the requirements of Article 46 of the Directive, and that these qualifica-
tions have to be recognised automatically (see Annex V.7).  
 
b. being in the possession of the final certificate ‘Higher Building Art49’ issued by Article 29 
of the Industrial Education Law. 
 The Industrial Education Law was abolished in 1 August 1968. Subsection b is 
therefore only applicable to architects who received a certificate from an Academy of 
Building Art (not university level) before 1971. These qualifications have to be recog-
nised in accordance with Annex VI to Directive 2005/36/EC. Subsection b will be de-
leted after the entry into force of the 2010 amendment.50 
 
c. being in the possession of: 
1°. a Master’s degree in the field of architecture obtained at an academy mentioned in the 
annex to the Law on Higher Education and Scientific Research 
2°. a final diploma issued by an Academy of Building Art based on Article 29 of the Law 
on Continued Education, the certificate of an education for professions in the field of ar-
chitecture, and town planning as meant in Article 34(3) of the Law on Higher Professional 
Education or the certificate of a continued education in the field of building art connected 
to a college as meant in the Law on Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
 Training for the architectural profession can also be obtained by following a part-
time education at an Academy of Architecture. Students at the academies are employed 
in an architects’ office or similar practice during working hours. As part of their work, 
students are expected to become conversant with all the aspects of the building process. 
In this way their theoretical knowledge will be broadened and deepened at the same 
time. In the evening the students have to follow mandatory courses at the academy. 
 
                                                                
48 Bond der Nederlandse Architechten, The Architectural Profession in the Netherlands, leaflet, August 2006. 
See http://www.bna.nl/binaries/bna-downloads-3/infoblad-the-architectural-profession-in-nl.pdf, last vis-
ited 23 December 2009. 
49 In Dutch this is called ‘Hoger bouwkunst onderricht’. 
50  Article 29 of the 2010 Act stipulates that a person can apply for registration if s/he is (before the entry into 
force of the new Act) in the possession of Dutch qualifications that allowed him to register before the entry 
into force of the 2010 Act. 
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In this way, holders of the following qualifications51 can also be registered:  
- Master in Architecture at the Academy of Amsterdam, issued by the Examination 
commission of the Academy of Building Art in Amsterdam 
- Master in Architecture at the Academy of Rotterdam, issued by the Examination 
commission of the Academy of Building Art in Rotterdam 
- Master in Architecture at the Fontys Academy in Tilburg, issued by the Examina-
tion commission of the Fontys Academy for Architecture and Town Planning in 
Tilburg 
- Master in Architecture at the ArtEZ Academy for arts, issued by the Examination 
commission of the Academy of Building Art in Arnhem 
- Master in Architecture at the Hanze Academy in Groningen, issued by Examination 
commission of the Academy of Building Art in Groningen 
- Master in Architecture at the Zuyd Academy, issued by the Examination commis-
sion of the Academy of Building Art in Maastricht. 
 
The training at such an Academy can only be followed after one has completed a spe-
cific technical Bachelor’s education at an institute of higher education, that comprises 
four years full-time study. The Master’s programme contains a combination of theory 
and practice. Graduates obtain the academic title Master in Architecture.52 Their qualifi-
cations have to be automatically recognised since they are listed in Annex V.7. of  Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC. Other educations which are not enumerated in this Annex or in Annex 
VI will fall under the general system. 
 Subsection c, 2° will be deleted following the entry into force of the 2010 amend-
ment Act. 
 
As has been noted before, Article 26(1) ATA holds that the VROM Minister is obliged 
to give those who are registered and fulfil the requirements as mentioned in Article 9(1) 
c, but do not fulfil the requirements of Article 47(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC, the oppor-
tunity to complete an Examination as meant in that Article of the Directive. This will be 
further discussed under b.  
 
d. being in the possession of the certificate of a Continued Building Art education as 
meant in Article 29 of the Industrial Education Law. 
 As noted above, the Industrial Education Law was abolished in 1 August 1968. Sub-
section d is therefore only applicable to architects who received a certificate of an Acad-
emy of Building Art (not university level) until 1970. These qualifications have to be 
recognised in accordance with Annex VI to Directive 2005/36/EC.  This subsection will 
also be deleted following the entry into force of the 2010 amendment Act.53 
 
                                                                
51 See Article 3 of the Detailed Rules of 14 April 2006. 
52 Just as is the case with university education, Article 4 of the Detailed Rules enumerates old educational 
programmes at the Academies which also fulfil the requirements to be registered (acquired rights). 
53  Again it should be mentionned that Article 29 of the 2010 Act indicates that a person can apply for regis-
tration if s/he is (before the entry into force of the new Act) in the possession of Dutch qualifications that 
allowed him to register before the entry into force of the 2010 Act. 
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f. being in the possession of the diploma of the Foundation Institute for Architecture 
(F.I.A) which was issued after having completed an education organised by this Founda-
tion of at least four years, which was started at the latest by 5 August 1988, and of an 
attestation delivered by the VROM Minister which indicates that the person involved 
successfully withstood the Minister’s inquiry on the designs he made and executed during 
a factual practice of at least six years in the field of architecture or; 
being in the possession of the diploma issued by the Foundation Institute for Architecture 
(F.I.A.) which was obtained at the conclusion of an education which was started after 5 
August 1988 if this education satisfies, according to the VROM Minister, the requirements 
of Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 85/384/EEC 
 Since the first part of requirement f is not applicable to those who have started their 
education now, it will not be further discussed. With regard to the second part, it must 
be stated that following research done by the Bureau in 1996, the VROM Minister de-
cided in 1997 that the F.I.A. education did not fulfil the requirements of the Architects’ 
Directive. Since this possibility is also mentioned in Annex VI of Directive 2005/36/EC, 
professionals fulfilling these requirements and in possession of this diploma not later 
than the reference academic year 1987/1988, should also be recognised automatically in 
other EU states. This subsection will also be deleted in the light of the 2010 Act which 
updates Article 9 ATA.  
 
h. having successfully completed an education which is assigned by the VROM Minister 
after the professional organisations representing the architects have been heard on the 
matter. 
 This provision makes it possible to amend/supplement the requirements of the 
Architects’ Title Act. Article 9(2) (c) of the 2010 amendment Act states that one is also 
allowed to register if one holds a certificate relating to an education in the field of archi-
tecture of which the VROM Minister has decided that the level  is equal with that of a 
master education in the field of architecture in one of the above-mentioned universities 
or academies.  
b. Dutch examinations 
 
Next to those who obtained qualifications as mentioned under a.) persons who did not 
complete a certain educational programme but who passed the following examinations 
will also be allowed to register: 
 
e. having passed the architect’s examination instituted by the Council of Architects before 
the date on which the examination, as meant in sub g of this Article, can be taken for the 
first time. 
 These examinations organised by the BNA existed until 1987, and will therefore not 
be discussed further. Since they are listed in Annex VI of Directive 2005/36/EC, they 
have to be recognised in terms of those who passed not later than during the academic 
year 1987/1988. Subsection e is thus not contained in the 2010 amendment. 
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g. having passed the examination for architects as meant in chapter VI of this law, or 
having obtained exemption for this examination from the VROM Minister due to excep-
tional competence. 
 As held by Article 3(2), the Bureau provides administrative assistance with regard to 
the organisation of these examinations. Article 25 ATA gives architects who do not fulfil 
the requirements of the Architects’ Title Act (no Dutch or foreign recognised diplomas) 
a chance to register by the successful completion of an examination. The possibility to 
register after having successfully completed an examination will be discussed in more 
detail under b.). 
 
The Examination Decision Architects’ Title Act of 20 November 199054 contains more 
specific rules on the examinations described in Articles 25 and 26 ATA. 
 
Article 2 of the Examination Decision Architects’ Title Act indicates that only persons 
who have practised the profession for over seven years are allowed to take part in the 
examination. This is composed of two parts. This is also provided in Article 12b of the 
2010 Amendment Act.  With regard to the first part of the examination, the architect 
has to present three of his designs to the Examination Commission, and give an oral 
explanation (Article 3(1)). Article 3(2) contains some criteria which are applied to test 
the professional’s competence. With regard to the second part, candidates have to write 
a paper on a subject chosen by the Examination Commission and have to make a design 
which fulfils the Commission’s criteria (Article 4(1). The criteria mentioned in Article 3 
and 4 accord to the criteria mentioned in the Detailed Rules of 14 April 2006, and are 
the same as those which were listed in Article 3 of Directive 85/384/EEC and which are 
now listed in Article 46 of Directive 2005/36/EC. The candidate is only allowed to take 
part in the second part of the examination, if he succeeds in the first part. As held by 
Article 6(1), the Examination Commission can exempt candidates from the second part 
if they have already demonstrated in another way their ability to fulfil the requirements 
listed in Articles 3 and 4. Exemption from the second part can, for example, be granted 
to those who have already published in a professional magazine, as long as the publica-
tion gives a sufficient insight into the architect’s qualities. 
 
Article 25(2) AA foresees that the extent and the content of these examinations are de-
termined by a general measure of administration (GMA) which will also regulate the 
requirements to get permission to complete the examinations, as well as those to get an 
exemption from certain parts. The Examination Decision Architects’ Title Act carried 
this Article into effect. The examination rules, as well as their modifications, have to be 
approved by the VROM Minister (Article 25(3) ATA). As held by Article 26(2), Article 
25(2) and (3) also apply to examinations falling under Article 26. Before 1998, the Bu-
reau advised the Minister with regard to examination matters. Since 1998 this has be-
                                                                
54 Decision of 20 November 1990, Official Gazette 1990, 577 modified by the decisions of 2 November 1993, 
Official Gazette 1995, 521 and 14 February 1998, Official Gazette 1998, 99.  
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come the task of the Bureau Rijksbouwmeester55, since the Bureau did not think it was 
advisable to be involved in procedures in which candidates were involved, who were 
often already summoned by it for the illegal use of the architectural title. One can only 
participate in the examinations described in Articles 25 and 26 ATA after payment of 
the fee as noted in Article 7 (Article 27). As held by Article 14 Examination Decision 
Architects’ Title Act, a candidate can object to a judgement on the examinations to the 
Examination Commission. The GMA does not foresee the possibility if instituting a 
higher appeal. This does not preclude the possibility that one can protest against the 
judgement of the Examination Commission before a civil court. Lastly, it should be 
mentioned that the examination Regulation of 29 September 199356 on the examination 
for architects, as meant in Chapter II of the examination Decision of 20 November 1990, 
approved by the VROM Minister, contains more detailed rules on the institution of the 
examination. This will not be discussed further. 
 
Article 26 jo. Article 9(1) (c) ATA 
As noted earlier, Article 26 ATA stipulates that the VROM Minister is obliged to give 
those who are registered and who fulfil the requirements as mentioned in Article 9(1) c, 
but do not fulfil the requirements of Article 47(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC, the oppor-
tunity to complete an examination as detailed in that Article of the Directive. In this 
respect it should be repeated that in Article 46(1) Directive 2005/36/EC, training as an 
architect shall comprise a total of at least four years of full-time study or six years of 
study, at least three years of which is on a full-time basis, at a university or comparable 
teaching institution. The training must lead to successful completion of a university-
level examination. As held by Article 47(2), by way of derogation from Article 46, rec-
ognition shall also be accorded to training which, as part of social betterment schemes 
or part-time university studies which satisfy the requirements referred to in Article 46, 
as attested by an examination in architecture passed by a person who has been working 
for seven years or more in the field of architecture under the supervision of an architect 
or architectural bureau. In this way, Annex VI of Directive 2005/36/EC indicates that 
the certificate stating that its holder has passed the degree examination in architecture 
awarded by the architectural academies which are recognised by the state, should be 
recognized by other Member States if professionals already possessed these qualifica-
tions no later than the reference academic year of 1987/1988 (entry into force of Direc-
tive 84/384/EEC). However, persons who did start such an education later do not fall 
under Annex VI. It follows that with regard to the diplomas awarded by the State-
recognized architectural academies, a complication arises since persons who followed 
such an education part-time, fulfil the criteria of the Architects’ Title Act and can thus 
be registered, but do not fulfil the requirements of the Directive: they have not enjoyed a 
part-time education lasting six years of which at least three years were full-time (Article 
46(1) Directive 2005/36/EC). Article 26 ATA gives these persons – as long as they 
started their education after academic year 1987-1988 – the opportunity to complete an 
                                                                
55 The Rijksbouwmeester advises the government on the architectural policy and national accommodation. It 
forms part of the VROM Ministry.  
56 Stcrt. 1993, 192. 
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additional examination so that they fulfil Article 47(2) at last. As stipulated in Article 
6(2) Examination Decision Architects’ Title Act, the Examination Commission will 
automatically exempt the registered candidate who fulfils the requirements of Article 
9(1) c ATA, and has at least seven years of professional experience under the leadership 
of another architect, from the second part of the examination. This last provision refers 
in particular to Article 26(1) ATA. 
 
Article 25 jo Article 9(1)(g) ATA 
Article 25(1) ATA on the other hand, indicates that the VROM Minister is obliged to 
give persons the opportunity to complete these examinations at least once a year. As 
held by Article 3(2), the Bureau provides administrative assistance with regard to the 
organisation of these Examinations. These examinations are meant for those who did 
not enjoy an education as mentioned in Article 9, and who could not benefit from the 
temporary provisions of Chapter VII, but who are of the opinion that registration 
should follow due to their professional experience. The successful completion of an 
examination according to Article 25(1) ATA, gives them the possibility to register. As 
suggested above, only persons with a minimum of seven years of practical experience 
are allowed to sit the examinations. The VROM Minister who is competent to exempt 
persons from sitting the examination as described in Article 9(1) g, is obliged to give 
persons the opportunity to complete these examinations at least once a year. After suc-
cessful completion of the required examination, the professionals are then allowed to 
register. Since the examinations are not listed in annex VII of the Directive, they will 
however not be recognised automatically, but will fall under the general system of rec-
ognition. Due to the experience that participants have enjoyed, they are likely to have 
gained enough knowledge so that they normally they do not have to take part in the 
second part of the Examination. It follows that the Examination for those professionals 
consists of verifying whether the candidate can exhibit seven years practical experience, 
and whether the designs presented to the Examination Commission is of sufficient qual-
ity. The number of persons who use this possibility is very low, while the number of 
successful participants is even lower. As indicated in Articles 9(1) (g) ATA and 25(1), it 
is the VROM Minister who is competent to exempt persons from completing the ex-
amination as described in Article 9(1) g. In this regard it should be mentioned that the 
Ministry of VROM has laid down certain criteria which can indicate that someone has 
such exceptional competence such as intense work in the field for at least ten years, so 
that the professional practice can guarantee that that person is able to function as a 
competent designer, publications in professional journals at a more than exceptional 
level, the recognition of the professional community that the work contributes in an 
exceptional way to the development of architecture, work of a consistent high level from 
an architect with a personal architectural vision, etc. 
 
The possibility of the Minister to exempting persons for the need to sit these examina-
tions in cases of exceptional competence is implemented in Article 5 of Directive 
85/384/EEC which is now reflected in Article 48(2) Directive 2005/36/EC.  
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If the candidate successfully completes the examination, he can be registered according 
to Article 9 ATA, and is allowed to use the professional title due to Article 23(1) ATA. 
This does not encompass that his qualifications will be automatically recognised at EU 
level. 
c. EC/EEA qualifications 
 
In the foregoing, mention has been made of Directive 2005/36/EC on several occasions. 
The Act of 12 June 2008 has amended the Architects’ Title Act of 7 July 1987 in order to 
implement this Directive. With regard to EC qualifications Article 9(1) i and j has now 
been amended, and replaced by subsections i, j, k, l, m, n as follows: 
 
Enrolment in the register as architect will be granted to those who are in the possession 
of: 
i. 
 -  evidence of formal qualifications as an architect as determined in Article 21 of Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC issued by the competent body of another involved Member State and 
listed in Annex V, or 
- an educational diploma as determined in Article 47(1) Directive 2005/36/EC (train-
ing provided by the German ‘Fachhochschulen) satisfying the requirements of Article 
46 and followed by a four year period of professional experience as attested by a cer-
tificate as meant in Article 47(1), or 
- taking into account the requirements mentioned in Article 47(2) (i.e. training as part 
of social betterment schemes or part-time university studies which are passed by a 
person who has been working for seven years or more in the field of architecture under 
the supervision of an architect or architectural bureau), an attestation of a successful 
examination in architecture which satisfies the requirements of Article 46. 
 Article 9, i. is often used by Austrians who can only register themselves in their own 
state after having three years of professional experience. To be able to work as an archi-
tect immediately after obtaining their diploma, they register in the Netherlands.57 
Since one can only register as an architect in Italy after having completed the necessary 
education as well as a state examination, an architect who did not fulfil this state exami-
nation cannot register in the Netherlands, since they are not fully qualified to register in 
their home state. The state examination is recognised at the EU level. The Austrians, 
even though they do not have any practical experience, have the required diploma, while 
the Italian diploma is not complete without succeeding in the state examination. 
 
j.  
- evidence of formal qualifications as an architect as mentioned in Article 49(1) para-
graph 1 of Directive 2005/36/EC (provision on acquired rights; listed in Annex VI 
point 6 of the Directive and awarded by another Member State and attesting a 
course of training which began no later than the reference academic year referred to 
                                                                
57 http://www.architectenwerk.nl/architectenpraktijk02/Architectendata, last consulted 9 November 2009.  
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in that Annex, even if they do not satisfy the minimum requirements laid down in 
Article 46) 
- evidence of a certificate as determined in Article 49(1) paragraph 2 of Directive 
 2005/36/EC (special provision regarding certificates issued by the Federal Republic 
of Germany) 
- evidence of a confirming declaration as determined in Article 49(2) of Directive 
 2005/36/EC (certificates issued to nationals of Member States by the Member States 
which have enacted rules governing the access to, and pursuit of, the activities of an 
architect as of the following dates: 
 (a) 1 January 1995 for Austria, Finland and Sweden; 
 (b) 1 May 2004 for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
        Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia; 
 (c) 5 August 1987 for the other Member States). 
 
k. an attestation giving access to the professional activities of architect as determined in 
Article 23(3) paragraph 1, (4 ) paragraph 1, (5) paragraph 1 accompanied by a certificate 
as meant in (3) paragraph 2, (4) paragraph 2 and (5) paragraph 2 (special provisions 
regarding evidence of formal qualifications issued by the former Czechoslovakia, the 
former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia). 
 
l. a certificate as determined in Article 48(2) Directive issued by the competent authority 
of another Member State indicating that the professional has especially distinguished 
himself by the quality of his work in the field of architecture. 
 This subsection got its present form as a result of the law of 2 December 2004 on the 
amendment of several laws regarding the execution of the Agreement of 21 June 199958 
on the free movement of persons concluded by the EC and its member states on the one 
hand, and Switzerland on the other, and which concerns the adaptation of the Archi-
tects’ Title Act due to a ruling of the ECJ on the freedom of establishment. Due to this 
amendment, community nationals in the possession of an architectural diploma which 
does not have to be recognized by the other member states in the light of the Architects’ 
Directive, still have the possibility to be subscribed in the register. To be registered, the 
VROM Minister has to check the knowledge and ability of the requesting party, by 
comparing the level of education and the professional experience of the requesting party 
with the knowledge and qualifications of the holders of a national attestation which 
gives, following Article 9(1) a and c, the right to register. 
 
m. evidence of formal qualifications as an architect issued by the competent authority of 
other Member States which are recognized by the Bureau after an inquiry, and in accor-
dance with Articles 5 -13 General Act Recognition EC professional qualifications59. 
 This Act implements Chapter I of Title III (the general system) of Directive 
2005/36/EC. 
                                                                
58 Agreement 21 June 1999, Luxemburg. 
59 Act of 6 December 2007 holding general regulations on the recognition of EC-professional qualifications, 
Official Gazette 2007, 530 (General Act Recognition EC-professional qualifications). 
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 With regard to the free provision of services, reference should be made to Articles 
27 b and 27 c ATA which were added by the Act of 12 June 2008. These Articles imple-
ment Title II of Directive 2005/36/EC. As held by Article 27 b(1), a service provider shall 
provide his services in the Netherlands under the professional title of the Member State 
of establishment, in the official language(s) of that state. Furthermore, service providers 
can also use their academic titles (Article 27 b(2)). The latter provision implements 
Article 54 of Directive 2005/36/EC. On request, the services provider can ask to be regis-
tered. He has to add a declaration that he is legally established in his Member State to 
pursue his professional activities, offer proof of his nationality and, if the profession is 
not regulated, proof that he has pursued the activity for at least two years during the 
previous ten years. Contrary to Article 7(2) of the Directive, the ATA does not demand 
that evidence of professional qualifications have also to be provided. A decision will be 
made within four weeks. Article 27 c ATA deals with the exchange of information be-
tween the Bureau and the competent authority of another Member State in the event of 
complaints by service receivers. 
d. Non EC/EEC qualifications 
 
After implementation of Directive 2005/36/EC, Article 9(1) i 3° and j are now replaced 
and amended as follows by Article 9(1) n and o: 
Enrolment in the register as architect will be granted to those who are in the possession 
of: 
n. a diploma, certificate or other title in the area of architecture issued by a third state 
which is recognized by the competent authority of a Member State in accordance with 
Article 2(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC. In this case, the person involved has to qualify as a 
migrating professional and be in the possession of a declaration which is issued by that 
competent authority, and which indicates that he has at least three years of professional 
experience in the area of architecture. 
 This subsection implements Article 3(3) of Directive 2005/36/EC. Since it is appli-
cable if recognition is provided by another Member State in accordance with Article 
2(2) of the Directive, it is only applicable to professionals holding the nationality of a 
Member State and not to third-country nationals. 
 
o. a diploma, certificate or other title in the area of architecture which is issued by the 
competent authority of a third state in conclusion of an education which satisfies, accord-
ing to the Bureau, the requirements of Article 46 Directive or, when it does not satisfy 
those requirements, is recognized by the Bureau after an inquiry, in accordance with Arti-
cle 5-13 General Act Recognition EC professional qualifications. 
 As already indicated above, the General Act Recognition EC professional qualifica-
tions implements Chapter I of Title III (the general system) of Directive 2005/36/EC 
correctly. However subsection o is not limited to recognition in accordance with this 
General Act, but is applicable to all qualifications issued by a competent authority of a 
third state, even if the professional has the nationality of a third-state. It follows that 
subsection o can be invoked by third-country nationals in possession of the requisite 
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architectural qualifications. Recognition should be granted if the qualifications satisfy 
the requirements listed in Article 46 of the Directive. 
4. Registration procedure 
Professionals wanting to register according to Article 9 ATA, have to fill in a request 
form, send over the evidence and pay the inscription fee (Article 13(1)). In this regard it 
should be mentioned that members of professional associations get a discount because 
these associations pay the registration fee of their members collectively.60 In the event of 
a request for recognition or a request for registration involving Article 9(1) (m), the 
Bureau needs to come to a decision within three months of it receiving all the necessary 
documents (Article 13(4) ATA). If compensation measures are necessary, the recogni-
tion decision can be postponed until these measures are completed by the applicant. A 
decision should be taken at the latest one month after completion of these measures 
(Article 13(5) ATA and Article 19(3) and (4) General Act Recognition EC professional 
qualifications). 
 
As noted above, the General Administrative Act (Awb) is applicable to the practices of 
the Bureau. While Article 15 ATA foresees that registration will not be refused without 
the person concerned being heard by the Director or his substitute, the Article was 
amended due to the entry into force of the General Administrative Act. Now Article 4:7, 
1 Awb states that an administrative organ has to give the applicant the opportunity to 
expound his view whenever it refuses his application in whole or in part, and when the 
refusal is based on data concerning the applicant which is different from those which the 
applicant provided himself. Furthermore, as held by Article 2:1 Awb, everyone can be 
assisted or can be represented by an authorised person in his relationship with public 
organs. Decisions need to be founded on solid grounds (Article 3:46, 1 Awb) and have 
to be delivered or sent to interested parties (Article 3:41, 1). The possibility to object to, 
or appeal the decision, must also be mentioned (Article 3:45 Awb). 
 The Bureau makes sure that after the decision to register has been made, the actual 
registration will follow as soon as possible (Article 14(1)). Registration will not be re-
fused if the applicant did not have the opportunity to hand over extra evidence in sup-
port of his qualification. 
 
Immediately after registration, as well as every following year, registered professionals 
have to pay a contribution (Article 16(1)). The Bureau will determine the amount which 
has to be paid (Article 7). 
Article 17(1) ATA stipulates that the registration will be annulled in the following cases: 
a. if, according to the provisions of this act, the registration took place unlawfully; 
b. if the registered professional does not fulfil the obligation to pay the contribution as  
detailed in Article 16(1); 
c. on request of the registered professional; 
d. after the decease of the registered professional. 
 
                                                                
60 Priemus et al. 2001, p.53. 
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As held by Article 17(2) jo 15(1), the decision to annul a certain registration based on 
Article 17(1) a, will only take place after the professional has been given the opportunity 
to hand over extra proof of his qualifications. 
 Such a decision based on Article 17(1) b will only take place four weeks after the 
professional was informed of the decision by which his registration was annulled (Arti-
cle 17(3)). 
Following Article 4:1 Awb, the request to be removed from the list as indicated in Arti-
cle 17(1) c, has to be done in writing. 
 Every annulment based on Article 17(1) a-c will immediately be communicated to 
the person involved (Article 17(4)). This means that following Article 3:41 Awb, the 
decision will be sent or handed to the interested parties, including the applicant. The 
decision has to indicate that an appeal may be instituted to the Trade and Industry Ap-
peals Tribunal within the period described in Article 21. This follows from Article 3:45 
Awb. 
 
In the case of Article 17(1) b and c, the interested parties will also be informed of the 
possibility for them to request the cancellation of the annulment (Article 17(4) jo Article 
18(1)). This request, which has to be made in writing according Article 4:1 Awb, will 
only be taken into account after the inscription fee as detailed in Article 13(1) is paid, 
and after all the contributions as detailed in Article 16(1) and due before the request was 
made, have also been paid. 
 Four weeks after the reception of the request as per Article 18(1), the Bureau will 
cancel the annulment (Article 19(1)). The moment of cancellation of the annulment will 
be considered as the moment of registration, and the moment on which the fee which as 
described in Article 16(1) has to be paid (Article 20). 
 
As indicated before, an appeal against a decision can be instituted by the interested 
parties. This will be based on the provisions of this act to the Trade and Industry Ap-
peals Tribunal (Article 21(1)). Such an appeal is possible not only against the decisions 
of the Bureau Architects’ Register, but also against decisions based on the Architects’ 
Title Act taken by the responsible Ministers.61 Article 21(2) and (3) ATA contain some 
more specific rules.62 
                                                                
61 On 1 January 1994 the Act of 16 December 1993 (Official Gazette 1993, 650) modifying the Act on the 
Judicial Organisation, the General Code of Administrative Law, the Act on the Council of State, the Act of 
Appeal, the Act on the Civil Servants 1929 and other regulations, as well as revoking the Act Administra-
tive Case Law Public Decisions (Arob-Act – ‘Arob’ being the abbreviation of the Dutch title of the Act: 
‘Wet Administratieve Rechtspraak Overheidsbeslissingen’) entered into force. This Act is also known as 
the Act on the Completion of the first phase on the Revision of the Judicial Organisation. Before this Act 
entered into force, an appeal could be instituted against decisions of the Bureau Architects’ Register before 
the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal. However, against decisions of the responsible Ministers, one 
could institute an ‘Arob’-appeal. This meant that after an administrative objection or appeal, one had the 
possibility to institute an appeal to the Arob-judge. The administrative judge in the Arob-case was the 
Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of State. This Section was the first and only judicial in-
stance which took a binding decision on the appeal. Due to the fact that the Section became overburdened 
very quickly, and due to the complex system of legal protection, the Section and the Arob-Act were abol-
ished. In this regard it should be added that the Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of State 
which tenders only an advice to the Crown, was held not to fall within the definition of a ‘tribunal’ as 
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The Architects’ Title Act does not contain any provisions on fines which can be imposed 
on those who wrongfully use the title. Article 435 jo Article 23 of the Criminal Code 
holds that a pecuniary fine of 3,700 Euros will be imposed upon those who use the title 
of ‘doctorandus’ which used to be the title obtained by those who now hold a Master’s 
degree. It should be noted that this Article only refers to academic titles, and not to the 
use of the professional title of architect. The District Court is competent to decide upon 
complaints (Article 23(4) AA). 
2.2.2. Turning the Architects’ Title Act into a more powerful quality instrument 
The Architects’ Title Act foresees that those registered by the Bureau are allowed to use 
the title. Registration is reserved for those who possess a certain qualification that is 
described in the Architects’ Title Act. It follows that, in general, only one criterion is 
tested for registration: the diploma obtained. If one is in the possession of the required 
diploma, or can prove that one has passed a certain examination, one can be registered 
for the rest of one’s life whether or not the profession is practised. It is held that this 
situation cannot guarantee professional competence and consumer protection during 
the whole period in which the architect practises his profession. Upon the request of the 
1998 Rijksbouwmeester Prof. ir. Wytze Patijn in 2001, an evaluation on the effectives of 
the Act was conducted by the Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Stud-
ies of Delft University (OTB)63. It was concluded that overall the Act produced an exten-
                                                                                                                                                             
meant in Article 6 (1) ECHR. Since the Crown, which was empowered to determine the dispute, does not 
qualify as an independent and impartial court, there was a violation of Article 6 (1) ECHR. See European 
Court of Human Rights, Application no. 8848/80, Benthem v. the Netherlands, paragraphs 40, 43-44.  
62 If a recognition decision or an approval by the Minister as meant in Article 9 (1) (o) is considered as a 
general compelling regulation, a judicial appeal can be instituted to the Trade and Industry Appeals Tri-
bunal contrary to Article 8:2 Awb which stipulates that an appeal cannot be instituted against general 
compelling regulations (Article21(3)). This would mean that only the civil judge would be competent to 
rule upon this decision. However, Article 21(3) indicates that the legislator holds the opinion that the ad-
ministrative judge is competent to rule upon decisions as meant in the Architects’ Title Act. This para-
graph was added by the Act of 26 September 2002 (Official Gazette 2002, 526) which amended several 
regulations relating to the implementation of Directive 2001/19/EC, which is now replaced by Directive 
2005/36/EC. See R. Seerden and F. Stroink, Administrative Law of the European Union, Its Member States 
and the United States, A Comparative Analysis, Intersentia, Antwerp-Groningen, 2002. It serves to execute 
the Directive and contains, in Article III B, the possibility to institute a higher appeal against the rejection 
of a request to recognize an architectural diploma which has not been obtained in a EU or EEA Member 
State, but which is recognized by a EU Member State. The same applies if no decision has been taken 
within three months (Article III B Act of 26 September 2002 included a new Article 9a in the ATA Act 
This Article has been abolished however by the Act of 12 June 2008 amending the Architects’ Title Act and 
implementing Directive 2005/36/EC).  
Lastly, it should be mentioned that Article 8:4 e Awb is applicable (Article 21 (2) ATA). This means that an 
appeal cannot be instituted against a decision containing a judgement on the knowledge and abilities of a 
candidate or student that has taken the examination, or has been tested in any other way, or containing the 
determination of requirements, standards or more detailed rules for this examination or test. This para-
graph was added by the ‘Leemtewet Awb’ (Act of 26 April 1995, Official Gazette 1995, 250, entry into force 
on 17 May 1995). It precludes a higher appeal against decisions of the Commissions which are charged 
with the taking of the examination, as meant in Articles 25 and 26 of this law, to the Trade and Industry 
Appeals Tribunal.  
63 Priemus et al., 2001. 
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sive, transparent and reasonably functioning market for architectural services. However 
improvement was needed. The OTB report indicated that, in the light of consumer pro-
tection and quality, the imposition of a two year period in which professional experience 
should be gained was necessary as well as lifelong education for all architects. A code of 
conduct and a complaint procedure for consumers in the event that an architect violated 
this code were also recommended. 
 In the light of this advice, the 2004 VROM Minister, Mrs. S. Dekker, wrote in her 
letter of 23 Mach 2004 to the President of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, 
that she was aiming to make the Architects’ Title Act a more powerful quality instru-
ment. In its Action Programme Environment and Culture64 of May 2005, the Cabinet 
confirmed that the Architects’ Title Act should become a more powerful quality instru-
ment, certainly in the light of the new Directive 2005/36/EC. Some of these findings 
have already been implemented in the amended Architects’ Title Act of 12 June 2008.  
Furthermore, as indicated above, very recently (on 4 Mach 2010) the Architects’ Title 
Act was amended again to include a mandatory period of professional experience of two 
years before one is allowed to register.  Some other changes were also introduced, such 
as an explicit recognition that also legal persons can use the title of architect.  The 2010 
Act has not yet entered into force.  Article VIII states that a Royal Decree will indicate 
when this will take place.  It is expected that the professional experience period will 
become obligatory from 2015 onwards.   
1. Lifelong learning 
The Act of 12 June 2008 which amended the Architects’ Title Act introduced a new 
Article 27a into the ATA which implements Article 22 (b) of Directive 2005/36/EC. This 
Article indicates that, unless the Bureau is notified that one is no longer professionally 
active, all registered architects are obliged to keep abreast of professional development 
by continuing education for at least 16 hours per year. Architects who are also a mem-
ber of the professional association BNA are, through their membership, subjected to 
more stringent rules: BNA members have to keep up with new developments by under-
taking at least 30 hours of education per year. The Architects’ Title Act does not foresee 
any sanctions if one does not fulfil this obligation, nor is there any supervision.65 This 
does not seem to be efficient. In this regard, the OTB also proposed to annul the regis-
tration of those professionals who have not been professionally active for a certain pe-
riod of time. In this way the risk that consumers would engage an incompetent profes-
sional was also deemed to be limited. However, since this proposal can be qualified 
more as a form of professional protection instead of title protection, it has not been 
accepted. 
2. Two year period of practical experience 
The OTB report also advised that professionals should have two years of professional 
experience before they are able to register. In this regard, the 2003 Rijksbouwmeester, Jo 
Coenen, took the initiative for the Experiment with regard to the Professional Experi-
                                                                
64 In Dutch: ‘Actieprogramma Ruimte en Cultuur’. 
65 Parliamentary Documents Lower House 2007/2008, 31.079, no. 10. 
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ence of Young Architects to give newcomers in the profession the possibility to gain 
much more and much wider practical experience in the brief two-year period during 
which newly-qualified architects begin regular practice. In this way they would be pre-
pared to fully enter the profession. The new architects were given an individual mentor 
and had to follow a common programme. The evaluations of the Experiment demon-
strated that it was a much needed and necessary complement to regular education, and 
more in particular with the education provided by the Technical Universities. The tran-
sition from the TU-education to real practice is not particularly seamless since the edu-
cation provides for scientific design competences and does not qualify as a ‘professional’ 
education. Therefore, it does not contain a period for traineeship, even though Article 
7.6(3) Law on Higher Education and Scientific Research provides that an education 
which prepares individuals for particular professions have to include a practical prepa-
ration with regard to professional practice. Article 7.6(2) explicitly holds that this is also 
applicable to the profession of architect. It has been asked whether there is sufficient 
practical preparation in the educational process at this moment. Practical skills and 
insights into building regulations, procedures, building costs, etc. are subjects which 
have to be learned through practice. As noted in the OTB report, the obligatory trainee-
ship period in Member States such as Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France, should be taken as an example. In this regard it should be noted however that 
European legislation does not demand the completion of a professional experience pe-
riod. However, the Architects’ Title Act has recently been amended. In July 2009, the 
Dutch Council of Ministers has, upon request of VROM Minister Cramer, agreed to 
send the proposal to amend the Architects’ Title Act to the Second Chamber.66 On 4 
March 2010 the Act amending the Architects’ Title Act was approved by the First 
Chamber as well.  When the amended Act enters into force, the title of ‘architect’ can 
only be used after completion of a traineeship (Article 12d), while those who follow this 
traineeship can call themselves ‘architects in training’. It is foreseen that the amended 
act will enter into force in the traineeship will become mandatory from 2015 onwards. 
Those who are already registered are not obliged to follow such a practical period, since 
they probably already have practised the profession. The Bureau has to implement and 
manage these amendments.67  
3. Professional liability insurance 
It was also proposed to introduce obligatory professional liability insurance since con-
sumers have no guarantee that the architect is covered by professional liability insur-
ance. In two Round Table Meetings (11 April 2005 and 21 June 2005) held by members 
of the professions, it was however held that a compulsory professional liability insurance 
was not desirable and that the creation of a deontological rule which states that archi-
tects have to communicate to their clients before the contract is concluded with regard 
to whether or not they are in the possession of such insurance, was a better solution. 
                                                                
66 See Parl. Doc. 2008-2009, 32016, nr. 3. 
67 At this moment the Bureau advises the VROM Minister on the quality of architectural education. In the 
future its task in this field will probably be extended, with the organisation of the professional experience 
period and responsibility for its quality, as well as with the creation of a deontological code and a com-
plaints procedure. 
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Compulsory insurance was considered to give rise to market regulation, and to give 
consumers a false feeling of security, since not every professional act is covered by such 
insurance. At this moment, only BNA members are obliged to buy professional liability 
insurance (Article 6(2) BNA Articles of Association). However, as held in Part I of this 
thesis, Article 23 of Directive 2006/123/EC indicates that Member States may ensure 
that providers whose services present a direct and particular risk to the health or safety 
of the recipient, or a third person, or to the financial security of the recipient, subscribe 
to professional liability insurance. Since the design and supervision of buildings can 
cause severe damage in the event that it is not performed well, it can be argued that the 
Netherlands has failed to implement the Directive in this regard. In this regard it should 
be taken into account, however, that Dutch architects will usually apply standard condi-
tions that require architects to insure their professional liability. This will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 13.  Furthermore, Article 27a which will be included in the 
Architects’ Title Act after the entry into force of the 2010 amendment, indicates that 
those who are included in the register will have an information obligation towards (po-
tential) clients.  This obligation means that the registered architect who is asked to sub-
mit a quotation, is required to inform his client of his expertise and professional compe-
tence, coverage of the work to be carried out by him through a professional liability 
insurance policy and of the rights and obligations of the client. 
4. Complaint procedures and a deontological code 
The OTB report also made a recommendation for a public basis for complaint proce-
dures and a deontological code. Since, currently consumers have no opportunity to 
complain if an architect does not behave well – they can institute civil proceedings but 
this involves a long and difficult process – a deontological code would provide protec-
tion by giving them the possibility to complain. It should be possible that the registra-
tion of professionals who do not work in accordance with a deontological code, or who 
make other professional faults, can be annulled. Other sanctions can be a warning, a 
suspension or a fine. It is proposed that the civil judge remains the competent authority 
to determine possible damage compensation. The deontological code will be inspired by 
the code of the Architects Council of Europe. The Council of State has not (yet) sup-
ported this amendment, due to the fact that the competence to create such rules is not 
sufficiently clear and precise. 
 
These were the most important findings of the Research Institute for Housing, Urban 
and Mobility Studies of Delft University.68 It can be concluded that the Architects’ Act 
                                                                
68 Another proposed amendment is to change the Bureau into an independent agency of public law or a 
public agency for trade and industry. In this regard it should be noted that, on 2 November 2006, an Act 
was promulgated containing more detailed rules on independent agencies, also know as Framework Act 
independent agencies, Official Gazette 587, 30 November 2006. It is foreseen that this new Act will be 
made applicable to the Bureau. See Parl. Doc. 32 016. As held in paragraph 12.2.2.1 of this thesis, the Bu-
reau is an independent agency of private law. An independent agency is an organisation which fulfils pub-
lic tasks, but which is not directly subordinated to a Ministry. Since the Cabinet’s policy with regard to in-
dependent agencies is to put public tasks as much as possible under ministerial control, there are some 
limits to their competences. In general, an independent agency can only make rules on administrative or 
technical matters. Special subjects can only be regulated insofar as the Minister gives his approval first. It 
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already foresaw the permanent education Act of 12 June 2008 (Article 27a AA) while a 
bill is pending on a two year period in which professional experience should be gained 
(bill 18 July 2009). The other proposals have not yet been implemented. 
3. The Association of Dutch Architects 
As indicated in paragraph 12.1, the Association of Dutch Architects (BNA) set up a 
private register for architects stricto sensu in 1948. This should be distinguished from 
the public register which was created in 1988 and managed by the Bureau. As a result of 
public registration, the architectural title is protected. Since the profession is not pro-
tected, the public register generally only guarantees clients that a registered architect has 
followed the required professional education. The demands of competent professional 
practices however, are more exacting, and include, among others, practical experience, 
adherence to a Code of Conduct, enhancing skills by following courses and a liability 
insurance.69 Only membership of the BNA -which is the sole general professional asso-
ciation of Dutch architects- guarantees all these skills. Through the BNA, architects who 
are of the opinion that the legal protection is not sufficient to guarantee a proper fulfil-
ment of professional services, can thereby still unite themselves more closely. Member-
ship is not compulsory, but is open to all registered architects who have gained sufficient 
(two years) qualified practical experience. The BNA created deontological rules on the 
‘way’ in which the profession should be practised. By becoming a member, the architect 
obliges himself to work in accordance with these rules. They have to be observed by all 
BNA Members and have a bearing on competence, independence (Article 2 Code of 
Conduct), responsibility and the loyalty of the architect as an adviser of his client, with-
out disregard, however, of his responsibility to society as a whole, and of his collegiality 
towards his fellow professionals (Article 1 Code of Conduct).70 In this way, the Code 
obliges the members inter alia, to improve their own knowledge, take into account the 
consequences of their actions for society and the environment, and make agreements in 
which the rights and duties of themselves and their clients are laid down in a sound way. 
The BNA Code of Conduct does not contain any provision on price regulation or busi-
ness structure.  It seems thus that also BNA architects are allowed to associate with en-
                                                                                                                                                             
would thus be problematic for a public agency to create rules on the professional experience period, the 
deontological code or on permanent education. The Bureau is a ‘b-organ’ as meant in Article 1:1 (1) (b) 
General Act Administrative Law since it is a private agency holding public authority. The Bureau has pub-
lic authority since it registers new professionals and manages the register. Since this responsibility is held 
by a private agency which is, for the majority, composed of members of the profession, it can be seen as an 
independent institution. See Priemus et all, p. 35.  
 With regard to the independent public agency model, board members of the Bureau are appointed by the 
VROM Minister who disposes of a lot of instruments to effect his political responsibility, and to prevent 
practising professionals protecting themselves against newcomers (approval of the budget and the annual 
accounts, creation of policy rules regarding the execution of tasks by the independent public agency, an-
nulment of a decision, subjecting of certain decisions to foregoing approval, …). What the exact conse-
quences will entail will become clear after the Architects’ Act is amended to incorporate these changes.  
69 Bond der Nederlandse Architechten, The Architectural Profession in the Netherlands, leaflet, August 2006, 
p. 5. See http://www.bna.nl/binaries/bna-downloads-3/infoblad-the-architectural-profession-in-nl.pdf, last 
consulted 23 December 2009. 
70 Ibid., p. 6. 
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trepreneurs in the Netherlands.  With regard to publicity, Article 2(2) indicates that 
architects have the freedom to make their activities, expertise, experience and compe-
tence known to the public.   
 The statutes of the BNA foresee in Articles 11 and 12, that membership can be can-
celled by the board when a member does not fulfil its obligations. There is a College of 
Supervision and a Council of Appeal where a member can fight such a decision. Fur-
thermore, BNA members are obliged to insure their professional liability, and have to 
undertake permanent education of 30 hours per year. With this final requirement in 
mind, the BNA Academy was created. In this academy, architects can follow several 
courses as part of the process of permanent education.71 
 The main occupations of the BNA are limited to testing the quality of the architec-
ture and of building techniques in terms of social developments; informing members 
about new (legislative) developments and changes; stimulating a high quality of educa-
tion and practical training; discussing with the government and other actors in the 
building sector about the judicial and economic frameworks within which architects 
perform their tasks; drawing up general conditions for the relationship between archi-
tects and clients, architect-employers and architect employees; representing the archi-
tect-employers in trade-unions and cooperating with other professional organizations; 
promoting the role of the architect as businessman and emphasizing their role in eco-
nomic society; etc.   
 It should be stressed however, that architects are not obliged to register with the 
BNA. At present the BNA has over 3,000 members, representing some 1,500 practices.72 
Roughly 75% of Dutch practices are associated with the BNA through the membership 
of one or more of their architects. However, when looking at the individual number of 
architects, only one third is a BNA-member. It follows that most members are large 
bureaus.   
4. Conclusion 
In the Netherlands, the architectural profession has changed considerably over time. 
Due to the high population density, the complexity of building projects has increased, 
which means that most building projects are set up by building promotors.73 As of 1 
October 1993, registered architects can officially be distinguished from other profes-
sionals in the building sector since they have the privilege to call themselves ‘architect’ 
to the exclusion of all others. The Architects’ Title Act gives rise to the legal protection 
of the title of Architect in the Netherlands. The general requirement for registration is 
the possession of a recognized diploma/certificate, or the successful taking of an exami-
nation. In general, Dutch students can follow a five-year university education or a four-
year part-time training at an Academy, the latter after having completed a four-year 
                                                                
71 See http://www.bna.nl/nl/nieuws/persberichten,2008/02/bna-academie.html and http://www.bna.nl/ 
nl/nieuwsberichten,bna/2008/06/wet-arch-titel.html, last consulted 1 November 2009. 
72 http://www.bna.nl/nl/overbna, last consulted 9 November 2009. 
73 However, recently a project has been started in the municipality of Almere to encourage consumers to 
‘design’ their own houses in conjunction with their own architect. See http://www.echo.nl/al-
bu/wonen/redactie/836573/uniek.project.in.almere.poort/, last consulted 23 December 2009.  
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Bachelor programme. It is also possible to use the title after successful completion of the 
examination instituted by the Council of Architects. In order to take this examination, a 
minimum of seven years of practical experience in the field of architecture is required. 
The VROM Minister can grant exemption on the basis of proven exceptional compe-
tence. Automatically recognised certificates are those issued by the universities or acad-
emies mentioned in the Architects’ Title Act and those mentioned in Annex V.7 and VI 
of Directive 2005/36/EC. Other qualifications can be recognised under the Directive’s 
general system which is incorporated in the Act of 6 December 2007, containing general 
rules on the recognition of EC qualifications.  The 2010 Amendment Act of the Archi-
tecs’ Title Act includes a mandatory period of two years in which professional experi-
ence has to be gained before one can be registered as a fully qualified architect. It is 
foreseen that the traineeship -which is currently only obligatory for BNA members- will 
become mandatory from 2015 onwards. Registered architects are not subject to a code 
of conduct and there is no mandatory insurance obligation. Also legal persons can regis-
ter. The Architects’ Act is in line with the provisions of Directive 2005/36/EC. However, 
since there is no mandatory insurance obligation except for members of the Association 
of Dutch Architects (BNA), it can be questioned whether this is contrary to recital 98 of 
Directive 2006/123/EC which states that any operator providing services involving a 
direct health, safety of financial risk for the recipient or a third person, should, in prin-
ciple, be covered by appropriate professional liability insurance. 
 
The Bureau is charged with the registration of architects. Legally registered architects 
who comply with the educational requirements may exercise their profession as private 
architect or as salaried architect in an architects’ office, in the public service, in profes-
sional bodies such as housing corporations or pension funds, and in the building indus-
try, and use the title.74 
 To protect the consumer and society as a whole, the Bureau is authorized to insti-
tute legal proceedings against persons who illegally use the title of architect. The Bureau 
also functions as the ‘competent authority’ as detailed in Directive 2005/36/EC for all 
matters relating to the implementation and administration of its provisions. 
 
Registration offers only a confirmation that the architect has fulfilled the required edu-
cation programme. It follows that title protection can give some information about the 
quality of architectural services, but that an architect has also practical experience can 
only be guaranteed by membership of the BNA. Architects with two years professional 
experience can voluntarily become a member of the BNA. These architects have to act in 
accordance with the BNA Code of Conduct. The Permanent Professional Training 
Regulations which apply as of January 2006, contains rules on the professional educa-
tion of BNA-members and implies that these architects should spend at least thirty 
hours per year on professional training.75 
                                                                
74 Bond der Nederlandse Architechten, The Architectural Profession in the Netherlands, leaflet, August 2006. 
See http://www.bna.nl/binaries/bna-downloads-3/infoblad-the-architectural-profession-in-nl.pdf, last vis-
ited 23 December 2009. 
75 Van Gulijk 2009, p. 33.  
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The Dutch title protection does not present significant obstacles as far as competition 
within, or entry into, the profession is concerned, because it is not coupled with a pro-
fessional monopoly76. It does not prevent others, without a title, from entering the mar-
ket. 
 In the Netherlands there is no protection of the profession since many legal re-
quirements already apply to the architect’s design as well as to the construction process, 
which all aim to protect the quality of buildings. It follows that to exercise the profession 
of architect in the Netherlands, neither inscription in the register nor BNA membership 
are mandatory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
76 Maks & Philipsen 2002, p. 73. 
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CONTRACT LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 
1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters discussed the public regulation of architects in the Netherlands. 
It was demonstrated that, contrary to the Belgian situation, only the title of architect is 
protected, but not the practise of the profession. This means that the involvement of an 
architect is not mandatory for the design of plans and the supervision of building works. 
Furthermore, the professions of architect and entrepreneur can be practised by one and 
the same person. Whether this has any consequences within the relationship between 
the building master, the entrepreneur and the (person practising as) architect, will be 
investigated in this chapter. It should be noted however, that just as was the case with 
the Belgian situation, this thesis will not contain a detailed description of the construc-
tion process, since it only aims to discuss the regulation of architects. However, when 
discussing the tasks of architects, it is impossible not to refer to the presence of other 
building partners, since the tasks of these professionals are often interrelated. For the 
same reasons as were described earlier, the tasks of the architect will only be discussed 
within the ambit of the traditional construction process. 
 Since the new civil code of the Netherlands is based on the Code Napoleon of 1804, 
while Belgium still uses this Code with only some minor amendments, the contractual 
regulation of architects in both countries contains some similarities. It follows that when 
discussing a regulation which is similar in both countries, I will refer to my explanation 
in the Belgian chapter and will not describe the content of that regulation in detail again, 
except if the Dutch regulation contains a derogation. However, even though the provi-
sions of the civil codes of both states are comparable on several points, it has to be noted 
that the Dutch regulation dealing with the tasks and liabilities of architects is not limited 
to the provisions of the Civil Code or to the provisions which have been expressly 
agreed upon in the architectural contract.1 This is due to the fact that, in the Nether-
lands, the professions have created their own sets of rules, called standard terms. These 
                                                                
1 Of course contracts do not only contain what has expressly been agreed upon, but also what is deemed to 
be included, in accordance with the nature of the agreement, by reasonableness and fairness, usage and the 
law (see Article 1134 Civil Code Belgium and Article 6:2 Dutch Civil Code) 
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standard terms are generally accepted and even foreseen in special ‘extra-judicial’ arbi-
tration authorities.2 In the majority of the cases, parties have agreed that these standard 
terms are applicable to their contract. This means that problems which arise in the event 
of a building containing a certain defect are mostly solved by these arbitration authori-
ties. As noted above, in Belgium it is not at all common for building problems to be 
solved outside of the court. Generally accepted standard terms are also non-existent. It 
follows that the regulation of (the tasks and liabilities of) architects3 in both countries is 
not that similar at all. Since the exact ambit of the architectural tasks is generally laid 
down in a contract (or in standard conditions), the contractual liabilities of architects 
will also be discussed in relation to the tasks of the building master and other building 
partners. As noted in paragraph 6.1., it is, of course, possible that the architect is also 
liable in tort towards third parties (such as the entrepreneur, neighbours, persons rent-
ing a house, etc.). In this regard it should be noted that the extra-contractual responsi-
bility will only be withheld if no contractual obligations are violated.  Since the respon-
sibilities and tasks of architects are determined by the contract, and since my analysis of 
case law on the liabilities of architects has demonstrated that the overall majority of 
cases holding architects liable are based on their contractual liability, I will not discuss 
the liability in tort of architects, or their criminal liability. 
2. The legal position of the architect 
2.1. Liberal profession 
Dutch legislators have not created a legal definition of the concept ‘liberal profession’. 
It is however presumed that free professionals are professionals who practise a regulated 
profession and personally provide intellectual services in an independent way, after 
having fulfilled the required education. They are personally responsible for their actions, 
often subscribe to a deontological code, have a relationship of trust with their clients, 
and pursue their clients’ as well as the public interest. 4 
The profession of architect is considered to fulfil all these requirements and is enumer-
ated on the list of free professions of the Chamber of Commerce. 
2.2. The legal classification of the architectural contract 
The Dutch Civil Code does not contain any specific provision on the representation of 
the building master by the architect. Nevertheless, the contract between the architect 
and the building master is mostly categorized as a ‘contract of services’ as explained in 
Article 7:400 CC5. 
                                                                
2 As held by Article 1020 Civil Proceedings Act, it should be laid down in writing that a dispute will be 
subject to arbitration.  
3 As held before, when the profession of ‘architect’ is discussed in the following chapters, the persons al-
lowed to use the title are referred to, except if I expressly state otherwise. 
4 http://www.raadvoorhetvrijeberoep.nl/, last consulted 23 December 2009. 
5 In Dutch: ‘overeenkomst van opdracht’. 
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As noted above, entrepreneurship was considered as a sort of rent of work in Roman 
law (locatio-conductio operis faciendi). The Code Napoleon did not break with this tradi-
tion. It followed that the Dutch Civil Code of 1838, which was heavily influenced by the 
Code Napoleon6, stated in Article 1583 of Title 7 of Book III, that there are two types of 
rent: the rent of goods and the rent of services, work and industry7. This can be com-
pared to Articles 1708-1711 of the text of the Code Napoleon used in Belgium. 
 
Nevertheless, in 1907, the Labour Agreement Act8 broke with this tradition. It was held 
that only goods could be rented, as opposed to services, labour and industry. The con-
tent of Title 7 (now Title 4) was reduced to rent agreements, which therefore no longer 
included entrepreneurship agreements, labour agreements and agreements to fulfil 
certain services. These were brought under a new title, Title 7A on the ‘Agreements to 
supply labour’9. These agreements were thus no longer classified as a type of rent. 
 After several amendments, these types of agreements are no longer classified under 
the same title. The Labour Agreement Act is now codified in Title 10 of Book 7 of the 
Dutch Civil Code which only deals with labour agreements stricto sensu.10 This means 
that nowadays the entrepreneurship agreement is no longer classified under a common 
heading with other types of agreements, and has its own Title 12, which was created in 
2003, but only entered into force on 1 September 2006.11 The difference between a la-
bour and an entrepreneurship agreement is that there is no level of subordination be-
tween the entrepreneur and the one who engages him. Furthermore, in principle, 
agreements to fulfil services are regulated in Title 7 of the Civil Code, entitled ‘Commis-
sion’12 (in Dutch: Opdracht). 
 
In the Netherlands, the contract concluded between an architect and his client is gener-
ally classified as a contract for services as defined in Article 7:400 CC (commission). The 
difference with the notion of mandate which is a type of commission agreement (Article 
7:414 CC) is that in the event of a mandate, the architect fulfils legal actions for the ac-
count of the building master. However, in principle, the architect does not fulfil legal 
actions but only factual ones.13 Therefore the contract of the architect is qualified as a 
commission contract. 
                                                                
6 Until 1838 the Code Napoleon was applicable in the Netherlands. 
7 In Dutch: ‘huur van goederen, en huur van diensten, werk en nijverheid’. 
8 Wet van 13 juli 1907 op de arbeidsovereenkomst, Stb. n. 193. 
9 In Dutch: ‘arbeidsovereenkomst’. 
10 A labour agreement is an agreement by which one party engages himself to fulfil labour requirements for 
and at the service of another party, during a certain time, and against a certain wage: Article 7:610 CC 
11 Act of 5 June 2003 to amplify title 7.1 (Purchase and Barter) of the new Civil Code with provisions on the 
purchase of immovables as well as the determination and introduction of title 7.12 (entrepreneurship), Of-
ficial Gazette. 238. With regard to contracts to which the second section is applicable, the old regime has to 
be applied in the event that the contract has already been concluded before the entry into force of the new 
title on 1 September 2006. The first section is applicable to these contracts,. 
12 In Dutch: ‘overeenkomst van Opdracht’. 
13 Van Zeben 1991, p.318. As held by Article 7.1 New Rules 2005, the architect is his client’s mandatary if and 
insofar as his client has assigned him in writing for that purpose, or if the architect can prove that the cli-
ent has otherwise explicitly given him permission. However, the lack of a written authorization cannot be 
brought in against the consultant, if and insofar as the consultant proves that the client has otherwise ex-
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As held in Article 7:400 CC.: 
’1. The contract for services is an agreement to which one party, in the absence of an 
employment contract, fulfils services for the other party which do not constitute the 
erection of a material work, the preservation of things, the assignment of works or the 
transport of persons or things.’ 
 
In the event that Article 7:400 CC is applicable, the service provider fulfils certain tasks 
for his client for his own account. Since the architect does not normally fulfil legal ac-
tions for the account of his client, Articles 7:414-424 on mandate are, in principle, not 
applicable. 
 The difference with regard to Article 7:750 CC on entrepreneurship, on the other 
hand, is that the contract for services as meant in Article 7:400 CC does not concern the 
creation of a material, tangible work, while Article 7:750 CC only means materials crea-
tions.14 Since architects design plans and do not construct the building themselves, Arti-
cle 7:750 CC is not applicable to them. 
2.3. The status of the architect 
Architects can practise their profession as a self-employed professional, as an employee 
or as an official of the state appointed by the administration.15 In the situation in which 
architects work as employees, they normally have concluded a labour agreement with 
their employer, and not a contract of services. It should be noted that in the Nether-
lands, architects can even be employed by entrepreneurs. However, since they practise a 
liberal profession, they always have to take into account the interests of the general pub-
lic. Their intellectual independence cannot be affected. 
 
Hereunder the tasks and responsibilities of the self-employed architect will be discussed 
in greater detail. The tasks of the other types of architects are generally the same. 
3. Parties to the architectural contract 
As held above, the relationship between the architect and the building master is quali-
fied as a contract of services, and not as an entrepreneurial contract. The provisions in 
Title 12 on entrepreneurship do not refer to the architect at all. The reason is that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
plicitly given permission, or if and insofar these actions follow out of the given circumstances or the nature 
of the commission. The New Rules will be discussed in more detail hereunder. In general however, archi-
tects are not allowed to sign a contract with an entrepreneur on behalf of the client. If the architect exceeds 
his authority to act, he is strictly liable towards the entrepreneur if the latter suffers damages because of 
this.  
14 According to Article 7:750 (1) CC, a contract for works is a contract whereby one party, the contractor, 
undertakes towards the other party, the client, otherwise than under a contract of employment, to create 
and to deliver works of a tangible nature, against a price in money to be paid by the client. The entrepre-
neur is thus obliged to erect the work and to deliver it to the building master, in accordance with the con-
tent and purpose of the agreement.  
15 See for example Article 3(2) BNA Code of Conduct.  
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involvement of an architect is not mandatory according to Dutch law. In the Nether-
lands, a building can therefore be constructed with or without the involvement of an 
architect. Since this thesis aims to describe the regulations relating to architects, it is 
obvious that the situation in which the building master decides to engage an architect 
will be under discussion. 
 
In the traditional construction process the architectural contract is concluded between 
the architect and a non-professional building master. The architect performs services for 
the building master which exist in principle in the design of a plan and the supervision 
of the execution of the building works. In this thesis only the traditional building proc-
ess will be discussed. 
4. Content of the architectural contract 
When a contract is concluded, parties generally discuss and agree on every specific as-
pect which is included in the agreement. In principle, contractual and liability matters 
are thus regulated by the Dutch Civil Code. This means that a valid contract is con-
cluded between two or more consenting parties (Article 6:213 CC jo art. 3:33 CC) if its 
object does not violate public order and good morals, and the contractual obligations 
are determinable (Article 6:227 CC). If the agreement came into existence as the result 
of a threat (Article 3:44(2) CC), error, deceit (Article 3:44(3) CC) or the misuse of cir-
cumstances (Article 3:44(4) CC), or if one of the parties was not legally capable of bind-
ing itself (Article 3:34 CC), the agreement can be declared void. Contracts are form free 
and, in principle, do not have to be written. 
 
The Civil Code provisions in Title 12 are not only applicable to building works, but to 
all types of entrepreneurship. Only Section 2 contains provisions which are explicitly 
applicable to building contracts. They aim to protect consumers and have coercive force. 
As has been stated previously, the professional groups in the Dutch building industry 
held that the stipulations of the Code Napoleon were too obsolete, and consequently 
have created their own rules, referred to as standard terms, which often replace the Civil 
Code provisions. Since the professional associations have created their own rules, the 
legislator considered it to be unnecessary to include more specific provisions relating to 
building construction in the Civil Code in 2003. Furthermore, if legislation which would 
cover all types of building projects had to be created, the regulation would be complex 
and extensive. There are situations in which the design is made by the building master 
himself, or by his architect, and situations in which the entrepreneur also acts as the 
designer. The execution of the work can be carried out with or without supervision, 
while the complexity of the building project can also require special rules. Since the 
building sector has demonstrated that it is able to foresee a differentiated system of 
regulations, the legislator has chosen not to create a special regulatory regime for build-
ing projects. Furthermore, the sector’s own rules can be adapted more easily. Neverthe-
less, as noted above, the legislator did chose however to create a coercive regime in fa-
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vour of consumers, since there is a risk of imbalance and inequality of economic power 
in this area.16 
 
The standard terms which are thus created by certain professional associations in the 
building industry, are therefore very popular. However parties always have to declare 
them applicable to the contract under consideration. The standard terms aim to regulate 
the contractual relationship of the building master and the entrepreneur, and the rela-
tionship between the building master and the architect. They constitute a part of the 
contract and have become generally accepted. Whenever standard terms are declared 
applicable to a certain contract, the contracting parties do not have to agree on every 
aspect separately. In this way, the contracts become more uniform, which brings about 
an easier situation for those involved in the building sector and their clients. It should be 
noted, however, that according to Article 6:233 CC, the applicability of the standard 
terms can be nullified if the user has not given the other party a reasonable opportunity 
to take notice of them. However, as held by Article 6:232 CC, the other party is bound 
by the general terms and conditions even if, at the time of entry into the contract, the 
user has understood or ought to have understood that the other party was not aware of 
its contents. Furthermore, in the event that the content of standard terms contract is 
unreasonably onerous, for example if the architect is released in whole or in part from a 
legal obligation to repair damage, it can be nullified.17 
 
As noted above, in this way not only architectural standard terms, such as the Standard 
Regulation 1997 (SR 1997) and the New Rules 2005 (NR 2005), were created, but so too 
were entrepreneurial standard terms such as the Uniform Administrative Terms for the 
Execution of Works 1989 (UAV), the Uniform Administrative Terms for Integrated 
Contracts 2005 (UAV-GC 2005) and the General Terms for Entrepreneurship in the 
Building Company (1992 (AVA 1992). 
 
Even though this thesis aims to discuss the regulation of architects, the importance of 
some of these entrepreneurial terms should not be underestimated. The reason is that 
some of them presume the presence of a ‘director’, which is deemed to be an architect, 
the building master or another expert. In this way, the UAV 1989 contain the most 
popular standardized contractual clauses when an architect is involved.18 They revised 
the Uniform Administrative Terms of 1968 and came into existence after deliberation 
between the organisations of building companies and the government. The UAV (and 
most of the other standard terms) are characterised by the fact that disputes between 
entrepreneurs and building masters are settled by the Council of Arbitration for the 
Building Industry which is not a judicial court. Its case law is quite uniform. The UAV 
                                                                
16 Asser-Van den Bergh 2007, p. 11. 
17 See for example Article 60(2) Standard Regulation 1988 and ’s-Gravenhage 22 November 2000, BR 2001, 
599, annotated by M.A.M.C. van den Berg. 
18 The UAV 1989 must be used for all projects commissioned by public authorities or subsidized by these. 
Bond der Nederlandse Architechten, The Architectural Profession in the Netherlands, leaflet, August 2006, 
p. 10. See http://www.bna.nl/binaries/bna-downloads-3/infoblad-the-architectural-profession-in-nl.pdf, 
last visited 23 December 2009. 
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are applicable in the traditional situation in which the entrepreneur erects a building in 
accordance with a design created by the building master or by the latter’s architect or 
advisor. They are therefore not applicable in the event that the entrepreneur created the 
design himself. Furthermore, the building is erected under the building master’s super-
vision (direction) or under the supervision of a director (i.e. generally an architect, advi-
sor or other expert). 
 
The most important architectural standard terms on the other hand are the New Rules 
2005 (NR) and the older Standard Regulation (SR) 1997.19 The NR define the general 
provisions and the obligations of the building partners with respect to the commission. 
As noted above, they are only applicable in a concrete case if parties agree upon this. 
The NR are created by the Royal Institution of Dutch Architects (BNA) and the Organi-
sation of Consultant and Engineers Bureaus (ONRI), but can also be used by architects 
who are not BNA members. Several disciplines in the construction industry, active in 
the design, consultancy and management phases, aimed to obtain an integrated design 
so that contracts would be more uniform, which would be easier for all parties.20 In this 
way the NR contains standard regulations which are commonly used in the construction 
sector, and which are generally not contrary to fairness and good faith. The NR are 
accompanied by a standard contractual form in which the parties make concrete agree-
ments with respect to the specific commission granted to the architect. The filling in of 
this basic contract differs as between projects, while the legal relationship remains the 
same. It should be noted, however, that the NR only regulate the relationship between 
the building master and the consultant (i.e. mostly an architect or engineer). The NR 
however do not describe the architect’s tasks in detail, as the former SR 1997 did. The 
tasks and competences are now enumerated in the ‘Explanatory Notes on the Legal 
Relationship client-architect, engineer and consultant NR 2005 Standard Form of Basic 
Contract’. It is important to note that, together with the NR, a ‘Standard Task Specifica-
tion’ was created, which enumerates the tasks of the various consultants in detail. A new 
version was made in 2009. These will also be further discussed hereunder. 
 
It follows that when inquiring about the tasks of the architect, not only the provisions of 
the Civil Code will have to be discussed, but also the NR which deal with the most re-
cent architectural standard terms and the UAV 1989 which contain the most popular 
                                                                
19 It should be noted that since 1 September 2006, the Regulation Consumer-Architects exists. This contains 
simpler rules on the legal relationship between the architect and his (non-professional) client, and is appli-
cable to smaller projects if parties agree so. In the event of a mistake by the architect, the building master 
can only obtain damage compensation to a maximum of 75,000 Euros. If the advisory costs are higher, the 
damage compensation can be 1,000.000 Euros at most. 75,000 Euros is also the maximum amount which 
can be obtained by client-consumers in the NR 2005 if the advisory costs are lower than 75,000 Euros. 
However, those who are not consumers can obtain a damage compensation of a maximum of 1,000.000 
Euros even if the advisory costs are lower than 75,000 Euros. It is important to note that in the event of a 
dispute, no arbitration is possible, and recourse has to be taken to the ordinary courts. See 
http://www.bna.nl/binaries/bna-downloads-3/02-algemene-voorwaarden-consument-architect.pdf, last 
consulted 17 November 2009. 
20 The New Rules 2005, Explanatory notes on the legal relationship between client-architect, engineer and 
consultant DNR 2005, Standard Form of Basic Contract. 
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entrepreneurial terms. This is due to the fact that the Civil Code does not discuss the 
tasks and liabilities of architects as such. Title XII on entrepreneurship presumes the 
absence of a ‘direction’, while Title VII on service contracts is applicable to the architec-
tural contract but does not deal with it specifically. However, since the Civil Code does 
contain rules on the relationship between the building master and the entrepreneur, its 
provisions cannot be neglected, since the responsibility of the architect often starts 
where the responsibility of another contracting party ends. Furthermore, if standard 
terms are not applicable to a contract, the Civil Code provisions have to be consulted. 
Title 7.12 even contains a few provisions which have coercive force.21 
 It is important to note that the UAV foresee that the building master is allowed to 
appoint one or more persons to ‘direct’ the work (§3.1 UAV 1989). In this way archi-
tects, but also other specialists, can function as director. If the building master does not 
appoint someone, he will function as the director himself. The director will represent 
the building master in all matters related to the construction, except if the UAV pro-
vides that the building master is exclusively competent (§3.4 UAV 1989).22 In the NR on 
the other hand, the architect is called a ‘consultant’ (see Article 1). The consultant is he 
who accepts the commission. This means that the NR are not only applicable to the 
architect practising as a free professional, but also to the architect-employee, and even to 
those who fulfil commissions without being in the possession of any educational qualifi-
cations.23 
 Since this thesis aims to discuss the regulations with regard to architects, I will use 
the term ‘architect’ when the UAV refer to the ‘director’ and the NR to the ‘consultant’. 
 
Membership of the BNA does not have any influence on the applicability of the archi-
tectural terms which are created by the BNA, or on the contractual relationship between 
the building master and the architect. Parties can always agree as to whether or not the 
NR are applicable. This means that even architects who are not a BNA member can 
agree that these terms are applicable24, as well as those who practise the profession with-
out being allowed to use the title25. Furthermore, the mere fact of being a BNA member 
does not automatically make the NR applicable. In any case, it should be noted that 
architectural terms cannot be applicable when there are no architectural actions (and, 
                                                                
21 Article 7:755 and 7:762 have coercive force, as well as section 2 of title 7.12. 
22 See for example the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 2 April 1913, Jaarverslag 1913, nr. II, 
6. Since the architect cannot represent the building master if the building master is specifically named in 
the UAV, he is, for example, not allowed to change or cancel the direction, prolong the period for delivery, 
agree on prices and changes with regard to the building specifications, put the entrepreneur in default, etc. 
In any case, the director is not allowed to adapt the building contract with the entrepreneur after its con-
clusion (Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1966, nr. 4712, Jaarverslag 1966, 49). If he did so, 
the building master would not be bound by the changes. Furthermore, the architect cannot raise the entre-
preneur’s honorarium without the consent of the building master. See Council of Arbitration for the 
Building Industry 26 August 1982, nr. 9878, BR 1982, 919. These matters do not fall under the architect’s 
normal competence.  
23 Van Wijngaarden & Chao-Duivis 2004, part 7, p. 16. 
24 Utrecht 15 January 1964, JAR 1964, 79; Arbitration Institute Architecture 25 March 1980, BR 1980, 641; 
TvA 1980/5, p. 124. 
25 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 25 July 1973, BR 1973, 808. 
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for example, only entrepreneurial actions) involved.26 Architectural standard terms are 
thus not necessarily applicable to every contract. In the event that they are not applica-
ble, and a certain issue is not contractually regulated, they are not even considered to be 
automatically applicable with regard to that specific issue. In such a case, one will de-
termine how the issue is generally regulated. Since architectural terms are mostly de-
clared applicable by the contracting parties, the architect’s competence as described in 
these standard terms, is often deemed to be the normal competence. It follows that, if no 
standard terms apply, and the building contract does not regulate a certain issue, one 
will look at the ‘normal’ solution which is, in general, presumed to be described in archi-
tectural terms, since they describe the tasks and liabilities architects incur in general. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the rules of the Civil Code complement the stan-
dard terms, so whenever the applicable terms do not regulate a certain issue, the Civil 
Code has to be consulted. 
 
If the NR 2005 are applicable, disputes between the building master and the architect 
have to be settled as amicably as possible, including the use of mediation. If no specific 
arrangements apply, the dispute will be settled by the ordinary civil judge applying the 
Code of Civil Legal Procedure. However, if parties agree that the settlement of disputes 
will take place by means of arbitration, then all disputes -including those regarded as 
such by only one of the parties- which arise between the client and the consultant or 
their legal successors or assignees as a result of the commission, shall be settled by arbi-
tration. Article 44 of the SR 1997 foresees arbitration by the Arbitration Institute of 
Architecture27 which specifically deals with issues between architects and building mas-
ters, while the NR 2005 resort to the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry28 
when it comes to dealing with building problems. This is the same Council as that indi-
cated in the UAV. The Council decides in accordance with the rules which are in force 
                                                                
26 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 20 September 1983, BR 1984, 535. 
27 This arbitration institute was set up in 1969 by the General Terms on the honoraria of architects and the 
contractual relationship between the building master and the architect (AR 1969) which was replaced by 
the SR 1988.  
28 Due to the wish to have a more integrated system, the board of the Arbitration Institute of Architecture 
and the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry is made up of the same persons. See 
http://www.arbitrageinstituutbouwkunst.org/curatorium/index.html, (last consulted 17 November 2009) 
and http://www.arbitrageinstituutbouwkunst.org/arbiters/index.html, (last consulted 17 November 2009). 
Arbitration by the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry as stipulated in NR was inspired by the 
wish to have one ‘general’ arbitration institute for the building sector in the Netherlands. Most disputes are 
brought before the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry: Van Wijngaarden & Chao-Duivis 
2004, part 8, p 14. A party in arbitral proceedings initiated with the Arbitration Board whose subject mat-
ter is linked to proceedings before another arbitration institute in the Netherlands, may request that these 
proceedings be completely joined, provided that the other proceedings are conducted subject to the appli-
cability of rules providing for the possibility of a complete joinder of arbitral proceedings in a substantively 
corresponding manner. The chairmen of both arbitration institutes will jointly decide. See Article 19, Ar-
bitration Regulation of the Arbitration Institute of Architecture and Article 17, Council of Arbitration 
Regulation. Each of the parties shall, in principle, be entitled to appeal against an award rendered by the 
Arbitration Board in the first instance. The appeal shall be handled by an Arbitration Tribunal. See Article 
19, Arbitration Regulation of the Arbitration Institute of Architecture and Article 22, Council of Arbitra-
tion Regulation.  
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on the day on which the dispute has been brought up. If parties have agreed on arbitra-
tion, the civil court does not have jurisdiction (Article 58 NR). 
4.1. Obligations of the architect 
Even though the Standard Task Specification by the NR, which describes the architect’s 
tasks, is extremely detailed, hereunder the most important tasks which architects gener-
ally incur are summarised. 
 
- Provide assistance and advice to the client 
As held by Article 7:401 CC, the architect has to fulfil his commission29 with due care. 
This means that his services have to be carried out with the same diligence that society 
requires from other persons of the same profession and undertaking similar tasks.30 As 
stated in Article 7:403 CC, the architect has to inform his client31 about what he has done 
in order to fulfil his commission, and has to notify him immediately after completion of 
his task, in the event that his client was not aware of completion. Furthermore, the ar-
chitect has to justify the way in which he has fulfilled his task. If he has used or received 
money for the account of his client as part of the fulfilment of his tasks, he also has to 
inform his client about this. It follows that Article 7:403 CC is a concretization of the 
duty of care obligation stipulated in Article 7:401 CC. This duty of care obligation is also 
contained in Articles 11.1 and 11.2 NR 2005 which state that the architect has to dispose 
of the required knowledge and competence, for the proper fulfilment of the commis-
sion, and has to carry out the commission in a proper and careful manner, assist the 
client independently in a position of trust, and conduct his services to the best of his 
knowledge and capacity. The architect should avoid everything that can prejudice the 
independence of his advice. The duty of care obligation which is an obligation of means, 
is not only applicable to the architect’s advisory task but to the whole process. 
 
The duty of care obligation also means that the architect keeps his client informed about 
the execution of the commission. He provides, to the best of his capacity, and in time, 
on request, all pieces of information, including information about the progress of the 
execution of the commission, alterations of (government) regulations or decrees, or 
alterations with respect to the financial aspects of the commission, the financial conse-
quences of alterations thereof whether necessary or not, as well as information about 
agreements which he has concluded with third parties for the fulfilment of the commis-
sion (Article 11 NR). He also has to give advice on construction materials. Furthermore, 
it is obvious that the architect has to take into consideration the public and private regu-
lations which are relevant to the commission, and has to inform the building master 
about the progress of the works, the existence of which may be considered as common 
knowledge among consultants (Article 1.4 and 1.5 NR). In this way the provisions of 
                                                                
29 In Dutch: ‘opdracht’. 
30 Supreme Court 18 June 1926, NJ 1926/1021; Supreme Court 9 June 2000, NJ 2000, 460. 
31 The client is ‘de opdrachtgever’. 
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(among others) the Housing Act and the Spatial Planning Act have to be taken into 
account, as well as private law rules relating to neighbourhood obligations. 
 Architects have an obligation of means in this regard, which means that they have 
to make a design which is suitable for obtaining a building permit, but they do not have 
to guarantee that such a permit will effectually be granted. If the design does not meet 
the legal requirements, architects are strictly liable however. 
The architect also has to warn his client if the information given to him contains such 
shortcomings, or shows such deficiencies that he would act in defiance of standards of 
reasonableness and fairness should he proceed. 
 
As held by Article 7:402 CC, the architect has to respect justified directions in relation to 
the performance of his commission, and which are given to him in due time. If he has 
reasonable grounds to refuse the fulfilment of his task in accordance with the directions 
given to him, he can terminate the contract if his client does not adapt these directions, 
and he can invoke serious grounds. However, if the commission contains certain faults, 
or if the date provided to him contains errors which are so serious that it would be con-
trary to reason to base his work on them, he has to inform the building master (Article 
11.10 NR). 
 The architect also has to do what is necessary to obtain decent price offers from 
entrepreneurs with regard to the execution of the building project. However, the archi-
tect is not allowed to grant the commission to a particular entrepreneur. This is still the 
task of the building master. However, if the entrepreneur could rightfully trust the ar-
chitect’s power to grant him the work, the building master can be bound by this, even 
though no permission was given to this effect.32 
 
- Determination of the programme and the budget 
Article 3 NR 2005 states that the architect will advise his client to let him fulfil a pre-
investigation if the client does not dispose of a list of demands which can be considered 
as the starting point for his activities, if he is not sure whether the execution of the cli-
ent’s demands is possible, or if he deems a pre-investigation to be desirable. If fulfilment 
of his client’s wishes is possible, the architect draws up a written concept of the commis-
sion in consultation with the client, from which emerges what has been discussed, as 
well as the applicability of these rules (Article 4.1 NR 2005). As held by Article 4.2 NR 
2005, the agreement is officially concluded if the architect confirms in writing to his 
client that he can execute this concept, or if such a written offer by the architect has been 
accepted by the client, or if that which has been laid down is agreed upon in another 
way, as long as it is in writing. It follows that if the client approves the concept in writ-
ing, the contractual obligations are set, and the contract has been entered in to.33 As 
indicated by the Explanatory Notes to the NR, if the architect has been asked to draw up 
estimates or budgets, he has to draw these up to the best of his ability. According to the 
                                                                
32 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1948, nr. 1431,  Jaarverslag 1948-1949, 16. 
33 It should be noted that it is obligatory for an entrepreneurial contract to be in writing if it relates to the 
purpose of constructing a dwelling consisting of an immoveable thing or part, and is commissioned by a 
natural person not acting in the conduct of a profession or business (see Article 7:765). Section 2 of title 7 
of book 7 has coercive force, and contains several provisions which all aim to protect consumers.  
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Arbitration Institute of Architecture, architects are obliged to provide the client with 
cost estimates.34 This also falls under the proper and careful carrying out of the commis-
sion.  The budget does not only include the real costs but also the architect’s fee.  In this 
regard it should be noted that chapter 12.8. of the NR contains rules on how the archi-
tects can calculate his fee, for example by percentage, that is on the basis of the value of 
the work to be done; by time, that is on the basis of the time spent; or by discretion, 
meaning that it is left entirely to the discretion of the parties.  In this regard it should be 
noted that the SR 1997 used to indicate the fee basis by means of a reference to NEN 
2631, which is a Dutch norm indicating how investment costs of building should pref-
erably be calculated. A formula was drawn which led to the determination of a certain 
percentage which would then result in the fee.35 This formula left no room for price 
competition whatsoever and was often also used by architects which were no BNA 
members or to contracts to which the SR 1997 was not made applicable and was not 
only used by the Arbitration Institute Architecture but also by the ordinary courts.36  
This form of price fixing was not taken over by the NR 2005. 
 
- Design of the plan 
As held by the Standard Task Specification by the NR, the architect is responsible for the 
design. Of course the design of the architect has to be of good quality and has to satisfy 
the building master’s demands. As noted above, these demands have to be agreed upon 
first (Article 2(3) NR). Before the design can be made, the architect first has an obliga-
tion of means to investigate the soil, to see whether it is fit for constructing a building in 
accordance with the client’s wishes.37 
 
- Supervision of the execution of the building works 
As held by §3.6 UAV, the architect supervises the execution of the building works and 
verifies whether the contractual obligations have been observed. This is also confirmed 
by the Standard Task Specification by the New Rules 2005 under the heading ‘Execu-
tional Phase’. The architect has to check the quality of the work on a regular basis, and 
to determine whether they are fit for approval. Since the architect has to act with due 
care, he has an obligation of means. As to what the supervision of the execution exactly 
entails, I refer to Chapter 8.5. In any case, it should be noted that architects can engage 
experts to assist them during the verification of the building work. 
4.2. Obligations of the building master 
- Give the architect and the entrepreneur the opportunity to work 
As held by Articles 12.1 and 12.2 NR, the building master has to behave as a good and 
careful building master in his relationship with the architect. This means that even 
though he is not obliged to control the latter’s advice, he has to give him the opportunity 
                                                                
34 Arbitration Institute Architecture 16 January 2004, BR 2005, 155. 
35  See for more details Maks & Philipsen 2005, p. 62. 
36  Maks & Philipsen 2005, p. 74. 
37 Court of Appeal ’s-Hertogenbosch 25 February 1981, BR 1981, 876. 
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to fulfil his job. Towards the entrepreneur, the building master is not obliged to assist 
him with the execution of the building. Nevertheless, an obligation to cooperate can be 
written down in the contract or can be deduced from its purpose. In the literature it is 
said that such an obligation exists if the entrepreneur has a positive interest in the good 
performance of the contract.38. Of course this is the case with building contracts, since 
the entrepreneur wants to get a good reputation for his work and so gain new clients, 
and needs to have enough work to keep his employees in employment. Therefore the 
building master is obliged to give the entrepreneur the opportunity to fulfil the contract. 
An example of the cooperation obligation can be found in Article 12.4 NR which holds 
that if the building master actually detects a shortcoming, or should have been con-
scious thereof, he has an obligation to warn the architect in that respect. Furthermore, 
the building master has to hand over the permission to the entrepreneur and put the 
land at the entrepreneur’s disposition (§5 UAV). It follows that both parties have to take 
each other’s interests into account. 
 
- Provide all necessary information 
The building master has to provide the architect will all information that is necessary to 
undertake the project. In the event that he notices, or should have noticed, a certain 
fault in the architect’s plans, he has to warn the architect about this (Article 12.4 NR). 
 
- Pay the price 
As held by Article 7:405 CC, if the architect enters into the agreement within the prac-
tice of his profession or business (trade), his client has to pay him. If the amount is not 
determined, the client has to pay a regular or reasonable amount. In such a case, the 
regulation in standard terms is held applicable on this point, since its content is deemed 
to be generally known and customary.39 The obligation to pay is also stipulated in Article 
12.8 NR.  It follows that if there is a conflict, and the judge cannot fall back on the prov-
able presence of contractual dispositions between the architect and the client, he is 
charged with the duty to investigate the characteristic feature of the architect-principal 
relationship. He will look at standard terms to determine what belongs to the tasks of 
the architect and to determine a reasonable honorarium for the architect.40 
 Of course the client also has to pay the service provider’s costs which are related to 
the fulfilment of his commission, as long as these costs are not included in his honorar-
ium. Furthermore the client also has to compensate for damage suffered by the architect 
in the event that a certain serious danger arose during the fulfilment of the task, for 
which the architect cannot be held accountable. In the event that the service provider 
was working within the practice of his profession or business, he only has to be compen-
sated if that danger surpasses the risks which are normal within the execution of that 
profession or trade (Article 7:406 CC). It follows that, in the event that the danger con-
stitutes a normal risk which has to be taken into account, the professional service pro-
vider will not get damage compensation. Most architects are insured for such risks. As 
                                                                
38 Asser-Hartkamp 4-I, 2004, nr. 281. 
39 Amsterdam 7 March 1979, BR 1979, 801. 
40 Adriaansen, Maks & Philipsen 2005, p. 56. 
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indicated in the previous chapter, Dutch architects are not (yet) obliged to buy profes-
sional liability insurance. This might be contrary to recital 98 of Directive 2006/123/EC 
which states that any operator providing services involving a direct health, safety of 
financial risk for the recipient or a third person, should, in principle, be covered by 
appropriate professional liability insurance. 
 
- Approval and acceptance of the work 
As held by Article 7:758 CC, in his relationship with the entrepreneur, the building 
master has to approve and accept the work if it seems that it has been carried out in a 
good and proper way. As held by §3.4 UAV jo §9 and 10, the architect will approve and 
accept the work unless the building master has notified the entrepreneur that he will do 
this himself. 
5. Liabilities and risks of the architect and the entrepreneur 
5.1. Introduction 
In the forgoing chapter, the most important tasks of the architect were briefly discussed. 
This chapter aims to discuss the main liabilities of architects in the event that a building 
suffers a certain defect. As held before, the Civil Code does not assume the presence of 
an architect. Therefore the general liability principles will apply, as well as the regula-
tions laid down in the New Rules. Reference should also be made to the UAV, in which 
the presence of an architect to direct the work is made possible. It should be noted that 
the liability of the architect depends on the concrete circumstances of the case. In the 
following, I aim to provide the reader with the general liability principles which are 
applied when judges or arbitrators rule as to whether or not the architect has violated 
his contractual obligations. It should be noticed that this subject will only be discussed 
within the framework of the traditional construction process. Furthermore, only the 
contractual liability will discussed and not the architects’ liability in tort or penal liabil-
ity. 
5.2. Proof of liability 
As held by Article 6:74 CC, every failure in the performance of an obligation shall re-
quire the debtor to repair the damage which the creditor suffers because of this, unless 
the failure is not attributable to the debtor. If performance is not permanently impossi-
ble, the debtor has to be put in default before he is obliged to repair the damage. 
 
With regard to the architectural responsibility, Article 13.1 NR holds more specifically 
that the architect is liable if he committed a culpable shortcoming (accountable fault) 
and that the building master has put him in default in writing and summoned him to 
repair the consequences of the shortcoming within a reasonable time, given that the 
architect has not (or not on time) repaired the consequences of these shortcomings. If 
follows that the architect who perpetrates a shortcoming is not, by definition, therefore 
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liable. To be declared liable, the client must declare in writing that the architect is li-
able41, grant him a reasonable time to make good the consequences of the shortcoming, 
in the event that the architect has not, or not on time, complied with this summons. The 
architect is thus only liable for his culpable shortcomings at the moment that he has not 
answered the proof of default. This is also stipulated in Article 6:74 CC.42 
 Each case of not complying with an obligation following from the commission is a 
shortcoming. The shortcoming is culpable when the architect could, and should have, 
avoided the shortcoming. The criterion is that of a well and carefully acting architect 
who acted with normal attentiveness. The architect should be equipped with the re-
quired professional knowledge and means, while these requirements are related to the 
actual commission.43 The arbitrators will always verify whether a well and conscien-
tiously operating consultant would have handled it in the same way. The architect is 
thus not liable for damage which could not be foreseen44, or when he did everything 
which could reasonably be expected from him.45 However, sometimes the architect will 
be answerable for a certain result. Calculations, for example, should not contain any 
mistakes. If the commission stipulates that an uncertain environment, for example a soil 
which cannot properly be investigated before the start of the execution activities, should 
be examined, then the consultant cannot be answerable for the result, but he has met his 
obligation to advise in a proper and careful manner if he has ‘done his best’ in the given 
circumstances.46 
 
In the Netherlands, the Civil Code, but more importantly standard conditions, describe 
what the tasks of an architect really encompass. Court decisions, decisions of arbitration 
institutes and doctrine have often interpreted these tasks and determined their extent. I 
refer to paragraph 8.4. for some examples. 
 Overall, architects have an obligation of means towards the building master. As held 
by Article 11.1. NR 2005 he has to fulfil his commission with good care and assist the 
building master to the best of his knowledge and competence. It is clear that architects 
can be held liable in cases which they did not design with due care. The design should 
conform to the state of the art, which is an obligation of means.47 Architects have to 
advise their clients on the applicable legislation. Since they are obliged to know the rele-
vant regulations, they can be held strictly liable if the design is not in conformity with 
these rules. Architects do not have to guarantee that a building permit will be granted. 
The design only has to be eligible to obtain such a permit, which indicates the existence 
                                                                
41 The proof of default does not have to be issued in all cases, for example if a term has been agreed on as 
fatal, the sole expiry of this date, without the work having been executed that should have been carried out, 
is enough to be in default. 
42 Arbitration Institute Architecture, nr. 1200-0162, unpublished; Arbitration Institute Architecture 12 
September 2003, nr. 1200-0204, unpublished. The purpose of a summons is to give the architect the oppor-
tunity to cure the consequences of the default within a reasonable time. 
43 Explanatory Notes to the New Rules, Article 1. 
44 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 27 January 1986, BR 1986,462. 
45 Court of Appeal Amsterdam 29 May 1970, BR 1971, 421; Van den Berg, Bregnan and Chao-Duivis (et al) 
2007, p. 266. 
46 Explanatory Notes to the New Rules, Article 11 (2).  
47 Bruggeman, Chao-Duivis & Koning 2007, p. 44. 
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of an obligation of means.48 If the architect exceeds his competence, it is possible that he 
binds his clients to third parties, which can lead to severe damages. It follows that in 
such a case, he will be strictly liable.49 Architects have to examine the building site to the 
best of their ability. This clearly is an obligation of means. The same is true with regard 
to the selection of building materials: the architect can be held liable in the event of 
improper advice, or if he was, or should have been, aware of the unfitness of the materi-
als.50 An obligation of means also exists regarding the advice on construction costs. The 
budget determined by the architect has to be more or less equal to the real costs, since 
architects cannot predict every possible situation that can have an influence on the 
price. Since architects are not obliged to be present at the building site at all times, it can 
be said that they have also an obligation of means in this regard. In any case, architects 
are always allowed to engage experts such as engineers with regard to certain tasks. 51 
The architect will be liable if he should have noticed that the expert was not competent, 
or noticed this without taking any action. 
 
Of course the client has to prove the culpable shortcomings of the architect. However, 
arbitrators are able to determine on their own whether a culpable shortcoming has been 
committed due to their experience and competence. Therefore, they do not often de-
mand that the building master should fully prove his viewpoint. In this regard it should 
be noted that there are many limitations to the architect’s liability. However since the 
introduction of SR 1988 they have become fewer in number, making them not unrea-
sonably onerous as meant in Articles 6:236 and 6:237 CC 
 
The entrepreneur, on the other hand, has to execute the works according to the plan 
provided to him by the building master or by the building master’s architect (§6.2 
UAV). In such a case, the entrepreneur has to make sure that the work is executed in 
accordance with the plan and the directions of the architect. He is, in principle, not 
responsible for the fact that the work does not live up to the building master’s expecta-
tions due to a fault in the plan, except if he neglected his duty to issue a warning (§14 
UAV).52 Furthermore, it should be noted that the entrepreneur can only invoke his right 
                                                                
48 Van Gulijk 2009, p. 76; Arbitration Institute of Architecture 19 April 2005, No. 1200-0301, not published.  
49 See Article 1 jo 7 NR 2005. 
50 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry, 21 September 2001, BR 2002, 149. 
51 Arbitration Institute Architecture 3 February 2003, BR 2004, 75. 
52 See ’s-Gravenhage, 27 November 1952, NJ 1953/661. The entrepreneur is also obliged to warn the building 
master for any faults/defects in the building master’s area of responsibilities, as long as he could/should 
have noticed them (7:754 CC). This duty does not encompass a full research of the obligations, but only re-
fers to what is reasonably noticeable and is based on the principle that parties have to take each other’s le-
gitimate interests into account, even in the pre-contractual phase: See Supreme Court 15 November 1957, 
NJ 1958, 67 (Baris/ Riezenkamp). If the entrepreneur failed to issue a warning, he will normally only be 
held fully liable if he was aware of the fault in the design/instructions, and did not act upon it. If he was not 
aware of it, but could/should have been aware of it, the damage compensation will mostly be divided be-
tween parties in accordance with Article 6:101 (1) CC. The damage which has to be compensated for is 
mostly calculated as the difference between the costs which have to be made to repair the defect, and the 
costs which should have been made if the entrepreneur had issued a warning in time, and his warning 
would have been followed: See Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry, 14 May 1969, nr. 5487, BR 
1969, 454.  
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to the presence of a director to supervise the work if this was contractually agreed with 
the building master or in the case of exceptional circumstances. If afterwards it turns out 
that the entrepreneur is not sufficiently competent to do the job, he cannot demand that 
the building master hire an architect to repair his faults. 
 
It is important to note that §44.3 UAV 1989 states that, notwithstanding the liability of 
parties by virtue of the contract or the law, the entrepreneur is liable for damage to the 
work, unless this damage is the consequence of exceptional circumstances against which 
the entrepreneur did not have to take appropriate measures due to the character of the 
work, and it would be unreasonable to hold him liable for the damage. It seems there-
fore that the entrepreneur has a residual liability and will be held liable every time an-
other party cannot be held responsible, based on the law or by contract. 
 
Since the architect will be held liable in the event that he committed a culpable short-
coming within the framework of his tasks, while the entrepreneur will be held liable in 
the event of an attributable shortcoming in the execution of the work, in the Nether-
lands the professionals will not be held liable in solidum. 
 
Of course parties are always allowed to insert exoneration clauses in the contract as long 
as these do not violate the true meaning of the contractual obligations, and do not exon-
erate deceit or malicious intent. This will be further discussed in paragraph 8.5.3.2. 
5.3. Liability before and after reception of the building work 
Constructions build by the entrepreneur under the supervision of the architect have to 
be approved and delivered to the building master (see Chapter IV UAV and Article 16.1 
NR). 
 As held by Article 758(1) CC, the works will be delivered by the entrepreneur to the 
building master after the latter has accepted them. After the entrepreneur has indicated 
that he has finished the execution53, the building master has to react and approve or 
disapprove the work within a reasonable time period (dependent on the circumstances 
of the case). Silence is considered to be an acceptance. According to §9.1 UAV, the en-
trepreneur has to notify the architect in writing that he has completed the execution. 
Furthermore, §9 contains precise time limits wherein the work has to be accepted if the 
building master wants to evade automatic acceptance (§9 and 10). In any case, small 
defects cannot be a reason to withhold approval (§9.7 UAV). After approval, the build-
ing work will be delivered to the building master (§10.1) UAV). Nevertheless parties can 
agree to foresee a maintenance period, in which the building master can test whether the 
                                                                
53 The entrepreneur has to fulfil the works and offer the construction within the agreed time period. In the 
event that this time period is not respected, a fine can be imposed (Article 6:91 CC) and the UAV may 
even foresee in a diminution of the contract price (§42 UAV). In the event that the work cannot be offered 
due to force majeure or a fault of the building master, the time period can be prolonged. The Council of 
Arbitration for the Building Industry only applies this diminution if the building master has suffered dam-
age. Furthermore the judge can soften the amount of the fine based on Article 6:94 CC if reasonableness 
requires this (coercive force).  
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building is free from defect. Defects which are noticed within this period have to be 
repaired by the entrepreneur, with the exception of defects which are caused by con-
struction or working methods which are proscribed by the building master, or by the 
building master’s materials (§11.2 jo §5.2 and 5.3 UAV). At the end of the maintenance 
period, the entrepreneur will ask the architect once more to verify and approve the 
work. 
 It is important to note in this regard that Article 11.3 NR states that the architect has 
to buy professional indemnity insurance that offers at least the same cover as the skele-
ton policy, lastly and jointly decreed and published by the Royal Institute of Dutch Ar-
chitects and the Organization of Consulting Engineers (ONRI). As noted before, archi-
tects who are a BNA member are obliged to buy insurance. Due to the NR, all architects, 
even those who are not a BNA member, have to buy professional liability insurance if 
they apply these NR. 
 As held by Article 15 NR, the damage to be compensated for by the architect, is 
limited per commission to a sum equal to the consultancy costs with a maximum of 
1,000,000 Euros. As stated before, this is only the case if the NR 2005 are made applica-
ble. However, in the case of commissions where the client is a consumer, and the con-
sultancy costs per commission are lower than 75,000 Euros, the damage to be compen-
sated for is limited to a maximum of 75,000 Euros. These limitations are, of course, only 
valid if the NR are applicable, and are only valid for ‘professional’ faults of the architect. 
If the architect voluntarily causes damage or was grossly negligent, it can be at odds with 
the principle of good faith to invoke this provision.54 
5.3.1. Liability before reception of the building work 
As stated before, Title 12 of Book 7 of the Dutch Civil Code does not include the pres-
ence of an architect. Since this thesis aims to discuss the regulation of architects, it pre-
sumes the involvement of an architect, so that the provisions of the NR have to be re-
ferred to when discussing their liability as well as the provisions of the UAV which deal 
with the presence of a direction. However, to understand the ambit of the architects’ 
liabilities, one also has to take into account the liabilities of the entrepreneur and the 
building master, as described in the Civil Code and the UAV, since the liability of one 
person often starts where that of another person ends. 
 
As already noted, Article 13.1 NR holds that the architect is liable in the event that he 
has committed a culpable shortcoming, and the building master has put him in default 
in writing and has summoned him to repair the consequences of the shortcomings 
within a reasonable time, while the architect has not (or not on time) repaired these 
consequences. Since the architect is responsible for the supervision of the execution 
(§3.6 UAV) as well as for the design of the plan (Standard Task Specification to the NR), 
while the entrepreneur is responsible for executing the work in accordance with the 
architect’s design and directions (§6.2 and 6.4 UAV), -at least if these standard terms are 
                                                                
54 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 18 August 1997, BR 2000, 704, annotated by M.A.M.C. 
van den Berg.  
  Chapter 8  
355 
applicable- the respective professionals will be held liable in the event that they have 
committed an attributable shortcoming within the framework of their respective obliga-
tions, and were in default with regard to repairing the damage. In the case of force ma-
jeure, they can therefore not be held liable. As already noted above, it should be noted 
that the architect has, in principle, an obligation of means. This means that he has to 
fulfil his duty of care and act as a reasonable and prudent professional, in order to es-
cape liability. 
 As noted above, in this thesis, the presence of an architect to supervise the building 
work is presumed. It should be noted that his supervision is meant as an extra guarantee 
for the building master, and not as a diminution of the entrepreneur’s responsibilities. 
 However, even though supervision is not obligatory, this does not mean that the 
building master will never be liable for failing supervision towards the entrepreneur. If 
the entrepreneur does not receive any remarks about the work that has been executed by 
him, he will trust that his work is fulfilling the building master’s requirements. If it then 
turns out that this is not the case, and that the entrepreneur found himself, due to the 
attitude of the architect, in a less favourable position, he can claim damage compensa-
tion from his contracting party, the building master. When determining the entrepre-
neur’s liability for his respective culpable shortcomings, the attitude of the supervisor 
will only be taken into account if the entrepreneur was not aware of the fault, and he 
could not know that the supervision was insufficient. It follows that the building master 
will only be liable with regard to the entrepreneur for insufficient supervision, if the 
architect’s attitude could reasonably let the entrepreneur believe that his work would be 
approved by the building master, while the entrepreneur’s trust in the supervisor was 
justified and the damage was caused because the entrepreneur built upon this trust.55 Of 
course, the building master can always institute proceedings against the architect. The 
fact that the entrepreneur’s trust in the supervisor has to be justified, does not leave 
much room for the entrepreneur to hold the building master accountable for faults with 
regard to the supervision. Since the supervisor cannot personally control every aspect of 
the building process, only evident faults or faults which occur repeatedly are considered 
to be faults which should have been noticed by the architect. Of course contracting par-
ties can always agree otherwise. 
 
The Civil Code and the UAV do contain some more specific liability rules with regard to 
defects in, or lack of fitness of, materials or tools used by the entrepreneur. These shall 
be for the account of the entrepreneur (Article 7:760(1) CC). This is confirmed by §17 
UAV 1989, which stipulates that the entrepreneur is responsible for the good quality of 
the building materials, their fitness for the intended purpose, and their timely delivery. 
It is important to note that the entrepreneur is not allowed to use building materials 
which are not approved. As held by §18.1 UAV, the materials have to be approved by 
the architect before they are incorporated into the construction. Materials which are put 
at the entrepreneur’s disposal by the building master are deemed to have been approved. 
 
                                                                
55 Asser-Van Den Berg 2007, nr. 111. 
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Nevertheless, in the event that the materials, including the land, are proscribed by the 
building master and contain a defect causing an improper performance of the work, the 
building master will be liable (Article 7:760(2) CC). This is also confirmed in §5.2, 5.3, 
5.4 UAV 1989. Article 7:760(2) CC confirms the content of Article 6:77 CC which states 
that where, in the performance of an obligation, an object is used which is unfit for pur-
pose, the resulting shortcoming will be attributed to the debtor, unless this would be 
unreasonably onerous in the light of the content and purpose of the legal action out of 
which the obligation arises, generally accepted principles and other circumstances of the 
case. It follows that, if an improper execution is due to defects or the use of inappropri-
ate materials on the part of the building master, including the land, the latter will be 
responsible for the consequences, at least if the entrepreneur respected his warning duty 
and did not otherwise fail his duty of care. However, in the event that Article 7:760(2) 
CC applies, the entrepreneur will be liable in the event that he failed his duty to warn, as 
stipulated in Article 7:754 CC, or failed in his expertise or due care in another way. 
Paragraph 2 applies mutatis mutandis in the event of errors or defects in plans, draw-
ings, calculations, specifications or executing directions provided by the building master 
(Article 7:760(3) CC). The extent of the entrepreneur’s obligation to deliver a good and 
proper building, is therefore dependent on the amount of specifications given by the 
building master, and the amount of freedom of choice which is left to the entrepreneur. 
The building master is therefore responsible for his own choices. The consequences of 
these defects are therefore for the account of the building master, whether or not he can 
be blamed for these defects.56 
 §5.2 UAV 1989 holds in this regard that the building master is liable for the con-
struction demanded of him, and the working methods required by him (i.e. for the or-
ders and directions given by him or in his name57). §5.3 UAV extends his liability to 
building materials prescribed by him. This paragraph is an exception to §17 which states 
that the entrepreneur is responsible for the quality of the building materials, and their 
fitness for their intended use. If the prescribed instructions of the building master, as 
well as the execution by the entrepreneur, contain defaults, both the building master and 
the entrepreneur can be held partially liable.58 
 
                                                                
56 Explanatory Memorandum, Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 23, 095, nr. 3, p.32. In 1966, the Supreme Court 
held that in the event that the building master does not provide the materials himself, but orders which 
materials have to be used by the entrepreneur who then has to purchase them, the building master is liable 
in th event that they are defective, even if these materials are, in principle, fit for their intended use: Su-
preme Court 25 March 1966, NJ 1996, 279 (Moffenkit). The Explanatory Memorandum to Article 7:760 (2) 
CC departed from this viewpoint. In the event that certain types of materials, which are fit for their in-
tended use, are prescribed by the building master, while the specific materials bought by the entrepreneur 
are accidentally unfit, the entrepreneur will be held liable. It was held that there is no reason to shift the 
risk to the building master since the entrepreneur could also be faced with this problem if there would not 
have been any direction at all as to the materials which have to be used. Only if the type of materials were 
unfit in any case, would the building master be responsible. In such a case, the instruction of the building 
master is qualified as a defective design choice (as opposed to §4 UAV).  
57 It is, however, possible that the building master exonerates himself for any faults in the required construc-
tion: Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1934, nr. 954, aarverslag 1934, 15. 
58 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 19 September 1918, Jaarverslag 1918, nr. 119, 93; Council 
of Arbitration for the Building Industry, Jaarverslag 1921, nr. XLIII, 87. 
  Chapter 8  
357 
To avoid liability as meant in Article 7:760(2) and (3), the entrepreneur must therefore 
warn the building master about inaccuracies in the agreed specifications at the moment 
the contract is concluded, or during the execution, to the extent that he was, or ought to 
have been, reasonably aware thereof.59 The entrepreneur does not have to investigate the 
instructions and directions, but has to warn of defects which are noticeable after a global 
inspection.60 The entrepreneur’s warning duty is also stipulated in §6.14 UAV, which 
states that if it appears that the orders or directions contain defaults or omissions which 
are so serious that it would be against good faith for the entrepreneur to execute them 
without issuing a warning, the entrepreneur is liable if such a warning did not take 
place. In such cases, the building master has to prove that the entrepreneur failed in his 
warning duty. 
 
When determining whether or not the entrepreneur is liable in the event that he failed 
his duty to warn, the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry holds that the 
entrepreneur only has to do a marginal testing.61 The Council takes the level of expertise 
of the building master into account. In this way, it has often been held that if the entre-
preneur is no expert, or if the building master has more expertise than the entrepreneur, 
the entrepreneur is not liable for specific technical issues and has no warning duty. The 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, only takes the level of expertise of the building mas-
ter into account after having judged that the entrepreneur is liable, to determine the 
extent of the damage which has to be paid.62 Furthermore, the Council of Arbitration for 
the Building Industry holds that if another expert is consulted by the building master, 
the entrepreneur can, in principle, trust the latter’s advice and does not have to warn of 
any faults63. If the entrepreneur has not enough experience to undertake this task, he 
should hire an expert himself. On the other hand, when the entrepreneur is an expert in 
the field himself, he has to warn the building master/director as soon as possible. The 
more serious the fault is, the bigger his warning duty is.64 In any case, it is important to 
note that the warning has to be given to the architect immediately after the fault is no-
ticed (§6.14 UAV 1989). In general, failure of notification brings about full liability. 
However, account has to be taken of the foreseeability of the damage. 
 
In the event that the building master made a fault and the entrepreneur failed in his duty 
to issue a warning, the defect is, in the first place, still the risk of the building master. 
The reason is that if there was no defect in the materials, directions or design, the entre-
preneur did not have to issue a warning for anything at all. If he had to issue a warning, 
this necessarily entails that there was already a defect which could have been prevented 
if the entrepreneur had respected his warning duty. The damage is therefore caused by 
both parties. In such a case, the damage can be divided in accordance with the respective 
                                                                
59 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 7 October 1983, BR 1984, 166; Council of Arbitration for 
the Building Industry 12 July 2000, nr. 21.273, BR 2000, 167. 
60 Asser-Van den Berg 2007, nr. 101; Asser-Thunissen 1994, nr. 539. 
61 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1939, nr. 1206, Jaarverslag 1939, 27.  
62 Supreme Court 18 March 1932, NJ 1932 (Mook/Sap III). 
63 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1958, nr. 2700, Jaarverslag 1964, 16. 
64 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1962, nr. 3828, Jaarverslag 1962, 104. 
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mistakes of the parties concerned (Article 6:101 CC). However, the Council of Arbitra-
tion for the Building Industry often holds the entrepreneur liable for the entire damage, 
since §6.14 UAV states that the entrepreneur is liable for the harmful consequences of 
his failure. According to the Council, this means that the entrepreneur’s failure to warn 
caused the total damage.65 In any case, a division cannot take place if the entrepreneur 
was aware of the fault and did not warn the building master. If the architect made a 
design fault as well, the building master can institute proceedings against both profes-
sionals. In such a situation, the architect will only be held liable for his culpable short-
comings and will only have to pay for that part of the damage which is caused by him.66 
The architect can therefore also be held partially liable for failure of supervision in such 
a case. It can be concluded that if there is a fault in the execution of the work, the entre-
preneur has to cure it, or pay compensation for the damage caused.67 However, if a cer-
tain obvious fault which could not be overlooked by the architect is approved, it is pos-
sible that the entrepreneur may no longer be held liable.68 In any case, it should be noted 
that the architect will not be held liable in solidum together with the entrepreneur in the 
Netherlands. If the building master engaged an architect to design the plans and to give 
directions during the execution of the building work, and it turns out that the building 
suffers from a defect, the building master will, in general, turn to the entrepreneur in-
stead of to the architect, even if the former failed in his duty to warn.69 The reason for 
this is that architects mostly use general conditions in which their liability is strongly 
limited, while the UAV foresee in §44.3 that, notwithstanding the liability of parties by 
virtue of the contract or the law, the entrepreneur is liable for damage to the work, 
unless this damage is the consequence of exceptional circumstances against which the 
entrepreneur did not have to take appropriate measures due to the character of the 
work, and it would be unreasonable to hold him liable for the damage. It seems there-
fore, that the entrepreneur has a residual liability and will be held liable every time an-
other party cannot be held responsible, based on the law or on the contract. In the event 
that the building master turns to the architect anyway, the architect can claim that, 
within the contractual relationship between the building master and the architect, the 
former is responsible for the entrepreneur’s failure to warn, which jointly caused the 
damage. The damage can then be divided in accordance with the respective faults. If this 
division would not be reasonable due to the seriousness of the faults, and the circum-
stances of the case, it can still be corrected (Article 6:101 last sentence CC). This correc-
tion factor will often be used since the position of the architect as professional designer 
brings about that he has to design the building with the utmost accuracy, since he knows 
that the executor will place trust on his design. He can never speculate on the fact that a 
possible fault will be noticed by the entrepreneur, and can never trust on a ‘double 
                                                                
65 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 7 October 1983, nr. 11.380, BR 1984, p. 166, annotated by 
H.O. Thunissen 
66 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 16 November 2005, nr. 27.016, unpublished; Council of 
Arbitration for the Building Industry 1929, nr. 683, Jaarverslag 1929, 68. 
67 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 15 December 1994, nr. 16.977, unpublished. 
68 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 5 November 2003, nr. 23.526, unpublished. 
69 Van Den Berg, Bregman, Chao-Duivis & Langendoen 2004, pp. 282-293. 
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check’.70 Even though the duty to warn is a duty in favour of the building master, the 
architect cannot presume that this duty will always be rightly fulfilled. In the relation-
ship between the building master and the architect, the statement of the architect that 
the damage is jointly caused by the fact that the entrepreneur did not warn will, in prin-
ciple, therefore not release him from his liability due to the reasonableness correction 
factor mentioned in the last sentence of Article 6:101 CC. 
 
Article 7:760(1) CC and §17 UAV can be compared to Article 1788 of the Civil Code as 
it is used in Belgium, while Article 1789 of the latter Code can be compared to Article 
7:760(2) CC and 5.2-5.3-5.4 UAV. 
 
Article 7:757 CC can be compared to Article 1790 of the Civil Code used in Belgium. It 
holds that if the object upon which, or to which the works have to be executed, perishes 
or gets lost, making the execution of the work impossible, while this cannot be attrib-
uted to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur is entitled to a proportional payment of the 
agreed price based on the work he has already fulfilled and his costs. In the event of 
malicious intent or gross negligence on the part of the building master, the latter has to 
pay the full contract price less the entrepreneur’s savings (Article 7:757(1) CC). In the 
event that the object71 was kept by the entrepreneur (i.e. in principle before reception), 
the building master does not have to make any payment unless the perishing or loss of 
the object was due to his fault (see Article 1790 CC Belgium). If this is the case, Article 
7:757(1) is likewise applicable (Article 7:757(2)) CC). It follows that in the case of ‘nor-
mal’ culpability, the entrepreneur has to be paid proportionally, while in the case of 
malicious intent or gross negligence, the contract price has to be paid fully, less his sav-
ings. The UAV do not contain an Article comparable to Article 7:757 CC. As noted 
above, according to the UAV, the work is, in principle, at the risk of the entrepreneur 
until the moment of delivery (§6.4 UAV 1989), unless special circumstances occur 
(§44.3 UAV). 
5.3.2. Liability after receipt of the building works 
1. In principle: the architect can be held liable for five years after completion of the commission 
As noted before, Article 13 NR states that the architect is liable towards his client if he 
committed a culpable shortcoming and the client has declared in writing that he is li-
able, and has summoned him to make good the consequences of the shortcoming within 
a reasonable period of time and the consultant has not, or not in time, complied with 
this summons. The architect is only liable for damage that directly results from his cul-
pable fault or negligence (Article 13-14 NR). 
 
                                                                
70 Asser-Van den Berg 2007, nr. 106. 
71 With regard to immovables, the ‘object’ is mostly not ‘kept’ by the entrepreneur. Buildings are normally 
constructed on the land of the building master who automatically becomes the owner.  
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Even though the New Rules 2005 do not foresee specific provisions dealing with the 
exact content of the architect’s liability after reception, they do foresee them during a 
prescribed period.72 
 
According to Article 16 NR 2005, each liability of the architect expires five years from 
the day upon which the commission was terminated, either by completion or cancella-
tion. The day on which the object is completed or is deemed to be completed is regarded 
as the day on which the commission is terminated in the event that this date took place 
before the day on which the architect was sent his final bill. Otherwise the date on which 
the final bill was sent counts as the starting point for the prescribed period. However, 
the legal claim on account of a culpable shortcoming is not admissible if the building 
master has not, with due diligence, declared in writing, and for good reasons, that the 
architect is in default after he has discovered the shortcoming or reasonably should have 
discovered it. This legal claim on account of a culpable shortcoming expires two years 
after the written a motivated notice of default. Furthermore, it is not admissible for this 
claim to be brought up later than five years from the day upon which the commission 
was terminated, either by completion or cancellation. 
 It follows therefore that the building master first has to put the architect in default, 
and has to institute a proceeding within two years of the written proof of default. In any 
case, each liability expires after five years, so if the building master puts the architect in 
default four years after the completion of the building works, but waits two years to 
institute proceedings, his claim will be inadmissible. 
 
It is important to note that the architect can only be held liable by the building master 
during the five year period after completion of the building work in the event that it is 
proven that he committed a culpable shortcoming. In the Netherlands, the building 
master thus has to prove the architect’s shortcoming with regard to each liability. There 
is therefore a heavier weight on the building master’s shoulders. 
 
It should be noted however, that Article 16 NR is only applicable in the event that the 
New Rules 2005 have been made applicable to the contract. If this is not the case, the 
claim for damage will generally prescribe after twenty years (Article 3:306 CC). Article 
3:310 CC is more specific, and holds that claims for damage due to shortcomings in the 
performance of a contract prescribe five years after the creditor discovered the short-
coming and is aware of the identity of the debtor. In the event that the creditor did not 
discover the damage, the liability period of ten years starts to run after the damage was 
caused. It follows that the New Rules limit the liability period as laid down in the Civil 
Code.73 
                                                                
72 The former standard architectural terms used to foresee a liability was a period of ten years. Since this gave 
rise to extremely high insurance premiums, this was reduced to five years. See A. De Groot, BR 1989, p. 
247. 
73 It should be added that the New Rules also limit the extent of the architects’ liability. As held by Article 15, 
the compensation which has to be paid by the architect for the damage caused to his client equals the advi-
sory costs (advisor’s fee, supervision costs and additional costs) with a maximum of 1,000,000 Euros. If 
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2. The entrepreneur is in principle not liable for defects after delivery of the building works 
As noted before, after the entrepreneur has indicated that he has finished the execution 
of the building work, the building master has to react and approve or disapprove these 
works within a reasonable time period. After the acceptance by the building master, the 
entrepreneur will deliver the works. Just as in Belgium, parties often agree to establish a 
maintenance period in which the building master can test whether the building is free 
from defects. Defects which are noticed within this period have to be repaired by the 
entrepreneur for his own account, unless they are caused by construction or working 
methods which are proscribed by the building master or by the building master’s mate-
rials (§11.2 jo §5.2 and 5.3 UAV). At the end of the maintenance period, the entrepre-
neur will ask the architect to once more verify and approve the work. 
 
As held by Article 7:758(2) CC, after delivery of the building work, the building master 
carries the risk for this work. This is confirmed by §12.1 UAV which holds that after the 
day on which the work is delivered in accordance with §10.1 or 10.2 UAV, the entrepre-
neur is no longer liable for defects in the work. It follows that, after delivery and recep-
tion of the work, the entrepreneur is, in principle, no longer liable for defects in the 
construction. 
 
As held by §6.4 UAV, the construction and its execution are for the account of the en-
trepreneur until the day on which the construction is delivered in accordance with §10 
UAV. The construction is considered to be delivered when it is approved or when it is 
deemed to be approved. The day on which the work is approved or is deemed to be 
approved is therefore the day on which the work is considered to be delivered. In the 
event that the entrepreneur has indicated that the work is ready to be delivered and the 
building master does not check the work and accepts it within a reasonable period (with 
or without reservations), nor disapproves of it, the building master is presumed to have 
tacitly accepted the work. If there is an explicit or implicit (for example by uncondi-
tional payment or unconditional use of the construction) approval, the works are con-
sidered to be approved by the building master and will be delivered by the entrepreneur. 
If the applicable standard terms do not contain a provision on acceptance, the uncondi-
tional use of the building counts at least as a presumption of approval74. If the building 
master does not accept the work, he has to give his reasons for refusal. If the entrepre-
neur agrees with these objections, he must repair them and subsequently ask for a new 
approval. If he does not agree, it is possible to bring the dispute before the Council for 
Arbitration.75 
§9 and 10 UAV contain more details about the formalities which have to be fulfilled 
before delivery can take place. These will not be discussed within this thesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
these costs are less than 75,000 Euros, the compensation can be, at most, 75,000 Euros. It follows that, with 
regard to large projects, clients often still have to bear a considerable amount of the damages themselves.  
74 See for example Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 198, nr. 70.352, unpublished; Council of 
Arbitration for the Building Industry 9 May 2007, nr. 28.679, unpublished. 
75 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 25 August 1999, nr. 70.422, unpublished. 
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As held by Article 7:758(3) CC, there is one exception to the fact that the entrepreneur is 
no longer liable for defects after the reception of the work by the building master: since 
the entrepreneur is freed from liability for all defects which reasonably could/should 
have been noticed by the building master at the moment of delivery, he is still liable for 
damage caused by hidden defects. The entrepreneur is thus discharged from all liability 
for defects which the building master should have noticed at the moment of delivery. It 
is important to note that in the event that the works are not approved due to minor 
defects, it is possible that arbitrators may be called upon to verify whether or not the 
defects hinder the entrepreneur from using the building. The Council of Arbitration for 
the Building Industry has ruled a number of times that small defects do not hinder de-
livery as long as they do not impede the use of the building76 (see also §9.7 UAV). 
 
It is important to note that §12 UAV contains an additional exception. §12.2.b UAV 
states that the entrepreneur is not freed from liability after delivery of the work in the 
event that the work or part of it contains a hidden defect which is due to a fault on the 
part of the entrepreneur, the fault of his supplier, sub-contractor or his workmen, and 
the entrepreneur has been notified of that defect within a reasonable time period after 
its discovery. Furthermore, the entrepreneur is still liable after reception if the situation 
described in Article 1645 Old CC takes place. This exception to the entrepreneur’s liabil-
ity, as well as others, will be discussed in detail hereunder (point 3., 4. and 5.). 
 
As stipulated in Article 7:759(1) CC where, after delivery, the construction is found to 
contain defects for which the entrepreneur is liable, the building master must give the 
entrepreneur the opportunity to repair these defects within a reasonable period of time, 
unless this cannot be demanded from the building master in the given circumstances. 
This is, of course, without prejudice to the entrepreneur’s liability for damage caused by 
the defective delivery. 
 The entrepreneur’s possibility to repair the defects is based on the proportionality 
principle, and does not have to be granted to him if this would bring about considerable 
inconveniences for the building master, or in the event that a satisfying result is not 
expected, or cannot take place within a reasonable time period. If the costs of repair 
would be disproportional to the building master’s interest, the entrepreneur does not 
have to repair the defects. It should be noted, however, that even if the entrepreneur 
cures the defects, he still has to indemnify the building master for the damage caused by 
his deficient delivery.77 Article 7:759 CC therefore takes the interests of both parties into 
account. The same principles can be found in §46.1, 6.7 and 11.2 UAV. As held by §46.1 
UAV, if the entrepreneur does not repair the defects, the building master can repair 
them himself or have someone do this for the account of the entrepreneur. In the case of 
a serious defect, he can also resolve the contract in accordance with Article 6:265 CC. 
                                                                
76 See for example Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 22 October 1917, Jaarverslag 1917, Nr. 
XIII, 55, W. 10.318; Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 17 April 2003, nr. 25.113, unpub-
lished; Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 2 June 2003, nr. 23.438, unpublished Council of 
Arbitration for the Building Industry 11 May 2006, nr. 28.107, unpublished; Council of Arbitration for the 
Building Industry 17 Augustus 2006, nr. 27.297, unpublished. 
77 Van Wijngaarden & Chao-Duivis 2004, part 2, p 178. 
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Parties often agree to put into place maintenance or experience period. In this period 
the building master is allowed to use the construction over a certain period to ‘experi-
ence’ whether or not the building suffers from defects. This possibility is not foreseen by 
law and thus has to be agreed upon explicitly, or has to be applicable by usage. In this 
regard it should also be noted that none of the standard terms which existed before 1945 
contained any provision on maintenance periods. Nevertheless, the Council of Arbitra-
tion for the Building Industry often held that certain defects could still be repaired after 
a certain period during which the building master could test his building. It follows that 
an experience period is often deemed to be present due to usage, even if neither the 
contract, nor standard terms which proscribe such a period, are applicable to the con-
tractual relationship.78 Even the UAV do not contain provisions for an experience period 
as such, but do give rules in the event that the building specifications prescribe such a 
period (§12 UAV). If the UAV are applicable, parties thus have to come to a specific 
agreement about the existence of such a period, and its duration, which can therefore 
differ on a case by case basis. 
 The UAV do foresee, however, that the experience period starts to run after delivery 
of the building work and that the entrepreneur has to repair defects which become ap-
parent during this period on his own account, with the exception of defects for which 
the building master is liable ( §11(2) UAV). Furthermore, as held by §11.4 UAV, dam-
age which arises within the maintenance period comes for the account of the building 
master, with the exception of damage which is a consequence of insufficient work per-
formed by the entrepreneur. 
 
Until the last day of the experience period, defects79 which were not visible at the mo-
ment of delivery, and which could therefore not have been indicated at that time, can be 
communicated to the entrepreneur.80 Within a reasonable period81 the entrepreneur has 
to repair these defects as well as possible consequential damage82 for his own account, 
except if it can be demonstrated that the building master is liable for the damage83 (par. 
11.2 and 11.3 UAV). After reparation, the entrepreneur has to be paid. However, if the 
entrepreneur does not offer reparation or refuses it, or when arbitrators hold that the 
case is better solved without reparation in natura84, or when such reparation is impossi-
                                                                
78 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 7 February 1996, nr. 17.177, unpublished; A.C. van Zeg-
gelen, BR 1976, p. 221. 
79 Since the standard terms do not indicate which defects have to be repaired, every construction which is not 
in accordance with the building specifications or the requirements of good work, has to be repaired. 
80 The defects have to become apparent during the experience period, not before it: par. 11 (2) UAV, Article 
9 (2) AVA 1992.  
81 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1923, Jaarverslag 1923, nr XXVIII, 124. 
82 The building master does not have to prove that the defects are caused by the entrepreneur. Council of 
Arbitration for the Building Industry 7 November 1988, nr. 13.378, BR 1989, 222; Council of Arbitration 
for the Building Industry 4 July 1997, nr. 18.297, unpublished.  
83 The building master can, for example, be liable if he puts building materials at the disposal of the entre-
preneur which contain defects that could not be noticed by the latter (Par. 5 (2), (3) and (4) UAV, par. 6 
(14) UAV; Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 13 February 2006, 23.839, unpublished, or if 
he used the construction in an improper way. 
84 For example when reparation in natura is extremely costly. 
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ble, the entrepreneur can be condemned to pay a financial compensation to the building 
master instead, or a deduction of the entrepreneur’s fee can take place. As noted before, 
the building master can also repair the defects himself, or have someone do this for the 
account of the entrepreneur. In the event of a serious defect, he can also resolve the 
contract in accordance with Article 6:265 CC. However, if the construction can be used, 
and the building master has sufficient certainty that the defects will be repaired within a 
reasonable time,85arbitrators will not permit a deduction of the entrepreneurs’ fee86. 
 
In a situation in which receipt is refused, the entrepreneur will normally try to repair the 
defects as soon as possible, and will ask for a new approval. If this is the case, approval 
can only be refused by the building master if the first disapproved defects are not re-
paired. New defects can thus not be the reason for a second refusal (§9.9 UAV).87 
 
If parties agree that there shall not be an experience period, this means that after recep-
tion, the work is not allowed to contain any defects which could otherwise have been 
repaired during the experience period.88 
 
Since Article 7:758 CC and §12 UAV contain a transfer of risks from the entrepreneur 
(and the architect) to the building master, they bring about a reversal of the burden of 
proof: before delivery, the entrepreneur is liable unless he can prove differently; after 
delivery, damages are for the account of the building master unless he can prove that 
one of the exceptions is applicable. 
 
From this moment onwards the prescription period starts to run, which limits the liabil-
ity for defects in the building work. This will be further discussed hereunder. 
 
The provisions which were discussed above all refer to the liability of the entrepreneur. 
The New Rules 2005 do not contain a special provision dealing with liability after re-
ceipt of the building works. For this reason, reference should be made again to Article 
13 which holds that the architect is liable for culpable shortcomings if he did not, or not 
in time, comply with a written summons of his client. In this regard it should be noted 
that if the work is of such low quality that the entrepreneur could not reasonably have 
trusted in the architect’s approval, the entrepreneur cannot invoke the architect’s ap-
proval to escape from liability towards the building master. The representation power of 
the architect as described in §3.4 UAV, is thus limited to the situation that he works 
with due care and good faith.89 Once the works are approved however, the entrepreneur 
                                                                
85 See, for example, Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1925, nr. 499, Jaarverslag 1925, 112; 
Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1948, nr. 1467, Jaarverslag 1948-1949, 36. 
86 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1927, nr. 566,  Jaarverslag 1927, 40. 
87 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 16 December 1982, nr. 9473, TvA 1983/5, sub 2; Bloemlez-
ing 1981-82, 132. 
88 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 8 May 1992, nr. 15.616, unpublished; Council of Arbitra-
tion for the Building Industry 15 February 1985, nr. 11.366, unpublished. 
89 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 7 January 1932, W. 12404. 
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does not have to demonstrate that the approval was justified. In the event of a dispute, 
the building master has to prove that it happened incorrectly.90  
3. The entrepreneur is liable for hidden defects after delivery 
As noted above, Article 7:758(3) CC states that the entrepreneur is discharged from all 
liability for defects which could reasonably have been discovered by the building master 
at the time of delivery. 
 
For a long time, the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry held that the en-
trepreneur was not liable for defaults after the experience period, except if Article 1645 
Old CC, which will be discussed hereunder, would be applicable.91 In 1957, the notion of 
‘hidden defect’ was used for the first time by the Council of Arbitration for the Building 
Industry.92 The Civil Courts had used it previously in the 1920s, and often held that the 
entrepreneur would not be liable after approval of the work by the architect except for 
‘defects which could not have been discovered at the moment of reception’.93 It is impor-
tant to note that not only the materials used can have hidden defects, but also the work 
executed by the entrepreneur94. 
 
In 1930, the Supreme Court decided that the entrepreneur is liable for hidden defaults 
for a thirty year period (Mook/Sap (II))95. The Council of Arbitration for the Building 
Industry followed this judgment for quite some time. This meant that, after the experi-
ence period, the entrepreneur would still be liable for defects which could not have been 
noticed at the moment of reception, even if these defects did not lead to a collapse or 
perishing of the building as meant in Article 1645 Old CC. It follows that if the building 
master could have noticed the defect, his legal claim would not be confirmed. 
 
In 1961, the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry held that the amount of 
supervision is very important to determine whether or not a certain defect was hidden. 
It held that, whenever a director (for example an architect) supervised the execution of 
the building works, a defect would only be deemed hidden ‘if it could not be noticed, 
even after proper supervision and inquiry by the direction’. The level of expertise of the 
building master, the involvement of an expert (architect) and the amount of supervi-
sion, were and are therefore very important in this regard.96 Since it is up to the building 
                                                                
90 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 15 February 1980, nr. 8933, BR 1980, 628. 
91 See, for example, Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1954, nr. 2121,  Jaarverslag 1954, 67. 
92 Van Wijngaarden & Chao-Duivis 2007, part 2, p. 59; Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 
1957, nr. 2328, Jaarverslag 1957, 19. 
93 See for example Court of Appeal Arnhem 16 December 1924, NJ 1925/421; Groningen 28 October 1932, 
NJ 1934/1557. 
94 Defects which were visible at the moment of reception, but of which the severity could not be compre-
hended by the building master, also constitute hidden defects: Council of Arbitration for the Building In-
dustry 26 March 2007, nr. 71.059, unpublished. 
95 Supreme Court 13 November 1930, NJ 1931, 247. 
96 Roermond 10 January 1985, BR 1986, 145; Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 28 April 2006, 
nr. 56.282, unpublished. 
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master to prove that a certain defect is hidden,97 a defect is qualified as hidden more 
easily when the building master has no expertise in the field and is not assisted by an 
expert (architect).98 Even though an expert should notice a particular defect more easily, 
in the Netherlands the entrepreneur is still considered to be the first person responsible. 
This means that, in the event of hidden defects in the execution of the building work, 
the architect can, in general, only be held liable together with the entrepreneur if he did 
not supervise the work properly.99 An improper supervision can therefore diminish the 
entrepreneur’s degree of liability.100 However, it is possible for the entrepreneur to exon-
erate or limit his liability for hidden defects after reception, except if this recourse would 
be contrary to good faith.101 If only incidental supervision by the architect took place, a 
defect is qualified more easily as being hidden since, in such cases, the entrepreneur has 
a higher level of responsibility.102 However, the building master can be held liable as well 
in the event that his supervision is too lenient. 
 
As noted above, in principle the building master should allow the entrepreneur to cure 
the defects for which he is accountable in accordance with Article 7:759 CC. It is obvi-
ous that this Article is applicable in the case of hidden defects. If the entrepreneur does 
not repair the defects, the building master can institute an action for reparation in 
natura, an action to get payment of the reparation costs, or an action based on a de-
crease in value. Consequential damages also have to be repaired. 
 
However, as held by Article 7:762 CC, the liability of the entrepreneur for hidden defects 
that are known yet not disclosed by him, cannot be excluded or limited, and neither can 
it be made subject to shorter prescription periods than those provided for in Article 
7:761 CC. As held by Article 6:89 CC, the creditor cannot invoke a defect in the per-
formance if he did not protest within a short time after he noticed the defect, or should 
have noticed it. Any non-disclosure by the persons charged by the entrepreneur with the 
supervision of the performance of the work, shall be equated with non-disclosure by the 
entrepreneur. Non-disclosure of such defects by persons who are charged by the entre-
preneur with the supervision of the execution of the work, shall be equated with his own 
non-disclosure. Even though Article 6:76 CC holds that the debtor who uses the services 
of other persons in the performance of an obligation is responsible for their conduct as 
if it was his own, non-disclosure by the entrepreneur’s subordinates can therefore not be 
equated with his own non-disclosure. Article 7:762 CC has coercive force. 
 As stipulated in Article 7:761(1) CC, any right of action for a defect in works deliv-
ered prescribes the expiry of two years from the time the building master makes a com-
                                                                
97 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 22 November 2004, nr. 26.444, unpublished. 
98 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 8 September 1976, nr. 7637, BR 1977, 99; Bloemlezing, 
1976-1981, 25. 
99 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 22 August 2006, nr. 70.929/70.940, unpublished. 
100 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 17 August 2005, nr. 25.084, BR 2006, 55. 
101 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 8 September 1976, nr. 7618, BR 1976, 891; Bloemlezing 
1976-1981, 23; Court of Appeal Arnhem 19 August 1997, BR 1998, 416. 
102 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 7 January 1980, nr. 9329, BR 1980, 395, annotated by H.O. 
Thunnissen; Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry, 20 January 1994, nr. 14.859, BR 1994, 683, 
annotated by H.O. Thunnissen. 
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plaint on the matter. If the client has set a period for the entrepreneur to cure the defect, 
the prescription period shall begin only at the end of that period, or so much earlier if 
the contractor has indicated that he will not cure the defect. In any event, the right of 
action is prescribed on the expiry of twenty years from the delivery in the case of the 
construction of buildings (Article 7:761(2) CC. 
 
It can be concluded that when no standard terms are applicable, the entrepreneur stays 
liable for hidden defects for twenty years.103 However, if a complaint has been made, the 
action has to be instituted within two years. Article 7:761 CC contains, therefore, a dou-
ble prescription period. Consequently, both Articles 6:89 and 7:761 CC force the build-
ing master to take the entrepreneur’s interests into account. 
 
In the event that the UAV are applicable, reference should be made to §12 which states: 
’1. The entrepreneur is not longer liable for defects in the work after the day on which 
the work is deemed to be delivered in accordance with §10(1) or (2). 
2. This is different however 
a… . 
b. if the work or any part of it contains a hidden default due to the fault104 of the en-
trepreneur, his supplier, his sub-contractor or his manpower, and this defect was men-
tioned to the entrepreneur within a reasonable time after its detection. 
3. A defect as meant in (2b) is only hidden if it could reasonably not be noticed by the 
director during the supervision, or at the moment of delivery as meant in §. 9(2) 
4. The legal action based on hidden defaults has to be instituted within five years of 
the day mentioned in §10(1) or (2) 
5. If the building specifications foresee in an experience period, the day after the end of 
the experience period will replace the day mentioned in §12(1) …”105 
 
Firstly, it should be noted that it follows from the wording of §12.4 UAV that in the 
event that a hidden defect could not reasonably have been noticed by the director (§12.3 
UAV) but was known to the entrepreneur, a problem arises. This is due to the fact that 
§12.4 UAV holds that the legal action has to be instituted five years after delivery, while 
Article 7:761(1) CC indicates that legal action should be instituted within two years after 
the protest of the building master and, at the latest, twenty years after the delivery (Arti-
cle 7:761(2) CC). Since the liability of the entrepreneur for hidden defects which were 
known to him cannot be excluded or limited according to Article 7:762 CC which has 
coercive force, it seems that §12.4 UAV is in violation of these provisions of the Dutch 
Civil Code. 
 
                                                                
103 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 1 August 1994, nr. 17.337 BR 1994, 880. The twenty year 
prescription period is in line with Article 3:306 CC which states that all rights for action prescribe after 
twenty years, except if the law provides otherwise. 
104 By this is meant that the entrepreneur has a risk-liability: Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 
22 January 1990, nr. 13.592, BR 1990, 859, annotated by H.O. Thunnisen. 
105 The rules of non-conformity in the Civil Code do not apply if the UAV are applicable: Council of Arbitra-
tion for the Building Industry, 1 December 2005, nr. 27.935, unpublished.  
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Secondly, §12 UAV contains a more extensive research obligation for the architect. 
After delivery, the entrepreneur is still liable for damages caused by defects which are his 
fault, or that of his supplier, sub-entrepreneur or manpower, and which could not have 
been noticed by the architect during the execution of the building work or at the mo-
ment of reception. It follows that the architect has to control and supervise the work 
during the whole execution period. If the defect could therefore be noticed during the 
execution, but not at the moment of delivery, the entrepreneur cannot be held liable.106 If 
the fault could have been noticed, the Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 
often decides that within the relationship building master-entrepreneur, the building 
master has to carry his own damage. The building master is held liable for insufficient 
supervision, even though there is not even an obligation to supervise.107 The UAV there-
fore contains a liability limitation on the part of the entrepreneur compared to the Civil 
Code provisions. The definition of what constitutes a hidden fault in the UAV 1989, is 
the same as the definition applied by the Council of Arbitration for the Building Indus-
try.108 It is up to the building master to prove the existence of the hidden fault. However, 
to verify whether a fault was hidden or not, account should be taken of the level of ex-
pertise of the building master and/or his architect. According to Asser/Van den Berge109, 
the rights of the building master are limited by this too much. They hold that a supervi-
sor is engaged for the benefit of the building master, and not to diminish the entrepre-
neur’s obligations. Therefore it is not reasonable to hold the building master liable in the 
event that he engaged a supervisor or supervised the works, while he cannot be held 
liable if no supervision took place.110 It is argued that the building master should only be 
held liable in a situation in which the entrepreneur could trust that he was executing the 
building works professionally, that his trust was justified and that the damage was partly 
caused by that trust. Only in such a case should the building master should be held li-
able, in accordance with Article 6:101(1) CC. If the entrepreneur could not trust on the 
silence of the building master or his supervisor, due to the seriousness of his fault, or if 
he had to understand that approval would never be granted, the entrepreneur should 
not be able invoke that the defect was not hidden, since the entrepreneur cannot be 
rewarded for his lack of good faith. However, as noted above, the Council of Arbitration 
for the Building Industry does not take into account the justified trust of the entrepre-
neur or the attitude of the supervisor. The Council only evaluates whether a more care-
ful attitude on the part of the supervisor could have prevented the damage. If so, this is 
disadvantageous to the building master. Furthermore, whether the entrepreneur was 
aware of his defective construction or not is also not of importance as far as the Council 
is concerned. 
                                                                
106 As noted above, this is different if the UAV are not applicable. With regard to defects which the building 
master could but did not notice during the construction process, the entrepreneur is still liable in accor-
dance with Article 7:758(3) CC. However if it becomes clear that the building master did notice the defect 
but did not act upon it, it could be contrary to reasonableness and fairness to hold the entrepreneur liable 
(see Article 6:248 and 6:101 CC).  
107 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 11 February 2005, nr. 25.811. 
108 Van Wijngaarden & Chao-Duivis 2007, part 2, p. 94. 
109 Asser-Van den Berg 2007, nr. 114. As noted above, the UAV do not contain an obligation to engage a 
supervisor, but only the possibility (§3.1 and 3.9 UAV). 
110 Asser-Van den Berg 2007, nr. 116. 
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It is important to note that after substantial reparation by the entrepreneur, a new pe-
riod of five years starts to run regarding the repaired defects in accordance with §12.5 
UAV.111 Furthermore, it should be noted that it seems that with regard to defects known 
to the entrepreneur, the liability period as described in §12.4 UAV, can be overruled by 
the two year period as stipulated in Article 7:761(1) CC which starts to run from the 
moment the building master has made a protest. This means that if the building master 
has given a notice of default, he is obliged to institute his claim within two years after 
this notification. 
4. The entrepreneur is liable after delivery for damage caused by the perishing of the building due 
to serious defects 
As of 1 September 2003, the Civil Code’s new title on entrepreneurship entered into 
force in the Netherlands.112 One of the most important changes was the abolition of old 
Article 1645 which stated: 
 “When a building, erected against a fixed price, perishes in whole or in part due to a 
default in its composition or the unsuitability of the land, the architect and the entre-
preneur are liable for ten years.” 
 
As will immediately be noticed, Article 1645 (old) CC is a direct translation of Article 
1792 of the Code Napoleon which was already discussed in the chapter on Belgium.113 It 
was included in the Dutch Civil Code of 1838 and was taken up in an unaltered form in 
Article 7A:1645 CC in 1992. At that time the new title on entrepreneurship was awaited 
for. Even though Article 7A:1645 CC was abolished when the new title on entrepreneur-
ship entered into force in 2003. However, Article 1645 Old CC was still applicable up to 
31 August 2006 for building contracts which were entered into prior to 1 September 
2003.114 Moreover, the Article can still be applicable if parties agree to it. Since most of 
the present standard terms, such as the UAV 1989, still refer to the Article, Article 1645 
Old CC is also applicable to the contracts concluded under the ambit of these standard 
terms. It should be noted that Article 1645 Old CC was not one of public order. This 
means that parties could contractually exclude its applicability. 
 
§12 UAV states: 
’1. The entrepreneur is not longer liable for defaults in the work after the day on which 
the work is deemed to be delivered in accordance with §10(1) or (2). 
2. This is different however 
a. when the case described in Article 1645 Old CC occurs 
5. If the building specifications foresee an experience period, the day after the end of 
the experience period will replace the day mentioned in paragraph 1 …” 
 
                                                                
111 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 8 December 1982, nr. 10.166, BR 1983, 160; TvA 1983/5, 
175 sub 12. 
112 Decision of 25 June 2003, Official Gazette 2003, p. 272. 
113 Van den Berg 2003, p.181. 
114 Article 7:217 Transitional Law. 
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It follows that the entrepreneur is still liable for a ten year period for serious faults, even 
if these faults do not contain hidden faults if Article 1645 old CC is applicable. 
 
Hereunder I will briefly discuss the content of Article 1645 CC again, and refer to Dutch 
case law to explain its scope. 
 The fact that the building must ‘’ for Article 1645 CC to apply, was taken quite liter-
ally by the Supreme Court in 1929. It held that Article 1645 CC means that the stability 
of the building should be infected in a way that the building has fallen down or is at risk 
of falling down.115 This risk means that the ‘collapse process’ should have started within 
ten years.116 This narrow interpretation of the Article has generally been followed by the 
Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry. However, in 1973, the Council took a 
broader approach, and held that a ‘collapse’ means that the building has defects which 
are so serious that its stability is in danger, and that this danger can only be averted by 
extraordinary and costly measures.117 
 
As held by Article 1645 Old CC, the reason for the collapse has to be a fault in the build-
ing’s composition or the unsuitability of the land.118 If the building master or the archi-
tect determined the composition of the building, the entrepreneur will not be held liable, 
except if he did not warn them with regard to defects he noticed, or should have noticed, 
during the construction process.119 
 This means that for the entrepreneur to be liable, he should have determined the 
composition of the building himself. The same goes for the unsuitability of the land. It 
should be noted that the liability for the ‘collapse’ of the building is not limited to the 
damage to the building itself, but is extended to other damage which is a consequence of 
the collapse, such as physical injuries to a person.120 Of course, as will be discussed here-
under, it is possible that the liability is divided between the entrepreneur and the build-
ing master or the architect.121 
 
With regard to the ten year’s responsibility, the civil courts hold that the collapse proc-
ess should have started within ten years of delivery.122 The Council of Arbitration for the 
Building Industry holds that the claim has to be instituted within ten years of delivery.123 
                                                                
115 Supreme Court 14 November 1929, Mook / Sap, NJ 1929/1776, W. 12059. However, lower courts some-
times have a broader interpretation: e.g. The Hague 7 December 1926, NJ 1927/1015 and NJ 1928/1022. 
116 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 19 August 1987, nr. 12.508, BR 1988, 217, annotated by 
H.O. Thunnissen. 
117 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 15 August 1973, nr. 6566, BR 1973, 799, annotated by 
H.O. Thunissen; NJ 1974/305, annotated by P. Zonderland. 
118 Van Wijngaarden & Chao-Duivis 2007, part 2, p. 32; Court of Appeal Amsterdam 6 February 1925, W. 
11347. 
119 Den Bosch 15 February 1963, NJ 1963/296. 
120 Zwolle 6 June 1990, BR 1990, 861. 
121 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 13 June 1974, nr. 7117, BR 1974, 701; Jaarverslag 1974, 64; 
Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 3 May 1976, nr. 7713, BR 1976, 728; Bloemlezing 1976-
1981, 29. 
122 Roermond 2 June 1983, BR 1985, 480; NJ 1985/147. 
123 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 16 June 1986, nr. 12 219, BR 1987, 59. 
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When the Uniform General Terms are applicable, the claim can also be instituted later, 
as long as the entrepreneur has been put in default within ten years.124 
 It follows that, if the UAV are applicable, the prescription period of twenty years as 
described in Article 7:761(2) CC is applicable for all defects in the received work which 
do not fall under the ambit of Article 1645 Old Civil Code, and do not constitute a hid-
den defect as meant in §12.2b UAV 1989. 
 
The most important consequence of Article 1645 Old CC is its reversion of the burden 
of proof. It is not the building master who has to prove that the ‘collapse’ arose due to 
the shortcoming of the architect/entrepreneur, but it is up to the architect/entrepreneur 
to prove that the collapse was caused by a circumstance for which he was not responsi-
ble125 or for which he does not carry the risk126. Of course, after the expiry of the ten year 
period, the building master has to prove that the entrepreneur is responsible for the 
collapse.127 Article 1645 CC contains therefore a presumption of non-fulfilment on the 
part of the architect/entrepreneur. The building master therefore does not have to prove 
that the defect was caused by the architect’s or the entrepreneur’s shortcoming. The 
professionals, on the other hand, have to demonstrate that the perishing is caused by a 
circumstance which is not imputable to them.128 
 
Finally it should be noticed that the liability period as described in Article 1645 old CC, 
can still be overruled by the two year period as stipulated in Article 7:761(1) CC which 
starts to run from the moment the building master has made a protest. This means that 
if the building master has given a notice of default, he is obliged to institute his claim 
within two years after this notification. 
5. Deceit 
Lastly it should be noted that the content of Article 12.4 UAV in which the liability of 
the entrepreneur is limited to five years after receipt in the event of hidden defects, can 
be contrary to reasonableness and fairness in case of deceit or malicious intent on the 
part of the entrepreneur.129 Of course, also in other instances the entrepreneur as well as 
the architect can be held liable after delivery in such cases, based on the principle of 
good faith. 
                                                                
124 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 11 December 1991, nr. 14.356, BR 1992, 332, annotated by 
H.O. Thunissen. 
125 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 19 August 1987, nr. 12.508, BR 1988, 217, annotated by 
H.O. Thunnissen. 
126 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 3 December 1987, nr.12.541, B.R. 1989, 297; Council of 
Arbitration for the Building Industry 13 April 2005, nr. 24.753, unpublished. 
127 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 19 July 1993, nr.15.252, BR 1993, 920, annotated by H.O. 
Thunnissen. 
128 Supreme Court 13 November 1930, NJ 1931, 247, annotated by EM M (Mook/Sap II). 
129 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 2 July 2002, nr. 22.740. 
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5.4. The liability of the architect for subordinates and sub-entrepreneurs 
As held by Article 5 NR, the architect is allowed to have other persons fulfil his tasks 
under his leadership. With regard to certain components of his work, he can even give 
leadership to these persons. Nevertheless, the architect himself is responsible for the 
good and proper fulfilment of the work concerned. This is confirmed by Article 13.2 
NR, which holds that the architect is likewise responsible for the shortcomings of these 
persons, as for his own, unless the involvement of such person is imposed upon him. 
Such persons are mostly involved due to their specific knowledge and specialism. In this 
regard it should be noticed that Article 11.8 states that the architect informs his client 
about the natural person or persons who are authorized to represent him, if necessary 
mentioning the limitations of his or their authority. Furthermore, since the architectural 
contract is a service contract, mention has to be made of Article 7:404 CC as well, which 
states that if a certain task is assigned with the eye on a specific person who works to-
gether with, or is subordinated to, the commissioner, that person has to fulfil the task 
personally, unless the task can be fulfilled by others under that specific person’s respon-
sibility, notwithstanding the commissioner’s liability. 
 
Since this thesis deals with the liability of the architect, the liability of the entrepreneur 
in terms of his manpower and sub-contractors as described in Article 7:751 CC should 
not be discussed. 
 §6.26 UAV states however, that in a situation in which the UAV are applicable, the 
entrepreneur can only engage a sub-entrepreneur with the written permission of the 
architect. This means that the approval of the building master himself is not required.130 
Nevertheless, even if the architect approved the involvement of a certain sub-contractor, 
the entrepreneur is still solely responsible for this sub-entrepreneur in terms of the 
building master.131 This is a direct consequence of Article 6:76 CC which holds that 
where, in the performance of an obligation, the debtor uses the services of other persons, 
he is responsible for their conduct as if it was his own. Of course the subcontractor him-
self is liable in terms of the entrepreneur with whom he has a contractual relationship.132 
6. Liabilities of the specialists involved 
As held by Article 6.1 NR, if the proper realization of the project requires the appoint-
ment of one or more third-party-consultants, then the client shall not proceed to such 
action without prior consultation with the architect. If the architect is to work together 
with third-party-consultants, then the building master determines which participant is 
responsible for the co-ordination of the activities of the different consultants, and which 
participant is responsible for steering the progress of the activities of the different con-
sultants (Article 6.2 NR). Of course, in such cases, the architect is not responsible for 
                                                                
130 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 2 April 1980, nr. 9415, BR 1980, 796. 
131 ’s-Gravenhage 27 November 1952, NJ 1953/661. An exception arises when the subcontractor is appointed 
by the building master and the entrepreneur, who has given a task to a subcontractor, makes a protest, 
warning or reservation.  
132 Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 31 October 1968, nr. 5326, BR 1968, p. 608. 
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damage caused by such a consultant. However, if the architect hires specialists himself 
who are working for him, he is liable for them himself (Article 5 jo Article 13(2) NR).133 
7. Conclusion 
In the Netherlands, the relationship between the architect and the building master is 
qualified as a contract of services (Article 7:400 CC) and not as an entrepreneurial con-
tract. The provisions in Title 12 of the Civil Code which are applicable, not only to 
building works but also to all types of entrepreneurship, do not therefore regulate the 
relationship between the architect and his client. Entrepreneurial contracts only cover 
material works, while architects generally fulfil only intellectual tasks. 
 
The obligations of architects can be summarised as the provision of assistance and ad-
vice to the clients, the determination of the programme and the budget, the design of the 
plans and the supervision of the building work. However, as noted in the preceding 
chapter, clients are not obliged to engage an architect for these tasks. These obligations 
are not laid down in the Civil Code, but are laid down in standard terms, case law and in 
the legal literature. 
 
Architects are, in principle, liable for every failure in the performance of their obliga-
tions (Article 6:74 CC). In generally, they have an obligation of means, and have to act 
as a reasonable professional. They have to repair any damage which the creditor suffers 
because of their negligence, unless the failure is not attributable to them. If performance 
is not permanently impossible, the debtor has to be put in default before he is obliged to 
repair the damage. 
 
Architects have a large contractual freedom. Several sets of standard terms exist in 
which the relationship between the architect and the building master is regulated. The 
most recent standard terms are the New Rules (NR) 2005. These standard terms are 
applicable if parties so agree, which is generally the case, and also contain an arbitration 
clause which generally has to be specifically agreed to. 
 
With regard to the architectural responsibility, Article 13.1 NR holds more specifically 
that the architect is liable in the event that he has committed a culpable shortcoming 
(accountable fault) and that the building master has put him in default in writing, and 
has summoned him to repair the consequences of the shortcoming within a reasonable 
time, while the architect has not (or not on time) repaired the consequences of these 
faults. 
As held by Article 7:758(2) CC, after delivery of the building work, the building master 
bears the risk for such work. The general prescription period for liability is twenty years 
(Article 3:306 CC). Article 3:310 CC holds that claims for damages due to shortcomings 
in the performance of a contract, prescribe five years after the creditor has discovered 
                                                                
133 See also Council of Arbitration for the Building Industry 31 May 1918, nr. 101, Jaarverslag 1918, Nr. IX, 
37. 
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the shortcomings and if he is aware of the identity of the debtor. In the event that the 
creditor did not discover the damage, the liability period of ten years starts to run after 
the damage has been caused. 
 Article 16 NR 2005 deviates from this rule and foresees a liability period of five 
years which starts the day upon which the commission has been terminated, either by 
completion or by cancellation. Next to the limitation of the liability period, architects 
often limit the extent of their liability as well. In this regard, the damage to be compen-
sated by the consultant is limited per commission to a sum equal to the consultancy 
costs with a maximum of 1,000,000 Euros. In the case of commissions where the client is 
a consumer and the consultancy costs per commission are lower than 75,000 Euros, the 
damage to be compensated for is to a maximum of 75,000 Euros. 
 The UAV which are the standard terms applicable in the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and his client, do not contain many clauses limiting the liability of the 
entrepreneur. It follows that the liability for a possible shortcoming in design will more 
easily be laid by the entrepreneur if he did not warn about the fault in the design. In any 
case, the entrepreneur can be held liable for hidden defects after delivery (CC: twenty 
years; UAV: five years) and for damage caused by the perishing of the building due to 
serious defects (ten years). There does not exist an in solidum liability system to solve 
liability issues. 
 
Architects are not obliged to buy professional liability insurance. This is different, how-
ever, for BNA members. Even though only one third of the architects are associated with 
the BNA, the majority of architects are insured, since the NR also require insurance if 
they are applied to a certain contractual relationship (Article 11.3 NR). 
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COMPARISON OF THE SITUATION OF ARCHITECTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES 
The Belgian and Dutch architectural markets vary considerably, not only from a legal 
perspective but also in cultural terms. While it is often said that Belgians have ‘een bak-
steen in de maag’1 and engage their own architect to construct a house of their personal 
taste, most projects in the Netherlands are built by large building developers who gener-
ally engage architects and entrepreneurs to realize their projects, and who then sell the 
houses/apartments to individuals. It follows that houses in the Netherlands often re-
semble each other. 
1. Right to use the title 
In Belgium, the Architects’ Act lays down in detail who is allowed to use the title of 
architect. 
 In general, it can be said that Belgian and other EC/EEA nationals need to be in 
possession of a certain diploma obtained in Belgium, which requires five years of study. 
Persons who obtained their qualifications elsewhere in the EU/EEA are also allowed to 
use the title if these qualifications are listed in annex 1a and 2b which implement annex 
V.7 and VI of Directive 2005/36/EC, which means that recognition should be granted 
automatically. If the qualifications do not conform to these requirements, it is possible 
to complete an aptitude test or undertake an adaptation period in accordance with the 
Act of 12 February 2008, instituting a new General Framework for the recognition of 
EC-qualifications which implements the general system mentioned in Chapter I of Title 
III of the Directive. Professionals who obtained their qualifications outside the EU can 
invoke Article 1 §5, 4° AA which equalises formal qualifications issued by a third state if 
the holder has three years of professional experience on the territory of the Member 
State which has recognized the formal qualifications  Legal persons are not allowed to 
use the architectural title since they cannot be in the possession of the required qualifi-
cations.  
 
In the Netherlands, as of 1 October 1993, registered architects can officially be distin-
guished from other professionals in the building sector since they have the privilege to 
                                                                
1 It is generally said that Belgians like to build. 
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call themselves ‘architect’ to the exclusion of all others. The Architects Title Act gives 
rise to the legal protection of the title of Architect in the Netherlands. To use the title, 
one must be registered with the Foundation Bureau Architects’ Register which is 
charged with the registration of architects. The general requirement for registration is 
the possession of a recognized diploma/certificate, or the successful taking of an exami-
nation. In general, Dutch students can follow a five-year university education or a four-
year part-time training at an Academy. In order to sit the examination, a minimum of 
seven years of practical experience in the field of architecture is required, while the 
VROM Minister can grant exemption on the basis of proven exceptional competence. 
Automatically recognised certificates are those issued by the universities or academies 
mentioned in the Architects’ Act and those mentioned in Annex V.7 and VI of Directive 
2005/36/EC. Other qualifications may be recognised under the Directive’s general sys-
tem which is incorporated in the Act of 6 December 2007 which contains general rules 
on the recognition of which EC qualifications are applicable (General Act EC profes-
sional qualifications). Even though the current Architects’ Title Act does not specifically 
mention it, case law has indicated that legal persons may also use the title if certain con-
ditions are fulfilled.  This is confirmed by the 2010 amendment Act which has not yet 
entered into force. 
 BNA membership is only open to architects who have at least two year of profes-
sional experience. When the 2010 amendment Act enters into force, this condition will 
be extended to all architects. The Architects’ Act will be amended to include a two year 
period in which professional experience has to be gained before one can be registered. It 
follows that the possession of such practical experience is a requirement for practising 
the profession in Belgium, and will be a requirement to use the title in the Netherlands. 
It is foreseen that the traineeship will become mandatory from 2015 onwards. 
2. Right to practise the profession 
Architects in Belgium have a monopoly with regard to designing houses and supervising 
building works for (almost) all constructions which require a building permit. Not only 
the title, but also the profession, is protected. To be able to practise the profession, archi-
tects have to register with the Architects’ Order. To be registered on the tableau, a two 
year period in which professional experience has been obtained should have been com-
pleted. The Architects’ Order issues the licence to practice, manages the architectural 
register, determines the duties and rights of architects, and is responsible for (the for-
mulation and execution of) disciplinary rules. Only persons who are allowed to use the 
title can practise the profession, together with third country nationals in the event of the 
existence of reciprocal allowance by their state, or in the event that they got permission 
by Royal Decree. EC/EEA service providers will be registered in the Services Register in 
conformity with Article 8 §2(1) AO. This Article implements Title II of Directive 
2005/36/EC. Third country nationals will have to obtain the permission of the Council 
of the Order located in the area in which the service will be provided. Due to the Laru-
elle Act of 2006, legal persons can also practise the profession, and are allowed to fulfil 
architectural tasks. As indicated above, they are, however, not allowed to use the title. It 
can be said that this has improved the situation of architects since, in this way, they can 
  Chapter 9  
379 
secure their personal wealth. Instead of being personally liable, the legal person will be 
held responsible. Whether this is beneficial for their clients, can be seriously questioned 
and depends also on -the availability and content of- the liability insurance. 
 
In the Netherlands, the profession of architect is not protected. It follows that everyone 
can perform architectural services as long as the title is not used by those who do not 
fulfil the requirements of the Architects’ Title Act. It is said that the protection of the 
profession is not necessary since many legal requirements already apply to the archi-
tect’s design, such as the provisions of the Housing Act and the Building Decree. Regis-
tered architects are not subject to a code of conduct. Only BNA members have to act in 
accordance with the BNA Code of Conduct. To these architects, the Permanent Profes-
sional Training Regulations are applicable as of January 2006. These contain rules on 
professional education of BNA-members and imply that BNA architects should spend at 
least thirty hours per year on professional training. The fact that more persons are al-
lowed to practise the profession does not bring about a reduction in architects’ salaries 
in the Netherlands. As demonstrated by the Mirza & Nacey research in Chapter 2, archi-
tects in the Netherlands earn much more than their Belgian colleagues.  
3. Market conduct 
In Belgium there are currently no mandatory, minimum or maximum fee scales for 
architectural activities.  In 2004 the European Commission held that the recommended 
fee scale that was created by the Belgian Architects’ Order in 1967 and which got bind-
ing force by Royal Decree in 1985, violated EC competition law. The Commission esti-
mated that recommended minimum tariffs are generally created to coordinate the con-
duct of architects so that architects whose costs are lower are dissuaded from lowering 
their prices.  Consequently, the recommended fee scale was revoked by the Order. 
 In the Netherlands, the SR 1997 used to indicate the fee basis by means of a refer-
ence to NEN 2631, which is a Dutch norm indicating how investment costs of building 
should preferably be calculated. A formula was drawn which led to the determination of 
a certain percentage which would then result in the fee. This formula left no room for 
price competition whatsoever and was often also used by architects which were no BNA 
members or to contracts to which the SR 1997 was not made applicable and was not 
only used by the Arbitration Institute Architecture but also by the ordinary courts.  This 
form of price fixing was not taken over by the NR 2005. 
 
With regard to advertising, Article 13 of the Deontological Code in Belgium foresees 
that the architect is allowed to make his activities known to the public in an independent 
and discrete manner. Obtrusive publicity has to be avoided however. The architect has 
to take into account that his name and title are not used in an illegal way by others, or 
are used for commercial purposes by others. He is allowed to mention his title in books, 
and is even obliged to mention it on a plate at the building site during the construction 
work, and is allowed to have it mentioned afterwards.  
 In the Netherlands, there is no general regulation about advertising which is appli-
cable for all architects. The disciplinary code of the BNA mentions, in Article 2(2), that 
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architects have the freedom to make their activities, expertise, experience and compe-
tence known to the public. 
 
Finally, with regard to structural restrictions in Belgium, mention should be made of 
Article 6 AA and Article 10 of the Deontological Code, by which architects are not al-
lowed to practise the profession of entrepreneur. Since architects should be independent 
(Article 4 Deontological Code) every association of an architect with an entrepreneur is 
forbidden. In the Netherlands there is no such prohibition. Even though it may be ar-
gued that architects should be independent, it might be questioned whether such a se-
vere restriction is efficient, since the profession seems to function quite well in states in 
which there is no incompatibility between architects and entrepreneurs. In any case it 
should be noted that such restrictions prevent a single company from offering a total 
service package in which the building was designed and constructed by professionals 
who consider themselves as partners rather than adversaries.  
4. Insurance 
In Belgium, all architects, including legal persons, are obliged to buy insurance. In this 
way the building master has more certainty that he will receive damage compensation. 
This gives rise to more administration and higher premiums, and can bring about the 
situation that the quality of the work will diminish. 
 
In the Netherlands, there is no mandatory insurance obligation except for BNA mem-
bers. If standard conditions are used which prescribe professional liability insurance, 
architects also have to buy insurance. In this way it can be concluded that most archi-
tects are insured. However, since there is no legal obligation, the Dutch legislation might 
be contrary to recital 98 of Directive 2006/123/EC which states that any operator pro-
viding services involving a direct health, safety of financial risk for the recipient or a 
third person, should, in principle, be covered by appropriate professional liability insur-
ance. 
5. Liability 
In Belgium, design contracts take the form of ‘entrepreneurial contracts’ which is a 
specification of the more general ‘rent of labour’. As held by Article 1779 CC, the rent of 
work and services covers work provided by entrepreneurs performing in accordance 
with building specifications. The architect has to advise his client, design a plan, deter-
mine the programme and the budget, and supervise the building work. For the architect 
to be liable, a fault in the performance of his contractual activities, damage and a causal 
link must be proven. In this regard, architects are also liable if they engage an expert 
who lacks sufficient skills. The liability regime is next to the general provisions in the 
Civil Code and is specifically laid down in Articles 1787-1799 CC. In principle, the ar-
chitect is no longer liable after the building work is accepted (received) by the building 
master. However, the architect is still liable for (small) hidden defects after receipt of the 
work. The same is true for serious defects, which cause the building to perish totally or 
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partially (Article 1792 jo 2270 CC). These Articles are of public order since they are said 
to protect public safety, and cannot be contractually deviated from. It follows that the 
period in which the architect is liable cannot be limited. 
 Clauses that limit the extent are, in principle, void. Architects who hire specialists 
can limit their liability, but they are still liable if they discover any negligence on the part 
of these specialists. This gives protection to the building master. However the liability 
cannot be limited with regard to damages falling under Articles 1792 jo. 2270 CC). 
 It follows that standard terms are not commonly used in Belgium, and disputes are 
almost always settled by judicial courts. For certain defects, such as problems with the 
stability, insulation and water tightness, judges are sometimes more lenient towards the 
building master and hold that the architect has an obligation of means. However, the 
myriad of case law and the legal literature, indicates that Article 1792 CC does not con-
tain a presumption of fault. 
 The architect is often held liable in solidum with the entrepreneur. If the entrepre-
neur has made a fault in the construction, the architect is often held liable as well due to 
his defective supervision. Since the architect is the only building partner who is obliged 
to buy professional liability insurance, including the decennial liability, he is the one 
who mostly suffers from huge liability claims. To cover their own losses as well as the 
losses of other building partners, clients often take out a Construction All Risks Insur-
ance which covers damage during the realisation of the building work. 
 It can be concluded that the weight on the shoulders of architects is very heavy. This 
has been mitigated by the Laruelle Act which allowed legal persons to practise the pro-
fession of architect as well. This means that the creditors of the company can only claim 
compensation from the company’s wealth, and the architect-natural person’s wealth 
cannot be claimed against in order to obtain damage compensation. 
 
In the Netherlands, the relationship between the architect and the building master is 
qualified as a contract of services (Article 7:400 CC) and not as an entrepreneurial con-
tract. The provisions in Title 12 of the Civil Code which are applicable not only to build-
ing works, but to all types of entrepreneurship, therefore do not regulate the relationship 
between the architect and his client. Entrepreneurial contracts only cover material 
works, while architects generally fulfil only intellectual tasks. The obligations of archi-
tects can be summarised as the provision of assistance and advice to the clients, the 
determination of the programme and the budget, designing the plans and supervising 
the building work. These obligations are not laid down in the civil code, but can be writ-
ten down in standard terms, case law and in the legal literature. 
 Architects are, in principle, liable for every failure in the performance of their obli-
gations (Article 6:74 CC). In general, they have an obligation of means, and have to act 
as a reasonable professional in the same circumstances would do. They have to repair 
the damage which the creditor suffers due to their negligence, unless the failure is not 
attributable to them. If performance is not permanently impossible, the debtor has to be 
put in default before he is obliged to repair the damage. 
 In the Netherlands, architects have a large contractual freedom. Several sets of stan-
dard terms exist in which the relationship between the architect and the building master 
is regulated. The most recent standard terms are the New Rules (NR) 2005. These stan-
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dard terms are applicable if parties so agree, and contain an arbitration clause which 
generally has to be specifically agreed to as well. With regard to the architectural respon-
sibility, Article 13.1 NR holds more specifically that the architect is liable in the event 
that he has committed a culpable shortcoming (accountable fault) and the building 
master has put him in default in writing and has summoned him to repair the conse-
quences of the shortcoming within a reasonable time, while the architect has not (or not 
on time) repaired these consequences. 
 As held by Article 7:758(2) CC, after delivery of the building work, the building 
master bears the risk for such work. The general prescription period for liability is 
twenty years (Article 3:306 CC). Article 3:310 CC holds that claims for damage due to 
shortcomings in the performance of a contract, prescribe five years after the creditor 
discovered the shortcoming and is aware of the identity of the debtor. In the event that 
the creditor did not discover the damage, the liability period of ten years starts after the 
damage has been caused. 
 Article 16 NR 2005 deviates from this rule and foresees a liability period of five 
years which starts the day upon which the commission is terminated, either by comple-
tion or cancellation. Next to the limitation of the liability period, architects often limit 
the extent of their liability as well. In this regard, the damage to be compensated for on 
the part of the consultant is limited per commission to a sum equal to the consultancy 
costs with a maximum of 1,000,000 Euros. In the case of commissions where the client is 
a consumer and the consultancy costs per commission are lower than 75,000 Euros, the 
damage to be compensated for is up to a maximum of 75,000 Euros. 
 The UAV, which are the standard terms applicable in the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and his client, do not contain many clauses limiting the liability of the 
entrepreneur. It follows that the liability for a possible shortcoming of the design will be 
more easily laid by the entrepreneur if he did not warn about the fault in the design. In 
any case, the entrepreneur can be held liable for hidden defects after delivery and for 
damage caused by the perishing of the building due to serious defects. In solidum con-
victions are not used to solve liability issues. In the Netherlands, the building master 
thus has to prove the architect’s shortcoming with regard to each liability. There is thus 
a heavier weight on the building master’s shoulders. 
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COMPARISON OF THE SITUATION OF DUTCH AND BELGIAN ARCHITECTS 
WITH OTHER EU ARCHITECTS 
In Sections A) and B), the regulations relating to architects in Belgium and the Nether-
lands have been discussed in detail. In this section, I will give a brief overview of the 
most important aspects of (public) regulation in some other Member States of the Euro-
pean Union (old EU-15). In this way we can determine the extent to which the Belgian 
and Dutch regulations relate to the regulations in other States, and whether they are 
stronger or weaker or more or less comparable to them. The following conclusions are 
based on studies conducted by the OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and 
Mobility Studies of Delft University (paragraph 10.1.) as well as on a study of the Insti-
tute for Advanced Studies (Institut für Höhere Studien  –  IHS) in Vienna (paragraph 
10.2).  Note that these data relate to the situation of architects in the years 2003/2004. 
1. Studies conducted by the OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and 
Mobility Studies of Delft University 
The OTB Institute has conducted several studies with regard to the architectural profes-
sion.1 It came to the conclusion that the profession can be classified into five categories 
by taking into account whether or not there is title protection; whether or not the pro-
fession is protected; whether or not practical experience is required, and whether or not 
architects have to adhere to a disciplinary code. See Table 1. 
                                                                
1 Meijer & Visscher 2006, pp. 1-10. See also Meijer & Visscher 2008, pp. 1287-1298. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the legal position of architects within the EU  
A B C D E  
B Gm Lx P Sp Fr It A UK Gr N1 Ir Dn Sw Fi 
Protection of title Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y / / / / 
Protection of profession Y Y Y Y Y Y Y / / / / / / / / 
Practical experience Y Y Y Y / / / Y Y / / / / / / 
Disciplinary codes Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y / / / / / / 
Y: yes Lx: Luxembourg  It: Italy Nl: The Netherlands Fi: Finland 
/ : no P: Portugal  A: Austria  Ir: Ireland 
B: Belgium  Sp: Spain  UK: United Kingdom Dn: Denmark 
Gm: Germany  Fr : France  Gr: Greece Sw: Sweden 
 
A. Title and profession are protected. There is a legal system of practical experience 
and disciplinary codes. There is thus a wide ranging regulatory system (Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal). 
 
B. Title and profession are protected. There is a legal system of disciplinary codes. 
Practical experience is, however, not required (Spain, France and Italy). 
 
C. Title is protected. There is a legal system of disciplinary codes and practical experi-
ence. The profession itself is not protected however (Austria and the United King-
dom). 
 
D.  Title is protected. The profession is not protected. Other regulations are left to the 
relevant professional organizations (Greece and the Netherlands). There is thus no 
legal system of disciplinary codes or of practical experience2. 
 
E. No legal regulations concerning architects (Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and 
Finland). 
It is held that as long as the building accords with building regulations, it is not im-
portant who has designed them. The title is thus not even protected. Anyone can 
use the title of architect.3 
 
It can be concluded that the architectural title is legally protected in most of the states 
under consideration. The purpose of such regulations is to give some basic quality as-
surance to consumers when hiring an ‘architect’. As indicated in Part I, title protection 
also enables architects to work more easily in other EU states. However, in this regard, it 
should be noted that states do not have to introduce or maintain professional or title 
protection, or any other type of regulation. They only have to guarantee that no unjusti-
                                                                
2  It should be noted that the Act of 4 March 2010 amending the Architects’ Title Act (professional experi-
ence, life-long learning for town planners, garden and landscape architects en interior architects, amde-
ments related to the Framework Act on Independent Agencies and some other amendments), Stb. 2010, 
130, stipulates in Article 12d that a two year period of professional experience will be required before one 
is allowed to register.  This Article has not yet entered into force however. 
3 See for more information http://www.architectenregister.nl/pdf/01_sba.pdf, last consulted 10 November 
2009. 
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fied restrictions are imposed with regard to the recognition of qualifications which are 
obtained in Member States, and the free movement of architects. In this way, some 
states only require a particular education at an academy, while in others, registration can 
only follow after professionals have completed a certain period of practical experience. 
Furthermore, in some states, none of these requirements have to be fulfilled. Table 2 
contains some more detailed data with respect to the architectural profession. 
 
Table 2: Overview of the main characteristics of the legal position of building architects 
in the EU-15 in 2003/2004: 
Group A B Gm Lx P 
Educational institutions: 
- universities 
- academies 
194 
5 
14 
72 
15 
57 
/ 
/ 
/ 
18 
14 
4 
Min years of study 5 4.5 / 5 
Protection of title Y Y Y Y 
Protection of the profession Y Y Y Y 
Obligatory registration Y Y Y Y 
Internship required Y:2 (years) Y: 2/3 Y: 1 Y: 2 
Disciplinary code Y Y Y Y 
Insurance required Y Y Y / 
 
Group B Sp Fr It  
 Educational institutions: 
- universities 
- academies 
14 
14 
/ 
22 
22 
/ 
18 
14 
4 
 
Min years of study 5 6 5+  
Protection of title Y Y Y  
Protection of the profession Y Y Y  
Obligatory registration Y Y Y  
Internship required / / /  
Disciplinary code Y Y Y  
Insurance required Y Y Y  
 
                                                                
4 It should be noted thatn due to the restructuring of the education system, these figures are not longer 
correct. See Chapter 5.2.2 for an updated overview. This is also possible with regard to the other states un-
der consideration. 
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Group C A UK  
Educational institutions: 
- universities 
- academies 
6 
5 
1 
39 
18 
21 
 
Min years of study 5 5  
Protection of title Y Y  
Protection of the profession / /  
Obligatory registration Y Y  
Internship required 3 2  
Disciplinary code Y Y  
Insurance required Y Y  
 
Group D  Gr Nl  
Educational institutions: 
- universities 
- academies 
2 
2 
/ 
8 
2 
6 
 
Min years of study 5 4/5  
Protection of title Y Y  
Protection of the profession / /  
Obligatory registration Y Y  
Internship required / /  
Disciplinary code / /  
Insurance required / /  
 
Group E Ir Dn Sw Fi 
Educational institutions: 
- universities 
- academies 
2 
2 
/ 
2 
/ 
2 
3 
3 
/ 
3 
3 
/ 
Min years of study 5 5 4.5 5 
Protection of title / / / / 
Protection of the profession / / / / 
Obligatory registration / / / / 
Internship required 2 / / / 
Disciplinary code / / / / 
Insurance required / / / / 
 
It can be concluded that among the 15 countries examined, the architect’s title is pro-
tected in 11 cases.5 This does not mean that architects automatically have a monopoly in 
these countries. A monopoly only exists in 7 countries6. One should distinguish between 
the monopolies limited to certain objects (in Portugal, for example, the monopoly is 
limited to instances where special regulations apply, such as in case of protection of 
historic sites). Furthermore, in certain legislations, the monopoly is retained exclusively 
                                                                
5 In this regard it should be noticed that, in some countries, the current rules apply to building architects, 
interior architects, landscape architects and urban planners. In other countries the legislation is confined 
to building architects and civil engineers. The demands on the professional practice of building architects 
are, however, not comparable to demands on those of interior architects.  
6 This is in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal (to a lesser extent) and in Spain.  
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by architects (as in France, Belgium) and in others it is shared with engineers (e.g. Italy 
or Luxemburg). Belgium appears to be the country where the monopoly is at its strong-
est, since it does not only deal with the creation of plans, but likewise with the control 
over the execution of work as well.7 As held by the Belgian Centre d’Etudes d’Assurance, 
across this heterogeneity, it appears that legislation which protects the architects’ title 
and a fortiori legislation which supports a monopoly is stimulated by a wish to ensure 
the quality of construction, protection of the environment and public safety.8 Whether 
this is truly the case will be discussed in Part III of this thesis in which an economic 
analysis of the regulation of architects will be presented. In any case it should be noted 
that these differences have significant influence upon the appreciation of the specific 
nature of an architect in terms of liability and insurance.9 However, since the liability 
regimes in the different Member States are so diverse, and depend on the details of each 
specific case, it is not possible to categorise them into groups.10 
 Since it would be too much to discuss these data in more detail within the scope of 
this thesis, I will now turn to the findings of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vi-
enna. The IHS report not only discusses the differences in regulations, but also deter-
mines the level and extent of these regulations. 
2. Study conducted by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna 
As stated in Part I of this thesis, the Lisbon European Council in 2000 adopted an eco-
nomic reform programme to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world by 2010. In the field of regulated professions, steps 
towards these goals have been taken by the Commission through initiatives based on 
competition policy on the one hand, and on internal market policy (freedom of estab-
lishment, freedom to provide services which led to the adoption of Directive 
2005/36/EC and Directive 2006/123/EC) on the other.11 
 
In the field of competition law, the European Commission initiated a research project to 
investigate whether all these regulations truly served the interests of consumers. A large-
scale project on competition in professional services was conducted by the Directorate 
General for Competition, and a first step was the investigation of an independent study 
carried out by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna (IHS) in 2002/3 on the eco-
                                                                
7 As held by the Belgian legislator, the architects’ monopoly in Belgium is stimulated by “the necessities 
imposed upon the safety of inhabitants, hygiene of living areas, concern for the aesthetics of the construc-
tion, collaboration and conservation of country’s artistic heritage, protection of the capitals invested in the 
construction by the project owners: See Doc. Parl. Ch., 1936-1937, No. 236, Exposé des motifs. 
8 http://www.groupe-cea.com/upload/doc_stheme/Document_en/16/_liabilities_in_Europe.pdf , last con-
sulted 10 November 2009. 
9 See Title I and II of this Part. 
10 For an overview I refer to http://www.ordredesarchitectes.be/nl/teksten/cea/TABEL.PDF, last consulted 15 
November 2009. 
11 As indicated in Part I of this thesis, the close relationship between the Treaty provisions on competition 
and those on free movement have been acknowledged by the ECJ in Wouters. The ECJ relied on the same 
arguments in order to conclude that competition rules, on the one hand, and Treaty rules on freedom to 
provide services and establishment on the other, had not been infringed: See Brumter 2004, p. 219. 
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nomic impact of regulation in the field of liberal professions in different Member 
States12. On the basis of the encouraging results of the study, the Commission launched 
an invitation to comment on the place of regulations in the liberal professions, consist-
ing of a questionnaire addressed to professionals in all Member States which aimed to 
collect an insider’s perception of the issue. Then, in October 2003, a public consultation 
took place involving consumers’ representatives, members of the liberal professions and 
businesses, which concluded the research and information phase.13 Professional associa-
tions and Member States were called on to review critically the existing public and self-
regulation, and to reform or eliminate rules if needs be. Successively, on 9 February 
2004, the Commission presented its final report on competition in professional services, 
with the aim to summarise the findings of the research and consultation proceedings, 
and to provide guidance to the interested regulatory subjects as to the next steps towards 
modernisation in the liberal professions14. In its final report, the Commission identified 
the following main categories of potentially restrictive regulations relating to EU profes-
sions: 
- entry requirements and reserved rights 
- price fixing and recommended prices 
- advertising regulations 
- regulations governing business structure and multi-disciplinary practices. 
 
This report used regulatory indices to compare and measure the level of regulation in 
the EU-15. The overall index ranged from 0 in the case of no regulation (for architects 
and engineers in five countries), to 12 in the case of maximum regulation15. 
 According to the study, countries with a high degree of regulation intensity for all 
professions are Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and, with some exceptions in the field of 
technical services, Germany, as well as France and possibly Greece (in Greece there was 
not much information available in the English language). Belgium, Spain (and possibly 
Portugal) were considered to be in the medium category, and the UK, Sweden (with the 
exception of pharmacists), the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland and Denmark (the latter 
with the exception of pharmacists) appeared to have more or less liberal regimes. Never-
theless, according to the report, the least regulated Member States are arguably the most 
sceptical with regard to the restrictions which still remain in their countries. See Table 3. 
                                                                
12 Contract No. COMP/2002/D3/S12.334490. IHS study: See Paterson, Fink, Ogus et al. 2003. 
13 A conference on the regulation in the liberal professions was held on 28 October 2003, hosted by the DG 
Competition in Brussels. Commissioner Monti made the closing speech. 
14 Report on Competition in Professional Services 9 February 2004, COM(2004) 83 final. A follow-up report 
was made in 2005 to update the first report,and a conference called ‘Better Regulation of Professional Ser-
vices’ was held in Brussels. Furthermore, in December 2006, a conference on ‘The Economic Case for Pro-
fessional Services Reform’ was organized. 
15 This was the case for pharmacists in Sweden, where all pharmacies were until recently owned by one state-
owned company. 
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Table 3: Total IHS regulation indices for different professions. Source, IHS Report, Part 1, p. 83. 
 Accountants Legal Architects Engineers Pharmacists 
Austria 6.2 7.3 5.1 5 7.3 
Belgium 6.3 4.6 3.9 1.2 5.4 
Denmark 2.8 3.0 0 0 5.9 
Finland 3.5 0.3 1.4 1.3 7.0 
France 5.8 6.6 3.1 0 7.3 
Germany 6.1 6.5 4.5 7.4 5.7 
Greece 5.1 9.5 n/a n/a 8.9 
Ireland 3.0 4.5 0 0 2.7 
Italy 5.1 6.4 6.2 6.4 8.4 
Luxembourg 5 6.6 5.3 5.3 7.9 
Netherlands 4.5 3.9 0 1.5 3.0 
Portugal n/a 5.7 2.8 n/a 8 
Spain 3.4 6.5 4.0 3.2 7.5 
Sweden 3.3 2.4 0 0 12 
Uk 3.0 4.0 0 0 4.1 
 
With regard to the architectural profession in particular, the report concluded that, in 
general, market entry was heavily regulated in the Member States while market conduct 
was not. The maximum index was 6 in Italy while the average across the European Un-
ion was less than 3. For this reason, the IHS study identified the architectural profession 
as the least regulated among the professions examined. In respect of market entry, some 
countries showed rather restrictive licensing models (e.g. Austria, Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg) while, in other states, certification with or without very limited exclusive tasks 
reserved to the professions was the standard model (e.g. Sweden, the UK, the Nether-
lands, Finland and Denmark). The IHS research demonstrated that in all the countries 
where reserved tasks for architects apply, membership of a professional association is 
compulsory. Moreover, a university degree is a basic requirement to enter the respective 
market in these countries, while a considerable degree of variation existed regarding 
mandatory professional exams and required professional practice. The conduct regula-
tions for architects and engineers appeared to be less restrictive in most of the countries 
when compared to the regulations of other professions. Only Italy, Germany and Lux-
embourg had rather restrictive regulations in this respect. Furthermore, the study 
showed that, in most countries, there did not exist any binding price or fee system (ex-
ceptions were held to be Belgium16, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg (with regard to 
public works only)). In most countries, only moderate regulations existed concerning 
advertising and on forms of business and inter-professional co-operation. Furthermore, 
the studies found that, in recent years, a development could be seen in the countries 
with a high degree of regulation to more liberal regimes, especially with regard to con-
duct regulations. See Table 4. 
 
                                                                
16 It has been held previously that the Belgian Deontological Norm No 2 is held to restrict competition law 
and is no longer used by the Belgian Architectural Association as the recommended standard.  
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Table 4: Technical Services (Architects): IHS Regulation indices. See IHS report, Part 1, p. 64. 
 Entry Conduct Total Rank 
Italy 3.2 3.0 6.2 1 
Luxembourg 2.6 2.7 5.3 2 
Austria 3.9 1.2 5.1 3 
Germany 1.8 2.7 4.5 4 
Spain 3.2 0.8 4.0 5 
Belgium 2.4 1.6 3.9 6 
France 2.2 0.9 3.1 7 
Portugal 2.2 0.6 2.8 7 
Finland 1.4 0.0 1.4 9 
Denmark 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 
United kingdom 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 
Greece n/a n/a n/a n/a 
3. Conclusion 
A detailed analysis of the regulation of architects in all EU states (except for Belgium 
and the Netherlands) would be outside the scope of this thesis. This Title was added to 
the research, to give the readers an idea about the regulation of architects in other states. 
Whether and how the findings of the two studies mentioned above correspond, will not 
be discussed. In this regard it should be noted that deviations are possible since the OTB 
research only determined whether disciplinary codes have to be adhered to, whereas the 
IHS study also looked at the conduct of these rules. Furthermore, the IHS report re-
ceived a lot of criticism from legal and economic scholars. The criticism was however 
not that much on the calculation of the regulation indices but more on the empirical 
analyses in the following chapters. This will be discussed in more detail in Part III of this 
thesis. 
 In any case it can be concluded that, compared with other EU states, Belgium has a 
rather restrictive regime with regard to architects, whereas the Netherlands exhibits a 
more lenient situation. 
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THE ARCHITECTURAL PROFESSION: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 
1. Objectives of the economic analysis of law 
Even though this thesis deals with the liberal profession of architect -the world ‘liberal’ 
literally meaning ‘free from restraint’- it has been demonstrated in the preceding chap-
ters that the architectural profession is (certainly in Belgium) heavily regulated. This 
chapter aims to compare the Belgian and Dutch regulatory systems as discussed in Part 
II of this thesis, from an efficiency perspective. To achieve this end, a law and economics 
analysis of the regulation of the architectural profession in those two countries is used. 
 
The law and economics approach to legal and regulatory issues -also called the eco-
nomic analysis of law- unites the field of law and the field of economics, and aims to 
bring about a better understanding of both. As will be clarified in this chapter, econom-
ics provides a scientific theory to predict how people respond to changes in law, and 
what the effects of legal sanctions on behaviour are. In other words, microeconomic 
theory offers an explanation about how legislation and other regulations affect the 
choices of individuals. In this way, laws constitute incentives for changing behaviour, 
and can be instruments for achieving important social goals (efficiency -i.e. the cheapest 
means- and distribution) and/or paternalistic goals while economics predicts their ef-
fects on efficiency, and on the distribution of income and wealth. As held by Cooter and 
Ulen, because of these qualities, laws can be seen as implicit prices.1 In this regard, this 
part of the thesis discusses how the decisions of architects (producers) and their clients 
(consumers) are coordinated through movements in market price, taking account of the 
fact that consumers and producers will always try to maximize their utility. This means 
that they will always choose the best alternative when making a decision.2 Producers will 
therefore choose to provide those goods or services which maximise their profits, i.e. the 
goods and services for which the difference between the price per unit that consumers 
are willing to pay and the cost of production of these units is the largest. Competition 
among producers will therefore force these producers to minimise their costs of produc-
                                                                
1 Cooter & Ulen 2003, p. 4.  
2 Ibid. 
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tion and sales prices. Consumers, on the other hand, will try to choose goods or services 
with the best quality-price ratio. The decisions of consumers and firms must be made 
consistent in the sense that somehow the two sides must agree about the quantity and 
price of the good or service that will be produced and consumed.3 When these con-
sumption and production decisions are consistent in this sense, the market is said to be 
in equilibrium. In this part of the thesis, it will be explained that, in general, the market 
for architectural services, as many others, is not in equilibrium at all, as a result of cer-
tain problems. Law and economics theory aims to describe these problems, and to offer 
solutions for them. In order to determine the effects of the existence and absence of laws 
on the goals of efficiency and distribution, judges and other lawmakers must have a 
method of evaluating these effects. An economic analysis of law provides an objective 
method for evaluating which legal rules are to be preferred.4 In this way, it may help to 
establish which combination of regulation or non-regulation options is likely to lead to 
more efficient outcomes.  
2 Methodology and structure 
In this chapter the general theory of the economic analysis of law will be described, and 
it will be demonstrated that economics is not only linked with taxation, regulation of 
markets or competition law, but is a behavioural science that more generally analyses 
human behaviour, even if this is not strictly market orientated.5 Different possibilities 
will be discussed which are used to internalize externalities such as moral persuasion 
(paragraph 11.3.2), the Coase theorem (paragraph 11.3.3), taxes (paragraph 11.3.4), 
liability rules (paragraph 11.3.5) and regulation (paragraph 11.3.6). Even though Part II 
of this thesis only discusses contractual liabilities, since the relationship between the 
architect and the building master is in principle regulated by a contract, it can be said 
that the economic analysis of tort law is interesting since architects always have to act 
with a minimal amount of due care to prevent the occurrence of any harm. The tort law 
analysis is highly relevant since it presupposes a situation in which there is no regula-
tion. This analysis will be offset against the regulation of behaviour via government 
regulation. The criteria for regulation will be discussed from a public as well as a private 
interest perspective (paragraph 11.3.6.1), followed by an overview of the ‘authors’ who 
generally create regulation next to the specific contracting parties: the government and 
self-regulating agencies such as professional associations (paragraph 11.3.6.2). In this 
regard it should be noted that, through the legal analysis of contract law which is pro-
vided for in Part II of this thesis, I aim to determine whether the intensity of contract 
law is linked to the intensity of regulation. This will be further discussed in paragraph 
11.3.7. However, this research does not contain an economic analysis of contract law 
and further research is recommended in this area. Finally, this thesis will contain a brief 
discussion of insurance theory (paragraph 11.4.) and its importance for architects. 
                                                                
3 Ibid., p. 14. 
4 Barnes & Stout 1992, pp .1-2. Economics provides a useful normative standard for evaluating law and 
policy. 
5 See on this topic Becker 1976; Van den Bergh & Heremans 1987, pp. 139-163. 
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While each paragraph refers to the architectural profession, an economic analysis of the 
regulation of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands will be presented in paragraph 
11.3.6.4. Finally, a conclusion will be provided in paragraph 11.5. It should be noted that 
this thesis cannot extensively deal with all problems of economic analysis (it will, for 
example, not discuss whether or not it is better (i.e. more efficient) to have EU legisla-
tion to uniformly regulate (harmonize) the architectural profession), but aims to dem-
onstrate that law and economics can be a useful method for analysing architectural law 
and policy. 
3 The internalization of externalities 
3.1. Introduction 
As demonstrated in Part II of this thesis, the architectural profession is surrounded by 
difficult tasks and responsibilities. It is obvious that architects have to work with due 
diligence and seriousness because it is crucially important that the buildings they design 
are safe and secure. When a decision causes costs or benefits to individuals or groups 
other than the person making the decision, the decision has caused external effects, also 
called externalities. 
 If an externality occurs, the decision-maker does not bear himself all the costs (such 
as pollution from cars – a negative externality) or enjoy all the gains (such as improved 
health care reducing absenteeism – a positive externality) from his action. In a free mar-
ket, i.e. a market without regulations, externalities are not internalised in the decision-
making process of the suppliers. As a result, too much or too little of the good will be 
consumed from the point of view of society: if the costs to the world exceed the costs to 
the individual making the choice (e.g. pollution, crime) then the good will be overcon-
sumed from society’s point of view; if the world around the person making the decision 
benefits more than the individual does (e.g. education, safety), then the good will be 
underconsumed by individual decision makers. 
 
With regard to the provision of services by architects in particular, externalities can 
appear if the quality of the service rendered by the architect is not high, since this can 
cause huge losses for private parties and for society as whole. A badly constructed or 
poorly designed apartment building may cause casualties and does not only constitute a 
problem for the owner of the building and the individuals who rent the apartments, but 
also for the public security in general (for example, visitors, people walking by … ). Due 
to possible third party effects, society becomes a second client: one that does not pay 
directly, but one that fears to ‘pay’ indirectly for bad or biased services.6 On the other 
hand, every individual can enjoy the sight of a beautiful building and safely visit it, 
which certainly can be qualified as a positive externality. 
 
                                                                
6 Geens 2004, p. 290. 
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In this thesis I will discuss a variety of legal instruments that can be used to internalize 
externalities. However it should first be determined whether legal rules are needed at all 
to achieve such internalization. For this reason, a variety of instruments which can be 
used to prevent the injurer of damages with appropriate incentives to prevent/reduce 
harm will be analysed. It will be demonstrated that, next to moral persuasion, negotia-
tions and taxes and liability rules and regulation can lead to the prevention of damage. 
Since the latter two options are most common, this part of the thesis mainly focuses on 
liabilities and regulations. The reader should note, however, that this thesis does not 
provide an economic analysis of contract law, but aims to offer an economic analysis of 
tort law and regulation. This might seem odd at first instance since neither in Part I nor 
in Part II was liability in tort discussed from a legal point of view, while the regulation 
and the contractual liability of architects was presented. However, by presenting an 
economic analysis of tort law and regulation, the main possibilities through which so-
cially optimal behaviour and thus the prevention of damages can be obtained, are in-
cluded. Indeed, injurers are likely to take due care in order to prevent damages when 
faced with the threat of liability rules. Regulation, on the other hand, can also be used to 
provide incentives for prevention in the event that liability rules are not able to achieve 
the desired results. The private law which was discussed in Part II of this thesis will serve 
to determine whether the intensity of contract law is linked to the intensity of regula-
tion. 
3.2. Moral persuasion 
In the absence of regulation, there will be no incentives for architects to take into ac-
count possible damages caused by, for example, a faulty design to third parties. How-
ever, not only can legal rules provide incentives to internalise the externality by forcing 
the architect to take into account the damage caused, but it is possible that such inter-
nalisation can also be achieved through moral persuasion of the architect, pointing at 
his liability to society as a whole. This might lead to voluntary compliance, although the 
efficacy of such an approach has been questioned.7 
3.3 Coase theorem 
Another way for private parties to internalize external effects is through negotiation, 
except in cases where transaction costs are prohibitive. In this way, the externality is 
internalized in a contract. Coase referred to the reciprocal nature of harm. In this way it 
can be said that harm is not just caused by an architect who designed a high apartment 
block which spoils the view of the neighbours, but also by the presence of those living 
next-door. In such a case, it should be decided whether the rights of the architect and 
the building master or those of the neighbours should be limited. This will depend on 
who can take precautions to reduce or prevent the harm. According to the Coase theo-
                                                                
7 Oates & Baumol 1975, pp. 95-128. 
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rem8, in the absence of, or in a situation of very low transaction costs9, the outcome of 
negotiations will be economically efficient, regardless of how the government allocates 
property rights, because the interested parties will bargain privately to maximise their 
joint utility and social welfare and, in this way, correct the externality. Through bargain-
ing, parties can therefore internalize the externality, for example by including a risk 
premium in the prices for professional services.10 However, even though a premium may 
be included in the prices for professional services, in markets for professional services 
the transaction costs are generally too high.11 Nevertheless, since professionals find it 
possible to pass their increased liability on to their clients by increasing their prices, the 
Coase theorem has not lost its relevance in the professional services market. Indeed, 
since it is possible that the architect is held liable in tort by the owners of the neighbour-
ing building if they suffer damage caused by the construction works, this will be taken 
into account when the contract is created. The price charged to the building master 
reflects the division of risks as agreed between the architect and his client. 
3.4 Pigouvian tax 
Another theoretical solution for the problems caused by negative externalities can be 
found in the imposition of a tax (the so-called Pigouvian tax12) on all activities that gen-
erate external costs, thereby reducing the incentives to take part in such activities. Not 
only private parties can internalize external effects through negotiations, but also gov-
ernment can achieve this by means of taxes and subsidies. This tax should be equal to 
the amount of the external costs. Optimally, for each harmful activity, the marginal tax 
rate should be equal to the marginal costs caused by it. However, as suggested by Philip-
sen13, this solution does not seem practical in markets for professional services. It is 
difficult to calculate what level of tax would counterbalance the negative externality. 
Hence some form of quality regulation and/or liability rules are needed to cure the 
problem of negative externalities in the professions. 
                                                                
8 Coase 1960, pp. 1-44. 
9 These are the costs associated with the time and effort needed to search out, negotiate, and consummate an 
exchange. 
10 As will be explained in the next paragraph, due to the information asymmetry problem (one of the parties 
to a contract has information that is not available to the other) in markets for professional services, trans-
action costs are usually very high, so that the Coase theorem will mostly not deliver the desired results. In 
the relationship between architects and clients, transaction costs include, for example, the client’s costs as-
sociated with finding an appropriate architect, negotiating with the architect on the design assignment, 
drawing up a design contract, and bringing a claim before a judge in event of the architect’s breach of duty. 
Van Gulijk 2009, p.159. 
11 Philipsen 2009, forthcoming. Advance access online since 21 April 2009, last consulted 23 December 2009. 
12 Pigou 1954.  
13 Philipsen 2008, p. 96.  
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3.5 Liability rules 
3.5.1 Prevention of accident costs 
As indicated earlier, the professional task of architects is very complex. For this reason, 
the right incentives have to be created to make sure that architects take good care. Gen-
erally speaking, a lot of professional activities can be carried out in a very safe way. It 
follows that the increase in value they bring to society is often larger than the costs of the 
damage they cause.14 Since the influence of damages on people’s behaviour should only 
extend to the point where the costs of accidents are acceptable for society, it is of no use 
prohibiting these activities. However, in today’s market, consumers are in need of effec-
tive and independent redress mechanisms when things go wrong. In this regard, the 
classic economic analysis of law starts from the assumption that, by exposing the costs 
of their actions through liability rules, parties will be motivated to take optimal care to 
prevent accidents. The result would be a reduction in the total social cost of accidents, 
since it is at the level of care that the costs of prevention and expected damage are 
minimised.15 It follows that economists tend to stress the deterrent function of tort law, 
as opposed to the compensation goal to which lawyers mostly refer.16 In the famous 
book The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi proposed a law and offered an economic analysis 
of the deterrent function and the compensation goal of tort law, and made a distinction 
between primary, secondary and tertiary accident costs.17 
 Primary accident costs are the costs of accident (tort) avoidance and the damage 
that finally occurs. More specifically, they are the costs associated with the reduction of 
the number of accidents and the severity of such accidents (prevention costs), as well as 
the costs of accidents that are not prevented because preventing them is more costly 
than letting them occur (costs of damages). As held by Calabresi, the principal function 
of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of (avoiding) accidents.18 The reduction 
of the social costs of accidents was thus the central role of tort law. Since there is a trade-
off because some damage is very costly to prevent, Calabresi has argued that the primary 
cost reduction goal is to minimize the sum of the costs of prevention and the costs of 
damage.19 It follows that primary costs include the costs of accidents that are not pre-
vented, because preventing them is more costly than letting them occur. With regard to 
the architectural profession, it can be said that primary costs include the professional’s 
costs associated with the creation of his design; the costs to architects of hiring other 
experts to make sure the design contains no faults; the costs related to the study of books 
and articles to learn the characteristics of certain building materials, etc. As indicated by 
Calabresi, the costs of prevention and the costs of damage can be reduced by taking an 
adequate level of care. The more prevention there is, the lower the level of damages will 
                                                                
14 Ogus &Veljanovski 1984, p. 107. 
15 Faure 2008, p. 78. 
16 See, for example, Endres & Staiger 1966, pp. 79-93.  
17 Calabresi 1970. 
18 Calabresi 1970, p. 26. 
19 Calabresi 1970, pp. 26-27. 
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be. According to the Learned Hand rule20, the injurer has to weigh his costs of preven-
tion against the costs of damage for the injured party.21 The injurer of the damage is 
liable for negligence if the prevention costs are less than the expected benefit. Therefore, 
the injurer has to make prevention costs that, at most, equal his expected benefit. As 
indicated before, often rules are created to indicate that the architect should observe a 
minimum level of care. Furthermore, the costs of prevention and damage can be re-
duced by performing a certain level of activity: the higher the level of dangerous activi-
ties, the more damage will occur. An optimal activity level will be achieved if the ex-
pected utility derived from the activity at least equals the expected damages as a result of 
the activity. 
 Secondary costs, on the other hand, refer to the equitable spreading of loss. An 
example can be found in the taking out of insurance.22 As indicated in Part I of this the-
sis, architects are mostly covered by professional liability insurance. Sometimes this is 
even imposed by law. Obviously, the secondary cost reduction goal only comes into the 
picture after earlier measures to prevent or reduce primary costs have failed. With re-
gard to this second type of costs, it should be investigated as to whether architects, as 
injurers or victims, are better capable to bear the costs of liability in a certain situation. 
The one who is most capable is considered to be the cheapest risk bearer. Usually the 
damage is placed on the wealthy in order to bring about a just distribution, regardless of 
whether or not this involves financial spreading, since they will be in the best situation 
to pay for the damages. Therefore, the wealthy are often considered to be the cheapest 
risk bearers.23 
 Tertiary costs are the costs of administering the legal system. They are administra-
tive costs such as the verification costs of insurance companies, negotiation costs, law-
yer’s costs, costs of using the courts, costs of administering punishment, and other ad-
ministrative costs. The purpose of this tertiary cost reduction goal is to question whether 
the attempt to reduce accident costs, either through primary or secondary cost reduc-
tion, does not cost more than it actually saves.24 If the administrative costs of the preven-
tion and compensation of damages exceed the actual prevention and compensation 
costs, prevention and compensation may not be worthwhile. 
3.5.2. Strict liability vs. negligence 
To minimise the above-mentioned social costs in terms of harm, a certain level of care 
has to be taken. Cost-benefit analyses have demonstrated that the optimal level of care is 
that where the marginal costs of care taking equal the marginal benefits of accident 
reduction.25 Liability law should provide parties with incentives to adopt this optimal 
                                                                
20 Cooter & Ulen 2004, p. 331f; Shavell 2004, p. 191. 
21 Van den Bergh 2001, p. 116; Van Gulijk 2009, p. 161. 
22 Calabresi 1970, p. 51. 
23 Calabresi 1970, p. 21, pp. 27-28. Calabresi mentions three variables that may indicate that a party is the 
superior risk bearer: if he is in the best position to prevent the risk; if he can best insure himself; if he can 
take out insurance at the lowest cost.  
24 Calabresi 1970, p. 28; Van Gulijk 2009, p. 163. 
25 Shavell 1987, p. 7; Landes & Posner 1981, p. 870. 
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care level. In this regard two main liability systems exist: strict liability and negligence. 
Which of these systems provides parties with incentives to take optimal care depends on 
whether one deals with a unilateral or a bilateral accident situation. 
 In a unilateral accident situation – i.e. a situation in which the victim cannot influ-
ence the accident risk – with negligence rules, the injurer will take optimal care if the 
due care which is required in accordance with the negligence rule is equal to the optimal 
care as defined above.26 This is due to the fact that the injurer will not take more care 
than is necessary, since he escapes liability as soon as he complies with the due care 
standard. Taking higher care will be more expensive for him, while taking lower care 
will lead to a duty to compensate for the damage. Liability for negligence does not pro-
vide incentives to adopt an optimal actively level however. The same is true in the case 
of strict liability. The level of care taken by the injurer will equal the optimal care, since 
this will lead to a minimization of the total expected accident costs. It should be noted 
however, that even though both the negligence and the strict liability rules lead to a 
minimization of the social costs of accidents, secondary and tertiary costs may be differ-
ent within the two liability systems. With regard to the secondary costs, an injurer who 
follows the due care level will never have to compensate the victim, while if strict liabil-
ity applies, the reverse is true as soon as damage has arisen. Since, in negligence systems, 
the victim has to convince the judge of an insufficient level of care taking on the part of 
the injurer, high administrative costs are present. It follows that the judge has to make 
an extra effort to determine what the marginal costs and benefits of care taking lie.27 In 
strict liability systems, these costs do not exist. However, a legal case will follow as soon 
as the victim has suffered injury, since compensation is always due. Since the optimal 
activity level is not incorporated in the due care standard which is applied by the court, 
negligence rules will not give optimal incentives to the injurer to adopt an optimal activ-
ity level.28 Under a strict liability rule, the injurer has an incentive to adopt an efficient 
activity level since this is the way to minimize the total expected accident costs. 
 In a bilateral accident setting, victims will only have incentives to take due care in 
the case of negligence. Indeed, if the injurer is only subjected to a negligence rule, the 
victim carries his damage as long as the injurer has taken due care. For this reason, the 
victim also has an incentive to adopt an optimal activity level. In the event that the in-
jurer is held strictly liable, on the other hand, the victim will receive compensation any-
way. In a strict liability regime combined with a contributory negligence defence, the 
victim will not receive compensation if he did not take the efficient level of care. If this is 
the case, both the injurer and the victim will take efficient care to avoid liability.29 In 
such a case, the victim has no incentive to adopt an optimal accident level since it will 
not be taken into account by the judge to determine whether the victim was negligent or 
not. Another possibility is the combination of negligence with a contributory negligence 
defence, in which the injurer does not have to pay the victim if the latter was negligent, 
not even if the injurer did not take due care. Finally, also, a comparative negligence rule 
                                                                
26 Shavell 1987, p. 8; Calabresi 1975, p. 658. 
27 Shavell 1987, p. 9; Calabresi 1975, p. 666. 
28 Adams 1989. Shavell 1980, pp. 1-25.  
29 Shavell 1980, pp. 12-13. 
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can provide incentives for care taking to the injurer as well as the victim. If both parties 
failed to take due care, the victim can only claim compensation which is proportional to 
the amount of damage caused by the injurer. 
 Since Part I of this thesis focuses on the liability of architects, I will not discuss this 
bilateral accident situation in further detail. Within the relationship of architect-
building master, there is normally no liability in tort, but instead a contractual liability. 
Liability in tort is possible however, in the relationship architect-entrepreneur, at least if 
they did not regulate their tasks and obligations in a contract.30 It should be noted how-
ever, that when the entrepreneur can influence the accident risk, for example by warn-
ing the architect in time with regard to a certain problem, a liability rule should be cho-
sen which gives an incentive for care taking on the part of the entrepreneur as well. This 
can be found in cases of negligence, strict liability with a contributory negligence de-
fence, negligence with a contributory negligence defence and a comparative negligence 
rule. However, in a regular situation, it is not the entrepreneur that truly suffers from a 
fault of the architect or vice-versa, but the building master with whom the professionals 
have a contractual relationship. 
 
In any case, when having to make a choice between strict liability and negligence31, it is 
often argued that strict liability eases the victim’s burden of proving fault in order to 
obtain compensation. However, as has been discussed above, the principal aim of tort 
law is not to provide for damage compensation, but to deter injurers from causing dam-
age in the first place. Furthermore, if often occurs that legal systems qualify every viola-
tion of a regulation as a fault, so that victims only have to prove this violation, a causal 
relationship and damage. Whether strict liability is thus more beneficial for the victim 
can be questioned. This is even more so, since strict liability regimes often contain sev-
eral derogations to this regime.32 However, strict liability does impose upon the injurer, 
not only the incentive to take efficient care, but also to adopt an optimal activity level. 
The injurer will be held liable, regardless of the victim’s behaviour. In a system of strict 
liability with a contributory or comparative negligence defence, the victim’s behaviour 
also becomes important since the latter is in a position to limit the damage by taking due 
care. From the perspective of damage prevention, we should avoid the situation in 
which the actions or inactions of the victim are not taken into account as well. 
 Another factor that should be taken into account is that strict liability does not 
bring about high information costs for the judge.33 As opposed to a negligence system, 
the judge does not have to decide what the optimal level of care in a concrete situation 
should have been. The judge only has to ‘punish’ the one who did not obtain a certain 
                                                                
30 It should be repeated that in Belgium, a contract between an architect and an entrepreneur is often scruti-
nised extremely closely, since it argued that it might harm the independence of architects. 
31 It should be noted that the above-mentioned analysis is based on a situation in which both parties are risk 
neutral. As pointed out by Endres and Schwarze, strict liability is only efficient if, in some way, risk can be 
removed from the risk averse injurer, for example through insurance: Endres & Schwarze 1991, pp. 1-25 
32 See for example Brans 1994, pp. 61-67 and pp. 85-91. 
33 Polinsky 1988, pp. 139-147. 
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result by holding him liable.34 It follows that in a strict liability system the injurer will 
take all efficient precautions to avoid the accident, even if the judge is not able to deter-
mine the negligence standard. With regard to the architectural profession, it can be said 
that strict liability gives architects incentives to take efficient care. However, since the 
architect has to deal with very complex and different matters, and provides intellectual 
services, he is mostly held liable if due care was not taken. Indeed, architects often do 
their utmost to prevent harm, but it is always possible that damage occurs anyway. As 
has been demonstrated in Part I of this thesis, for this reason architects in Belgium and 
the Netherlands are mostly held liable for negligence. Only in certain specific circum-
stances is a stricter liability regime applied if it is presumed that the architects should be 
able to guarantee a certain result with regard to a particular task in a building project.35 
3.5.3. Caps 
It is possible that financial limits (caps) are placed on the amount that has to be paid by 
the injurer. Limits are often created by public regulations, but are also present in (insur-
ance) contracts. The insurability of the damage is often seen as a reason of the imposi-
tion of such caps, as well as the pressure of interest groups36 who want to lower their 
risks. However, if this is the case, the level of care taken by the injurer will diminish, 
since he will only take the level of care which is needed to avoid an accident which 
equals the statutory limited amount, as opposed to the level which is needed to reduce 
the total accidents costs efficiently.37 As has been demonstrated above, not only the ex-
tent of the damage can be limited, but also the liability period. This will lead to underde-
terrence and also undermines the principle of the full compensation of victims.38 In this 
regard it should be noted that the limitations on architectural liability as formulated in 
the Belgian Civil Code (Article 1792 and 2270 CC) and the Dutch New Rules (Article 15 
and 16 NR)39 are only applicable in the contractual relationship between the architect 
and the building master. They therefore do not fall within the ambit of tort law. How-
ever it must be said that the same risk of underdeterrence exists, since architects will 
consider the harm-causing event as one with a limited maximum cost and do not have 
the incentive to take due care which would reduce all accident costs efficiently, nor will 
they aim to prevent/minimise costs which may arise after the maximum liability period 
has passed. A limitation on the amount of damage that will be covered by insurance 
however, does not mean that the injurer himself will have to pay the excess on the insur-
ance. Nevertheless, in such cases, the victim bears the risk that the injurer may be insol-
vent. 
                                                                
34 Another factor which is relevant when opting for strict or negligence liability is the insolvency risk of the 
injurer. In case of strict liability, a problem arises if the amount of the damages is higher than the injurer’s 
wealth. If this is the case, the injurer will take less than the optimal care (underdeterrence). Faure & 
Hartlief 2003, p. 43. 
35 The imposition of a very high standard of care under negligence is often referred to as absolute liability. 
See Faure & Skogh 2003, p. 247. 
36 In paragraph 12.3.6 the aims and effects of interest groups will be further discussed.  
37 Landes & Posner 1984, p. 419. 
38 Hartlief & Tjittes 1994.  
39 See chapters 6 and 8 of this thesis. 
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3.5.4. Conclusion 
It can be concluded that the economic analysis of tort law indicates that liability rules 
provide incentives to parties to engage in careful behaviour. This means that tort law is 
not primarily seen as a system to compensate victims for damage, but rather to deter 
injurers from causing damage in the first place. Different liability rules can be applied. 
The most important ones are negligence and strict liability. As indicated above, strict 
liability brings about certain advantages: the costs are shifted to the injurer who will 
have to try to achieve the optimal care level as well as an optimal activity level since he is 
deterred more easily; judges have no costs to determine the due care standard; victims 
do not have to prove fault. However, if the victim also has influence on the risk by tak-
ing due care, a contributory or comparative negligence defence to the strict liability rule 
should be added. In this way all accident costs can best be prevented/limited, at least in 
risk neutral situations. Since the relationship between the architect and the building 
master which has been discussed in Part II of this thesis does not, in principle, fall under 
tort law but under contract law, it should be noted that the architect will not be held 
liable in tort to the building master, either under a negligence rule or a strict liability 
rule. Since generally architects and entrepreneurs are third parties with regard to one 
another, they can resort to tort law to obtain damages. However it should be noted that 
it is mostly the building master who suffers damage due to a fault on the part of one of 
these professionals. Nevertheless, it can be argued that since liability for negligence and 
strict liability are also used in contract law, the economic criteria presented above in 
relation to negligence and strict liability in tort law may also have relevance for the con-
tractual liability. 
3.6. Regulation 
As indicated above, for liability rules to work effectively, there must be a victim and an 
identifiable injurer who is able to pay compensation. Furthermore, concrete damage has 
to be determinable. This is not always the case, which means that other possibilities have 
to be considered. 
 Especially since the early 1990s, the regulation of liberal professions has received a 
lot of attention in the law and economics literature.40 Traditionally, architecture has not 
been subjected to the competitive forces that are present in commercial sectors. The 
policy of distinguishing professional practice from commercial trade reflects a rational 
concept that, due to the specialized, personal and important nature of the professional 
services and the need to uphold and preserve the quality and integrity of the professions, 
competition would not guarantee a socially optimal outcome.41 As has been discussed 
earlier in this thesis, Member States and professional associations have created many 
regulations to ‘control’ the architectural profession, so that competition is often re-
stricted. As opposed to liability rules, these regulations are anticipatory interventions 
which are used by the government or a professional association to prevent undesirable 
                                                                
40 See, for example, Ogus 1994. 
41 Van den Bergh 1999, p. 89. 
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actions or outcomes in markets, or to direct market activity towards desirable ends. It is 
thus regulation that is created in advance to any action. As will be explained hereunder, 
ex ante regulation is often present in the form of entry regulations and conduct regula-
tions. In this part of the thesis, we will investigate whether these regulations are really 
necessary to achieve efficient outcomes. To answer this question we first need to explain 
why regulation is created in the first place, and whether it provides any benefits. In this 
regard, the law and the economics literature addresses two opposing views which ex-
plain the creation of regulation: the public interest approach and the private interest 
approach. These theories will now be discussed. 
3.6.1. The Public Interest Approach 
According to the public interest approach, regulation is justified in terms of the per-
ceived shortcomings of the market system when it comes to dealing with certain prob-
lems. Public interests are involved if the government takes upon itself the responsibility 
to protect social interests in the belief that these interests would otherwise not be prop-
erly protected. Public interests are therefore a sub-collection of social interests.42 As 
suggested by Hameleers, when discussing public interest theory, the starting point is an 
economic analysis of (trans)actions in a market without government intervention.43 
Public interests are at stake when transactions between market players, or the actions of 
one market player, do not take into account the consequences for other stakeholders 
who are not involved in that transaction or action. As a consequence, private interests 
served by that (trans)action do no coincide with social interests, and negative external-
ities may result.44 In such cases, the transaction mechanism does not function well. In 
economic terms this is referred to as a ‘market failure’ which means that the sum of the 
net benefits of a certain activity to producers and consumers is below the maximum 
attainable with the existing level of resources in the economy, so that the socially effi-
cient level of output is not attained. To compel stakeholders to compensate third parties 
for these negative externalities, the government can use statutory or other measures.45 
Regulations formulated by government agencies should pursue the public interest in 
correcting for market failure.46 In this way they aim to improve social welfare by erasing 
issues which prevent an economically efficient outcome, and to realise a politically ac-
ceptable distribution of income, i.e. the financial accessibility of the service. What ex-
                                                                
42 Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy, Het Borgen van Publiek Belang, The Hague, 2000; Teul-
ings, Bovenberg & Van Dalen 2003.  
43 Hameleers 2004, p. 86.  
44 Negative externalities appear if a decision causes costs to individuals or groups other than those making 
the decision. The concept of ‘externalities’ will be discussed hereunder. 
45 The government has a comparative advantage compared to the market since it is the only party that can 
use public compulsion to force all interested parties to participate.  
46 Posner 1974, pp. 335-358; Noll 1989, pp. 1253-1287. 
 It must be noted, however, that the presence of asymmetric information which entails that one party has 
more information at its disposal than another party, does not guarantee that the market will fail. What 
matters is whether the asymmetric information brings about a different outcome than the outcome that 
would exist if there was symmetric information. If this occurs, then the case for market failure can be 
made: Arnold 2004, p.726. This will be discussed in detail hereunder. 
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actly constitutes the public interest is not a constant, but varies according to time, place 
and the specific values held by a particular society.47 In any case, the public interest ap-
proach holds that regulation might be necessary to circumvent the shortcomings of the 
market when it has to deal with certain problems leading to less social welfare. However, 
regulation may fail if the efficiency gains to which it gives rise are outweighed by in-
creased transaction costs or misallocations in other sections of the economy.48 
 
As suggested by economic theory49, to obtain a general equilibrium in an economy with 
perfect competition wherein it is possible to enlarge someone’s welfare without dimin-
ishing the other’s utility50, four conditions have to be fulfilled: 
1. In every market there should be many small and identical producers, who cannot 
significantly influence the price level, and who sell homogeneous products in their 
respective markets. 
2. There should be perfect information in that economy, meaning that all market 
participants are informed about all (equilibrium) prices and characteristics of 
goods. 
3. There are no external effects. 
4. The products are private goods. 
 
If one of these conditions is not fulfilled, one can speak of a certain degree of market 
failure: a situation in which the market does not provide the ideal or optimal amount of 
a particular good or service. In practice, there will always be some distortions in the 
market. I will now discuss these conditions in more detail.51 
1. A lack of competition 
An industry in which there are so many firms that no one of them can influence the 
market price by its individual decisions, and in which there are so many consumers that 
the individual utility-maximizing decisions of no single consumer can affect the market 
price, is called a perfectly competitive industry. Market power, on the other hand, results 
either from the existence of monopolies and related market structures or from cartel-
like behaviour on the part of a group of firms/suppliers. In contrast to firms under per-
fect competition, who sell their products at the level where price equals marginal costs52 
                                                                
47 Ogus 1994, p. 29; Speech of Kroes, Better Regulation of Professional Services, UK Presidency Seminar, 
Brussels, 21 November 2005. It can be said, however, that p ublic interests in the liberal professions relate 
to the quality of the service (i.e. efficiency) and the financial accessibility of the service (i.e. equitable distri-
bution of income). 
48 Ogus 1994, p. 30. 
49 See for example Maks & Philipsen 2005, p.12-13.  
50 This is also known as a Pareto-efficient situation. Maintaining freedom of trade is, in principle, Pareto- 
 Improving, because voluntary exchange transactions make all participants better off.  
51 Paternalistic or distributive arguments for intervention in the market will not be discussed in this thesis.  
52 If a producer wants to determine whether his initial level of production is his maximum, he can make very 
small (marginal) changes away from his initial level. The costs associated with this small increase are called 
marginal costs. The benefits of producing more are called marginal benefits. As long as the marginal bene-
fits exceed the marginal costs of the change, the producer will continue to make more small changes. 
When benefits and costs are equal he will stop making changes, and the producer has reached his maxi-
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equals minimum average costs, a monopolist will sell its (smaller) output at a higher 
price level: where its marginal costs of producing equals its marginal benefits.53 It follows 
that a monopolist always operates in a Pareto inefficient manner.54 A situation is said to 
be Pareto-efficient or allocatively efficient if it is impossible to change it so as to make at 
least one person better off without making another person worse off. The abuse of mar-
ket power is a problem which causes market failure. In these situations, regulation (in 
the form of competition law) may offer a solution to avoiding abuse of dominance and 
to combat cartel-like behaviour.55 This will be discussed in more detail hereunder. It 
should be observed however, that the costs of correcting market failure by means of 
regulation have to be smaller than the efficiency gains derived from the regulation, and 
that the regulation has to be in proportion to the said failure. 
 
The market for professional services is – at least before the formation of self-regulating 
bodies – characterized by many small and identical producers, who cannot significantly 
influence the price level, and who offer more or less homogeneous services in their re-
spective markets. It follows that, at least at first sight, the formation of monopolies and a 
lack of competition should not be feared in the architectural profession. The competi-
tive process which generates efficiency requires that no single producer of a good or 
service (or group of co-ordinated producers) controls a sufficiently large share of that 
market that it can determine, by its own decision, the equilibrium combination of price 
and output for the market. If this was not the case, prices would be higher and output 
would be lower than in a truly competitive market. However monopolistic situations do 
not only exist when there are only a few professionals active in a certain market. They 
can also be created when a relative large number of professionals are active, but is only 
allowed to do so after fulfilling certain heavy requirements meaning that the number of 
active professionals is still much smaller than when no such requirements were im-
posed. As indicated in the previous chapters, both the Netherlands and Belgium impose 
certain requirements upon architects. In both countries, architects have to be registered 
before they can use their title. Registration is only possible after certain education and 
training requirements are fulfilled. The number of active architects is therefore smaller 
than if no requirements were imposed. Moreover, in Belgium, only persons in posses-
sion of the architectural title can practise the profession with regard to buildings for 
which a building permit is required, while in the Netherlands, anyone can practise the 
profession. It follows that Belgian architects possess a real monopoly in the construction 
market with regard to designing and supervising the construction of buildings. 
                                                                                                                                                             
mum utility. The optimum for nearly all decisions occurs thus at the point at which marginal benefit 
equals marginal cost. 
53 Maks & Philipsen 2005, p. 14. 
54 Varian 1984, pp. 79-85. 
55 It should be noted that regulation should not be used to create as much competition as possible, but that it 
may be used in the public interest to regulate cartels and the abuse of dominance. In certain situations it 
might even be better to have only one or a few producers instead of many small firms. This is the case 
when the costs of producing certain goods by one or a few producers are smaller than the costs of separate 
production by many smaller producers. Such monopolies or oligopolies are called ‘natural’ monopolies or 
‘natural’ oligopolies.  
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2. Information asymmetry 
a. Experienced clients vs. professionals 
Asymmetric information is present when one of the parties to a contract (generally the 
professional) has information which is not available to the other party (the client). Since 
professionals generally know more about the quality of the service they provide – their 
services mostly involve the application of their human capital to judge individual cases – 
than their clients, professional services are often characterized by information asymme-
try. The problem of information asymmetry occurs particularly in cases where one is 
dealing with experience goods56 or trusts goods57 as opposed to search goods58. Profes-
sional services fall under the first two categories since the quality of the services pro-
vided can, at best, only be determined after consumption or use. It follows that informa-
tion problems are almost always present. This is strengthened by the fact that most con-
sumers of architectural services will only turn to an architect once (or for a very limited 
number of times). In this regard it should be noted that the reputation of an architect is 
very important with regard to attracting new clients: future business often depends on 
the satisfaction of previous clients.59 Furthermore, the level of client sophistication ordi-
narily will determine how a client selects an architect. Most clients are uninformed 
about which qualifications are important, and do not know how to assess the qualifica-
tions, which means that they cannot make good use of their options. Furthermore, if 
costs are associated with interviewing and evaluating more than one architect, this can 
constrain a client’s ability to perform a meaningful personal evaluation.60 Building com-
panies or promoters, on the other hand, are normally repeat buyers, and are more 
equipped to judge the quality of the services provided. However, as suggested by 
Stephen, the fact that individual clients lack expertise and information on quality does 
not mean that the market will inevitably fail. If such information can be transferred 
between purchasers, reputation will play a role in disciplining suppliers. If repeat pur-
chasers can easily transfer their experience to inexperienced clients by acting on their 
behalf in the selection of the professional, or via a list of approved professionals, infor-
                                                                
56 Experience goods are goods or services the properties of which can only be assessed after consumption or 
after experience. This means that if these goods are bought regularly, consumers may learn about their 
quality through the repeat purchase mechanism.  
57 Trust goods are goods or services the properties of which can only be determined after applying highly 
technical standards, and for which there is no learning through the repeat-purchase-mechanism, meaning 
that the properties of these goods cannot be assessed either before or after the transaction. They are also 
called credence-goods. Since a profession can be defined as an occupation with the following characteris-
tics: specialized skills, skills that are particularly or fully acquired by intellectual training, the service calls 
for a high degree of integrity, and it involves direct or fiduciary relations with clients – also services per-
formed by free professionals can be described as being ‘objects of trust’. The consumer – who mostly can-
not fully control the quality of the service rendered – has to rely on the expertise of the professional in or-
der to assess whether or not it has the desired level of quality.  
58 In the case of search goods, consumers know already where they can obtain each of the options available to 
them, but they have to evaluate the utility of each option first on price and quality. 
59 Reputational concerns can serve as a disciplinary force. See Reagan 1998, p. 559. Such concerns may 
render the need for certain traditional rules unnecessary if the architect is already concerned with main-
taining his reputation consistent with the rules. See Zacharias p. 34.  
60 Zacharias 2007, p. 176. 
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mation asymmetry may be overcome.61 The reputation of an architect therefore plays a 
significant role with regard to attracting new clients. As suggested by Zacharias, reputa-
tions can be earned through performance that is reported in some relatively neutral way, 
or observed and recounted by people qualified to judge the performance (such as previ-
ous clients, other professionals, evaluating institutions).62 In this regard he noted that 
wealthy, experienced and sophisticated clients are likelier to know how to identify 
earned reputation and to make the effort to identify the reputations of potential archi-
tects, since they know what questions to ask and how to interpret the information re-
ceived. For such clients, there is less need to regulate. Inexperienced or untutored con-
sumers, on the other hand, may not know where to look or know what information is 
important. If they seek information on earned reputation, they are most likely to rely on 
word of mouth from other individuals who have had limited experience in evaluating 
the professional. Reputations can also be created, either by a professional himself, or by 
a third party (for example the press), who may have a financial or other incentive to 
publicize particular perceptions about the professional. In this way the professional can 
generate publicity to create a good name. Obviously, such a reputation tends to be less 
objective, and mainly targets potential clients who have limited resources for identifying 
useful information on their own, and is mainly self-serving. Furthermore, advertise-
ments mostly only mention surface facts instead of providing real core information. 
However, the characterization of reputation as earned or manufactured does not auto-
matically determine how accurate a reputation is, who can access it, and whether it is 
meaningful. Since lay consumers are mostly not well equipped to determine the quality 
of a building design, reputations developed by them may be less accurate than those 
developed by independent professional evaluators. The question can then be asked 
whether the need for regulation in markets with infrequent purchasers justifies that 
regulation be extended to markets where purchasers are experienced.63 In this regard 
Stephen holds that public policy towards markets for professional services should be-
come more differentiated than in the past, differentiated by profession and by consumer 
type within each market.64 
 
In any case, it should be noted that since free markets will only achieve efficient out-
comes if a significant number of consumers is able to make purchase decisions on the 
basis of complete and undistorted price-quality judgements, free markets for profes-
sional services will not produce efficient outcomes.65 Professionals may not wish to 
communicate certain information, and are likely to act only in their own interests, with-
                                                                
61 Stephen 2004, p. 148. Stephen holds that there is a potential for oversupply in the professional service 
markets for those categories of service sought by infrequent purchases, where the mechanism of reputation 
or the use of experienced agents does not operate. He indicates that regulation is needed to achieve effi-
cient levels of output and prices. 
62 Zacharias 2007, p. 185, pp. 190-192 and p. 195.  
63 In this regard Gilson concludes that over time, “information asymmetries” have decreased because, among 
other reasons, sophisticated clients have learned to use in-house counsel to select representation, and these 
in-house counsels are in a position to assess both quality and reputation. This, essentially, has shifted the 
power in the relationship to the demand side of the equation. See: Gilson 1990, p. 888.  
64 Stephen 2004, p. 149.  
65 Stephen & Love 2000, nr. 5860. 
  Chapter 11  
411 
out taking account of their clients’ best interests. 66 Since quality control by consumers is 
often impossible, and monitoring the quality of architectural services is difficult due to 
lack of knowledge, the ignorant clients of the professionals pay anyway, without know-
ing whether the price is reasonable.67 In this regard it should be noted that architecture is 
an exceedingly complex craft and there are myriad ways in which the architect’s integ-
rity is put to the test. As suggested by Skolimwski, the practice is immoral if the architect 
cuts corners and produces shoddy designs and buildings, when the client expects other-
wise. The client is the innocent, while the architect retains power and can subtly ma-
nipulate the client in so many ways. 68 
b. Adverse selection 
Furthermore, as proposed by economic theory, serious information asymmetries can 
culminate in a market for lemons69, i.e. a market on which only goods of inferior quality 
are offered. If the consumer is not able to judge the quality of the service provided, he 
will not be willing to pay a higher price for higher quality, so that providers of higher 
quality products or services charging higher prices will be driven out of the market. This 
results in a market with sub-optimal quality services. This process is also known as ad-
verse selection. Adverse selection is possible every time a party on the market is in the 
possession of information which is not known by the other parties (for example the 
services rendered is of lower quality than normally to be expected) and makes a decision 
(for example a single used price will emerge for a certain type of task) that adversely 
affects the others. As already noted, since consumers cannot evaluate the properties of 
the supplied products/services, nor control whether a certain professional has the right 
knowledge and know-how to do a job, professionals have no incentives to guarantee a 
high level of quality. As a result, consumers tend to compare the costs instead of the 
quality of the services offered. Suppliers of high quality products, however, will not be 
satisfied with an average price and consequently will be driven out of the market, 
thereby reducing the average quality of suppliers in the market. Furthermore, since they 
cannot evaluate quality, the price that consumers are willing to pay for the services will 
be lower than that which they would be willing to pay to a high quality provider if they 
could identify one. Their choice of professionals is therefore limited. This all leads to 
quality deterioration and a reduction in the market price, possibly generating a race to 
the bottom or a ‘lemons market’.70 The public interest theory holds that regulation might 
be able to convert this ‘equilibrium’ of low quality and low prices into a market outcome 
characterised by high quality and a reasonable price.71 For example, by setting and polic-
                                                                
66 Addison, Barrett & Sieben 1997, p. 69. 
67 It should be noted that e ven when consumers do possess all the necessary information, perfect rationality 
can break down under complications. Beyond a certain complicatedness, our logical apparatus ceases to 
cope – our rationality is bounded – and economic theory holds that in such cases, consumers process the 
information only up to a point where the marginal benefit of the information equals the marginal cost of 
processing more information. See Simon 1987. Due to these problems , the market usually fails to produce 
the socially optimal quantity and quality of the professional service. Garoupa 2004, p. 4. .  
68 Skolimowski 1993, p. 497. 
69 Akerlof 1970, p. 487. 
70 Akerlof 1970.  
71 Maks & Philipsen 2002, p. 17. 
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ing a minimum quality standard, the adverse selection problem can be reduced. 72 On the 
other hand it has been argued that when a professional such as an architect operates in a 
field in which a reputation for client-centred behaviour is imperative – architectural 
services are credence goods and architects often ‘depend’ on the publicity made by for-
mer clients – the need for rules against self-dealing and even negligence is diminished, 
because the market will enforce similar standards.73 
c. Moral hazard 
Information asymmetry can also cause a moral hazard problem. This arises after a client 
has selected a professional and remains when one party to a transaction (e.g. the archi-
tect) changes his behaviour (e.g. he buys an insurance74) in a way that is hidden from 
and costly to the other party (the client) (there are no or fewer incentives to do his ut-
most to create good plans to avoid the collapse of the building). Moral hazard therefore 
arise when the behaviour of the insured changes after the purchase of insurance, leading 
to the probability of loss or the size of the loss increasing. A moral hazard problem arises 
when the architect and his client have differing individual objectives, and the client 
                                                                
72 Leland 1979, pp. 1328-1346. However professional bodies often set this quality standard above the socially 
desirable level. 
73 Zacharias 2008, p. 180. Zacharias, who studied the situation of lawyers (p. 184), suggested that information 
about lawyers’ reputations casts light on the degree to which lawyers, or groups of lawyers, will care about, 
and adhere to, specific kinds of rules, and how they will implement regulatory leeway. 
74 Insurance theory predicts that concluded insurance contracts influence the insured’s behaviour, and that 
the decision to insure is invariably consistent and commensurate with the insured’s risk aversion. People 
are inclined to choose insurance to avert possible financial losses they do not want to bear themselves. 
Since insurers mostly have less information on the magnitude of the risk to which the insured is exposed, 
they want to inform themselves of the risk attributes of the insured and adjust their premiums accordingly 
to avoid adverse selection. This is even more so since those running the bigger risk are assumed to have a 
proportionate demand for insurance, causing an ever increasing claims rate for insurers. See Van Boom 
2008, p.253. However, some argue that the opposite phenomenon is happening, and that those who have 
the least need for insurance are most likely to by it. See, for example, Hemenway 1990, pp. 1063-1069 and 
Chiappori & Salanie 2000, pp. 56-78. Insurance demand is not always perfectly rational. In legal systems 
where motor liability insurance is not compulsory, it has been found that those who do not take out insur-
ance are more accident-prone than others. This is called advantageous or propitious selection. As held by 
Van Boom, there is little evidence as to whether propitious selection is a weaker or stronger driver in in-
surance market failure than adverse selection. See Van Boom 2008, p. 259. In any case, economic theory 
predicts that individuals shielded from financial loss by insurance coverage will demonstrate adapted be-
haviour and will thus actually increase the risk of the insured loss. See Shavell 2005, pp .63-77; Graf von 
der Schulenbrug 2005, p. 282 and Parsons 2003, pp. 448-471. In this way, research has shown a positive 
correlation between the increase of sickness coverage and the amount of sick leave. See Johansson & 
Palme, pp. 1879-1890. To cure this problem, insurers try to fix the right premium level at the beginning of 
the insurance contract, by collecting information from the insured. However, the costs of monitoring the 
insured during the running period of the contract are usually considered to be excessive compared to the 
expected benefits thereof. See Baker & Griffith 2007, pp. 487-544. As suggested by Van Boom 2008, p. 262, 
it follows that less energy is spent on monitoring the insured, but this does not mean that this is an ineffi-
cient state of affairs: the cost of controlling moral hazard and avoiding adverse selection must be set off 
against the expected benefits. As Van Boom rightly holds, some degree of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion can be efficient, provided that the insurance market in question is itself functioning properly. Too lit-
tle effort by the insurance industry may result in an inefficient level of precaution, and may eventually 
cause adverse selection and uninsurability. Legislators should, however, be careful with introducing com-
pulsory insurance since it is possible that insurers are then bound to apply less risk and premium differen-
tiation than would be advisable. See Cohen & Dehejia 2004, pp. 357-393. 
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cannot easily determine whether the architect’s actions are being taken in pursuit of his 
goals, or are self-interested misbehaviour.75 Since the client is not able to control the 
architect’s efforts, he cannot sanction the architect’s negligent attitude.76 An example of 
this moral hazard behaviour can be found in the principal-agent problem of demand 
generation, which means that professionals render extra services or services of a higher 
quality than is necessary, which consumers would not have wanted if they have been 
fully informed.77 The producer thus has an incentive to over-supply quality in order to 
charge higher prices, even if the client would be better served with a lower quality at a 
more reasonable price, or the producer supplies services the client does not need. In 
these circumstances a market for professional services is likely to generate a level of 
professional services which is above the optimal (or efficient) level, and thus there will 
be market failure. If all of its members were to behave in such a way, this could harm the 
reputation of the profession. Each member of the profession would individually like to 
cheat, but if all members cheat, then they will all be worse off in the end. Indeed, since 
the market price reflects only the average quality level, and will thus attract average 
quality sellers, cheating would lead to a reduction in the average level of quality as per-
ceived by consumers, a further reduction in market prices, and a further reduction of 
quality. Due to information asymmetry, consumers are not able to recognize high qual-
ity products or services. (Self)-regulation can be seen as a solution to this ‘free rider’ 
problem78. Regulation may not be needed for professional clients who are not at an in-
formational disadvantage. 
 
From the above it follows that the regulation of professional services can improve the 
market equilibrium: the benefits of regulation include a decrease in search costs, im-
provements in service quality, more adequate supply of information concerning the 
quality of professional services, and a reduction in risk.79 Furthermore, since rules can 
                                                                
75 Milgrom & Roberts 1992, p. 170. 
76 Somers 2005, p. 83. 
77 This is called supplier-induced demand. If consumers remain dependent on the prescriptions of service 
providers, and are risk averse (clients will pay money to avoid having to face uncertain outcomes; they can 
purchase insurance from an insurance company or may self-insure and incur expenses to minimize the 
probability of an uncertain event to arise, or to minimize a certain monetary loss (e.g. buying smoke detec-
tors). It is also possible to reduce the price one is willing to pay), the increased uncertainty they have to 
face regarding the price and quality of the service offered, may partially offset the benefits from the en-
hanced competition. 
 As suggested by Jenny, in some professions in France, the auditing of the prescriptions or the services 
furnished by service providers by auditing agencies has emerged. They check the services rendered by pro-
fessionals to diminish their strategic behaviour. He suggests that promoting independent auditing of ser-
vice providers’ prescriptions may not be a perfect solution, since the quality of the service rendered by the 
auditors and their independence may also be difficult to assess, but at least it has the potential of making it 
more difficult for members of the professions to strategically use the fact that they provide their clients 
both with a prescription and with the services rendered. According to Jenny, such auditing therefore seems 
a necessary complement to the elimination of the most blatantly anticompetitive provisions of regulatory 
codes, and self-regulations used by the professions. See Jenny 2004, p. 139. 
78 Fletcher 2004, p. 74.  
79 Garoupa 2004, p. 6. Furthermore, another information problem that might provide an argument for the 
regulation of professional services is bounded rationality. This means that potential tortfeasors may re-
spond less appropriately to incentives given by the tort system than is expected, due to fact that actors of-
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introduce minimum quality standards, confidence can be increased so that the relation-
ship between the consumer and the professional is more easily based on trust generated 
by regulation.80 
3. External effects 
As noted in paragraph 11.3.1., an externality occurs when a decision leads to costs or 
benefits to individuals or groups, other than the person making the decision. Since, in a 
free market, externalities are not internalised in the decision-making process of the 
suppliers, too much or too little of the good will be consumed from the point of view of 
society. In the latter case, the inclusion of external economies in the competitive model 
causes the social benefits of an activity to be higher than its private costs, at the margin.81 
It follows that if the price mechanism does not take into account the full social costs and 
social benefits of production, consumption externalities can cause market failure. 
 
Negative externalities can also appear in the architectural market every time the quality 
of the service rendered by the architect is not high, since this can cause huge losses for 
private parties and for society as a whole. However, since everyone can enjoy and visit 
certain buildings, positive externalities are also created. 
 
As suggested by Arruňada, the provision of private services usually goes together with 
the provision of external effects or, in other words, with public services.82 These exter-
nalities stem from both the nature of the private services and from political decisions, 
which obliges certain private service providers to also provide certain public services. 
Arruňada holds that in this way, the production of private and public services by a sin-
gle professional can be defined as an economy of scope or joint production, which is less 
costly than if different service providers are involved, due to the use of joint information 
– the human capital or general knowledge as well as specific knowledge relating to the 
customer or the case in question – and contractual resources. However, as Arruňada 
rightly indicates, assigning the production of externalities to professionals achieves 
economies of scope, but poses a serious problem in that, in principle, the professional 
has no incentives to produce the (positive) externalities, as these are services for which 
he is not paid, and for which he might even have to incur a certain cost.83 It follows that 
there must be strong incentives to make the professional independent of the customer 
who is paying him, even considering that, if the services are refused, the professional 
risks losing the customer. Arruňada concludes that achieving suffcient incentives for 
such a high degree of independence will be costly; in particular, it will require suppress-
ing or restraining competition. It follows that regulation is needed to overcome quality 
                                                                                                                                                             
ten take shortcuts in making decisions that frequently result in choices that fail to satisfy the utility maxi-
misation prediction. The limits of human cognitive abilities make it often impossible to follow a utility 
maximising strategy. This will not be further discussed in this thesis. For more information, see Faure 
2008, pp. 75-102. 
80 Meyer & Rowan 1991, p. 44. 
81 Addison, Barrett & Sieben 1997, p. 67. 
82 Arruňada 2004, p. 53.  
83 Ibid. 
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deterioration caused by negative externalities. In this way, the existence of individual 
liabilities provides incentives for service providers to deliver high quality work. Aca-
demic education and training are also defence mechanisms against the negative exter-
nalities which can arise due to low quality services. External effects can also be internal-
ized by private parties through negotiation, except in cases where transaction costs are 
prohibitive. In this way, the externality is internalized in a contract. According to the 
Coase theorem84, in the absence of, or in the case of very low transaction costs85, the 
outcome of such negotiations will be economically efficient, regardless of how the gov-
ernment allocates property rights, because the interested parties will bargain privately to 
maximise their joint utility and social welfare and, in this way, correct the externality. 
Through bargaining, parties can therefore internalise the externality, e.g. by including a 
risk premium in the prices for professional services. However, due to the information 
asymmetry in markets for professional services, transaction costs are usually very high, 
so that the Coase theorem will mostly not deliver the desired results. In the relationship 
between architects and client, transaction costs include, for example, the client’s costs 
associated with finding an appropriate architect, negotiating with the architect on the 
design assignment, drawing up a design contract, and bringing a claim before a judge in 
the event of the architect’s breach of duty.86 
4. Public goods 
As stated before, the provision of private services often goes hand in hand with external-
ities or, in other words, with public services, since private services can have conse-
quences for society. Externalities thus deal with the effects of services on the public at 
large. The concept of  ‘public goods’ which will now be discussed, refers to the service 
itself. Street signs are examples of public goods since they are non-excludable and non-
rival in consumption. Non-rivalrous consumption implies that consumption of the 
good by one person is not at the expense of another person. Non-excludability means 
that it is either impossible, or too expensive (for a private profit-maximising firm), to 
exclude people from consumption of the good. It follows that public goods generate 
important positive externalities which are of great value for society in general. As al-
ready explained, the same can be said of public services. Professional services can be 
classified as public goods since, once advice has been given, it can be passed on for free. 
Information can therefore be seen as a public good. The danger exists therefore that 
professionals under-provide socially valuable information because it may cost them 
more to provide this information than it is worth to consumers.87 However, the non-
rivalrous nature may be limited to the extent that advice is so specific that another client 
with slightly different circumstances may not be able to use the same advice.88 For this 
                                                                
84 Coase 1960, pp. 1-44. 
85 These are the costs associated with the time and effort needed to search out, negotiate, and consummate an 
exchange. 
86 Van Gulijk 2009, p. 159. Transaction costs can also be reduced by making information available or defin-
ing standard provisions in contracts (‘normative Coase theorem’). 
87 Maks & Philipsen 2002, p. 20. 
88 RBB Economics 2003, p. 2. See http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/rbb_ihs_cri-
tique_en1_1183706206.pdf, last consulted 23 December 2009.  
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reason the services of an architect can generally not be qualified as a public good. Even 
though it can be argued that every member of the public can profit from a high quality 
urban environment designed by an architect (positive externalities), while the architect 
does not get a reward from every person making use of his project so that he might not 
be willing to supply the services asked for, or that he will supply them inadequately, the 
plan that is designed by him is generally based upon the desires of his client and de-
pendent on the specific characteristics of the soil, the surface of the land, building regu-
lations, the available budget, etc. It follows that it is said that a free rider89 problem which 
would result in undersupply, does not seem to occur in markets for professional ser-
vices. 
3.6.2. The Private Interest Approach 
The public interest approach to regulation holds that regulations are created by gov-
ernment agencies to serve the public interest by correcting market failures. The private 
interest approach, on the other hand, holds that regulation is not only an answer to 
market failure but also a result of rent-seeking behaviour on the part of interest groups. 
In economics, rent seeking is the process by which an individual or firm seeks to gain 
through the manipulation of the economic environment rather than through trade and 
the production of added wealth. Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of un-
compensated value from others without taking actions which improve productivity, 
such as by imposing regulations or other government decisions harming consumers. As 
indicated by Olson, these interest groups which try to maximise their utility are most 
successful in appropriating rent if they are small, single-issue oriented and well organ-
ized.90 With regard to this first criterion, it can be said that smaller coalitions with a 
strong community of interest will tend to have stronger political voices, because each 
group member has a larger financial stake in the outcome, given that the potential gains 
will be divided among fewer individuals. Therefore, a group will become an effective 
lobby if it is small enough in number, and if the financial interests are sufficiently con-
centrated so that the potential benefits from organizing and lobbying for government 
favours will exceed the associated costs.91 Since consumer interests are more diffused, 
and the costs of organizing consumers to avoid wealth transfers are relatively high and 
will exceed the expected gains, small cohesive groups are often successful in obtaining 
wealth transfers at the expense of the general public.92 Through compulsory membership 
in professional bodies, interest groups are able to cope with the free riding problem.93 In 
this way, rents are generally generated and protected through effective limitations on 
entry and competition in the liberal professions sector.94 Interest groups also satisfy the 
                                                                
89 Free riders hope to benefit at no cost to themselves, from the payment of others. 
90 Olson 1965, pp. 587-602. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Van den Bergh 1999, p. 113. 
93 On the free riding problem (i.e. advantages also flow to outsiders who do not bear the costs of lobbying) 
see Olson 1965. 
94 The asymmetry in the quality of checks of entrants and of established members of the profession is an 
example of attempts at monopoly rent protection. 
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last two criteria mentioned by Olson: they are mostly very well organised and especially 
concentrated in their profession. 
 
The private interest approach is based on three economic theories: the public choice 
theory, the capture theory and the economic theory of regulation. These theories will 
now be discussed. 
 
The public choice theory is directed towards the study of politics based on economic princi-
ples. It explains how individual preferences are reflected in the voting procedures of 
public institutions. The theory holds that self-interest produces nothing but pathology 
in political decisions.95 In this way, politicians are sensitive to the whims and desires of 
voters and interest groups, since they strive for the maximisation of votes in order to be 
re-elected and to maximise their budget or prestige. Coalitions of voters who have a big 
stake in a benefit, often join together to seek special advantages from the state in order 
to have favourable legislation enacted. Because of their large interests, they are more 
likely to take effective action than the taxpayers at large, over whom the costs are spread. 
This may give rise to inefficient regulation. The public choice theory predicts therefore 
that the outcomes of the regulatory process will tend to favour the regulators instead of 
either businesses (capture theory) or the public (public interest theory). 
 
The capture theory emphasises the pressure or influence exerted by private persons or 
interest groups on government to have regulations enacted in their private interest, 
rather than in the public interest. In other words, no matter what the motive is for the 
initial regulation and the establishment of the regulatory agency, eventually the agency 
will be captured by the special interests of the industry that is being regulated. Industries 
find it beneficial to exert influence or even bribe regulatory agencies because each firm 
has a lot at stake. A common way of doing this is to have former or future employees in 
the industry temporarily work for the regulatory agency. In any case, the private inter-
ests of the persons subject to regulation may be served more by the regulation than is 
the public interest. 
 
The economic theory of regulation was described for the first time by Stigler.96 Accord-
ing to this theory, it is the industry itself that asks for regulation. Regulation originates 
where the benefits are concentrated (the industry) and the costs can be divided over a 
large group (consumers). In this way, wealth is transferred from the population as a 
whole to small groups of professionals. The economic theory of regulation assumes that 
the government is the supplier of regulation while the demand side consists of interest 
groups looking for protective regulation. Stigler held that the power of the state to co-
erce its citizens provides the possibility for the utilization of the state by an industry to 
increase its profitability. Every branch of industry which has enough power to do this, 
will lobby the government for the creation of barriers to entry with regard to the indus-
try, or for conduct barriers in order to keep the number of suppliers low, so that the 
                                                                
95 Starr 1988, pp. 6-41; Ogus 1994, pp. 58-71; Posner 1998, pp. 572-576. 
96 Stigler 1971, pp. 3 -21. 
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insiders can sell their products at high prices. Since the government is often pressured 
by these professionals, it does not always take the interests of the public into account. In 
this way interest groups aim, for example, for professional licensure to decrease the 
supply of professionals below the social optimum, increase the prices charged by profes-
sionals, and increase existing professionals’ incomes beyond their marginal productivity, 
thus generating rents and quasi-rents.97 The government is thus the supplier of regula-
tion which is acquired by the industry, designed and operated primarily for its benefit. 
When the industry seeks political power, it will make contact with the appropriate seller, 
i.e. the political party, and must be prepared to pay with the two things a party needs: 
votes and resources. It does not come as a surprise that the demand will be very high 
when the potential benefits of restricting competition cannot be obtained by the indus-
try itself, for example by means of cartel formation. In 1976, Petlzman supported Stig-
ler’s conclusions, but added that the gain obtained by the winning group through politi-
cal action, will not necessarily be maximised as it is within the power of the political 
process to grant it, because other interest groups and voters will be influential as well, 
and politicians will distribute favours and disfavours to maximise their chances of being 
re-elected.98 Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each pressure group in 
terms of producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure (from other interest 
groups) on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the dead-
weight costs of taxes and subsidies.99 According to Becker, it is not the existence of well-
organised pressure groups that may be harmful to the economy, but the unequal distri-
bution of political power across these groups. In any case, Stigler’s famous paper marked 
the beginning of the end of the widely accepted assumption that regulation was intro-
duced and applied to remedy market imperfections, and to pursue widely accepted pub-
lic interest goals.100 
 
The private interest approach101 is a combination of the three theories described above 
and warns against rent seeking behaviour by interest groups, especially in cases of self-
regulation, because it can constitute an incentive for the government to issue regulations 
which are not in the interest of the public as a whole. An example is that when applying 
the private interest theory, regulation not only fails to counter monopoly pricing, but is, 
on the contrary, used to sustain it through state intervention. It follows that rent-seeking 
is unproductive from a social welfare point of view because, as a result of the decrease in 
competition, wealth will be redistributed from consumers to producers. To analyse the 
extent to which regulation in a particular profession serves private interests rather than 
the public interest, a quantitative empirical analysis in needed. Architectural associa-
                                                                
97 Hadfield 2000, pp. 953-1006; Kleiner & Kudrle 2000, pp. 547-582. 
98 Peltzman 1976, p. 221. 
99 Becker 1975, pp. 421-447. 
100 Joskow 2005, pp. 169-193.  
101 A lthough there are definitely some indications in the – mostly US based – empirical literature backing up 
the private interest approach and its rent-seeking hypothesis, there is no real consensus in the literature on 
the actual incidence and consequences of rent-seeking behaviour in the professions: See Philipsen 2008, p. 
98. There still seems to be relative lack of empirical results as opposed to the volume of theoretical litera-
ture. 
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tions can, in general, be qualified as successful interest groups. As explained in Chapters 
5 and 7, the Belgian Architects’ Order and the Dutch BNA enjoy public law status and 
can determine who may use the professional title. Furthermore, they can impose pun-
ishments on individuals not complying with the deontology, and ask for financial con-
tributions as a condition of membership. The private interest approach may explain why 
progress on the programmes to harmonize national systems for professional qualifica-
tions has been painfully slow. As noted in Chapter 3, it took more than seventeen years 
before the Architects’ Directive saw the light of day due to substantial differences in the 
way the profession was regulated, not only with regard to training conditions and pro-
fessional qualifications, but also with regard to architectural obligations and liabilities. 
As pointed out in paragraph 3.3.1.1., for this reason some Member States and certain 
professional associations were of the opinion that the Directive should only apply to 
persons holding a university degree, others such as Germany and the Netherlands also 
wanted to approve non-university education in cases where practical experience com-
plemented the theoretical knowledge up to university level. The length of the education 
was also a point of conflict. The Dutch Architectural Association wanted to regulate the 
profession as strictly as possible since it was held to be harder for Dutch architects to 
find work in another state than vice versa, which stimulated the Association to claim 
regulation and title protection.102 The different objectives and desires of the Member 
States and their professional associations, and the increasing conflicts, led to a situation 
of deadlock that lasted for almost two decades. This indicates that these associations are 
quite influential and were successful in preventing the creation of legislation that was 
not in their interests. Before the creation of Directive 85/384/EEC, architects who 
wanted to practise their profession in another Member State had to rely upon the gen-
eral free movement principle and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. Since discrimination on nationality was (and still is) prohibited, Member States 
had to allow nationals of other Member States – and later also certain third-country 
nationals – to establish themselves, or provide services on its territory, under the same 
conditions as its own nationals. The qualifications of architects obtained in other states 
were generally not exactly the same, while Member States were allowed to impose re-
strictions for reasons of public policy, public security and public health. It followed that 
a certain level of qualifications was generally demanded before one was allowed to prac-
tise the profession while using the architectural title. Since there was no specific legisla-
tion until 1985 dealing with the situation of architects in particular, due to the national 
disagreements described above, EU architects faced a situation of legal uncertainty due 
to the lack of clear rules with regard to the recognition of their qualifications. In this 
regard, it might be argued that the architectural associations were successful rent seek-
ers. 
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3.6.3. Producers of regulation 
1. Public regulation vs. self-regulation 
The term ‘public regulation’ describes the traditional regulatory system: the public au-
thority being the all-embracing regulator, setting the relevant legislative or regulatory 
rules, monitoring compliance with them and enforcing them by imposing sanctions.103 
The aim of the public authority is to implement public policy. By virtue of the principle 
of subsidiarity (Article 5(2) EC), it is up to Member States to decide whether they wish 
to regulate the professions directly through national rules, or allow self-regulation by 
professional bodies. As we have seen before, in Belgium and the Netherlands, the regula-
tion of the architectural profession has been achieved through a combination of direct 
government regulation (public regulation) and rules adopted by professional associa-
tions. Indeed, although some aspects of self-regulation have their origins in spontaneous 
ordering from within a profession, it is argued that self-regulation is often created after a 
deliberate delegation of the state’s law-making powers to an agency, whose membership 
is composed of representatives of the profession itself.104 It is therefore also possible that 
the government does not leave the whole process of elaboration, supervision and control 
to the professional groups, but creates the framework and the conditions under which 
the professional associations can elaborate and execute the professional regulations: this 
is the so-called conditioned self-regulation in which the professionals will be involved 
more closely, so that there will be greater effectiveness and performance.105 These asso-
ciations, generally called ‘Orders’, are composed of practising professionals and enjoy 
public law status. The competence of professional associations to regulate a profession 
was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Arduino. In this case 
the Court held that Member States have the right to regulate a profession. Due to the 
absence of harmonisation at the European level, Member States have the primary re-
sponsibility for defining the framework in which professions operate. When doing this, 
they are allowed to involve professional associations to create rules, as long as they do 
not abdicate their powers without clear instruction and control.106 As long as Member 
States retain (in principle107) the decision-making powers, and establish sufficient con-
trol mechanisms, they can involve professional bodies in this task.108 Self-regulation in 
                                                                
103 Palzer & Scheuer 2004. T he government has the power to directly supervise the level and content of 
information provided by professionals. It can prohibit false information or oblige professions to disclose 
data and facts in relation to the price, composition, quantity or quality of a certain service.  
104 Paterson, Fink & Ogus 2003, p. 15. 
105 Somers 2005, pp. 84-85. In the professional sector, self-regulation has been characterised as an institution 
of trust: a social contract between society and the profession that mitigates the moral hazard problem aris-
ing from information asymmetry. Dingwall & Fenn 1987, pp. 51-64. 
106 See also the Speech of Mario Monti for the Bundesanwaltskammer in Berlin on ‘Competition in Profes-
sional Services: New Light and New Challenges’ 21 March 2003. This was also confirmed by the European 
Parliament in its resolution on follow-up to report on Competition in Professional Services, 12 October 
2006, (2006/2137/(INI)). The Parliament held that The Member States should be responsible for monitor-
ing the scope of self-regulation to ensure that it does not impact negatively on consumer interests or the 
general interest.  
107 See Case C-309/99 Wouters. 
108 In a mature democracy it would not be justified if professional groups could be freed of control by the 
democratically elected Parliaments. 
  Chapter 11  
421 
the architectural profession transforms architectural associations into public bodies 
since entry and performance can be regulated by the profession itself. It contains some 
degree of collective restriction, other than constraints imposed by the government or 
state, to affect outcomes that would not be obtained by individual market behaviour 
alone.109 
 
As noted above, an important incentive for regulation -and, in particular, state regula-
tion- is the protection of consumers of professional services against abuse. By getting 
acquainted with the relevant regulation, a consumer can verify exactly what he can ex-
pect from a provider, and he can protect himself against non-qualified professionals and 
fraudulent behaviour. Due to the fact that more information is available as to what the 
provider has to live up to, common standards are introduced. Professional associations 
often impose their own regulations on their members to bring the governmental control 
to the lowest level possible. To achieve their objectives, they draw up their own regula-
tions and take full responsibility for monitoring compliance with them. One of the main 
problems of self-regulation amongst professionals is that there is no competition be-
tween self-regulatory structures, as each profession enjoys a monopoly over a certain 
market.110 However, as indicated before, a greater output is produced under conditions 
of perfect competition than under a monopoly.111 The difference in these two output 
levels is the deadweight loss of monopoly112. Accordingly, considering that it is not the 
market but the state and/or a professional association which determine(s) the condi-
tions under which a professional can operate, one can conclude that the price and qual-
ity of services are less dependent on supply and demand.113 This is to the benefit of the 
service providers and constitutes an(other) incentive for self-regulation: the more regu-
lation they create, the more difficult it is for new professionals to enter the market, and 
the easier it is to establish a monopoly. However, in general, both types of regulation are 
liable to restrict competition between professionals and their enterprises.114 
To give the reader a better knowledge of the implications of a self-regulatory regime, I 
will now discuss the main arguments for and against self-regulation. 
a. Public interest arguments in favour of self-regulation 
The main arguments in favour of self-regulation are elaborated by Miller115. He states 
that the specific knowledge of professionals with regard to quality and risks will lead to 
lower costs. In contrast to the government agencies -which have to recruit costly experts 
(often members of the profession) in order to obtain the necessary facts and data- pro-
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fessional associations have the relevant information or can get it at lower cost.116 Thanks 
to the information advantages of self-regulatory agencies, monitoring and enforcement 
costs are also reduced since the professions are more committed to rules protecting the 
high standard of the profession enacted by themselves than to statutory regulation on 
quality. As concluded by Baggott and Harrison, self-regulation will not only minimise 
information costs but may also avoid the counterproductive results that can emanate 
from an adversarial relationship between the professions.117 
 Another advantage of self-regulation is that it is more flexible, since there are, in 
general, no long bureaucratic processes that have to be followed to change the profes-
sional rules. The argument goes that for this reason, innovation is less likely to be stifled, 
and consumer choice is not that easily excessively limited. 
 The third argument advanced by Miller in favour of self-regulation is that it is the 
profession itself which bears the costs of the regulation, not the government. Therefore 
the professional will do whatever it takes to keep those costs as low as possible. Because 
this saves consumers many costs (fewer taxes), self-regulation is more easily accepted. 
Due to the efficiency gains, professional rules are less difficult to monitor and, in this 
way, monitoring and enforcement costs are reduced. 118 
b. Private interest arguments against self-regulation 
Most of Miller’s arguments cannot be reconciled with the private interest approach. It is 
a well-known fact that professionals belong to special interest groups, aiming to exclude 
competition rather than to improve quality. Since professionals want to make optimal 
profits, they do not hesitate to keep information secret, and to let individuals pay for 
services they do not need. Furthermore they often impose very high quality standards or 
entry restrictions and might only reveal the information which is in their interests and, 
if they are powerful, they can even influence the government to do what they prefer. The 
result will be a decrease in the level of social welfare, and a redistribution of wealth from 
consumers to suppliers.119 
 Another disadvantage of self-regulation is its lack of democratic legitimacy. As 
suggested by Van den Bergh, ‘self-regulatory bodies are not accountable through normal 
democratic channels such as democratically elected Parliaments and third parties usu-
ally do not participate in establishing the self-regulatory regime. Moreover, the self-
regulatory bodies often combine representative and regulatory powers. If a profession is 
entrusted with powers to pursue the general interest, democratic legitimacy seems to 
require that an independent public authority supervises the professional body and 
(dis)approves its self-regulatory rules.’120 
 Furthermore, the flexibility of self-regulation can be questioned. Since professionals 
will always try to obtain rents, they will resist changes in regulation that generate more 
opportunities for competition. Problems like information asymmetry and negative ex-
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ternal effects will therefore not be solved by self-regulation. Even though professionals 
make the rules themselves, this does not mean that all regulatory costs are paid for by 
the profession itself: the costs can be externalized and translated in the form of higher 
prices, so that consumers still pay for them. 
 The above-mentioned public interest arguments in favour of self-regulation are 
actually, at the same time, arguments against public regulation. The challenge is to profit 
optimally from the advantages of self-regulation, while trying to control the danger of 
rent-seeking behaviour. 
 
As explained above, professionals can -through the creation of market ‘shelters’121 and 
monopolies in professional service provisions- secure autonomy, job security, high 
income and status, and collective social mobility.122 However, nowadays the clients of 
professionals do not hesitate to institute proceedings against professionals. Conse-
quently, professional associations themselves impose more regulations and monitor 
their members strongly to bring the need for governmental control to the lowest level 
possible. It can be said that they have a certain decentralized regulatory control within 
states.123 Therefore, one can conclude, along with Van den Bergh124, that professions have 
a dual character.125 On the one hand, it is argued that they constitute self-interested oc-
cupational monopolies whose anticompetitive effects distort the social and economic 
organization of a society. On the other hand, through internal regulatory mechanisms 
and socialization practices, they promote certain values of moral obligation and public 
service, altruism and a special relationship of trust with clients. Self-regulation may thus 
both improve market performance and reduce competition. However, often its negative 
consequences in terms of restrictions of competition outweigh any potential benefits. 
For this reason, Van den Bergh argues that the state should create an institutional 
framework under which it becomes possible to fully profit from the advantages of self-
regulation while, at the same time, minimizing its disadvantages. He suggests that the 
delegation of regulatory powers to self-regulatory bodies in markets for professional 
services should allow them to adequately cure the existing market imperfections with-
out, at the same time, giving them the scope to reduce economic welfare again by creat-
ing a disproportionate distortion of competition. At the same time, the lack of democ-
ratic legitimacy should be remedied.126 To render self-regulation more efficient, Van den 
Bergh introduced two different institutional choices concerning the organization of self-
regulatory powers so that self-regulation becomes more efficient: co-regulation and 
competitive self-regulation. These methods127 will now be discussed. 
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2. Co-regulation 
One speaks of co-regulation when public policy objectives are achieved through the 
combination of a certain degree of self-regulation and traditional public regulation. 
When jurisdictions adopt co-regulation, self-regulatory bodies enact rules, but public 
authorities hold some oversight with regard to ratifying those rules.128 This is also called 
mixed regulation. In this way the legislator can, for example, create rules on how a self-
regulatory body must function, but without itself becoming involved in the determina-
tion of the rules of entry and conduct129. As indicated by Palzer and Sheuer, ‘in the con-
text of co-regulation, the state or competent authority will play a significant role, setting 
the legal framework and monitoring the functioning of the system by assuming respon-
sibility for initially checking self-regulatory bodies, having a say on the monitoring of 
results and, if necessary, requesting that adaptations be implemented. Thus, the 
achievement of public policy goals is not relinquished to societal control entirely; the 
responsibility remains with the state.’130 The state has therefore the last word on the 
contents of rules that will govern entry into a profession and its performance, and sub-
jects self-regulatory rules to a public interest test.131 It follows that member States should 
not unconditionally delegate regulatory powers to private economic operators enabling 
them to create anti-competitive rules. Public regulators should maintain a margin of 
discretion in assessing whether such rules are in conformity with the public interest. As 
put forward by Van Den Bergh, ‘A key element of a co-regulatory regime is thus the 
self-contained development of binding rules by the co-regulatory organization and its 
liability for these rules. In a co-regulatory-system, non-compliance with the given rules 
is directly or at least indirectly (for example in the form of possible revocation of a li-
cence) sanctioned by the state (public authority). However, bearing in mind that state 
authorities may intervene in the case of an alleged malfunctioning of a co-regulatory 
institution, this will necessitate, at least to some extent, the doubling of institutional 
structures, which leads to the conclusion that more efficiency, in particular in terms of 
costs is not to be expected in the short-term.’132 
 Co-regulation is regarded by many as a means to achieve better regulation, and to 
accomplish both coping with the increasing risk of failure of traditional regulatory con-
cepts, and handing back responsibility to society where that seems appropriate.133 It is 
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also held to be more democratic. However, protagonists of self-regulatory bodies articu-
late the fear that their established voluntary system might be ‘captured’ by the state and 
made into a co-regulatory system, and raise questions concerning the legitimization of 
this phenomenon, which is sometimes referred to as a shift to governance. State regula-
tors and private watchdogs, on the other hand, voice the concern that partially empow-
ering the industry to regulate itself might put the fox in charge of the henhouse.134 In any 
case, the adoption of co-regulatory systems remains a free decision of individual Mem-
ber States. As suggested in Part I of this thesis, European competition law does not ex-
plicitly require Member States to subject self-regulatory rules of professional bodies for 
which they bear the final responsibility, to a public interest test. There is therefore no 
clear and unconditional requirement that Member States must justify restrictions on 
public interest grounds, and show that the instruments chosen are proportionate to 
achieve such goals. However, states are not totally immune from liability since such 
rules may be challenged on the grounds that they have a restrictive effect on the free 
movement provisions of the Treaty. 
 For this reason it is doubtful that co-regulation will always lead to efficient out-
comes. 
3. Competitive self-regulation 
The concept of competitive self-regulation refers to competition between different pro-
fessional bodies.135 When the government delegates its powers to professional bodies, it 
gives them the power to restrict supply (allowing them to create a monopoly situation) 
and/or to charge above-competitive prices. To cure this problem, monopolies have to be 
eliminated by forcing the self-regulatory bodies to compete with each other. According 
to Van Den Bergh this can be achieved in two ways: by creating competition between 
different professions offering the same professional service (inter-professional competi-
tion) and by abolishing the exclusive right to control supply within a single profession 
(intra-professional competition). As shown by empirical research done by Paterson et 
al. in 1988136 and 1994137, in the area of conveyancing and legal services in England and 
Wales, inter-professional competition will not necessarily benefit consumers. The rea-
son is that when the number of rival professions is low and a limited range of homoge-
neous services is provided, removing a monopoly does not lead to lower prices. On the 
other hand, when there is a sufficiently large number of professional bodies, and when 
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services are sufficiently heterogeneous, the risk of cartelization may be contained.138 
Inter-professional competition may then act as a powerful deterrent to the lowering of 
professional standards. Since the current compartmentalization prevents the creation of 
alternative markets, for example for the provision of simple or routine services, inter-
professional competition can create tension between different professions, and may be 
helpful in discovering abuses and in improving efficiency, by introducing a new division 
of labour.139 Even though a lot of measures have been taken to promote inter-
professional competition, no steps have been taken yet to make intra-professional com-
petition possible 140, at least not in the area of architecture. Even though different profes-
sional organisations do exist (for example the Association of Flemish Architects, the 
Association of Architects of the Province of Limburg, the Union of Architects, etc. in 
Belgium), the Belgian Order of Architects is still the only institution of which member-
ship is mandatory for a professional to be able to practise the profession in Belgium.141 
The monopolies of the different Orders of Architects have not been abolished, while the 
creation of more Orders within the same territory to enhance competition has not been 
allowed. Nevertheless this ‘liberalization’ could bring about some positive effects: rents 
could be eliminated while the benefits of self-regulation could be preserved. As con-
cluded by Van Den Bergh142, legislative measures leaving the largest possible scope for 
competition between legal rules should be preferred due to the likelihood of market 
failure caused by monopolies. 
4. Authors of regulation in Belgium and the Netherlands 
The legal relationship between the architect and his client is generally characterised by a 
skilled professional on the one hand, and inexperienced individuals on the other. For 
this reason, there will mostly be some degree of information asymmetry. As noted in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, according to the sector study conducted by Mirza and Nacey for 
the Architects’ Council of Europe in 2008, the largest single sector of the architectural 
market concerns individual houses. Private individuals are architects’ principal client 
type, accounting for almost half (47 %) of architectural practices’ revenue. This clearly 
mirrors the importance of individual housing as the largest market sector. However, 
even though Stephen argues that public policy towards markets for professional services 
should become more differentiated by profession and by consumer type, some caution 
should be maintained. Even though households might benefit from regulation which 
guarantees a certain quality, while business users might want to achieve flexibility or 
innovation (for example outsourcing, undertaking in-house certain categories of activi-
ties, being able to choose and mix service providers … ) which is more easily obtained if 
certain regulatory restrictions are removed, in my opinion, the creation of different sets 
of regulations for different types of consumers would be a time consuming and costly 
occupation, since both types of consumers have, in the end, the same wish: to have a 
building that is fit for purpose of a good quality and for a good price. For this reason, 
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regulation can be an instrument to cure market failure, not only with regard to the in-
formation asymmetry problem, but also because of the external effects that can be 
caused by the activities of architects. As has been demonstrated in Part II of this thesis, 
the creation of monopolies can also be of some concern in the architectural market. In 
Belgium, the Architects’ Act (AA) and the Architects’ Order Act (AO) determine who 
can use the title and practise the profession of architect. This is therefore clearly public 
regulation. The Deontological Code of 29 April 1983 which was created by the Archi-
tects’ Order and determines how architects should practise their profession, was ratified 
by Royal Decree on 18 April 1985. Article 39(1) AO holds that the King (i.e. the gov-
ernment) can give legal force to the deontological rules, and the regulations concerning 
traineeship, by means of a decision discussed in the Council of Ministers at the request 
of the National Council of Architects. With regard to the principles laid down in the 
deontological code, it can therefore be said that there is some form of co-regulation. 
Since there is only one Order (of course with territorial sub-divisions), and since archi-
tects hold a monopoly to design buildings which require a building permit, there is no 
real intra- or inter-professional regulatory competition. In this regard it should be noted 
however, that different professional organisations do exist (for example the Association 
of Flemish Architects, the Association of Architects of the Province of Limburg, the 
Union of Architects, etc. in Belgium). However the Belgian Order of Architects is still 
the only institution of which membership is mandatory for a professional to be able to 
practise the profession in Belgium.143 It follows that the monopoly of the Order of Archi-
tects with regard to registering new members and thus determining who is allowed to 
practise the profession, has not been abolished. 
 
In the Netherlands, the Architects’ Title Act (ATA) determines who can use the archi-
tectural title. This is public regulation. The Act determines that architects should regis-
ter with the Foundation Bureau Architects Register, which is not a professional associa-
tion but a public authority appointed by the Minister. Architects are not bound by a 
deontological code after registration. Only those who become members of a professional 
association such as the BNA are bound by their self-regulatory rules. In the Netherlands 
there is therefore no co-regulation to which all architects have to adhere. Since there is 
no Order at all, there can be no competitive self-regulation between different Orders. 
However, just as in Belgium, different professional associations do exist. It can be said 
that in this regard there is some intra-professional competitive self-regulation. Further-
more, since architects have no monopoly to provide architectural services, some level of 
inter-professional competition can also be present. However, since architects are not 
obliged to become a member of such an organization, the effects of any intra- or inter-
professional competition are difficult to predict. 
5. Conclusion 
From the above it can be concluded that both self-regulation and public regulation have 
advantages as well as disadvantages. To reduce most of the disadvantages, two ap-
proaches have been suggested by Van den Bergh: co-regulation and competitive self-
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regulation. Both these approaches maintain intact the information benefits and the 
benefits concerning the reduction of enforcement costs of self-regulation. A problem 
with co-regulation is, however, that the monopoly power of professional bodies is main-
tained unbroken. As noted above, European competition law does not explicitly require 
Member States to justify self-regulatory rules that restrict competition on public interest 
grounds, and to provide evidence that the rules are proportionate to achieving such 
goals. Van den Bergh therefore came to the conclusion that to achieve efficient out-
comes, existing methods of supervision should be improved upon.144 In this way proce-
dures should be developed to analyse whether the professional rules can be justified in 
the public interest, and impose no restrictions on competition that go further than nec-
essary to achieve that goal. A system of competitive self-regulation may create scope for 
competition between different professions offering the same service. It may also remove 
compulsory membership of monopolistic professional associations, and thus initiate 
competition within a single profession. However, as suggested by Evans, co-regulation 
and competitive self-regulation can also bring about disadvantages, such as a duplica-
tion of resources, confused consumers due to multiple standards, etc.145 Experiments 
with these types of mixed regulation are needed to obtain more knowledge about the 
efficiency gains associated with these methods. As noted above, regulation is often cre-
ated to cure market failure. Market failure can be caused by information asymmetry, 
externalities, public goods and lack of, or restrictions on, competition. On the other 
hand, states and self-regulatory bodies such as professional associations can also create 
rules which cause market failures and contravene competition law. 
 Since architectural associations are often keen on restricting competition in order 
for their members to have more power, the market will generate sub-optimal outcomes. 
Regulation in the form of competition law may offer a solution to avoiding the abuse of 
dominance or restrictive behaviour. The ultimate goal of competition policy is to pro-
mote an efficient allocation of resources.146 It is often argued by representatives of the 
liberal professions that self-regulation should not be subject to the competition rules at 
all, because that would endanger the profession’s independence, or because self-
regulation is in the public interest, not in the interest of the profession. However, a cor-
rect application of the competition rules would not endanger the practitioners’ inde-
pendence; they would still be free to provide their services in any way they want, as long 
as they do not use restrictive or abusive means. In any case, there is no guarantee that 
professional associations -which can easily be tempted to neutralize competition- will 
not introduce certain rules in their own favour. The democratically elected legislator is 
supposed to further all individual interests in an equal fashion to define what constitutes 
public interest.147 In general, there is less risk -but still some risk exists- that competition 
is distorted by public regulation. 
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3.6.4. Types of regulation 
1. Market entry regulation 
a. Educational requirements, registration or membership of a professional association, nationality 
and establishment requirements, numerus clauses, etc. 
Entry regulations define the conditions that have to be fulfilled before one is allowed to 
practise a profession and can therefore also be called qualification requirements. Typical 
market entry regulations are the demand for formal qualification certificates (e.g. uni-
versity degrees, length of practice and/or professional examinations) or membership of 
a professional body, nationality148 requirements, or economic needs tests (such as the 
fixing of a numerus clausus so that only a pre-determined number of practitioners is 
permitted per territory). Professional associations often use such entry regulation to 
limit the flow of new entrants into profitable markets. Diploma requirements are often 
created by the public legislator and supplemented by the profession with a mandatory 
traineeship, or an establishment policy. In general it must be stated that entry require-
ments are often used by existing members of a profession to restrict supply and thereby 
to earn supra-competitive rents. On the other hand, the entry requirements may be seen 
as attempts to meet the problem of information asymmetry as described above. If the 
quality of services cannot be assessed by the consumer, the problem of adverse selection 
arises, since this attracts professionals who offer low quality services. Market entry re-
quirements have the advantage that one can deal with this problem ex ante. However, 
being in the possession of certain educational requirements, or being a member of a 
professional association, does not necessarily guarantee that one is competent to prac-
tise the profession several years after the qualifications were obtained. This is certainly 
the case with regard to the architectural profession, since it is characterised as evolving 
rapidly due to new technologies. It follows that there is not necessarily a correlation 
between these entry requirements and the level of quality. The same goes for the imposi-
tion of a numerus clausus. If there are information deficiencies with respect to the qual-
ity of services, less intrusive steps should be applied first, such as the regulation of in-
formation or the regulation of the quality of the service itself. This will be discussed 
next. For concrete examples of entry regulation, I refer to Part I and II of this thesis. 
b. Information regulation and quality standards 
As noted above, information asymmetry is likely to occur in the market for architectural 
services. This can cause adverse selection, meaning that the quality of the services will be 
lower than the social efficient level which, in its turn, can lead to negative externalities. 
Different instruments can be used to uphold a sufficient level of quality. The obligatory 
provision of information (for example by means of advertising) and the prohibition of 
misleading publicity, can offer information on the quality of services. Furthermore, the 
government can also create minimum quality standards which have to be achieved by 
professionals when performing services: if these products or services do not live up to 
the standard expected, they are excluded from the market. Through the regulation of the 
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quality of services, social welfare can be enhanced in cases of information asymmetry or 
external effects by increasing the consumer surplus or decreasing the deadweight loss.149 
In other words, the opportunity costs of entering the market increase with quality.150 
Nevertheless, as held by Shapiro, the existence of low quality products is not a problem 
if there is demand for them, and they do not cause negative externalities, but if the qual-
ity is too low from a social welfare point of view, standards may solve the problem.151 
 There are three different types of standards.152 A target standard imposes (criminal) 
liability for eventual harmful consequences arising from the output of a supplier after it 
is brought on the market. Performance standards are helpful with regard to checking the 
quality of a product or service before it comes on the market, without intervening in the 
production process of the supplier. Finally, a specification standard forces or prohibits 
suppliers from using certain production methods or materials. However, since the gov-
ernments do not have at their disposal a sufficient amount of knowledge to set such a 
standard, in the area of professional services it must be assumed that one is dealing with 
performance standards. Minimum quality standards have the advantage that consumers 
with limited education are protected against low-quality services. Nevertheless, as noted 
above, the risk exists that certain goods or services which would have been bought by 
certain consumers if they would have been available, may be excluded from the market. 
It follows that the imposition of standards interferes more with the market than does the 
supervision of the level and content of information.153 Furthermore, the introduction of 
standards brings certain costs with it. The direct costs consist of administrative costs 
and compliance costs. Administrative costs are the costs which occur as part of the 
process of defining, monitoring and enforcing the quality standard. Compliance costs 
are costs made to fulfil the minimum quality standards, for example buying new equip-
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ment. Indirect costs, on the other hand, are the often unintended side effects of regula-
tion. In this regard standards can create inefficiency or act as a brake on technical 
change.154 Another problem associated with standards is that professionals will not hesi-
tate to lobby so that the government will impose quality levels with which they already 
comply (no compliance costs). In this way they are protected against new competitors. 
c. Reserved rights: certification and licensing 
As noted above, entry restrictions are, in many cases, coupled with reserved rights to 
provide certain services. If this is the case, only practitioners with appropriate qualifica-
tions can carry out certain tasks. Not only can the government create such legislation 
but also many professional associations have internal rules establishing conditions for 
membership, and use qualitative as well as quantitative entry restrictions. In this way, 
licenses or certificates can be issued to increase consumer welfare by guaranteeing an 
adequate quality of goods and services if certain requirements are fulfilled (for example, 
disposing of a certain education level). As indicated by Shapiro, this holds only if con-
sumers value high quality significantly compared to the costs of providing quality on the 
part of suppliers.155 
 If certification is issued, every individual can perform the services related to the 
regulated profession, but these individuals are not allowed to use the protected title 
without the relevant certificate.156 As mentioned above, title protection constitutes a 
form of certification, and indicates that the specific service is (or at least should be) of 
good quality. As mentioned before, after a person obtains an academic title, he can use it 
freely. However to be entitled to use a professional title, it is often necessary to be regis-
tered on the list of a professional association. The advantage of certification is that con-
sumers still have the choice between certified and uncertified services, which will not be 
the case in a licensed market.157 However, professionals might be inclined to invest too 
much in education in order to indicate high quality levels.158 On the other hand, it has 
been argued that if membership of a professional association, which signals good quality 
to the consumer, is not compulsory, professional associations would have to work hard 
to maintain their members and their clients, and would therefore have an incentive to 
maintain high quality, more than is currently the case.159 If there is insufficient demand 
for uncertified services, and if the number of certified professionals is not very high, the 
effects of certification come close to those of licensing. It follows that, contrary to mo-
nopoly protection (comparable to the licence system), where offering a certain service is 
reserved for certain professionals only, in the case of title protection, the consumer is 
free to choose to hire a professional, with or without a title. 
 
In case of licensing, services can only be performed by those professionals who have a 
credential issued by the regulator, which indicates competence in some profession. In 
                                                                
154 Maks & Philipsen 2002, p. 27. 
155 Shapiro 1986, p. 856.  
156 Curran 1993, p. 58. 
157 Philipsen 2003, p. 34. 
158 Shapiro 1986, p. 855.  
159 Less competition often leads to reductions in quality. See Evan 2004, p.525. 
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this way, the entry into the profession is restricted. With a licence system, the informa-
tion asymmetry problem fades away. Due to the exclusion of poorly-educated suppliers, 
the average level of quality of a market will rise. However, this is only so if there is a 
sufficient relationship between the educational level of the supplier and the marginal 
costs of providing high quality.160 As pointed out by Shapiro, if high quality is important 
to consumers so that the relationship between human capital and high quality is posi-
tive, consumers’ welfare can be enlarged by licensing or by certification, if suppliers can 
build their reputations over time by providing high quality goods or services.161 Social 
welfare can be improved through the use of licences because they alter the incentives of 
professionals by reducing the marginal cost of their quality provision.162 However, in 
choosing optimal minimum standards, a professional group or industry seeks to maxi-
mize its net gains. As with any monopoly, extra profits can be achieved by a lower level 
of total supply than is socially optimal, motivating the profession to set the optimal 
standards too high.163 Furthermore a Pareto-improvement will never be obtained, be-
cause there will always be consumers who would rather have bought low quality goods 
or services at a lower price. Empirical research has shown that in some cases, excessive 
licensing restrictions have led to higher prices without ensuring higher quality, while in 
some countries the loosening of restrictions in some professions has led to lower prices 
without any apparent reduction in quality.164 In any case, licensing laws which contain 
discriminatory rules can form a greater restriction on the freedom to provide services 
for non-nationals than for nationals, but also non-discriminating rules can cause this 
effect indirectly when they contain requirements which foreigners cannot meet as easily 
as nationals. Licensing intervenes further in the market process than certification does, 
but risk-averse165 consumers are better insured by it against possible harmful conse-
quences of bad service due to the exclusion of suppliers who do not meet certain stan-
dards.166 In this way, ‘quacks’ are excluded from the market. In fact, with regard to pro-
fessional services, licensing may function as a minimum standard of quality. In this 
regard it should be noted however, that a study concerning the free professions in Bel-
gium, including the profession of architect, showed that higher degrees of licensing 
restrictiveness was related to higher prices and higher earnings.167 It follows that there is 
                                                                
160 If an individual’s human capital increases because of increased license requirements, it seems at first sight 
plausible that his marginal cost of providing high quality decreases. See Maks & Philipsen 2002, p. 29.  
161 Shapiro, 1986, p. 856. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Leland 1997, p. 1338. 
164 Cox Foster 1990, pp. 26-27. 
165 A person is said to be risk-averse if he considers the utility of a certain prospect of money income to be 
higher than the expected utility of an uncertain prospect of equal expected monetary value.  
166 Philipsen 2003, p. 3.  
167 Maks, Philipsen & Faure 2001. Due to disproportionate quantitative and qualitative entry controls, and the 
giving of reserved rights causing there to be a smaller number of professionals, higher prices are likely to 
arise. A negative consequence is that once new professionals succeed in entering the market, they often 
work in partnerships and have to be satisfied with a minimum wage, even though they have successfully 
concluded studies of long duration. In this regard, the European Commission accepts that each Member 
State should be allowed to determine the level of qualification needed for entry to a profession in that 
country, but holds that such entrance requirements should be proportionate and reflect what is actually 
required to be able to perform the relevant service to an acceptable standard. However Button and Fleming 
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a real danger that consumers resort to cheaper alternatives -at least if this is possible- in 
the event that they think that professionals are overtrained and their services over-
priced.168 
d. Market entry regulation in Belgium and the Netherlands 
In Chapters 5 and 7, the Belgian and Dutch regulation of architects was discussed. It was 
concluded that in Belgium, the title as well as the profession of architects are protected. 
Since only registered architects are allowed to design buildings for which a building 
permit is required, Belgian architects have a monopoly in the industry in this regard. 
This means that they have a license to practise, and consumers have no choice between a 
registered architect and another service provider.  
 In the Netherlands, on the other hand, architects can use their title after being regis-
tered. However, non-registered persons can also perform architectural services, as long 
as they do not use the title of architect. It follows that registered persons are certified 
and not licensed, and that there is therefore more competition since there is no profes-
sional monopoly as in Belgium. Furthermore, membership of a professional association 
is not even required in the Netherlands, while in Belgium every architect is a member of 
the Architects’ Order. Only after registration at the Foundation Bureau Architects Reg-
ister can one use the title in the Netherlands, but membership of the BNA is not neces-
sary in order to be allowed to use the title. Since membership of a professional associa-
tion is therefore not required in the Netherlands, it should be questioned why such 
membership is required in Belgium. In this regard it might be questioned whether the 
Belgian compulsory membership is the consequence of successful rent seeking behav-
iour on the part of the Belgian Architectural Association, and whether it is more effi-
cient to replace this compulsory membership by optional membership in competing 
organisations. 
 In general, it has to be determined whether the Belgian and Dutch regulations are 
an appropriate answer to market failure and are proportional, or whether they create 
more problems (leading to higher costs) than they solve. 
 
With regard to the monopoly situation in Belgium, it should be noted that even though, 
on the one hand, regulation is deemed to be needed in order to cure problems caused by 
the abuse of dominance, information asymmetry, externalities, and a non-optimal sup-
ply of public goods,169 while on the other hand it is argued that deregulation is necessary 
                                                                                                                                                             
studied the licensing of architects in the UK but found no conclusive evidence of an impact on incomes, 
while other studies have come up with mixed conclusions. See Button & Fleming 1992, pp. 95-116. Lueck, 
Olson and Ransom concluded, in a thorough empirical study, that there was little support for the view that 
licensing restrictions affect the price of legal services. Their evidence suggests that it is what they describe 
as ‘market forces’ which are most important. See Lueck, Olsen & Ransom 1995, pp. 63-83. Olsen, (in a re-
view of the empirical literature on licensure in medical professions, focussing on the USA) concluded that 
the evidence is mixed, and varies across both time and the professions covered. See Olsen 2002, pp. 1018-
1054. 
168 Shapiro 1986, pp. 855-856.  
169 The European Commission also holds the opinion that many of these regulations (e.g. regulation of fees, 
restrictions on advertising, deontological rules) unnecessarily restrict competition and states that it is im-
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to liberalize the market in order to rule out or limit the existence of professional mo-
nopolies. Since architects are more often consulted by developers in the Netherlands, 
and are mostly consulted by individual clients in Belgium, it is expected that the prob-
lem of information asymmetry is more serious is in Belgium. However, since the Dutch 
situation demonstrates that other ex ante tools such as the Housing Act and the Building 
Decree which contain detail requirements which buildings need to satisfy can also pro-
tect the quality of buildings without the negative effects as far as the restriction of com-
petition is concerned, it might be assumed that, according to the public interest theory, 
the tool used in Belgium to cure market failure goes too far. Since market competition is 
already restricted to those who are allowed to use the title, the cure might be worse than 
the disease. 
 From a private interest point of view, it must be stated that it is impossible to enter 
the market in Belgium without registration by the Architects’ Order, which brings about 
acceptance of its deontological code. Since architects have to be insured, insurance 
companies also have an important say with regard to market access. Since good quality 
designs and buildings can also be obtained by other means, it can be said that the mo-
nopoly does not serve the public interest, but rather serves to limit the number of mar-
ket participants. This is likely to generate rents for architects who are already registered. 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that economic theory, and more specifically the law of 
supply and demand, has consistently predicted that prices will rise if the number of 
producers is limited. The question can then be asked whether the prices of architectural 
services are higher in Belgium than in the Netherlands due to the monopoly with regard 
to Belgian architects. In this regard, it should be noted that, in 2009, there are 12,714 
architects registered in Belgium170 and 13,182 in the Netherlands.171 75% of the architects 
registered in the Netherlands are architects in the narrow sense, meaning that they are 
not interior architects, town planners, or garden and landscape architects.172 There are 
thus +/- 9,886.50 architects in the narrow sense registered in the Netherlands.173 The 
difference is not considerable when taking into account the fact that the Netherlands is a 
larger country with a larger population. The 2008 research conducted by Mirza & Nacey 
for the Architects’ Council of Europe174 concluded that there are only 11,500 architects 
in Belgium and 9,100 architects in the Netherlands. These numbers are therefore 
lower.175 What is important however, is that, in Belgium, there are fewer persons holding 
the architectural title than in the Netherlands. 
                                                                                                                                                             
portant to determine what is meant by the public interest in different markets. See Communication of 5 
September 2005, COM (2005) 405 final, nos. 29 and 11. 
170 Number on 17 September 2009, Architects’ Order Belgium (interview by telephone 28 September 2009). 
171 Number on January 2009, Foundation Bureau Architects’ Register the Netherlands. 
172 As noted before, in Belgium, interior architects, town planners and garden and landscape architects are 
not registered.  
173 See http://www.architectenregister.nl 
174 Mirza & Nacey 2008. I refer to Chapter 2 for a description of how this research was carried out. For tables 
and charts I also refer to Chapter 2. 
175 As indicated in Chapter 2, the Mirza & Nacey research was based on various sources. The starting point 
was the research publication produced by COAC – Architectural Practice Around the World research by 
the Collegi d’Arquitectes de Catalunya (COAC), based on information supplied by national institutes and 
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 According to the Mirza & Nacey research, the market revenue of Belgian architects 
was 327,108,000 Euros (28,444 Euros per architect) and for Dutch architects it was 
901,558,000 Euros (99,072 Euros per architect), the market size referring to the architec-
tural market as measured as the sum of the revenues earned by private architectural 
practices. The value of the Dutch architectural market is therefore much higher than 
that of the Belgian market: see Table 7 and Chart 2 in Chapter 2). The average reve-
nue/earnings of Dutch architects is highest in all European countries (see Table 12 and 
Chart 8 in Chapter 2). The average hourly rate charged by Belgian architects is 60 Euros 
for principals and 47 Euros for architects who are not principals, while in the Nether-
lands, principals charge 116 Euros per hour and other architects 92 Euros (See Tables 14 
and 15 and Chart 7 in Chapter 2). This is quite surprising when looking at the economic 
theory discussed earlier, certainly if one notes that the architects working for the Dutch 
government aside, architects in the Netherlands (sole principals, partners/directors, 
salaried architects, freelance architects, … ) work fewer hours per week than their col-
leagues in Belgium (See Table 17 in Chapter 2).  
 The Mirza & Nacey research does not explain why Dutch architects earn more and 
charge higher prices. Indeed, Dutch and Belgian architects do not necessarily calculate 
their fees in the same way (see Table 13 in Chapter 2) but the question still remains as to 
why there is such a big difference. Since Belgian architects hold a monopoly, one would 
anticipate that they would be the big profit makers. A possible explanation might be 
found in the fact that it is because there is no monopoly in the Netherlands, there are 
fewer ‘real’ architects in the Netherlands compared to Belgium. Since individuals who 
are interested in making designs and supervising building works are allowed to carry 
out this activity without having to register, and thus also without using the title -they 
may even not have earned the title of architect- the number of possible suppliers is, in 
the end, much higher, so that there is more competition in general. Furthermore, in the 
Netherlands, there is no reason for entrepreneurs and building promotors not engaging 
in drafting designs as well, since the legislator has not created incompatibilities as in 
Belgium. Since not everyone interested in and capable of drafting designs is obliged to 
register to be able to carry out such work, there is less competition among ‘real’ archi-
tects, which might, in turn, explain the fact that ‘real’ architects charge higher prices. Of 
course consumers can choose whether to turn to a registered architect or another service 
provider. It may be argued that since most individuals only build once in their lives, and 
since this will probably be their most important spending decision ever, they are often 
inclined to choose for the ‘surety’ of the competences of someone holding a real degree 
and belonging to an Order. The same goes for business clients, since they also want to 
engage the best professionals for their projects. Since their financial assets are much 
greater than that of regular individuals, they have the possibility to turn to more expen-
sive architects. On the other hand, the Dutch building market is characterised by large 
projects carried out by building promotors who are engaged by public authorities to 
                                                                                                                                                             
associations of architects of the individual countries. Further data was collected by ACE in Phase I of this 
research. The researchers indicated that they attempted to verify all figures using a mixture of primary and 
secondary sources including Member Organisations’ websites, telephone / email. Different sources pro-
duced conflicting figures, sometimes substantially different. Final figures are their best estimates based on 
these several different sources. All figures used were the latest available at the time.  
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construct numerous identical houses in a certain area. Architects who are engaged in 
such projects can earn large profits with minimal investment, as opposed to their Bel-
gian colleagues where such projects are not so popular. For this reason it might be ar-
gued that fewer architects are needed in the Netherlands which seems to be confirmed 
by the fact that only a small number of graduated architects work independently (see 
Table 11 Chapter 2). It is also possible that there is a tendency to charge modest prices 
in Belgium due to the fact that architects are, in general, not actively involved in politics 
so that the profession is not represented by professionals seeking rents. Empirical re-
search is needed to confirm these findings.  
 In this regard, reference should be made to Van den Bergh and Montangie176 who 
studied the abolishment of the solicitors’ monopoly for conveyancing services in Eng-
land and Wales177 and the deregulation of the Dutch notary profession178, and concluded 
that liberalization does not guarantee lower prices179, so that increased competition is 
therefore not guaranteed either. They even found with regard to the Dutch notaries, that 
there is a justified concern that competition may decrease quality and jeopardize the 
notary’s integrity.180 Just as is the case with fixed fees, Van den Bergh and Montangie 
concluded that regulation may be justified even in the case of monopolies, as long as 
effective instruments to control and monitor quality are not (yet) in place. In this way, it 
can also be argued that if everybody can perform architectural services, quality may 
deteriorate, which will lead to more legal claims at high prices, at least if no other 
mechanisms exist to guarantee quality. As noted above, buildings designed by architects 
can also harm third parties (negative externalities), can cause positive externalities (also 
for persons renting the house, their visitors as well as persons walking by can enjoy the 
feeling of being safe in, or next to, the building) and the advice of architects or the plans 
designed by them can be passed on for free. However with regard to this latter point, it 
should be noted that clients often have personal demands and building constructions 
are dependent on the circumstances and surface of the land being used. Since in the 
Netherlands everyone can perform architectural services -as long as only those who are 
registered use the title – it can be asked whether this does not have a negative impact on 
quality. The answer to this question will depend on whether there are other mechanisms 
in the Netherlands which guarantee a sufficient level of quality. Whether the restrictions 
on competition resulting from exclusive rights (architectural monopoly in Belgium) do 
                                                                
176 Van den Berg & Montangie 2006, p. 189. 
177 Non-solicitors were admitted to offer conveyancing services in competition with solicitors. This solution 
has led for the first time to a reduction of fees by solicitors in this field as a response to the threat of new 
entrants in the market. However fees have then increased after the introduction of this form of competi-
tion. This finding is another confirmation of the fact that the issue of the introduction of competition in 
the market for legal services is still open and gives rise to many contrasting problems that are difficult to 
solve.  
178 To be brief, the monopolies of the notaries with regard to making up deeds for specific legal transactions 
are maintained, but there are no fixed fees, and anybody who has the necessary qualifications to become a 
notary has the right to be appointed as a notary in a certain area, provided that that person has a feasible 
business plan. The numerus clausus was therefore abolished.  
179 The Dutch ‘Commissie Monitoring Notariaat’ argues that the cause for the increase in notary fees is a 
result of low price elasticity in this sector, too little countervailing power on the part of consumers, and the 
fact that there is still too little competition between notaries. 
180 Intense price competition may also lower the respect for ethical rules.  
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not go further than necessary to achieve the goals of public interest, we require a cost-
benefit analysis which compares the architectural monopoly in Belgium with the archi-
tectural title protection in the Netherlands. Such analysis will not be presented in this 
thesis, but it is assumed that the protection of the architect’s function is better replaced 
by legal requirements on quality and safety of the design, such as clauses on these issues 
in Building Decrees. Such requirements also protect safety, quality and the public order 
interests of clients and society in general, which was the reason in the first place for 
Belgian legislators attempting to protect the function of architects.181 
e. Conclusion 
Entry regulation may lead to an increase in service quality. As pointed out by Fletcher, 
ex ante entry restrictions can do this in at least three ways: ‘Firstly, they can alleviate the 
risk of parties offering services they are not competent to carry out by ensuring that the 
professional’s knowledge is appropriate to the services offered. Secondly, such restric-
tions can reduce the incentives to cheat by lowering the cost of providing good quality. 
A highly trained professional needs to put in less effort in order to do a good job, and 
thus the benefits of shirking are lower. Third, they can reduce the incentives to cheat by 
raising the cost of being ‘struck off’. When a substantial investment is required in order 
to gain entry to a profession, the returns to membership will be high, and thus the cost 
of losing membership will also be high.’182 However, entry regulations generally restrict 
competition. When the rules are set higher than necessary to achieve the above-
mentioned objectives in order to create monopoly rents and restrict competition, entry 
restrictions will not produce welfare. As demonstrated by Shapiro, if the relationship 
between human capital and high quality is positive, and if suppliers can build a reputa-
tion over time by providing high quality, consumer welfare can be increased by the use 
of instruments such as licensing or certification. This however holds only if consumers 
significantly value high quality compared with the costs of providing quality on the part 
of suppliers. Licensing will never lead to a Pareto improvement since there will always 
be consumers who would rather have obtained low-quality goods or services at a lower 
price. Furthermore, even though entry regulation can have a positive influence on qual-
ity, this is not necessarily the case. As indicated by Cox and Foster who reviewed several 
empirical studies on the effects of entry regulation on quality and fees, the resulting 
quality is often unaffected. Djankov et al. even hold that higher levels of regulation of 
entry are in accordance with the public choice view associated with larger unofficial 
economies and no measurable benefits in terms of the quality of products.183 
 It follows that, due to the high costs caused by the protection of the function of 
architect in addition to the protection of the title, the protection of the function (mo-
nopoly) can better be replaced by legal requirements on quality and safety of the design. 
Curing market failure by licensing does therefore not seem to be the most efficient solu-
tion. In the case of certification, clients still have choice when it comes to engaging an 
                                                                
181 Van Gulijk 2009, p. 205. 
182 Fletcher 2004, p. 75. 
183 Djankov & Purrell, pp. 739-792; Djankov, La Porta, Lopes-de Silanes & Shleifer 2002; Fisman 2004, p.2, see 
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/regulationentry.pdf, l ast consulted on 30 November 2009; 
Cox & Foster 1990, pp. 26-27. 
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architect. Those who turn to a professional who is allowed to use the title are sure that 
the latter does have a certain educational background and/or some professional experi-
ence. Licensing therefore intervenes further in the market process than certification, but 
a licensing system insures risk-averse consumers better against possible harm caused by 
low quality services. 
2. Market conduct 
Conduct regulations cover all rules that directly regulate the conduct of professionals. 
Typical conduct regulations are regulation of prices and fees (fixed prices, minimum 
and/or maximum prices, etc.), regulation of advertising and marketing, regulation of 
location and diversification (geographical restrictions on offering services, restrictions 
on establishing branch offices) and restrictions on inter-professional co-operation or 
restrictions on forms of business (for example whether incorporation is allowed and 
under what preconditions).184 They can often be found in deontological codes formu-
lated by professional associations and can also intervene in the market. It should be 
noted however that the regulatory instruments which are used to restrict entry can also 
be applied by self-regulating bodies. 
a. Price regulations 
Price fixing aims at the elimination of a real variable for competition, namely the possi-
bility of introducing price reductions. It follows that consumers will not get the products 
or services at the lowest price possible.185 However, this does not mean that all competi-
tion is ruled out, since other types of competition are still present, such as the competi-
tion in service quality. 
 
Professional associations have argued that fixed prices protect the quality of services. 
They indicate that without fixed prices professionals are going to get into a race to the 
bottom to attract more clients with low prices. In this regard it must be noted that if 
consumers cannot judge the quality of services provided by professionals, they will base 
their decision to purchase certain services mainly on price. However, due to their lack of 
knowledge, they will not be willing to pay higher prices for higher quality. If fees remain 
unregulated, providers of higher quality services may be driven out of the market, and 
                                                                
184 Paterson, Fink & Ogus 2003, p. 2. 
185 Fixed prices automatically entail cross subsidisation. ‘Cross-subsidisation involves the transfer of value 
from one business to another. It often occurs where an undertaking uses profits it makes in one sector, 
where it has market power (a company will be in a dominant position if it has “market power”, which is 
defined as the ability to act independently of competitors, customers and, ultimately, of consumers.) to 
support low prices in other markets where it faces more competition. Competition law does not normally 
forbid cross-subsidisation. Cross-subsidisation is likely to be a problem where an undertaking operates as 
a monopoly, or is otherwise dominant in one market, and uses its power in that market to support its ac-
tivities in another market, for example to gain market share in that other market. Cross-subsidisation can 
therefore be an issue for regulated utilities, and often occurs alongside other abusive practices such as 
predatory pricing and selective price cutting/discriminatory pricing, which are prohibited by competition 
law.’ See M. Johsnon, Cross-subsidisation, Competition Focus 2004, available at http://www.martineau-
uk.com/publication_event/updates/crosssubt_full.pdf, last consulted 23 December 2009. Cross-
subsidisation is usually specifically prohibited by licence conditions, without any requirement for market 
dominance.  
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entry of new high-quality service providers may be discouraged by the low income lev-
els. This may result in a market with sub-optimal quality services.186 It follows that fixed 
fees may overcome the problem of adverse selection since then consumers will not 
compare the costs but rather the quality of products, at least if they are able to distin-
guish quality.187 As indicated above, Van den Bergh and Montangie studied the deregu-
lation of the Dutch notary profession and came to the conclusion that liberalization 
does not guarantee lower prices. They hold that due to the serious information asymme-
try in the market for notarial services, and due to the fact that quality assessment does 
not yet reach the minimum level required to avoid adverse selection, minimum fees 
might be preferable to price competition.188 Conversely, a maximum fee schedule may be 
helpful in dealing with the problem of moral hazard, since consumers cannot estimate 
the desired price/quality level and risk that producers oversupply quality to charge 
higher prices. A maximum fee schedule may therefore protect consumers against exces-
sive charges. Even though recommended fees can also limit competition and are also 
liable to create market failure, they can also inform consumers of the average fees to be 
paid and can alleviate the burden of drafting offers and/or negotiating individual fees. In 
this way they can reduce transaction costs and lead to lower fees. According to these 
authors, a flat rejection of regulated fees does not do justice to the fact that these may be 
useful instruments for coping with adverse selection, moral hazard, and high transaction 
costs.189 In this regard, the Architects’ Council of Europe (ACE) holds that adequate 
charging systems should be established, since these can give the client enough informa-
tion to understand what scope of service to expect.190 For this reason, all types of charg-
ing systems that are covered by law, and/or delegated to a professional organisation 
under agreed rules, and which fulfil the requirements for protection of the public inter-
est, or are founded on them, should be accepted, according to the ACE. It should be 
questioned however, whether the conclusions of Van den Bergh and Montangie with 
regard to fee regulations for the notary profession are also applicable to the profession of 
architect. As noted above, regulation is needed to guarantee efficient outcomes due to 
the presence of information asymmetry and negative externalities in a free market for 
professional services. If the consumer is not able to judge the quality of the service pro-
                                                                
186 Paterson, Fink & Ogus 2003, p. 211. 
187 As held by Caron, private clients certainly need different levels of protection from business clients. The 
latter will actually gain more from intra-professional competition, as they need less protection in terms of 
quality guarantees, since they are repeat purchasers of the services and, in this case, reputation can work as 
a mechanism for maintaining high quality standards. However this is not the case for private purchasers of 
services. See Caron 2008, p. 68. 
188 As proposed by Van den Bergh, policy makers should be fully aware of the adverse selection problem and 
refrain from introducing price competition as long as instruments to assess quality have not been suffi-
ciently developed and set in place. See Van den Bergh & Montangie 2006, p. 211. 
189 Another advantage of fee regulation according to Van den Bergh lies in the fact that fee regulations may 
also be used as an instrument to prevent public goods from being undersupplied. Since higher prices imply 
lower output, it can be presumed that fewer persons involve an architect. If losses (e.g. no new build-
ings/old, dangerous buildings) exceed the benefits of the price reductions in the real property practice, a 
price ceiling may be justified from a global welfare perspective. See Van den Bergh & Montangie 2006, pp. 
211-212. 
190 See K. Nilsson, Former President of the Architects’ Council of Europe in 2003, speech at the European 
Conference on Regulation and the Liberal Professions, Brussels, 28 October 2003. 
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vided, adverse selection will take place since he will not be willing to pay a higher price 
for higher quality, so that providers of higher quality charging higher prices will be 
driven out of the market. Furthermore, the professional has an incentive to over-supply 
quality in order to charge higher prices to the detriment of his consumer who might be 
better served with a lower quality at a more reasonable price (moral hazard). As sug-
gested above, the seriousness of the information problems may be mitigated by the re-
peat purchase mechanism. As demonstrated in Chapter II, according to the Mirza & 
Nacey research, individual houses account for 31% of the architectural market. This is 
the largest single sector. However, most architectural tasks are situated in other areas 
such as public housing, private housing (flats and housing developments), industry or 
commerce. Even though private individuals seem to be the architects’ principal client 
type, the public sector and building developers provide architects with most of their 
commissions. The latter categories can be qualified as clients using the repeat purchase 
mechanism. It seems that most consumers of the notary profession, on the other hand, 
are one-time-shoppers. The information asymmetry problem in the market for architec-
tural services is present, but probably less strong than in the notary market. It can there-
fore be argued that adverse selection takes place with regard to notary services rather 
than with regard to the services provided by an architect. It follows that excessive price 
competition caused by adverse selection that results in an overall reduction in the qual-
ity of the services provided, might therefore be less present in the architectural market. 
Accordingly, the regulation of fees is not as necessary in the architectural market in 
order to guarantee quality. In this regard it should be noted that, in any case, the re-
quirement to be in the possession of certain professional qualifications aims to prevent 
quality deterioration in the architectural market. 
 With regard to externalities, the Latin notary creates benefits for the parties in-
volved, but also for third parties who will get more and correct information concerning 
a certain transaction. As suggested by Van den Bergh and Montangie, regulation is 
needed to make sure that an optimal level of benefits for third parties (positive external-
ities) is achieved.191 The notary provides information and advice to prospective buyers 
and sellers about the legal aspects of the transaction, and acts as a neutral, impartial 
professional avoiding any conflict of interest. Authenticating legal documents on the 
transfer of property is important for the proper functioning of the whole economy, as 
they determine ownership of valuable assets and connected liabilities. The notary drafts 
a public document (notarial deed) that will be registered and has evidentiary power. As 
held by the aforementioned authors, the services provided by a notary have the charac-
teristics of a public good.192 Indeed, third parties also benefit from notarial deeds, for 
example when they want to buy property. In this regard it can be held that fee regula-
tions may be used as an instrument to prevent public goods from being undersupplied. 
However, it should be noted that even though notaries provide services from which the 
general public can benefit, it can be questioned whether they are truly non-rivalrous in 
nature. Notaries will only perform services if they are compensated for the work done. If 
                                                                
191 Van den Bergh & Montangie 2006, p. 196. 
192 Ibid., p. 191. 
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everyone could benefit from these services without there being someone to pay, they 
would refrain from making deeds and contracts since they also want to make profits. 
 The architect, on the other hand, acts in the interests of the building master. Of 
course he has to take into account public legislation, and has to make sure that the 
building is safe, but if his client wishes it, he will design an apartment building even if 
that destroys the neighbours’ quality of life. Even though every member of the public 
can profit from a high quality urban environment designed by an architect (positive 
externalities), the plan that is designed by him is generally based upon the desires of his 
client, and dependent on the specific characteristics of the soil, the surface of the plot, 
building regulations, the available budget, etc. Price regulation is therefore less required 
in the architectural market as a means of safeguarding quality. 
 From the above, it might be concluded that even though intense price competition 
may decrease the legal quality of notarial services, this is not necessarily the case with 
regard to the architectural profession, due to the different characteristics of each profes-
sion. 
 Furthermore, fixed prices are liable to cause a reduction in quality since it is mostly 
not possible to provide high quality services at very low prices.193 Moreover, fixed prices 
cannot prevent unscrupulous practitioners from offering poor quality services, nor do 
they remove the financial incentives for practitioners to reduce quality and costs. Pro-
fessions may still abuse their position by accepting rewards for their monopoly without 
enforcing high standards.194 It follows that there is not necessarily a causal effect between 
the level of fees charged and the quality of services supplied.195 With prices higher than 
the minima, collective fixing would not prevent the provision of poor-quality services 
with impunity.196 Even the circulation of recommended tariffs by a trade organization is 
liable to prompt the relevant undertakings to align their tariffs irrespective of their costs. 
                                                                
193 A certain degree of price-fixing has been accepted by the Commission if the aim and result of such price-
fixing is to ensure quality control. See, for example, Commission Decision 87/480/EEC of 13 July 1987, 
Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange Ltd., OJ [1987] L 222/24. 
194 In this regard, as early as 1970, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission of the United Kingdom argued 
that price competition in the supply of a professional service is likely to be the most effective single stimu-
lant to greater efficiency and to innovation and a variety of services. In the meantime, numerous studies 
led to the same conclusion. Almost thirty years later, Article 4 (a) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices, indicates that that the restriction of the buyer’s ability to determine its 
sale price, without prejudice to the possibility of the supplier’s imposing a maximum sale price or recom-
mending a sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of 
pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties, falls under the scope of Article 81(1) EC. This 
principle can also be found in Article 5 (d) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 of 29 November 
2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development agree-
ments. Recital 17 states explicitly that, in principle, certain severe anti-competitive restraints should be ex-
cluded from the benefit of the block exemption in Article 1, which exempts certain agreements from the 
scope of Article 81(1). These are limitations on the freedom of parties to carry out research and develop-
ment in a field unconnected to the agreement, the fixing of prices charged to third parties, limitations on 
output or sales, allocations of markets or customers, and limitation on effecting passive sales for the con-
tract products in territories reserved for other parties. 
195 OECD 1985, paragraph 199. See also the opinion of Advocat General Léger in Arduino. 
196 Commission Decision 95/188/EC of 30 January 1995 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty (IV/33.686 – Coapi), OJ 1995, L 122/37 [1995] 5 CMLR 468, paragraph 41. 
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Such a method dissuades undertakings whose costs are lower from lowering their prices, 
and thus creates an artificial advantage for undertakings which have the least control 
over their production costs.197 In the event of advisory prices, professionals are, in the-
ory, therefore still free to set their prices, although the risk of collective pricing behav-
iour is rather high.198 As suggested by the (then) Competition Commissioner Mario 
Monti in 2004, recommended prices can mislead consumers as to what is a reasonable 
price for the service they are receiving, and as to whether this recommended price is 
negotiable. As shown by the Commission Staff Working Document of September 2005, 
‘The key justifications given for maintaining recommended fee scales centre on the need 
to provide a guide to consumers on likely costs and protect against what is termed ‘un-
fair’ competition between practitioners. However, recommended fees and reference 
scales can still act to facilitate price co-ordination.’ 
 
It follows that, since price regulations are liable to restrict competition, tariff regulations 
imposed by professional associations should, in principle, be prohibited, since their 
object constitutes an appreciable restriction on the freedom of professional action, more 
exactly on the freedom to fix their individual scales of charges for payment for services 
to clients, and are thus at odds with the economic freedom of professionals.199 Price 
restrictions prevent consumers from benefiting from services at lower prices which 
more efficient agents could provide, and form a disincentive for agents to seek to alter 
their working practices to enable them to reduce their costs. The restrictions therefore 
fail to allow consumers a fair share of the benefits, and do not improve the distribution 
of services or promote technical or economic progress.200 Fixed prices therefore consti-
tute an agreement having, as its object, the establishment of scales of charges for clients 
and, as such, are contrary to Article 101(1) (a) TFEU (Article 81(1) EC).201 As stated 
                                                                
197 Commission Decision 96/438/EC of 5 June 1996 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty (IV/34.983 – Fenex), OJ L 181, 20 July 1996, pp. 28-36. See also the 2003 study of Paterson, Fink & 
Ogus and the OECD reports on competition in professional services.  
198 Philipsen 2003, p. 36. 
199 In this regard it can be added that, in 2008, the Belgian Competition Council decided that the Association 
of Interior Architects of Belgium (not a regulated profession) had infringed the competition rules by 
adopting and publishing a deontological norm with a scale of minimum fees. However the European Par-
liament seems to have taken another view on fee scales. The European Parliament, in point 9 of its Resolu-
tion of 5 April 2001 on scale fees and compulsory tariffs for certain liberal professions and, in particular 
lawyers, and on the particular role and position of the liberal professions in modern society, OJ C 21 E, 
24.1.2002, p.364 that: only compulsory tariffs established by professional bodies or Associations of all 
Members of a given profession may, according to circumstances, be regarded as decisions adopted by As-
sociations of undertakings submitting to competition rules. Apparently, for the European Parliament, 
non-binding fees are not under the control of the competition authorities. See: Resolution of the European 
Parliament of 5 April 2001 on scale fees and compulsory tariffs for certain liberal professions, in particular 
lawyers, and on the particular role and position of the liberal professions in modern society. Furthermore, 
on 23 March 2006, the European Parliament has adopted a resolution on the legal professions and the gen-
eral interest in the functioning of legal systems. The European Parliament considered that fee scales or 
other compulsory tariffs for lawyers and other legal professions are justified by the pursuit of a legitimate 
public interest (when) Member States actively supervise the involvement of private operators in the deci-
sion-making process. 
200 Commission Decision 95/188/EC, paragraph 43. 
201 Ibid.  
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above, recommended prices can also have this effect where compliance with a recom-
mendation by the undertakings to which it is addressed has an appreciable influence on 
competition in the market in question.202 Indeed, the fixing of prices, even those which 
merely constitute a target, affects competition, since such target prices enable all the 
participants in a cartel to predict, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what the pricing 
policy pursued by their competitors will be. 
 Even though fee restrictions can restrict competition, they can be a useful tool to 
prevent the problem of adverse selection if consumers are able to distinguish on quality. 
Furthermore, it is possible that public interest objectives can justify the fixing of mini-
mum prices, for example to prevent professionals from offering services below price, 
causing quality to deteriorate. Under conditions of asymmetric information, advertising 
will focus on aspects that consumers can easily access, such as prices or commercial 
quality features (location of the notary’s offices and availability of parking space, free 
cup of coffee, etc.) and may thus be a useful complementary tool to prevent adverse 
selection, which leads to excessive price competition among professionals and results in 
an overall reduction of the quality of the services provided.203 However the quality of 
services can be guaranteed by measures of a different type. Less restrictive mechanisms 
such as licensing, certification, quality standards and information regulation can already 
empower consumers to make more informed purchasing decisions and support high-
quality services.204 Furthermore, active monitoring by consumer associations on pricing, 
and the collection and publication of survey-based historical price data by independent 
organisations, can provide consumers with more information. 205 It follows that the regu-
lation of fees in combination with limitations on entry is dysfunctional in terms of im-
proving quality, since it is precisely the facilitation of market entry that raises the 
chances of a successful quality-enforcing policy. 
 As concluded by Van den Bergh, as clients often cannot reliably evaluate service 
quality, even after treatment (credence goods), there seems to be a case for more com-
prehensive quality-enforcing regulation.206 
b Advertising restrictions 
Advertising may facilitate competition by informing consumers about different prod-
ucts and allowing them to make better informed purchasing decisions. Advertising is 
therefore generally permitted, provided that it is true and objective, and conforms to 
basic principles such as integrity and compliance with professional secrecy. 207 Objective 
information satisfies the need among consumers to find their way in an often unknown, 
complex and new territory. Advertising restrictions may reduce competition by con-
straining the flow of information, and increasing the costs of gaining information about 
                                                                
202 This has been confirmed in several rulings of the ECJ. Case C-96/82, IAZ. For more information on the 
application of competition law to the liberal professions I refer to Wendt 2009.  
203 Van den Berg & Montangie 2006, p. 210. 
204 Case C-35/99, opinion of Advocat General Léger, paragraph 117. 
205 COM(2005) 405 final p. 21. 
206 Van den Bergh 1999, p. 105.  
207 Commission decisions of 7 April 1999, relating to a proceeding to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (IV/36.147 
EPI code of conduct), 1999/267/EC, OJ L 106, 23.04.1999, p. 14. See also Bicho 1999/2, pp. 24-25.  
  The Architectural Profession: an Economic Approach  
444 
different products.208 If advertising is banned, the established professionals have a clear 
competitive advantage and newcomers are disadvantaged. 209 This results in a limited 
choice for consumers since it is more difficult to shop around for a good price and ser-
vice, and this may have adverse effects on employment. Advertising is thus a means for 
existing firms to reaffirm their strengths by discouraging clients from searching for 
other products. Since newcomers are more likely to charge lower prices to gain consum-
ers’ trust, and may have to spend more on advertising, to the advantage of existing 
firms, restrictions on advertising can protect them by enabling them to compete.210 
 In this regard, Stephen and Love after reviewing seventeen studies on advertising, 
came to the conclusion that restrictions on advertising increase the fees charged for the 
profession’s services and that the more advertising there is, the lower the fees.211 There is 
therefore a connection between advertising and sellers’ individual price elasticity.212 
 As suggested by Caron, in markets for relatively homogeneous products, advertising 
will stimulate consumers’ search activity for low-prices, which will cause the demand 
curve facing each firm to become more price elastic.213 This means that a greater degree 
of price comparison by consumers will lead to greater reductions in sales for any seller 
who raises prices, and this will lead to lower prices in the presence of advertising.214 In 
markets for relatively non-homogeneous goods, advertising will help consumers gather 
information for quality comparisons by increasing consumers’ familiarity with a wider 
variety of market options, again causing increases in the own-price elasticity of the de-
mand curve. In the case of search goods, this will be accomplished by directly informing 
consumers of the availability and qualities of alternative seller’s products and, in the case 
of experience goods, advertising will indirectly increase consumer information by en-
couraging experimentation with more market brands.215 
 Just like legal services which are discussed by Caron, architectural services are never 
fully routine and fully standardized. If we consider them as non-homogeneous products, 
the full application of the view envisaging a relationship between advertising and in-
creased price elasticity will be harder. It can, in fact, hold for search and experience 
goods, whose quality can be ascertained prior to, or after, purchase, but not for credence 
                                                                
208 The prohibition of advertising can also constitute a restriction on the free movement of persons/freedom 
of establishment. See Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet International Products 
AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795. 
209 Comments and concluding remarks of Commissioner Monti at the Conference on Professional Regula-
tion, European Commission Centre Broschette, Brussels, 28 October 2003. 
210 Caron 2008, p. 36. Restraints on advertising enhance the ability of professionals to sustain collusive prices 
or, at least, to charge significantly above cost.  
211 Stephen & Love 2000, no. 5860. These findings are based on several academic studies. See also Benham 
1972, pp. 337-352; Cady 1976, pp. 493-510. See in this regard also Cox, De Serpa & Canby 1982, pp.305-
318 who conclude that advertisers have lower fees. 
212 Comanor & Wilson 1979, pp. 453-476. 
213 Caron 2008, p. 33. It should be noted that a person selling a homogeneous product or providing a ho-
mogenous service in a perfectly competitive market is not likely to advertise because this would have costs 
and no benefits for him. Nevertheless, the industry as a whole may advertise in the hope of shifting the 
market demand curve to the right. 
214 Stigler 1961, pp. 213-225. 
215 Nelson 1974, pp. 729-754.  
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goods, the quality of which may not be judged even after purchase. Thus, advertising of 
credence goods on the part of the seller may be more misleading than informative.216 
 As indicated by Maks and Philipsen, on the one hand, if the availability of price 
information was increased through advertising, this could discourage quality competi-
tion and could lead to a degradation of quality on the market.217 However, American and 
Canadian empirical studies provide a good deal of evidence that advertising does not 
adversely affect quality.218 It has been shown that even if price can communicate no 
information directly about quality, it can do so indirectly, because price serves as a posi-
tive signal of quality, when price advertising is allowed. Price advertising is therefore 
welfare enhancing, because it improves consumer choice. However, a problem arises if 
price advertising is undertaken exclusively, or at least principally, by low-price/low-
quality suppliers, since in these cases price advertising becomes an adverse signal on 
quality. As pointed out by Rizzo and Zeckhauser, since professionals are keen to avoid 
such adverse signals on quality, price advertising will be uncommon in most profes-
sions.219 Therefore not only may advertising have an effect on quality, perceptions of 
quality may have an effect on the form of advertising chosen by professionals.220 
 On the other hand, the prohibition of advertising will lead to higher search costs 
and higher fees.221 As an instrument to prevent quality degradation that results from 
adverse selection, advertising restrictions seem to be disproportional.222 It follows that 
obliging the producers/service providers to furnish information about the quality of the 
goods/services concerned would therefore be fruitful. However, as stated above, in the 
area of professional services, the disclosure of such information is a complicated matter, 
due to the fact that almost every service provision is different in nature. The ‘repeat 
buying by consumers mechanism’ provides incentives for suppliers of experience goods 
to produce goods and services of above minimum quality and to disclose information 
on quality voluntarily.223 If consumers are satisfied with their purchase, a further rela-
tionship with the professional is based on this positive experience, and they are likely to 
lead to good publicity for other consumers. Therefore, advertising is important to per-
suade consumers to a first buy.224 For products and services which are bought repeatedly, 
information regulation is not needed, because consumers can go to a different supplier 
the next time. Since the ‘repeat purchase mechanism’ is mostly not applicable to archi-
tectural services, there is a risk also that low quality products will be advertised in a 
                                                                
216 Cox 1989, p. 135. In the case of search goods, there is no ground to forbid price advertising, since advertis-
ing will lower search costs and fees 
217 Maks & Philipsen 2002, p. 24.  
218 See for example Muris & McChesney 1979, pp. 179-207. 
219 Rizzo & Zeckhauser, pp. 381-421. 
220 Stephen 2004, p. 148. A ccording to the public interest approach, it is necessary to regulate the provision of 
information if professionals abuse their reputation by lowering the quality of his services. The higher the 
quality is, the higher the opportunity costs are. See Leland 1979, p. 1331. 
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possibly fraudulent way. The prohibition of misleading -but not all- advertising, is thus 
certainly beneficial in these cases. 
c. Structural restrictions  
In the 19th Century and earlier, membership of a profession entailed that the practitio-
ner was regarded as having personal responsibility for the integrity and validity of the 
advice or the service which he provided. Therefore, they were expected to practise pri-
marily as sole practitioners, the only form of combination permitted being that of an 
unincorporated partnership, where all members of the firm took joint and several re-
sponsibility for one another. Practising behind the shield of incorporation with limited 
liability was regarded as fundamentally inconsistent with the status of professional prac-
titioner.225 
 In today’s market for professional services, there is a need for forms of cooperation 
between professionals and, more specifically, for multi-disciplinary practise. This is a 
consequence of all sorts of technological developments bringing about complex issues 
which require highly specialized service providers. Since it is impossible to be special-
ized in all these issues, cooperation is necessary. Furthermore, due to globalization, 
multidisciplinary business are needed and wanted by multinational firms, to deal with 
complex cross-border transactions. 
 States and professional associations often restrict such forms of cooperation since 
they fear that the independence and objectivity of the professionals is in danger. They 
argue that conflicts of interests can arise between architects who ‘should’ practise their 
profession with honour and dignity, and entrepreneurs who only have a pecuniary in-
terest. Unreserved and unlimited authorization of multi-disciplinary partnerships be-
tween different professions can lead to an overall decrease in the degree of competition 
prevailing in the market as a result of the substantial reduction of undertakings present 
in that market. However, business structure regulations restrict the ownership structure 
of professional services companies, the scope for collaboration with other professions, 
and the opening of branches, franchises or chains. This may have a negative impact if 
providers are inhibited from developing new services or cost-efficient business models. 
Just like the other restrictions discussed, structural restrictions are an ex ante method of 
dealing with an ex post problem. 
 As proposed by Fletcher, the creation of large corporate entities can arguably reduce 
the tendency to provide poor quality service, and can limit stimulation for unnecessary 
demand. She refers to the example of a professional working in a large firm who will 
only receive a share of the profits (if anything) as a result of any extra business he or she 
obtains from the client, whereas a professional working as an individual receives the full 
benefit of induced demand.226 The latter has therefore presumably increased incentives 
to engage in such behaviour. Furthermore, one of the most common market-based 
methods of solving asymmetric information issues is the creation of a reputation. A 
corporation will have a strong incentive to control the behaviour of its staff, such that 
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this reputation is not tarnished.227 Moreover, since professional services result in a wide 
variety of external effects which stem from both the nature of the private services and 
from political decisions which oblige certain private service providers to also provide 
certain public services, the production of private and public services by a single profes-
sional implies economies of scope or joint production. It follows that it is less costly if a 
professional produces both private and public services with regard to the same cases.228 
Because of these characteristics, it is argued that professional services are better pro-
duced and sold within organizational formulas -such as professional associations, pro-
fessional firms or hybrids- which are quite different from those of neoclassical abstrac-
tions of firms and markets.229 A range of services can then be provided, since one-stop-
shopping is easy and less costly for consumers, increases efficiency and increases in-
come. In the case of bigger corporations, there will be a better division of labour with 
more specialization, so that there are fewer costs. For example, there may be a division 
between architects designing industrial buildings and those designing private houses. 
 As proposed by the European Commission, business structure regulations appear to 
be less justifiable in professions where there is no overriding need to protect practitio-
ners’ independence.230 The architectural and engineering professions, for example, func-
tion effectively without these regulations in most Member States. It therefore appears 
unlikely that business structure regulations are essential to protect consumers of these 
services. This is confirmed in 1990 by the research by Cox and Foster who reviewed a 
large amount of empirical literature on the effects of regulation on quality and fees and 
came to the conclusion that a majority of the studies finds quality to be unaffected by 
licensing or business practice restrictions associated with licensing.231 Business structure 
regulations appear to be more justifiable in markets where there is a strong need to 
protect practitioners’ independence or personal liability. There might, however, be al-
ternative mechanisms for protecting independence and ethical standards which are less 
restrictive in terms of competition. In some markets, stringent ownership restrictions 
might therefore be replaced, or partially replaced, by less restrictive rules.232 
                                                                
227 Fletcher 2004, p. 76. 
228 It is less costly to produce a set of goods in one firm than it is to produce that set in different firms. 
229 Arruňada 2004, pp. 54-58.  
230 In this regard reference should also be made to Directive 2006/123/EC which hols in Article 25 that Mem-
ber States shall ensure that providers are not made subject to requirements which oblige them to exercise a 
given specific activity exclusively or which restrict the exercise jointly or in partnership with different ac-
tivities. Nevertheless, providers practising a regulated profession may be made subject to such require-
ments: in so far as this is justified in order to guarantee compliance with the rules governing professional 
ethics and conduct, which vary according to the specific nature of each profession, and is necessary in or-
der to ensure their independence and impartiality. Furthermore, in the event that multidisciplinary activi-
ties between these providers are authorised, Member States have to ensure that conflicts of interest and in-
compatibilities between certain activities are prevented; that the independence and impartiality required 
for certain activities is secured, and that the rules governing professional ethics and conduct for different 
activities are compatible with one another, especially as regards matters of professional secrecy. 
231 Cox & Foster 1990. 
232 Communication from the Commission – Report on Competition in Professional Services, /*COM/2004/-
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d. Market conduct regulation in Belgium and the Netherlands 
As indicated in Part II of this thesis, the Belgian deontological code aims to regulate the 
conduct of architects practising in Belgium. All architects are subject to the provisions 
of this Code since once a professional is registered (which is necessary to practise the 
profession unless Article 8(2) or (3) AO is applicable) he automatically becomes a mem-
ber of the Order, which entails that the deontological code is applicable. In the Nether-
lands there is no mandatory deontological code. Only architects who voluntarily became 
a member of the BNA are subject to the BNA’s rules of conduct.  However, standard 
terms often regulate the relationship between architects and their clients.  By the crea-
tion of defaults rules, transaction costs can be reduced. 
 With regard to the architectural profession specifically, one can say that there are 
currently no mandatory, minimum or maximum fee scales for architectural activities in 
Belgium and the Netherlands.233 Nevertheless, in both countries, prices are often calcu-
lated as a percentage of construction costs. Such a system is liable to undermine the 
incentives for architects to design in a way that reduces unnecessary construction costs. 
Furthermore, there is a lot of uncertainty as to the price which the client has to pay for 
the services provided by the representative for a long time. This precludes transparency 
as to the price payable by the user. 
 While in the late 1990s, recommended prices were abolished for architects in 
France234 and while in the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading came to the con-
clusion that the Royal Institute of British Architects’ (RIBA) indicative fee guidance 
could facilitate collusion235, in 2003 the European Commission sent the Belgian Archi-
tects’ Association a warning that its recommended minimum fee scale could constitute a 
violation of EU competition rules.236 In 1967, this fee scale found its origin in Article 12 
of the Association’s Code of Ethics, which new version was given binding force by Royal 
Decree in 1985.237 After becoming aware of the fee scale’s difficult and disputed status, in 
2002 the Belgian Architectural Association made a statement indicating that, since both 
                                                                
233 In its 2005 communication to the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions, the Commission concluded that several Member States were making progress to 
abolish fixed tariffs. Only four Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) still had fixed 
prices for architects and engineers at that time. See COM(2005) 405 final, pp. 12-20. The minimum scale 
which was legally enforced in Germany did not result in significant incomes for architects: see the ACE 
Document on Competition Policy and Professional Practice of Architects, http://www.mo.org/tr./-
UIKDocs%5Cacecompetitionpolicy.pdf, last consulted 5 September 2009. 
234 The French Conseil de la Concurrence also prohibited the French Architects’ Association from further 
elaborating and distributing fee scales: see Decision no. 97D45 of 10 June 1997 and Communication from 
the Commission – Report on Competition in Professional Services /*COM/2004/0083 final*/ 
235 However, the Office of Fair Trading adopted the RIBA’s new fee guidance based on historical information 
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236 On other occasions, the Commission also held that Article 81 EC (101 TFEU) fully applies if a Member 
State gives authority to a professional association to fix prices, thereby violating Article 3 (g), 10 and 81 
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Colegio Oficial de AGhentes de la Propriedad Industrial: Decision of 30 January 1995 [1995] OJ L 122. 
When professional associations promulgate fee schedules on the basis of such authority, they will not be 
immune from antitrust scrutiny. In both decisions, price fixing was held to be illegal. 
237 Article 39 of the Architects’ Order Act empowers the Crown, at the National Council’s request, to give 
binding force to the Code of Ethics by means of a Royal Decree discussed in Cabinet. This happened on 5 
July 1967 while the new Code of Ethics was given force by Royal Decree in 1985. 
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the Belgian Competition Council and the Court of Justice of the European Union seem 
to be taking a particular interest in the compatibility with the competition rules of fee 
scales drawn up by regulated professions, the fee scale should merely be understood as a 
guideline.238 This did not stop the Commission from finding that the fee scale had vio-
lated EC competition law. While it is true that the cost of the work is a determining 
factor in the insurance premium to be paid by the architect, the Commission decided 
that there was no other direct link between the cost of the work and the architect’s costs, 
or any necessary link with the value added by his services. According to the Commis-
sion, fees charged for professional service should reflect the architect’s skills, efficiency 
and costs, and perhaps his fame or notoriety, and should not be dependent solely on the 
value of the works or the price of the entrepreneur. Since the circulation of recom-
mended tariffs by a professional organisation is liable to prompt the relevant undertak-
ings to align their tariffs, irrespective of their cost prices, such a method dissuades un-
dertakings whose costs are lower from lowering their prices, and thus creates an artifi-
cial advantage for undertakings which have the least control over their production 
costs.239 Furthermore, recommended prices can mislead consumers as to what is a rea-
sonable price for the service they are receiving, and as to whether this recommended 
price is negotiable.240 A scale that imposes or recommends minimum fees is unlikely to 
protect consumers against excessive fees. Furthermore, such a scale does not prevent 
unscrupulous architects from offering poor-quality services. As indicated above, the fee 
scale can even protect them by guaranteeing a minimum fee. Since the fee scale was 
liable to discourage architects from working in a cost-efficient manner, reducing prices, 
improving quality or innovating, it was decided that it violated Article 101(1) TFEU.241 
 In the Netherlands, the SR 1997 used to indicate the fee basis by means of a refer-
ence to NEN 2631, which is a Dutch norm indicating how investment costs of building 
should preferably be calculated. A formula was drawn which led to the determination of 
a certain percentage which would then result in the fee. This formula left no room for 
price competition whatsoever and was often also used by architects which were no BNA 
members or to contracts to which the SR 1997 was not made applicable and was not 
only used by the Arbitration Institute Architecture but also by the ordinary courts.  This 
form of price fixing was not taken over by the NR 2005. 
 It follows that the absence of price fixing leaves open the possibility of introducing 
price reductions which, in turn, generates more competition. However the fixing of 
prices as a percentage of the construction costs, does not seem to be cost-efficient. 
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infringes the 1985 Code of Ethics. 
239 See on this matter also Case C-8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren, paragraph 21. As held by the ECJ 
in Case C-246/86 Belasco, even though fixed prices might not have been observed in practice, the decisions 
fixing them have the object of restricting competition. In this regard it should therefore be noted that while 
a professional association may, in certain circumstances, legitimately pronounce ex post on the level of fees 
being claimed, it is not allowed to attempt to harmonise the level of fees ex ante. 
240 As noted above, shortly after the scale was drawn up, the Association drafted a standard contract in which 
the only option for determining fees was a reference to the scale; this too attests to its intention to restrict 
competition on prices between its members, by drawing up a minimum fee scale. It circulated this stan-
dard contract for eighteen years. 
241 The Belgian Architectural Association was condemned by the European Commisson in June 2004. 
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With regard to advertising, Article 13 of the Deontological Code in Belgium foresees 
that the architect is allowed to make his activities known to the public in an independent 
and discrete manner. Obtrusive publicity has to be avoided however. The architect has 
to take into account that his name and title are not used in an illegal way by others, or 
are used for commercial purposes by others. He is allowed to mention his title in books, 
and is even obliged to mention it on a plate at the building site during the construction 
work, and is allowed to have it mentioned afterwards. In the Netherlands, there is no 
general regulation about advertising which is applicable for all architects. The discipli-
nary code of the BNA mentions, in Article 2(2), that architects have the freedom to 
make their activities, expertise, experience and competence known to the public. 
 Since there are no restrictions on advertising in Belgium and the Netherlands, con-
sumers can be informed adequately about the services offered by architects in order to 
come to a decision. However, since architectural services are often all different in nature, 
the disclosure of information is complicated, meaning that advertising might mislead 
consumers. It follows that advertising is quite important with regard to persuading cli-
ents in terms of a first buy, while the repeat buying mechanism should provide incen-
tives to provide a good price-quality ratio. 
  
Finally, with regard to structural restrictions in Belgium, mention should be made of 
Article 6 AA and Article 10 of the Deontological Code, by which architects are not al-
lowed to practise the profession of entrepreneur. Since architects should be independent 
(Article 4 Deontological Code) every association of an architect with an entrepreneur is 
forbidden.  
 In the Netherlands there is no such prohibition. Even though it may be argued that 
architects should be independent, it might be questioned whether such a severe restric-
tion is efficient, since the profession seems to function quite well in states in which there 
is no incompatibility between architects and entrepreneurs.  
 In any case it should be noted that such restrictions prevent a single company from 
offering a total service package in which the building was designed and constructed by 
professionals who consider themselves as partners rather than adversaries. Such coop-
eration can lead to higher levels of efficiency since there are fewer negotiation and trans-
action costs (the architect contracts with one company) while the professionals involved 
are more likely to cooperate from the beginning, and to seek solutions together in the 
event of a problem with the design or the construction work. From a public interest 
perspective, it might therefore be argued that negative externalities can be detected more 
easily. It follows that, from an efficiency point of view, the Dutch system should be pre-
ferred. 
e. Conclusion 
It can be concluded that price regulations (fixed and recommended prices), advertising 
restrictions and restrictions on business structure, can all limit competition between 
professionals within the profession, but also with other professions. They can often be 
found in the professional codes and the rules of conduct of professional associations. 
Even though regulation might be needed to cure market failure, the least restrictive 
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mechanism should be chosen to guarantee quality (proportionality). In any case, the 
costs of correcting market failure by means of regulation need to be smaller than the 
efficiency gains derived from the regulation. 
3. Findings of the European Commission 
As indicated in Part I, the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 adopted an eco-
nomic reform programme to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world by 2010. In improving the competitiveness of the EU 
economy, professional services were held to play an important role. A large-scale re-
search project on competition in professional services was conducted by the European 
Commission. In this way, the Commission aimed to determine whether the current 
regulation of professional services serves the interests of consumers, and is therefore the 
most efficient and least restrictive of competition, or whether better regulation, more 
adapted to the modern world, could help spur economic growth, and deliver better 
services and value for consumers.242 The Commission based this research on an inde-
pendent study which was carried out by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna 
which contained a schematic overview of regulation in the then 15 EU member States 
for six professions, including architects. For each of these professions, an overview was 
presented of all the rules restricting entry to the profession, and the rules restricting 
market conduct. A ‘regulation index’ was used which represented the degree of regula-
tion between 0 and 12. In this way, regulations concerning price fixing, recommended 
prices, advertising regulations, entry requirements and reserved rights and regulations 
governing business structure and multi-disciplinary practices as categories of regulation 
which are possible to restrict competition, were identified.243 
                                                                
242 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professional_services/overview_en.html, last consulted 
1 December 2009. 
243 In its report, the Commission also mentioned the reactions of the respondents to the findings of the IHS. 
With regard to architects, the majority of respondents supported appropriate entry regulation to ensure 
that architects are competent to carry out their functions and respect safety standards. However, the 
Commission argued that few respondents commented in detail on the extent to which licensed or certified 
architects should hold exclusive or reserved rights. Likewise, very few discussed the regulatory framework 
in countries such as Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, where unqualified practitioners are permitted 
to offer a range of architectural services. The Architects’ Council of Europe, for example, commented that 
control mechanisms are essential because the quality of architectural services is only discernible after the 
construction process. 
With regard to price fixing, the majority of the respondents argued in favour of price regulation and rec-
ommended prices for architectural services. Most suggested that these regulations are necessary to ensure 
quality. Unrestricted price competition would force prices to levels at which it would be impossible to en-
sure quality and safety standards. According to the Architects’ Council of Europe, for example, reasonable 
fixed prices are necessary to ensure that professionals compete on quality rather than on price. Without 
fixed prices, service providers would be tempted to offer the lowest price in order to gain contracts, leading 
to a reduction in the quality of construction. The Architects’ Order of Belgium argued that fixed prices are 
necessary to allow architects to make a reasonable profit and to exercise their functions with honour and 
dignity. They suggested that price competition would force architects to use inferior material that would 
reduce the strength and security of buildings. In the Commission’s view, however, none of the respondents 
explained why price regulation, as opposed to other mechanisms such as planning permission procedures, 
construction standards and monitoring, should offer an effective means of quality control. No reason was 
given to indicate why price regulation should be expected, in itself, to improve or safeguard construction 
standards, nor was any explanation given as to why architects subject to price regulation would not have 
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 After making a comparative analysis of nearly all EU Member States in terms of key 
economic variables and indicators (ratios which are calculated based on the number of 
firms in a country, their turnover, employment levels, population, GDP, the number of 
practising professionals, etc.), the IHS came to the conclusion that, with regard to tech-
nical services – under which architectural services can be qualified, – the existence of 
relatively higher numbers of larger firms, employing greater numbers of persons, could 
be associated with a low degree of regulation, and seemed to be a clear result of firms 
having the scope to merge. A higher degree of regulation was associated with a relatively 
low number of professionals, lower values of volume per employed person (lower pro-
ductivity) and lower volume per firm, which means that firm size, i.e. expressed as vol-
ume of business, is higher in less regulated countries. Furthermore, it was held that there 
was a real risk that the advantages which would result from an optimal size of firm 
(economies of scale) were not utilized fully in more regulated branches on account of 
missing incentives – with less competition there is less incentive to exploit a potential 
increase in productivity. These findings point in the direction of effects predicted by the 
private interest theory of regulation. However, research showed that the volumes of 
output in a country with a high degree of regulation tend to be higher than expected, 
and are often comparable to the volumes of output in a country subject to a lower de-
gree of regulation, due to the economic strength of the branch in that country. In any 
case, the research demonstrated that the level of professional regulation differs widely 
from country to country. The architectural and engineering professions were found to 
be among the least regulated professions. 
 
Taking into account all these findings, the main conclusion of the IHS in its research 
report was that a reduction of regulation is possible without having to fear the risk of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
strong motivations to reduce quality in order to maximise profits.  
No evidence was provided to suggest that standards are higher in the minority of Member States that have 
minimum or fixed fees. A large majority of respondents were also in favour of recommended prices for ar-
chitectural services. However, few commented in detail on the justification for this type of regulation. As 
held by the Commission, few of the respondents commented on the concern that recommended prices 
may facilitate collusion. Likewise, they did not explain why consumers should need recommended prices 
for architectural services, despite the fact that they do not rely on recommended prices when purchasing 
other complex products. In this regard, the Bundesarbeitskammer, an Austrian consumer organisation, 
even suggested that the Austrian professions sometimes lead consumers to believe that recommended 
prices are fixed prices in order to avoid giving discounts. They added that Austrian architects face few in-
centives to reduce prices and costs. 
With regard to advertising, the majority were of the opinion that architects should be free to engage in 
truthful advertising. 
Finally, as far as business structure and inter-professional cooperation is concerned, the majority believed 
that there is a need for regulation to ensure transparency of ownership with regard to architectural services 
companies, and to preserve architects’ independence from other groups. In this way, the Architects’ Coun-
cil of Europe argued that, given the complex nature and potential impact of architectural services, it is im-
portant for clients to be aware of the ultimate ownership of architectural services companies. The Council 
also suggested that architects’ independence should not be compromised as a result of cooperation with 
other groups. However, the Commission considered that the respondents did not comment on the poten-
tial economic advantages of cooperation between architects and other groups such as engineers and build-
ers. Nor did they comment on service provision in the majority of EU Member States where there are no 
significant regulations restricting architects’ participation in multi-disciplinary practices. 
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market breakdown.244 The report thus concluded that the lower regulation strategies 
which work in one Member State might be made to work in another, without decreasing 
the quality of professional services, and for the ultimate benefit of the consumer.245 It 
was held that there is no indication of malfunctioning of markets in relatively less regu-
lated countries. This might suggest that some rules are unnecessary. It was concluded 
that there is no link between the density of professional regulation and the protection of 
consumers, and that a high regulatory density is not very efficient. On the contrary, 
according to the report, low regulation is not a hindrance, but rather a spur to overall 
wealth creation. The report also led to the conclusion that less regulated countries have 
relatively lower revenues per professional, but a proportionally higher number of active 
professionals who generate a relatively higher overall turnover. This all suggests that 
more freedom in the professions is not a hindrance, but rather a spur to overall wealth 
creation. Since professional regulation may eliminate or limit competition, this can lead 
to decreased efficiency and innovation and can reduce the incentives to lower prices and 
increase quality.246 The Commission indicated that it would like to see the regulatory 
restrictions in Member States reviewed and, where they are not objectively justified, 
removed or replaced by less restrictive rules. 
 Whilst pointing out that the best way to achieve overall change would be by volun-
tary action of those responsible for setting the existing restrictions, primarily by means 
of reviewing the existent regulation through a proportionality-based approach247, the 
                                                                
244 Paterson, Fink & Ogus 2003, I, p. 104, p. 111, p. 119 and p. 127.  
245 Ibid. 
246 Communication of 9 February 2004, COM (2004) 83 final, no. 23. As noted above, this was already ac-
knowledged by the ECJ in its landmark Wouters decision where it held that certain types of regulation, 
even when they restrict competition, may be necessary for the proper practice of certain professions and 
should therefore be permitted. However, as held by Van den Berghe, the Commission’s policy line is a 
moderate one since it still holds that some level of regulation may be needed to cure the existence of in-
formation asymmetry, externalities and public goods in professional services while total de-regulation may 
not be required to enhance consumer welfare. See Van den Berg & Montangie 2006, p. 197. According to 
the Commission, some form of less restrictive re-regulation may suffice, so that some exceptions to the 
competition rules should therefore be allowed 
247 In this regard it should be noted that a proportionality test is not in line with the ECJ’s case law in Arduino. 
In the case law concerning Member States’ liability under Article 3 (1) (g) jo 10 (2) and 81 (1) EC, there is 
no mention at all of the need for state measures to be proportional to the achievement of the public inter-
est. Even though the ECJ mentions, in paragraph 109 of Wouters, that it does not appear that the effects go 
beyond what is necessary, the Court also stated that the fact that less restrictive rules may be applicable in 
certain Member States does not mean that a more restrictive rule in force in another Member State in-
fringes EC competition law. This is due to the fact that, in the absence of specific EC legislation in this 
field, each Member State remains in principle free to regulate the exercise of the legal profession within its 
territory. The Court thus held that bar associations have a margin of discretion to decide what they deem 
appropriate and necessary to protect the proper practice of the profession in their respective Member 
States. See Wouters, paragraph 105 and 108. Accordingly, different States may consider different core val-
ues and/or different means to protect them as being necessary for the proper exercise of the profession, so 
that professional regulations may significantly differ from one Member State to another. See Wouters, 
paragraph 99 and 108. It would therefore be contrary to EC competition law to unduly limit the margin of 
discretion through a proportionality principle (the most appropriate solution is not necessarily the least 
restrictive one). There is currently therefore, no basis in EC competition law for the public interest and the 
proportionality test proposed by the Commission in paragraph 88 of its Report, so that Member State are 
under no compulsion to amend their existing restrictive regulations in order to comply with such a test. 
See Siragusa 2004, p. 587.  
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Commission made clear that a simple elimination of anti-competitive mechanisms may 
not be enough to bring about more competition to this sector, and therefore that both 
regulatory authorities and professional bodies should explore the need to use pro-
competitive accompanying mechanisms which increase transparency and enhance con-
sumer empowerment. Such mechanisms include active monitoring by consumer asso-
ciations, collection and publication of survey-based historical data or public announce-
ments of the abolition of tariffs. The distinction between rules which are covered by 
competition law and rules which are not has to be decided on a case by case basis or 
more to the point, rule by rule, profession by profession.248 In any case, through co-
ordination in the European Competition Network the Commission will keep monitor-
ing the regulatory progress.249 
 
However, the study of IHS and thus also the Commission’s report got a lot of criticism. 
 With regard to the fact that the IHS report holds that a connection may be surmised 
between volume of business per professional and excess profit which means high profits 
for a smaller number of professionals are associated with higher regulation indices while 
low regulation is associated with higher employment and greater overall wealth crea-
tion,250 Van den Bergh and Montangie251 hold that this conclusion seems farfetched252, 
since higher volume (turnover adjusted for differences in price levels and GDP) does 
not equal higher profit. They argued that, by assuming that turnover is an indicator of 
profits, the IHS researchers have overlooked the fact that the costs of professional ser-
vices are not necessarily the same for all countries253, which means that higher turnover 
does not imply higher supra-competitive profits. Turnover in a heavily regulated profes-
sion may be higher because the bureaucratic costs and prices are higher, or because 
professionals in highly regulated Member States work harder than in other Member 
States. It is also possible that prices are higher because of a higher service quality. The 
report assumes a reasonable homogeneity of quality of professional services across EC 
Member States, which is a very strong assumption given the heterogeneity of prefer-
ences (concerning price/quality relationships and the views on the scope of public goods 
                                                                
248 Competition in Professional Services: New Light and New Challenges, Speech by Commissioner Monti to 
the Bundesanwaltskammer, Berlin 21 March 2003.  
249 National competition authorities have been active and a step change has been seen in their activity, with 
the majority reporting begin engaged in work in this field during 2004/05. The Commission found that the 
findings which could be drawn based on the fifteen ‘old’ Member States could equally be applied to the 10 
new Member States. Competition authorities in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom have well established programmes in this sector – Denmark as part of a wider governmental regula-
tory reform programme. Authorities in Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia also initiated 
structured work to bring reform to professions. In this way, architects in Belgium are now allowed to form 
incorporated firms. See Commission Staff Working Document, Progress by Member States in reviewing 
and elimination of restrictions to Competition in the area of Professional Services COM(2005) 405 final. 
250 Paterson, Fink & Ogus 2003, nr. 22, p. 4. 
251 Van den Berg & Montangie 2006, p. 199. 
252 RBB Economics 2003, p. 17.  
253 Turnover in a heavily regulated profession may be higher because the bureaucratic costs are higher as are 
the prices charged. Turnover can also be higher because professionals in highly regulated Member States 
work harder than in other Member States, or because the quality of the services is higher, leading to higher 
prices.  
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to be provided by the professions) and the concomitant differences in the scope of the 
professional monopoly. It should also be taken into account that high incomes may also 
reflect appropriate quality rents. As held by Van Den Bergh, as long as quality meas-
urement does not form part of the empirical work, strong policy conclusions do not 
seem warranted. It is thus concluded that the IHS Report does not take account of the 
potential effect of regulation on the quality of professional services. The magnitude of 
the costs and benefits of self-regulation is thus ultimately an empirical issue. 
 Furthermore, the report does not fully control for the risk of spurious correlation: 
the correlation between the degree of regulation (as indicated by the regulation index) 
and the level of employment (or total wealth) may be caused by a third variable linked to 
the two others (for example: gross domestic product) that is not controlled for. 
 Another criticism made by Van den Bergh and Montangie is that empirical work 
shows that deregulation does not automatically achieve the results desired by the policy 
makers, and may even provoke counterproductive effects. The Commission’s reports 
and the IHS study do not contain any traditional competition law analysis or an eco-
nomic empirical analysis, but base their decision with regard to the deregulation of 
prices on the fact that there does not seem to be market failure in states where prices are 
not, or are less, regulated. For this reason, the report assumes that price fixing does not 
form an essential regulatory instrument for the free professions. As pointed out above, 
studies on the effects of the liberalization of notarial services in the Netherlands show 
that prices may increase rather than decrease after deregulation, and that quality may be 
negatively affected by it. As suggested above, the IHS study does not consider the impact 
of regulation on quality. Furthermore, there is no convincing evidence that regulation of 
professional services decreases welfare.254 Furthermore, since the liberalization of profes-
sions is associated with a higher number of professionals, meaning that each architect 
has more competitors, it will be more difficult to earn a lot of money in a certain period 
of time. Certainly an architect established in a rural area feels the difference in his 
pocket when another architect settles in the same area, since people who are planning to 
build a house have suddenly the choice between two architects. If the prices they charge 
are about the same, the potential number of clients for each architect can be halved. This 
is not an attractive situation, since small areas contain only a small number of potential 
clients, and are thus not very profitable. Of course prices can be lowered to attract cli-
ents. However, the danger exists that a race to the bottom will take place, causing the 
architects to earn less money than if they worked in a big city. In a big city, bigger pro-
jects arise which are likely to generate more money. It follows that most architects are 
concentrated in areas with high population density to the detriment of rural areas. 255 
Consequently, persons living in rural areas do not have a lot of choice when it comes to 
professionals, unless they go all the way to a bigger city to find more architects so that 
                                                                
254 Van den Berg & Montangie, 2006, p. 199. 
255 An example of this theory can be seen in Iceland. Iceland liberalised pharmacy services in 1996 with the 
aim of increasing competition, cutting costs and improving the service to citizens. The result was that na-
tional expenditure in pharmaceuticals increased, and pharmacies became concentred in areas with high 
population densities to the detriment of the rural areas. See PGEU Presentation, Brussels 28 October 2003. 
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they are able to compare between the services they offer. It can therefore be argued that 
the objective of improving services to citizens is not achieved.256 
 It should also be noted that the Commission did not look at reduced transaction 
costs and increased legal certainly brought about by regulation, and did not pay enough 
attention to market imperfections that such measures may cure (information asymme-
try, etc.) or other goals of public interest (financial accessibility of services, guaranteed 
fixed prices).257 
 With regard to the architectural profession in particular, Katarina Nilsson, Presi-
dent of the Architects’ Council of Europe (ACE) in 2003, held that even though the 
profession of architect turns out to be the least regulated profession of all the professions 
examined, in order to really compare differences, the different types of regulation of the 
profession must be put in the context of different building regulations in the respective 
countries. Therefore, it is important to be well informed of the range and type of ser-
vices provided by the architect. In this regard, according to Nilsson, a seriously limiting 
factor in the IHS Study is the fact that it merely focused on the service provided by the 
profession and not, in any respect, on the effects of the service on society, of the context 
in which the service is used, and the scope of the service.258 In this regard, it should be 
mentioned that even though the IHS Study claims that fees are lower when professions 
are not regulated – which might be true in certain cases – the scope of the services 
charged for can vary, certainly when it comes to architectural services, and this also has 
a major impact on prices. In regulated countries, architects often have to take on more 
responsibilities than in less regulated ones in which the authorities’ control of the built 
environment is more extensive. 
 Criticism was also put forward by the Architects’ Council of Europe which did not 
agree with the deregulation plans of the Commission with regard to registration. It held 
that registration does not hinder competition since the professional bodies for architects 
are open to any professional that meets the requirements of qualification and training, 
and do not discriminate in their decisions.259 For architects, the only conditions to regis-
tration or membership are education, length of practice and that the professionals un-
dertake to comply with the Codes of Conduct of the organization. According to the 
ACE, none of these conditions could be said to hinder competition. They were created 
in the interest of consumers who have a clear and justified interest in knowing that any-
one who is an architect will comply with certain standards which have been established 
to meet the needs of society and the individual consumer. 
 
                                                                
256 See for criticism of the IHS report with regard to the legal profession: Henssler & Kilian 2003. 
257 Van den Bergh & Montangie 2006, p. 213. 
258 Nilsson, former ACE President, Speech at the European Conference on Regulation and the Liberal Profes-
sions, Brussels, 28 October 2003. Reference was made to Case C-292/6 Gullung v. Conseil de l’Ordre des 
Avocats au Barreau de Colmar et al., Judgement of 19 January 1988, ECR, 1988, 111. The ECJ held that a 
registration requirement is not incompatible with Article 43 EC, and that a lawyer who was denied access 
to the Bar in a Member State other than his own, due to a failure to fulfil the necessary conditions of good 
character, could not rely on Community law to work as a lawyer in the other Member State. The role of the 
Bar as the final supervisor of entry into the profession was thus confirmed.  
259 Nillson 2003. 
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In any case, as pointed out by Philipsen, despite the inherently subjective process of 
assigning weights to different forms of regulation, it seems safe to conclude that the IHS 
regulation indices provide at least a reasonable indication of the level of regulation in EU 
Member States circa 2003, because a relatively large shift in the weights often leads to a 
relatively small change in the value of the index. 260 
4. Conclusion 
Not only do states create regulation, but also self-regulatory systems make a combined 
use of the regulatory techniques described above: registration to become a member; 
certification to enjoy protection of the title; duty to comply with ethical rules; control of 
performance (sanctions), licensing, etc.261 From the analysis above, it follows that price 
fixing is the strictest regulatory instrument, followed by licensing, certification, impos-
ing quality standards and information regulation. All these instruments can be applied 
by the government as well as by self-regulating groups. On the one hand, government or 
professional associations often use entry restrictions, restrictions on advertising, on fees 
or on conduct, to obtain a certain level of quality. Ex ante regulation is often created to 
increase the incentives to avoid the situation that professionals might otherwise have to 
offer poor quality service or induce unnecessary demand (moral hazard). On the other 
hand, professional groups themselves are likely to set standards too high in order to 
push competitors out of the market or to use licenses as an entry barrier. In this way, a 
strict regulatory system could lead to a monopolistic situation and monopolistic advan-
tages for the professions concerned. As pointed out above, the creation of such mo-
nopolies can undermine competition.262 Therefore, many groups of professionals do not 
refuse, and even aim at a strong professional regulation.263 
 A lot of these restrictions are already removed by EU legislation and the case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union on the one hand, and initiatives at Member 
State level on the other. The public and private interest approaches to regulation as 
described above, and the empirical literature examining various forms of regulations in 
the professions, often lie at the heart of the action undertaken by the legislator. Research 
conducted by Van den Bergh and Montangie with regard to the abolishment of the 
solicitors’ monopoly for conveyancing services in England and Wales, and the deregula-
tion of the Dutch notary profession, indicates however that liberalization does not nec-
essarily guarantee lower prices, so that increased competition is not guaranteed by it. 
They even found with regard to the Dutch notaries that there is a justified concern that 
competition might decrease quality and jeopardize the notary’s integrity. Since this 
might be a result of the special characteristics of the notary profession, research is 
needed to determine whether this also applies to architects. Furthermore, the research 
indicates that regulation may be justified, even in a monopoly situation, as long as effec-
                                                                
260 Philipsen 2008, p. 103. In this regard it should be noted that although the criticism of the IHS report is 
justified and correct, the criticisms mainly concerns the empirical analysis, with regard to which the IHS 
has already stated that it is merely a first attempt. The European Commission took these conclusions one 
step further however.  
261 Van den Bergh 1999, p. 120. 
262 Van den Bergh 1999. 
263 Van Der Krogt 1981.  
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tive instruments to control and monitor quality are not (yet) in place. It can likewise be 
questioned whether quality will deteriorate if everybody is allowed to perform architec-
tural services, as is the case in the Netherlands, since it can be argued that if persons are 
engaged in designing a building but who are not ‘real’ architects, there is more uncer-
tainty and possibly higher transaction costs, while in the case of regulation, there are 
reduced transaction costs. The answer to this question will depend on whether there are 
other mechanisms in the Netherlands which guarantee a sufficient level of quality. Van 
Gulijk concluded in this regard that the protection of the architect’s function is better 
replaced by legal requirements with regard to the quality and the safety of the design, 
such as the requirements that have been established in the Dutch Building Decree. Such 
requirements also protect the safety, quality and public order interest of clients and of 
society in general, which was the reason in the first place for Belgian legislators wishing 
to protect the function of architects. Furthermore, whether the restrictions on competi-
tion resulting from exclusive rights (architectural monopoly in Belgium) and fixed 
prices do not go further than necessary to achieve goals of public interest, would require 
a cost-benefit analysis which compared the architectural monopoly in Belgium with the 
architectural title protection in the Netherlands. More empirical research is needed to 
solve this issue. It follows that, in any case, the most efficient regulatory instrument(s) 
should be chosen, and account should be taken of the effects of regulation on consumer 
surplus, producer surplus and the deadweight of welfare loss.264 In this regard it should 
be noted that it is important for regulation not be disproportionate to cure the market 
failure under consideration. In recent years, there is a trend to more pro-active forms of 
consumer protection and quality management, implying a lower degree of anti-
competitive effects. In several countries, professional indemnity insurance has been 
made obligatory or broadened for a number of professions, while in others, obligatory 
continuing education, facilities for specialisation or specific voluntary certification 
and/or benchmarking systems have arisen.265 Looking at the interaction between the 
European Commission, national regulators, and national competition authorities, there 
have been bottom-up266 effects as the Commission is influenced by the developments at 
the Member State level, as well as top-down effects. 
 
According to Philipsen, to find out whether regulations are liable to bring about bene-
fits, the general conditions for exemption of a restrictive agreement under EC competi-
tion law, as defined in Article 101(3) TFEU (Article 81(3) EC), seems to provide a useful 
scheme.267 It should be noted, however, that this is therefore not an economic test but a 
legal test. These four conditions are: (1) the agreement, decision or concerted practice 
must improve the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or eco-
nomic progress; (2) it must allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; (3) it 
must not impose restrictions on the undertakings that are not indispensable to the at-
tainment of the objectives; and (4) it must not afford the undertakings the possibility of 
                                                                
264 Adriaans, Maks & Philipsen 2005, p. 72. 
265 Paterson, Fink & Ogus 2003, 1, p. 90.  
266 Especially in the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands, national competition authorities undertake activities to 
identify restrictions to competition.  
267 Philipsen 2003, p. 43. 
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eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the product. As suggested by 
Philipsen, ‘If one substitutes the word ‘regulation’ for the phrase ‘agreement, decision or 
concerted practice’ the following observation can be made: Condition (1) states that we 
only need regulation if social welfare is improved by this regulation, just as public inter-
est theory suggests by its focus on market failure. Condition (2) adds to this that the 
consumer surplus must be given sufficient weight. Conditions (3) and (4) require that 
competition should not be restricted more than necessary (also because of the danger of 
rent seeking). One has thus to choose the optimal form or regulation.’268 According to 
Philipsen, regulation of a profession should preferably be measured against this scheme, 
and should thus meet all its requirements. 
3.7. Regulation vs. liability 
It is obvious that safety issues have to be taken into account when providing services. In 
particular, the architectural profession involves difficult tasks and responsibilities. Ar-
chitects have to work with due diligence and seriousness because it is of great impor-
tance that the buildings that are designed are safe and secure. The right incentives have 
to be created to make sure that architects take the utmost care. As indicated above, this 
can be done by means of different instruments such as liability regimes, regulation, 
taxes, etc. Because in general, a lot of professional activities can be carried out in a very 
safe way, the increase in value they bring to society is often larger than the costs of the 
damages they bring about.269 Since the influence of damages on people’s behaviour 
should only extend to the point where the costs of accidents are acceptable for society, it 
is of no use to prohibit these activities completely. However, in today’s market, consum-
ers are in need of effective and independent redress mechanisms when things go wrong. 
 
Liability rules are used separately or jointly with ex ante regulation to remedy market 
failure. Calabresi270 and Shavell271 made a comparison between ex ante regulations, which 
are categorized as ‘specific deterrence’, and ex post liability which is categorized as ‘gen-
eral deterrence’. 
 The specific deterrence method stipulates that government regulates a certain level 
of activities and care, and decides who should perform these activities and how these 
should be done. The main reason for this approach is that people are said not to know 
what is best for them.272 When persons do not live up to these governmental rules273, they 
will be punished. It follows that their behaviour is influenced directly by regulation, 
since it is generally independent of the actual occurrence of harm. 
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 According to the general deterrence method, it is the market which determines up 
to what level, and in what way, activities have to be carried out in view of the costs. Indi-
viduals have the freedom to engage in these activities and are in a position to take the 
possible accident costs into account. The regulator does not impose particular behav-
iour, but links predetermined consequences to certain behaviour. It follows that profes-
sionals only come into contact with these consequences once they have caused damage, 
or are accused of having made a professional mistake. Individuals are held liable for the 
damages they have caused and are deterred by a tort suit in cases of damage274, so that 
this method therefore works indirectly. As opposed to the specific deterrence regime 
which is enforced by public law and criminal law, liability is enforced by private law.275 
 The crucial difference between both systems is that, in the general deterrence 
method, there is no room for an ex ante decision about the desired number of accidents 
that a society is willing to bear. This method means that the behaviour of an individual 
is not regulated by governmental legislation, but is determined by the individual him-
self.276 Furthermore, in liability regimes, liability is based upon the damage caused to the 
victim. The victim is compensated for the consequences of certain acts or omissions, so 
that he will be put in the same position as that in which he found himself before the 
damage-causing event. As opposed to this, the specific deterrence method emphasizes 
the punitive nature of criminal regulation. Damage compensation is ‘paid’ not to an 
individual victim, but to society as a whole. When opting for the specific deterrence 
method, different assumptions are taken into account. In the first place, individuals are 
not able to determine their own benefits. Secondly, damage-causing events can also have 
non-pecuniary consequences. Thirdly, the specific deterrence method presupposes that 
individuals take moral decisions which cannot be expressed in terms of costs or benefits. 
Fourthly, there are income differences between the different market actors. In the fifth 
place it is held that there are dangerous activities which cannot be regulated through the 
market mechanism. These presumptions have to be reversed if one opts for the general 
deterrence method.277 
 Contrary to liability, regulation is, in general, independent of the actual occurrence 
of harm.278 While liability is enforced by private law, regulation is enforced by public and 
criminal law.279 
 
As maintained by Shavell, when choosing between tort law and regulation as instru-
ments for controlling risky activities, there are four criteria which should be taken into 
account: information, insolvency risk, the threat of a liability suit and administrative 
costs. 
 
The first determinant is the possibility that private parties and the government have 
different views concerning hazardous activities. In the event of information asymmetry 
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between the government and private parties, information problems can justify govern-
mental intervention through regulation. However, according to Shavell, it has to be 
determined who can acquire the information at the least cost – the government or the 
parties involved. When private parties have more information at their disposal than the 
government, it is better for them to make their own assessment concerning the control 
of risks, the advantages of the activity, the costs of lowering the risks and the damage 
possibilities. Otherwise, the chance would exist that the legislator would make arbitrary 
rules, or rules which are not the most suitable to regulate the problem. In this case, li-
ability rules will have more advantages because the information which is available ex 
post, and which can take into account all the (detailed) circumstances of the case, will 
lead to a better cost allocation than the allocation which is made by the legislator, ex 
ante.280 In the event that the government has better information, or if the parties do not 
readily appreciate all the risks, regulation should be preferred.281 
 As mentioned earlier, when considering professional activities which mostly involve 
trust goods, the professionals themselves rather than government agencies have specific 
knowledge on quality and risks. 282 For this reason, self-regulation can be preferred over 
state regulation. However, since consumers of professional services can also be qualified 
as private parties, there is normally also an information asymmetry between the private 
parties themselves. Even though a liability regime leads to efficient results, in these cases 
a regulatory regime will nevertheless direct the problem better, since it puts consumers 
in a better position to know ex ante which services and which minimum level of quality 
they may expect. 
 
Regarding the insolvency risk or inability to pay for the harm done – i.e. the ability of 
the person who caused the damage to indemnify the victim for the entire loss283- Shavell 
indicates that if the potential damages are higher than the wealth of the injurer, liability 
rules will not incline injurers to take optimal care. This is due to the fact that injurers 
cannot pay more than what they actually have, unless they are insured, of course. If the 
sufficient level of care is determined by ex ante regulation on the other hand, the poten-
tial injurer has to comply with this regulation, irrespective of his wealth.284 The inability 
to pay is thus not of any relevance within the specific deterrence system. Unwanted 
behaviour is forbidden, whatever the costs are. 
 With regard to the liberal professions, a combination of ex ante regulation and 
liability rules seems optimal. Since bad quality services provided by architects can have 
major effects, not only for the building master, but also for persons renting the building, 
or third parties walking by, ex ante regulation is needed to determine issues like the 
desired educational level of professionals and the desired level of quality. In this way, 
professionals who are, at first sight, not competent, are already ruled out so that the 
situation is immediately safer. However, if professionals who do possess the desired 
educational level were not at risk of being sued, they might not have the necessary in-
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centives to deliver good quality. In this regard, the insurance coverage is important.285 
Liability regimes can be attractive because, by lowering the insurance premium when 
the risks are low, individuals have incentives to keep the level of care as high as possible. 
However, a liability regime will not suffice, since bad quality services may have huge 
consequences, and the professional might not be able to pay for all the damages caused. 
It follows that a combination of ex ante and ex post regulation is needed to ensure that 
the optimal level of care is taken. 
 
According to Shavell, the possibility of a liability suit (third determinant) is not that 
high if the individual harm is small, or if the harm occurred a while ago before the dam-
age became apparent, or if it is difficult to establish a causal link between the actions of 
the injurer and the damage. If this is the case, a law suit may not be started, which im-
plies that a tort system will have no deterrent effect since the party causing the damage 
does not experience negative consequences from its behaviour.286 It follows that if there 
is no threat of a liability suit, an ex ante safety regulation has to ensure that a sufficient 
level of care is taken by the potential injurer.287 The chance of getting caught is therefore 
an issue to be taken into account in the case of regulation: due to the overload of cases 
which the courts have to deal with, and due to the resulting policy to set aside numerous 
less important cases, private parties tend to calculate their risk of having to pay for their 
wrongs. Problems in liability regimes concern the fact that there can also be legal 
wrongs without a victim, that there is often a lack of evidence, or that the damage done 
to each individual is so small that no one takes the effort to institute proceedings. It is 
important for the well-functioning of society that these wrongs are also punished.288 
Furthermore, if individuals are afraid to institute proceedings against very powerful 
parties, or if they are not able to indicate the person who caused the damage, a liability 
regime is not the best solution. Prior approval, such as licensing or certification, on the 
other hand, can ex ante exclude manifest incompetence which can give rise to high so-
cial costs. 
 With regard to the liberal professions, the chance of escaping a lawsuit is linked 
again to the information asymmetry argument, and the fact that professional services 
are often experience or trust goods. Since consumers are often not able to determine 
whether a professional has delivered poor quality services, while this is in any case often 
hard to prove, this implies that they may not have sufficient incentives to hold the ser-
vice provider accountable. This is even more so since, in many markets, the outcome of 
a professional’s work depends not only on his own service, but also on a variety of other 
factors, such as whether the entrepreneur obeyed the architect’s instructions. Since only 
a proportion of consumers are likely to institute claims, the redress in one case is often 
not appropriate punishment for certain misconduct. It follows that at least some level of 
ex ante regulation is needed, since there is a serious enforcement problem. When com-
paring liability with self-regulation, it should be noted that self-regulatory associations 
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have normally greater knowledge about a certain problem than judges. However, under 
a tort system, judges may also hire experts -usually members of the regulated profes-
sion- to assist them in the assessment of negligence. The question is then whether the 
savings resulting from combining the judges’ and the experts’ roles into one are greater 
than the potential losses due to over-inclusive self-regulation. This can be determined by 
empirical research. Even though this determinant does not seem to have a strong influ-
ence on the choice between liability and regulation for the specific case of the liberal 
professions289, a regulatory regime is generally favourable, since the information asym-
metry problem makes it difficult for consumers to determine what exactly caused harm. 
To be held liable, a causal link between a fatal accident involving a badly constructed or 
badly designed building and the involvement of the architect or engineer therein, should 
always be established. 
 
Finally, a comparison must be made between the administrative costs of a liability re-
gime and an ex ante regulatory system. For ex ante systems to function, public costs 
with regard to passing and enforcing the regulation, as well as private costs of compli-
ance, have to be incurred.290 Liability systems demand for public expenses of the legal 
system itself (fees of judges, building of court houses, electricity in court houses, etc.), as 
well as for private costs of time, effort and legal expenses borne by the parties (lawyers’ 
costs). The costs, or at least most of the costs of a liability system, only seem to be pre-
sent in the event that harm has actually happened. As noted by Philipsen, a lot of acci-
dents will be prevented by the deterrent effect of being held liable and having to pay 
damages to the victim.291 In the case of regulation however, the costs of passing and 
enforcing the regulation are always there, irrespective of the actual occurrence of an 
accident. These costs are not borne by the individuals causing the biggest risk – which is 
often the case in liability regimes – but by society as a whole.292 
 
It can be concluded that -if private parties have more and better information- informa-
tion asymmetry favours a liability regime in general. If this is not the case, regulation 
can take care of the information asymmetry problem. The same is true with regard to 
administrative costs. On the other hand, the incapacity to pay for harm done, as well as 
the possibility of a law suit, favour ex ante regulation. Indeed, regulation might be 
needed to prevent externalities causing large losses, for which professionals may be 
insolvent or for which there is lack of evidence. When applying these determinants 
specifically to the regulation of professions in order to determine whether regulation or 
liability is needed to cure a problem caused by market failure, it can be said that the 
criteria seem to apply, especially to the cases of externalities and information asymme-
try, while they do not seem to be applicable at all to cases involving market failure 
caused by the market power of public goods.293 In this regard it should be noted that 
liability rules can also be created by self-regulatory associations, so that they can design 
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punishment regimes specifically to achieve the incentivisation required for their mem-
bers to achieve good quality. However, as noted above, self-regulatory regimes may not 
provide the correct incentives to set appropriate levels of punishment or redress.294 It 
follows that a complete solution to the problem of risk control should involve the joint 
use of liability and regulation, with the balance of them reflecting the importance of the 
determinants.295 After all, regulation is rather static (inflexible) and can more easily be 
influenced by rent-seeking behaviour.296 Moreover, there may be problems of enforce-
ment. The creation of an independent monitoring and regulatory committee may be the 
solution to controlling risky activities. 
 
Even though professionals would have acted in accordance with all applicable legisla-
tion, it is still possible that a loss may be caused to third parties. Their rights on compen-
sation may not be impaired simply because the professional lived up to the regulation. 
As indicated above, the observance of these rules is just a minimum; the professional 
still has to take all possible precautions which are deemed necessary under tort law to 
avoid the possibility that his activities cause harm to third parties.297 
4. Compensation for damage 
4.1. Insurance: general principles 
Notwithstanding the use of liability rules, regulation or other instrument damage can 
still occur. In this paragraph I will discuss the traditional compensation mechanism: 
insurance. 
 The utilitarian approach with respect to insurance demonstrates that risk creates a 
disutility for risk averse persons. Their utility can be increased through loss spreading, 
or if the small probability of a large loss is taken away from the injurer, in exchange for 
the certainty of a small loss being the payment of a premium.298 This last option is the 
rationale behind insurance. Insurance can also be used to reduce transaction costs since 
it has been decided ex ante who will intervene if damage occurs. 
 As pointed out in paragraph 11.3.6.1, the behaviour of the insured party will change 
as soon as the risk is removed from him (moral hazard) since there are no incentives for 
care taking which used to be present due to the deterrent effect of having to pay com-
pensation in the event of damage. Shavell has indicated that there are two ways of con-
trolling this problem: firstly by an appropriate adaptation of the premium; secondly by 
partially exposing the insured to a risk.299 
 However, the determination of the appropriate premium is not easy, since informa-
tion on the insured is not readily available to the insurance company which has to invest 
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costs to obtain some knowledge. Furthermore in the event of a partial exposure to the 
risk, some risk aversion will still remain. Often a combination of both systems is applied 
to control moral hazard. It follows that the incentives for care taking are, in that case, no 
longer based upon liability law since the threat of having to compensate a victim is 
shifted to the insurance company. 
 Since insurance is based on a system of loss spreading, risk pools have to be con-
structed as narrowly as possible, so that the average premium corresponds with the risk 
of most pool members. If this is not the case, and parties would not disclose their risk 
profile appropriately, the narrowing of the risk pools might be endangered, meaning 
that the average premium would be relatively high for low risk members who would 
then leave the group (adverse selection).300 As noted by Priest, the adverse selection 
problem can thus only be cured by an appropriate risk differentiation.301 
 
Compulsory liability insurance is often advanced as a means of protecting the innocent 
victim. In this way the victim is protected against the insolvency of the injurer. How-
ever, liability insurance is also an instrument to increase the utility of a risk averse in-
jurer. It can thus be argued that insurance is not only beneficial for the architect’s client, 
but also for the architect. However a duty to buy insurance might be inefficient if it 
forces persons to purchase liability insurance while they actually have no need for it. 
Since insurance does not increase everyone’s expected utility (big architectural firms 
might not have a need to insure for a loss of 25,000 Euros, while a single architect might 
have this need), a general insurance obligation might create a social loss. Even those 
who have no demand for insurance are still obliged to pay premiums in situations in 
which professional liability insurance is mandatory. Since parties have different atti-
tudes towards risk, and hence different needs, it seems that an insurance obligation is 
generally not welfare increasing. In this regard it should be noted that, even without 
such obligation, those who are risk averse will probably buy insurance anyway. How-
ever, since parties are not always able to make an accurate assessment of the risk they are 
exposed to, insurance can protect them against underestimation of possible damages. 
Another justification for compulsory insurance is the protection of the victim against 
the insolvency of the injurer. If, due to the extent of the damage, the wealth of the in-
jurer is exceeded, the victim can still be compensated via insurance. On the other hand, 
insolvency may cause problems of underdeterrence. If the expected damage is lower 
than the injurer’s assets, he will only purchase liability insurance up to the amount of his 
assets, since he cannot lose more than he owns in a liability suit.302 The underdeterrence 
and underinsurance problems can be cured by compulsory liability insurance.303 If this is 
the case, the insurer has incentives to control the insured’s actions, and to check 
whether he has taken the necessary care to avoid damages.304 It follows that there might 
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be a case for compulsory insurance in the event of insolvency. However it should be 
questioned whether this is the best way to remedy the insolvency problem, certainly 
having regard to the fact that there will always be a moral hazard problem with liability 
insurance. Other possibilities, such as first party insurance, might cure the problem at 
lower cost and thus be more proportional to achieving the objective. This will not be 
further discussed within this thesis. However, it should be noted that, in the event of 
compulsory liability insurance, often the total risk is shifted to the insurer, which 
strengthens the moral hazard and brings about higher premiums. Furthermore, in in-
surance markets which are not fairly competitive, the insurer will have fewer incentives 
to align the premium with the insured’s individual behaviour. Even though the govern-
ment can decide that professionals are obliged to buy insurance, this does not mean that 
insurance companies are willing to cover the risks. Indeed, between the insurer and the 
professional, a contractual relationship will arise, but parties are not obliged to enter 
into an agreement. It follows that the insurance company has a lot of power, certainly if 
professionals are not allowed to practise their profession without being insured. This is 
questionable from a policy point of view.305 As noted by Faure, the creation of a duty for 
insurance companies to accept coverage seems like an extremely dangerous path to 
follow, given the importance of an effective control of moral hazard.306 He argues that 
the monitoring of the risk ex ante is an important instrument with regard to controlling 
moral hazard. This could ultimately lead an insurance undertaking to the decision that it 
considers the risk to be too high. To have an optimal control of moral hazard, insurance 
companies should be able to decide freely whether or not they want to insure a party. 
Finally, another problem exists in the fact that the insurer cannot invoke defences 
against the third party beneficiary of insurance, since these are not opposable to third 
parties. This means that the insurer has to compensate the victim, but can institute pro-
ceedings against the insured to claim the money back. This will only lead to results if the 
insured is not insolvent. 
4.2. Professional liability insurance in Belgium and the Netherlands 
In Belgium, all registered architects are obliged by law to buy professional liability in-
surance. It follows that insurers are at least certain that those who are mandatorily in-
sured are professionals with the required qualifications. Of course, other persons are 
also allowed to buy insurance, but these are not allowed to engage in architectural activi-
ties for buildings requiring a building permit. Since architects are the only professionals 
in the building industry who are obliged to buy insurance, while they are often held 
liable in solidum with the entrepreneur, it appears that the risk is shifted to those with 
the deepest pockets. Liability insurance increases the utility of risk averse architects. 
Since architects are thus held liable quite often (see Chapter 6), the insurance premium 
is quite high. Mandatory insurance also brings about high transaction costs every time a 
contract is concluded. At first sight, this might also have an effect on the premium to be 
paid by the architect, which architects, in their turn, can include in the price their clients 
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have to pay for their services. In this regard it should be noted that architects who are 
not risk-averse, and hence have no demand for insurance, have to pay the premium as 
well.307 Another potential danger of liability insurance is that there will always be a moral 
hazard problem. It follows that insurers should be able to cure this problem by monitor-
ing the insured, which does not seem to be easy and might be very costly. This, in turn, 
might lead to higher premiums for architects and higher prices for clients. It follows that 
higher premiums are not a necessary corollary of a mandatory insurance obligation. 
 On the other hand, it is possible that the architect is not able to make an accurate 
assessment of the risk he is exposed to, and the benefits of buying liability insurance 
(information problems). In a situation in which he underestimates the risk and does not 
buy insurance, compulsory liability insurance might be a solution to safeguard his own 
assets and those of his client in the event that the architect is insolvent. Insolvency may 
pose a problem of underdeterrence. As stated above, if the expected damage exceeds the 
architect’s assets, the architect will only have incentives to purchase liability insurance 
up to the amount of his own assets. Since the damage caused by a fault in a design or a 
fault in the supervision of the building work is generally quite substantial, a duty to 
purchase insurance coverage for the amount of the expected loss protects the building 
master (and certain third parties) better than when he is confronted with an insolvent 
and uninsured architect. Insolvency may cause architects to externalize harm by provid-
ing services that might cause harm which largely exceeds their assets. By buying insur-
ance, these costs can be internalized (Coase) if the insurer cures the moral hazard prob-
lem, for example by setting appropriate policy conditions and asking an adequate pre-
mium. In this way the costs will not be carried by society at large. Compulsory insurance 
might therefore remedy problems of underdeterrence and undercompensation. 
 
In the Netherlands, on the other hand, there is no insurance obligation, except for 
members of the BNA. Membership of the BNA provides the assurance that the profes-
sional has the required qualifications to use the title of architect. Other persons who are 
not architects can also buy insurance for damage that can occur during their de-
sign/supervision activities. Furthermore, standard conditions also often impose the 
obligation to be insured. This also brings about transaction costs. Since this is all based 
upon contract law, insurers are generally free to decide whether or not they want to 
insure someone. It seems logical that they are more likely to insure professionals hold-
ing a diploma or certificate than those lacking any qualifications. 
It follows that there is a trade-off between the benefits and costs of compulsory insur-
ance for architects and their clients. Since the damage caused by a fault in the design or 
the supervision of the building works is generally quite high, mandatory liability insur-
ance might be more in the interests of society (and thus more efficient with regard to 
compensating for damage) than liability rules without mandatory insurance. There is a 
real risk that the magnitude of the damage exceeds the architect’s assets. However, it is 
also possible to force the architect ex ante to provide a certain compensation, bank 
guarantee or other kind of payment as guarantee of compensation in the event that 
damage occurs. In such cases, architects are still liable in the event that the damage is 
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attributable to them, but are not obliged to buy insurance. This would be a flexible solu-
tion provided that it enables that damage is compensated adequately ex post, since the 
architect can choose any market solution.308 
5. Conclusion 
Since activities carried out by an architect can cause harm, architects need incentives to 
take good care. Externalities can be internalized in different ways: moral persuasion, 
taxes, liability rules and regulation. Furthermore, contracting parties may also agree 
themselves that certain rules are applicable within their relationship, in addition to the 
rules created by the state or the professional association (Coase theorem). 
 In this regard, the classic economic analysis of law starts from the assumption that, 
by exposing the costs of their actions to liability rules, parties will be motivated to take 
optimal care to prevent accidents. In this way, a reduction in the total social costs of 
accidents can be achieved, since it is at the level of care that the costs of prevention and 
expected damage are minimised. However, for liability rules to work effectively, there 
must be a victim and an identifiable injurer who is able to pay damage compensation. 
This is not always the case, which means that other possibilities have to be resorted to, 
such as regulation, either by the government or by self-regulating organizations. The 
architectural profession is characterized by high levels of regulation. This is often a mix 
of State regulation, self-regulation and custom and practice, which has evolved over a 
number of years. In spite of all the regulation policies, standard economic theory pre-
dicts that, in a ‘perfect market’, an unregulated outcome is optimal, in that consumer 
welfare can only be improved to the detriment of producer welfare, and vice versa.309 It 
follows that there is a certain tension between, on the one hand, the need for a certain 
level of regulation in the professions and, on the other, competition law. However, in 
the liberal professions which are characterized by high levels of information asymmetry, 
there will always be a problem of market failure and some degree of regulation will al-
ways be necessary. As suggested by Miller, governmental regulation is not always cost 
efficient, since the government is not always the party with the best knowledge on a 
certain matter.310 Furthermore public regulatory regimes are not that flexible, while the 
costs of regulation are spread over society as a whole. 
 
In this thesis it has been demonstrated that the regulation of the architectural title 
should be preferred over the regulation of the profession, since the latter can be replaced 
by other mechanisms to guarantee high quality. Even though a professional monopoly 
might be justified to protect quality, it is not proportional, and is likely to benefit pre-
dominantly the professionals themselves. It has been demonstrated also that price fix-
ing, advertising restrictions (except those aimed at false and misleading advertising), 
and restrictions to business structure, are not cost-efficient. In this regard it can be 
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stated that the entry to the profession is more heavily regulated in Belgium than in the 
Netherlands. Indeed, since only registered architects are allowed to design buildings for 
which a building permit is required, Belgian architects have a monopoly to design such 
buildings. It follows that more competition is possible in the Netherlands since there is 
no professional monopoly as in Belgium. Since the Dutch situation demonstrates that 
other ex ante tools such as the Building Decree can also protect the quality of buildings, 
without the negative effects as far as the restriction of competition is concerned, it might 
be assumed that, according to the public interest theory, the tool used in Belgium to 
cure market failure goes too far. Since market competition is already restricted to those 
who are allowed to use the title, the cure might be worse than the disease. Curing market 
failure by licensing does therefore not seem to be the most efficient solution. Certifica-
tion is recommended over licensing since clients still have the choice with regard to 
engaging an architect. Those who turn to a professional who is allowed to use the title of 
architect, are sure that the latter does have a certain educational background and/or 
some professional experience. A less extreme option to deal with the monopoly prob-
lem, next to its abolishment, can be found in the extension of the monopoly to other 
experts who also have the relevant knowledge and know-how.311 This might even be the 
case for certain entrepreneurs. 
 Furthermore, even though the prohibition of architects associating with entrepre-
neurs in Belgium might be justified for public interest reasons, since the architect should 
be able to work in total independence, it might be questioned whether this restriction, 
which does not exist in the Netherlands, is proportional. In any case, cost-benefit analy-
ses have demonstrated that business restrictions bring about more costs. 
 
My research aimed to determine whether the intensity of regulation is linked to the 
intensity of contract law which entails that I wanted to determine whether a higher level 
of regulation entails a less stringent contract law system of contract law with a lesser 
degree of contractual responsibilities and liabilities. 
 As pointed out in Part II, architects and their clients generally lay down their re-
spective rights and obligations in a written contract. These contracts are concluded since 
regulations are often weak, and cannot always be enforced. Contracts can be a useful 
(complementary) tool with regard to curing market failure.312 However, concluding 
private agreements brings about high transaction costs, since parties have to negotiate 
the content of the contract. In this regard, standard conditions can be created which 
only bring about high transaction costs at the time of creation, and which can be 
adapted to the specific needs of every new situation. Especially in the Netherlands, stan-
dard conditions with an arbitration clause, often form part of the agreement. It follows 
that self-regulation also has an influence on private law. Arbitration is popular since 
disputes will be resolved by a body which is composed of professionals in the building 
industry (entrepreneurs, architects, engineers) but also of building masters, who have a 
better knowledge than regular judges with regard to design/construction problems. It 
                                                                
311 De Caluwe 1997, pp. 20-22. 
312 Contract law provides the default rules, in case transaction costs (search and information costs, barganing 
and decision costs and policing and enforcement costs) are too high. 
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follows that there are fewer administrative costs which means that disputes can be re-
solved more quickly and less expensively. Arbitrators’ verdicts may be more accurate 
and predictable than those of a court, since arbitrators possess industry expertise. Of 
course when arbitrators have to decide upon complex or novel cases, it is also difficult to 
predict the decision.313 As noted by Van den Bergh, alternative dispute settlement be-
tween private parties is only desirable if they increase society’s wealth and are democ-
ratically legitimized.314 This desirability depends on the absence of information asymme-
try and negative external effects. If parties decide ex ante to resort to dispute settlement 
by means of arbitration, one can assume that this is useful for them so that this agree-
ment has to be honoured, but this does not mean that the state has to encourage alterna-
tive dispute settlement.315 In a situation of possible information asymmetry and possible 
negative externalities, a further cost benefit analysis is required before the desirability of 
an alternative dispute settlement can be determined. 316 
 
Due to the regulatory differences with regard to the architectural profession between 
Belgium and the Netherlands, one might expect that parties which are subjected to the 
Dutch legislation which is more lenient when it comes to professional qualifications, 
registration, mandatory insurance, etc. impose heavier requirements in their contracts 
in order to guarantee quality and limit externalities. With regard to the contractual 
liability of architects, it seems that both in Belgium and the Netherlands, architects are 
generally liable for negligence. Furthermore, the ten year liability principle which is laid 
down by Belgian public regulation, and which is of public order, cannot be contractually 
deviated from, and thus always forms part of the contract as well. It follows that this 
principle is a heavier burden for architects than the five year liability period which is 
generally laid down in the Dutch standard regulations. The heavier burden on architects 
in Belgium is strengthened by the fact that they are often held liable in solidum with 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, Dutch architects are also allowed to limited the extent of 
their liability (see Article 15 NR), while clauses that limit the extent of the architect’s 
                                                                
313 As held by Bernstein, the settlement of disputes through arbitration is taken a step further in the diamond 
industry in which all dealers of diamonds must sign an agreement to submit all disputes arising from the 
diamond business between dealers to the club’s arbitration system. Arbitration awards are kept strictly se-
cret to protect the reputation of those who are subject to a procedure. Since the system is based upon trust, 
members are not allowed seek redress in regular courts. Behaviour which does not fulfil the social values of 
the Jewish society is sanctioned informally. In this way the diamond industry has been able to use reputa-
tion at a cost low enough to create a system of private law, enabling most transactions to be consummated 
and most contracts enforced completely outside the legal system. See Bernstein 1992, pp. 115-157. It 
should be noted however, that this cannot be compared to the Dutch arbitration system as discussed be-
fore, since parties are free to decide whether or not disputes will be settled by arbitration. Furthermore, the 
arbitration procedure in the diamond industry, as discussed by Bernstein, only refers to procedures be-
tween professional dealers, while the Dutch Council of Arbitration and the Arbitration Institute for the 
Building Industry often deal with disputes between professionals and consumers.  
314 Van den Bergh 2008, p. 795. See also Shavell 1995, p. 3. 
315 Van den Bergh 2008, p. 795; Shavell 1995, p. 8: ‘If parties have inadequate information about the benefits 
of alternative dispute resolution and this information cannot be effectively communicated to them, the 
promotion of alternative dispute resolution can be justified. The same is true if alternative dispute resolu-
tion might positively affect third parties.’.  
316 An alternative dispute resolution agreement between the building master and the architects might not give 
proper attention to the rights of the entrepreneur or of third parties who suffered damage.  
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liability are, in principle, void in Belgium. It can therefore be concluded that in Belgium 
and the Netherlands, the intensity of contractual liability is not linked to the intensity of 
regulation. 
 
With regard to compulsory liability insurance, it can be held that there is a trade-off 
between the benefits and costs for both architects and their clients. Since the damage 
caused by a fault in the design or the supervision of the building works is generally quite 
high, mandatory liability insurance might be more in the interests of society (and thus 
more efficient when it comes to compensating for damage) than liability rules without 
mandatory insurance. However, it is also possible to force the architect ex ante to pro-
vide certain compensation, a bank guarantee or another kind of payment as guarantee 
of compensation in the event that damage occurs. In such a case, architects are still li-
able in the event that the damage is attributable to them, but are not obliged to buy 
insurance. This would be a flexible solution provided that it enables damage to be com-
pensated for adequately ex post, since the architect can choose any market solution. 
 
Even though the underdeterrence and underinsurance problems can be cured by com-
pulsory liability insurance, it should be questioned whether this is the best way to rem-
edy the insolvency problem, certainly having regard to the fact that there will always be 
a moral hazard problem with liability insurance. In a situation of compulsory liability 
insurance, often the total risk is shifted to the insurer, since the legislator often limits the 
possibilities to expose the insured to risk. In this way the duty to insure is often equal to 
the total amount of liability which strengthens the moral hazard and brings about higher 
premiums. Other possibilities, such as first party insurance, might cure the problem at a 
lower cost, and thus may be more proportional to achieve the objective. Since architects 
are obliged by law to buy professional liability insurance in Belgium, while this only is 
the case for BNA members in the Netherlands, it can be said that the Belgian system is 
not efficient, since architects who are not risk averse have to pay the premium as well. 
Furthermore, since architects are the only professionals in the building industry who are 
obliged to buy insurance, while they are often held liable in solidum with the entrepre-
neur, it appears that the risk is shifted to those with the deepest pockets. However, since 
BNA members have to buy insurance, and since standard terms often also contain an 
insurance obligation, it can be said that there is not such a big difference between the 
two states. In any case, as pointed out in Part II, the limitation of architectural liability 
by means of a private company with limited liability, is cheaper than the limitation of 
liability through contractual clauses. However, while this might be beneficial for archi-
tects, it is not desirable from a society’s point of view since an architect can ‘hide’ behind 
a legal person to safeguard his personal wealth. In this way only the capital of the com-
pany is at risk whenever a professional fault occurs, while the professional’s personal 
wealth is exempted from any claims. This again brings about problems of underdeter-
rence of architects and undercompensation of victims, and is thus not efficient in terms 
of compensating for possible damage. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
SUMMARY 
The profession of architect embraces a myriad of skills, abilities and know-how, and is a 
multi-layered proficiency. Architects do not only create a design for certain construc-
tion activities, but also provide a broad selection of services such as preparing and moni-
toring construction activities, applying for planning permission, land surveying, the 
issuing of planning permission applications, holding feasibility studies, guiding clients, 
integrating technical, social and economic problems that arise in connection with build-
ing works, etc. However, due to the new technological developments and the high de-
mands of clients, individual architects often specialize in a certain field, and engage 
other specialists such as engineers to help them with more technical issues. 
 
In the European Union, the architectural profession is practised by approximately 
436,280 persons. Due to the creation of the internal market, these professionals should 
be able to practise their profession in the EU without facing unjustified or dispropor-
tional restrictions. Due to the general non-discrimination principle contained in Article 
18 TFEU (ex Article 12 EC) and the free movement rights of Union citizens (Article 21 
TFEU – ex Article 18 EC), and of workers (Article 45 TFEU – ex Article 39 EC) and self-
employed professionals in particular (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU – Articles 43 and 49 EC), 
Member States are not allowed to impose unjustified or disproportional restrictions that 
are directly or indirectly based upon the architects’ nationality. Since States (and profes-
sional organisations) could not reach an agreement about the content of architectural 
studies due to the substantial differences in the national architectural educations, there 
is no minimum harmonization of architectural educations at EU level. However, a Di-
rective on mutual recognition of professional qualifications of architects was created in 
1985 (Directive 85/384/EEC) and is now replaced and updated by Directive 2005/36/EC. 
This Directive indicates that Member States are not allowed to restrict the free provision 
of architectural services, and several cases were decided by the ECJ on the basis of this 
Directive. With regard to the freedom of establishment, the Directive provides, in Chap-
ter III of Title III, for the automatic recognition of qualifications of EU nationals if these 
satisfy the requirements enumerated in Articles 46 or 47. All national qualifications 
Chapter 12 
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which are enumerated in annex V.7 to the Directive, fulfil these requirements. If a di-
ploma is not listed in one of the annexes, Chapter I of Title III of the Directive can be 
relied on if certain conditions are fulfilled with regard to the level of the qualifications 
obtained. If the duration of the training in the home Member State is at least one year 
shorter than that required by the host Member State, or if the training in the home state 
covers substantially different matters than that in the host state, recognition can be 
granted if certain compensation measures in the form of an aptitude test or an adapta-
tion period are fulfilled. Overall, it can be held that Directive 2005/36/EC contains a 
clear system that allows EU architects to move and practise in another Member State. 
The qualifications of EU architects who do not fulfil the requirements of the Directive 
should also be examined by the Member States before taking a decision in accordance 
with the Gebhard and Vlassopoulou rulings of the ECJ. Experience gained in another 
Member State should be taken into account, as well as the experience and qualifications 
obtained in a third-country (Haim, Hocsman). Directive 2005/36/EC is, as such, not 
applicable to third-country nationals. However, in Gül, the ECJ held that the profes-
sional qualifications of certain third-country nationals should also be taken into account 
in accordance with the Vlassopoulou ruling. 
 
With the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, the Member States established a legal basis in Title 
IV of the EC Treaty to create a common European immigration policy within an ‘Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice’. Since then, several initiatives have been undertaken 
which centre on the rights of legally residing third-country nationals. Directives have 
been issued which provide architects holding the nationality of a third country with 
certain free movement rights if a number of conditions are fulfilled. Furthermore, asso-
ciation and partnership agreements have been concluded by the EU and several third-
countries. However the situation of third-country nationals is still far from being equal 
or comparable to that of EU architects, since their rights are generally provided within 
the limits provided for by the national legislation of the host state. 
 
The recognition of professional qualifications has to be distinguished from academic 
recognition. Academic recognition still falls within the Member States’ sovereign powers 
(Article 165 TFEU). However, over time, the ECJ has developed case law which does not 
necessarily respect this strict division of power, and is applicable to those who are in the 
process of becoming a fully-fledged professional. Member States have decided to stan-
dardize rules in this area within the Bologna process that takes place outside the realm 
of the EU at intergovernmental level, and aims to create convergence, yet not the stan-
dardisation of European higher education. The Lisbon Recognition Convention, which 
was created within the framework of the Council of Europe, aims to give every applicant 
appropriate access to an assessment of his/her foreign academic qualifications, and 
adopts the idea of acceptance unless there are substantial educational differences, but 
does not foresee the harmonisation of architectural studies. It remains to be seen 
whether this Convention will genuinely contribute to free movement. 
 
This thesis has revealed that the architectural profession is characterized by quite a high 
level of regulation. This is often a mix of State regulation, self-regulation created by the 
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professional associations and custom and practice, and has evolved over a number of 
years. 
 Compared with other liberal professions, the regulatory situation of architects is 
bipolar in that the market entry regulations in some countries of the EU are relatively 
broad and rigid (e.g. in Belgium, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Luxembourg) where in other countries the regulations are comparatively 
liberal (e.g. in the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, England/Wales and Ire-
land). Market conduct regulation is generally very limited. 
 Next to the fact that regulations can limit the free movement of professionals, they 
can also restrict free competition in the European Union. EU competition law can be 
applicable to rules created by architectural associations if the rules have an impact on 
the EU market and affect trade between Member States. Next to market entry restric-
tions, price fixing, structural restrictions and advertising restrictions are able to hinder 
free competition. 
 
The discussion of the situation of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands has re-
vealed that there are crucial differences with regard to the right to use the title (profes-
sional qualifications) and the right to practise the profession. While in Belgium only 
those who are in the possession of the required qualifications are allowed to practise the 
architectural profession and the customer is even obliged to engage an architect for all 
constructions requiring a building permit, in the Netherlands anyone can practise the 
profession. The use of the title is reserved only for those holding the necessary diploma. 
As indicated by research conducted by Mirza & Nacey, the architectural clientele, as well 
as the revenue of architects, differ considerably between states. In Belgium, architects 
are more often consulted by private individuals than in the Netherlands, while architects 
are more often engaged by developers and local governments in the Netherlands than in 
Belgium. This is also noticeable in the building landscape which, in Belgium, is charac-
terized by houses built in different styles, while the Dutch building environment is, due 
to public policy, recognised by whole villages containing more or less the same houses. 
 Architects in Belgium earn less than their Dutch colleagues. 
 
With regard to contractual obligations and liabilities, it should be noted that in both 
states the main tasks of architects are the design and supervision of building work. In 
Belgium, after the reception of the building work, the architect is only liable for hidden 
defects and in the event of deceit. Furthermore, there is a ten year liability period with 
regard to serious defects which have caused the building to perish totally or partially. 
There is no possibility of limiting this prescription period. Since defects in the design or 
supervision of building works are generally liable to cause severe damage, building mas-
ters frequently invoke the ten year responsibility of architects. 
 Architects are often held liable. The Dutch Civil Code indicates that claims for 
damage due to shortcomings in the performance of a contract, prescribe five years after 
the discovery of the defect and, in the event of no discovery, ten years after the damage 
has been caused. However, it is possible to contractually deviate from these prescription 
periods. This is often done by the use of standard conditions that mostly provide for a 
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five year liability period. In the Netherlands, architects can also contractually limit the 
extent of their liability. 
 
Since activities carried out by an architect can cause harm, architects need incentives to 
take good care. In this regard, the classic economic analysis of law starts from the as-
sumption that, by exposing the costs of their actions to liability rules, parties will be 
motivated to take optimal care to prevent accidents. However, for liability rules to work 
effectively, there must be a victim and an identifiable injurer who is able to pay damage 
compensation. This is not always the case, which means that other possibilities have to 
be resorted to, such as regulation, either by the government or by self-regulating organi-
zations. However, when a building contains a certain default, the building master always 
has the possibility to turn to the architect who is – next to the entrepreneur and other 
building partners – immediately identifiable as a possible injurer. After all, the building 
master has concluded a contract with these professionals. Even third parties will proba-
bly not have to make much effort to become acquainted with the identity of the archi-
tect: there might be publicity on the building site, they can ask neighbours or the build-
ing master who will probably not hesitate to refer the injured parties to the architect to 
escape any responsibility himself. Nevertheless, due to the problem of information 
asymmetry, the building master is generally not in the position to determine the level of 
quality that should be provided, or the respective responsibilities of the engaged build-
ing partners. It follows that regulation is still needed to cure this market failure. 
 Standard economic theory has predicted that, in a perfect market, an unregulated 
outcome is optimal. It follows that there is a certain tension between, on the one hand, 
the need for a certain level of regulation in the professions and, on the other, competi-
tion law. According to the public interest theory, four conditions need to be fulfilled in 
order to obtain a general equilibrium in an economy with perfect competition: there are 
many small and identical producers who cannot significantly influence the price level, 
and who sell homogeneous products in their respective markets; there is perfect infor-
mation in such an economy, so that all market participants are informed about all (equi-
librium) prices and the characteristics of goods; there are no external effects; the prod-
ucts are private goods. Since the advice and service provided by an architect is generally 
so specific that another client in slightly different circumstances may not be able to use 
it, architectural services can, in principle, not be qualified as public goods. However 
Member States and professional associations often impose requirements upon architects 
before they can enter the profession. In Belgium, architects even possess a monopoly in 
the construction market with regard to designing and supervising buildings. In this 
regard it should be noted that the architectural profession is -certainly within the tradi-
tional construction process in which the architect’s clients are generally one-time con-
sumers – characterized by a high level of information asymmetry. This can lead to ad-
verse selection: consumers cannot evaluate the properties of the supplied services, and 
professionals are inclined to provide low quality services which are then bought by the 
consumers. Furthermore, a moral hazard problem arises: clients are not able to deter-
mine whether the architect is working in their best interests, and are not able to sanction 
the architect’s attitude. It follows that a problem of market failure is present within the 
architectural services market so that some degree of regulation will always be necessary. 
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This is strengthened by the fact that negative externalities can appear every time the 
quality of the service rendered by the architect is not high, and damages are caused. 
However, even though market failure, consumer protection and a high quality of the 
building environment seem to be valid reasons for entry regulation, the Dutch situation 
demonstrates that other ex ante tools such as the Dutch Building Decree can also protect 
the quality of buildings without the negative effects relating to the restriction of compe-
tition. It follows that it can be argued that, according to the public interest theory, the 
licensing system in Belgium goes too far in terms of curing market failure, since it seems 
that less restrictive measures -and thus more proportionate tools – are able to obtain the 
same effect: a high quality building environment. The same might be said of the prohibi-
tion of Belgian architects when it comes to practising the profession of entrepreneur. It 
should be noted however, that even though there is no monopoly in the Netherlands, 
the prices for ‘Dutch’ architectural services are higher. Liberalization does not guarantee 
lower prices or increased competition. 
 The private interest approach, on the other hand, indicates that regulation is not an 
answer to market failure, but the result of rent-seeking behaviour by interest groups. 
The Belgian Architects’ Order and the Dutch Bureau can determine who may use the 
professional title. The Order and the Dutch BNA, of which membership is not manda-
tory, can impose punishments on individuals not complying with the deontology and 
ask for financial contributions as a condition of membership. These institutions have 
therefore influential powers over their members and persons wanting to enter the pro-
fession. 
 
This thesis has revealed that, with regard to the architectural profession, a combination 
of ex ante regulation and liability rules seems optimal. Since bad quality services pro-
vided by architects can cause harm to the building master and third parties, ex ante 
regulation is needed to determine the desired level of professional qualifications and the 
desired level of quality. However, if professionals who do fulfil these requirements can-
not be sued, liability rules are also needed. Since a liability regime will not provide for 
sufficient incentives if the architect is not able to pay for the damage caused, his insur-
ance coverage is important. A potential danger of liability insurance is the presence of a 
moral hazard problem if only the insurer pays for the damage caused. This problem can 
be solved by an appropriate adaptation of the premium and/or by exposing the insured 
partially to the risk. In this regard compulsory liability insurance is often advanced as a 
means to protect the innocent victim. A trade-off exists between its benefits and costs 
for both architects and their clients. Compulsory insurance might remedy problems of 
underdeterrence and undercompensation, since the prospective costs can be internal-
ized if the insurer cures the moral hazard problem, for example, by setting appropriate 
policy conditions and asking for an adequate premium. Since the damage caused by a 
fault in the design or the supervision of the building works is generally quite high, man-
datory liability insurance might be more in the interests of society (and thus more effi-
cient when it comes to compensating damage) than liability rules without mandatory 
insurance. If the architect is not able to make an accurate assessment of the risk he is 
exposed to, compulsory liability insurance might be a solution to safeguard his own 
assets and those of his client in the event of insolvency. In Belgium, all registered archi-
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tects are obliged by law to buy professional liability insurance. In this way the problem 
of underdeterrence caused by insolvency can be cured, so that the victim can be pro-
tected against possible bankruptcy of his architect. It follows that compulsory liability 
insurance internalizes these negative external effects. However, since architects in Bel-
gium are the only professionals in the building industry who are obliged to buy insur-
ance, while they are often held liable in solidum with the entrepreneur, it appears that 
the risk is shifted to those with the deepest pockets. This might also have an effect on the 
premium to be paid by the architect, who, in turn, can include it in the price their clients 
have to pay for their services. In the Netherlands, there is no insurance obligation, ex-
cept for members of the BNA (more than 3,000 architects, that is approximately one-
third of all architects). Standard terms generally also provide for mandatory insurance, 
with the result that the majority of architects are covered by insurance. Even though it 
might be argued that the Belgian system is not cost-efficient, since architects who are 
not risk-averse have to pay the premium as well, while there will always be a moral haz-
ard problem, it should be noted that this conclusion should be considered in the light of 
the number of architects who risk insolvency. Empirical research is needed to determine 
the number of architects belonging to this category. If the risk of underdeterrence is 
considerable, the Dutch system might also be inefficient. In any case, other possibilities 
with regard to providing compensation, such as a bank guarantee, should also be con-
sidered. 
 
After this brief summary, I will now answer my research questions, and the problem 
definition formulated in Chapter 1.2 of this thesis. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
Is there legislation or case law at EU level that determines who should be allowed to use 
the title of architect or to practise the profession and how the profession should be 
practised?  
Due to the fact that discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited within the 
scope of the Treaty, and due to the free movement rights of workers and self-employed 
professionals (Articles 18, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU), the Union has provided EU architects 
with a legal framework to move within the EU, without having to face unjustified or 
disproportional restrictions that are directly or indirectly based upon their nationality. 
After almost eighteen years of negotiation, Directive 85/384/EEC on the mutual recog-
nition of architectural qualifications was created. This has now been updated and re-
placed by Directive 2005/36/EC that regulates the freedom of establishment, and the 
freedom to provide services on the part of EU architects. Title II of Directive 
2005/36/EC deals with the freedom to provide services, and holds that Member States 
are not allowed to restrict the free provision of services. However, service providers are 
subject to the professional rules which are applicable in the host Member State. With 
regard to the freedom of establishment, the Directive contains an automatic recognition 
system in Chapter III of Title III of the qualifications of EU architects if these qualifica-
tions satisfy the requirements enumerated in Article 46 or 47. The qualifications enu-
merated in annex V.7 to the Directive are all considered to satisfy the necessary re-
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quirements of Article 46. Article 49 deals with specific qualifications (listed in Annex 
VI.6) which do not satisfy the minimum requirements laid down in Article 46, but 
which also have to be recognized. It follows that Belgian architects in the possession of a 
diploma in one of the Annexes are allowed to practise and use their title in the Nether-
lands (and any other Member State) and vice versa. If a certain diploma is not listed in 
one of the annexes, Chapter I of the Directive can be relied on if certain conditions are 
fulfilled, and recognition should also be granted. In the case of substantial differences, 
compensation measures can be demanded in the form of an aptitude test or an adapta-
tion period. These have to be proportional, and must take into account the experience 
and knowledge already gained. It can be held that Directive 2005/36/EC contains a clear 
and useful system which EU architects can invoke when moving to another Member 
State. As held by Article 2(2) of the Directive, each Member State may permit Member 
State nationals’ in possession of evidence of professional qualifications not obtained in a 
Member State, to pursue a regulated profession on its territory, in accordance with its 
rules. It follows that under the Directive, Member States are not obliged to let such pro-
fessionals carry out activities in their territory. However, evidence of formal qualifica-
tions issued by a third country shall be regarded as evidence of formal qualifications if 
the holder has three years’ professional experience in the profession concerned, on the 
territory of the Member State which recognised these formal qualifications in accor-
dance with Article 2(2) (see Article 3(3)). Due to the case law of the ECJ, the qualifica-
tions of EU architects who cannot rely upon the Directive should also be examined by 
the Member States before taking a decision (Gebhard, Vlassopoulou). Even if one cannot 
invoke the Directive, one can still try to rely on the principles provided for by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in Gebhard and Vlassopoulou. It follows that Member 
States are obliged to examine whether the work experience gained in another Member 
State corresponds to the experience required under national law. The same goes for 
qualifications obtained in a third country (see, for example, Haim and Hocsman). 
 Directive 2005/36/EC is not applicable to third-country nationals as such. These can 
invoke the Court’s ruling in Gül in which it was decided that certain third-country na-
tionals are entitled to access to employment and equal treatment as if they were an EU 
citizen. Furthermore, Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, confers extensive rights upon certain third-country family members of EU citi-
zens who made use of their free movement rights. Family members that have the right 
of residence or the right of permanent residence in a Member State are entitled to take 
up employment or self-employment and shall enjoy equal treatment with the host 
Member State’s nationals within the scope of the Treaty (Article 23 and 24). It follows 
that third-country architects who fall within the ambit of Directive 2004/38/EC, and 
hold a certain qualification obtained in a Member State, should be able to rely on Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC to obtain access to the same profession as exercised in that country 
under the same conditions as nationals of the host Member State. If such third-country 
nationals are in the possession of a specific qualification listed in Annex V.7, automatic 
recognition should take place in accordance with Chapter III of Title III of the Directive. 
If this is not the case, recognition can possibly be granted in accordance with the general 
system as described above. It should be noted, however, that if the Union citizen has not 
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made use of his free movement right, one deals with a purely internal situation in which 
national law prevails. In such a case, the non-discrimination principle and the principle 
of equal treatment (on the basis of nationality) do not apply. It is more likely, however, 
that a third-country national spouse is in the possession of a third-country qualification. 
If this is the case, Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC, which imposes equal treatment, 
and Article 3(3) of Directive 2005/36/EC, should be jointly used. It follows that the evi-
dence of formal qualifications issued by a third country has to be regarded as evidence 
of formal qualifications of an EU holder, if the individual has three years’ professional 
experience in the profession concerned, on the territory of the Member State which 
recognised that evidence of formal qualifications. In all other cases, the third-country 
national has to rely on the case law of the ECJ in Haim and Hocsman and Gül. It follows 
that all qualifications, even those obtained outside the EU, should be taken into account 
by comparing the specialized knowledge, abilities and experience certified, with the 
knowledge and qualifications required by national law. 
 
After the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, legislation is created regarding 
the legal migration of third-country nationals to the EU on the basis of five Directives 
and one draft Directive: Directive 2003/86/EC on the right of family reunification; Di-
rective 2003/109/EC on the status of long-term residents; Directive 2004/114/EC on the 
conditions of admission of students, pupils, unremunerated trainees and volunteers; 
Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-country national re-
searchers; Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employments; draft Directive on a 
single permit and a common set of rights. All these Directives contain a right for third-
country nationals to participate in the labour market of the host Member States after a 
certain period of time and/or under certain conditions. It is doubtful, however, that 
there is genuine equal treatment of these third-country nationals. Even though the Di-
rectives have led to the development of certain minimum standards which need to be 
respected by Member States, national implementing measures are rather restrictive and 
are, in some cases, even lowered to the minimum standards provided for in the Direc-
tives. The absence of a general policy for all types of workers demonstrates the unwill-
ingness of Member States to give up their sovereignty in immigration matters. However, 
with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for qualified majority 
voting in this area, it is expected that more legislation will be created granting third-
country nationals stronger rights. Furthermore, the Union has also concluded special 
Agreements with certain third-country states which provide for broader free movement 
rights. In this regard, the Association Agreement between the EC and Iceland, Liechten-
stein and Norway (European Economic Area), the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and other ex-Soviet states, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement and the Stabiliza-
tion and Association Agreements with the Balkan States, all foresee certain free move-
ment rights for third-country nationals. These agreements grant more or less extensive 
equal treatment rights to third-country nationals who are legally resident and employed 
in a Member State. However, with the exception of EEA and Swiss nationals, the condi-
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tions governing the right to entry fall entirely within the competence of the Member 
States. 
 
Finally mention should also be made of Directive 2006/123/EC which aims to simplify 
procedures, and provides professionals with a more flexible regime when providing 
services in another EU state. The core provision of Directive 2006/123/EC is Article 
16(1) which provides that Member States have to respect the right of providers to pro-
vide services in a Member State other than that in which they are established. The Direc-
tive strikes a certain balance between guaranteeing the rights of service providers to free 
access and free exercise of a service activity, whilst allowing Member States the right to 
invoke their most essential requirements in certain clearly-defined circumstances. It is 
said that this will definitively improve legal certainty for service providers and consum-
ers.  The Directive is underpinned by obligations on Member States to co-operate with, 
and assist, one another to ensure that businesses are properly and efficiently supervised 
across the EU, whilst avoiding the duplication of controls. Since the Directive makes it 
easier to establish anywhere in the EU, saving time and money, it provides a welcome 
boost to cross-border service provision. However, the list of limitations and exceptions 
to its scope can be expected to have heavily reduced the integrative potential of this 
instrument. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
Which national regulations and self-regulatory measures issued by professional asso-
ciations exist in Belgium and the Netherlands with regard to the architectural profes-
sion? 
- Market entry 
In Belgium, the Architects’ Act lays down, in detail, who is allowed to use the title of 
architect. In September 2009, 12,714 architects were registered in Belgium. In general, it 
can be said that Belgian and other EC/EEA nationals need to be in the possession of a 
particular diploma obtained in Belgium which requires five years of study. The architec-
tural specialisation within civil engineering education leads to the title of ‘civil engineer-
architect’ (university) while successful completion of the education at an academy (non-
university) leads to the title of ‘architect’. For persons who obtained their qualifications 
elsewhere in the EU/EEA, they are also allowed to use the title if these qualifications are 
listed in annex 1a and 2b which implement annex V.7 and VI of Directive 2005/36/EC. 
Under such circumstances, recognition should be granted automatically. If the qualifica-
tions do not conform to these requirements, it is possible to complete an aptitude test or 
adaptation period in accordance with the Act of 12 February 2008, instituting a new 
General Framework for the recognition of EC-qualifications which implements the 
general system mentioned in Chapter I of Title III of the Directive (Article 1 §5 AA). 
 
Professionals who obtained their qualifications outside the EU can invoke Article 1 §4 
AA which holds that the competent Belgian authorities will examine the qualifications 
which fall under the ambit of Directive 2005/36/EC, but which are obtained outside the 
EU if they were recognized by another Member State. The training/experience obtained 
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in another Member State will also be taken into account. As held by Article 1 §5, 4°, 
formal qualifications issued by a third state have to be equalized with EU qualifications 
if the holder has three years of professional experience on the territory of the Member 
State which has recognized the professional qualification, and confirms this professional 
experience. This is the implementation of Article 2(2) jo 3(3) of Directive 2005/36/EC. 
 
In Belgium, everyone who is allowed to use the title can practise the profession of archi-
tect. However, the profession can also be practised by certain categories of engineers 
who are not allowed to use the title of architect (Article 2 §1 AA). Furthermore, as held 
by Article 8(1) AA, non EC-EEA nationals can only practise the profession if reciprocal 
benefits are granted, or if a Royal Decree has allowed this practice (Article 8(2) AA). 
These requirements render the free movement of third-country nationals who are in the 
possession of the necessary qualifications useless if there is no reciprocity. This is not in 
line with the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC or with the principles laid down in the 
Directives on legal migration as discussed in paragraph 3.2.2 and .3.3.2 of this thesis 
which do not require any reciprocity. Indeed, third-country nationals to whom one (or 
more) of these Directives is applicable should be treated equally with EU nationals. It 
follows that if an EU national in the possession of a third-country diploma is allowed to 
practise the profession of architect due to the application of Article 3(3) jo 2(2) of Direc-
tive 2005/36/EC, a third-country national who falls within the scope of Directive 
2004/38/EC, or one of the other Directives dealing with the integration of third-country 
nationals in the EU (or one of the Association Agreements), should be treated equally if 
these Directives provide for equal treatment with regard to access to the profession. 
Account has to be taken of the qualifications and experience obtained by third-country 
nationals, even if these are obtained outside the EU (Gül). 
 
Since the entry into force of the Laruelle Act on 1 July 2007, legal persons are also al-
lowed to fulfil architectural tasks. They are, however, not allowed to use the title. It is 
argued that a company can, in principle, better survive the troubles of life of a natural 
person, such as illness or death. Legal persons are, however, not allowed to use the ar-
chitectural title since they cannot be in the possession of the required qualifications. All 
architects, both natural and legal persons, have to adhere to the Deontological Code. 
According to Article 10 of this Code and Article 6 AA, the profession of architect cannot 
be practised by an entrepreneur, and vice versa. 
 
Architects in Belgium have a monopoly when it comes to designing houses and super-
vising building works for (almost) all constructions which require a building permit. 
Not only the title, but also the profession, is protected. To be able to practise the profes-
sion, architects have to register with the Architects’ Order. To be registered on the tab-
leau, two years of professional experience has to be obtained. The Architects’ Order 
issues the licence to practice, manages the architectural register, determines the duties 
and rights of architects, and is responsible for the formulation and execution of discipli-
nary rules. EC/EEA service providers will be registered in the Services Register in con-
formity with Article 8 §2(1) AO. This Article implements Title II of Directive 
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2005/36/EC. Third country nationals will have to get permission of the Council of the 
Order located in the area in which the service is to be provided. 
 
It can be said that Belgium has implemented Directive 2005/36/EC well, although too 
late. However, neither the Architects’ Act, the Architects’ Order Act or the Deontologi-
cal Code contain any provision on permanent education as meant in Article 22 (b) of 
the Directive. 
 
In the Netherlands, registered architects can officially be distinguished from other pro-
fessionals in the building sector, since they have the privilege to call themselves ‘archi-
tect’ to the exclusion of all others, as of 1 October 1993. On 1 January 2008, 9,100 archi-
tects were registered in the Netherlands. The Architects’ Title Act gives rise to the legal 
protection of the title of Architect in the Netherlands. To use the title, one must be regis-
tered with the Foundation Bureau Architects Register, which is charged with the regis-
tration of architects. The general requirement for registration is the possession of a rec-
ognized diploma/certificate, or the successful taking of an examination. In general, 
Dutch students can follow a five-year university education leading to the title ‘construc-
tion engineer’ or a four year part-time Masters training at an Academy which follows a 
specific technical Bachelors education at an institute of higher education that comprises 
four years of full-time study. It is also possible to use the title after successful completion 
of the examination instituted by the Council of Architects. In order to participate in this 
examination, a minimum of seven years of practical experience in the field of architec-
ture is required. The VROM Minister can grant an exemption on the basis of proven 
exceptional competence. Automatically recognised certificates are those issued by the 
universities or academies mentioned in the Architects’ Act, and those mentioned in 
Annex V.7 and VI of Directive 2005/36/EC. Other qualifications (including third-
country qualifications) can be recognised under the Directive’s general system which is 
incorporated in the Act of 6 December 2007 containing general rules on the recognition 
of EC qualifications (General Act EC professional qualifications). Third-country qualifi-
cations of architects who have already practised the profession in another Member State 
that has recognized the qualifications for three years, will also have to be recognized in 
the Netherlands. Even though the Architects’ Title Act does not specifically mention it, 
case law has indicated that legal persons can also use the title if certain conditions are 
fulfilled. 
 At this moment in time, one can say that generally, only the academic grade is re-
quired for a person to use the title in the Netherlands. BNA membership is only open to 
architects who have at least two year of professional experience. When the Act of  4 
March 2010 amending the Architects’ Act will enter into force, the title of  ‘architect’ can 
only be used after completion of a traineeship (Article 12d), while those who follow this 
traineeship can call themselves ‘architects in training’. It is foreseen that the traineeship 
will become mandatory from 2015 onwards. It follows that the possession of such prac-
tical experience -a requirement to practise the profession in Belgium- will also become a 
requirement to use the title in the Netherlands. 
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In the Netherlands, anyone can practise the profession. It follows that the profession of 
architect is not protected, which means that anyone can perform architectural services 
as long as the title is not used by those who do not fulfil the requirements of the Archi-
tects’ Title Act. It is said that the protection of the profession is not necessary since 
many legal requirements already apply to the architect’s design such as the provisions in 
the Building Decree and the Housing Act.  Furthermore, Welstandscommissies which 
are composed of architects, town planners and regular citizens, advise municipalities 
and decide whether buildings are of sufficient quality and fit within the surroundings.  
Registered architects are not subject to a code of conduct. Only BNA members have to 
act in accordance with the BNA Code of Conduct. The Permanent Professional Train-
ing Regulations which apply, as of January 2006, contain rules on the professional edu-
cation of BNA-members, and imply that these architects should spend at least thirty 
hours per year on professional training. 
 
- Market conduct 
There are no mandatory, minimum or maximum fee scales for architectural activities in 
Belgium. Nevertheless, prices are often calculated as a percentage of construction costs. 
Such a system is liable to undermine the incentives for architects to design in a way that 
reduces unnecessary construction costs. Furthermore, there is a lot of uncertainty as to 
the price which the client has to pay for the services provided by the representative for a 
long time. This precludes transparency as to the price payable by the user.  In 2004 the 
European Commission held that the recommended fee scale that was created by the 
Belgian Architects’ Order in 1967 and which got binding force by Royal Decree in 1985, 
violated EC competition law. The Commission estimated that recommended minimum 
tariffs are generally created to coordinate the conduct of architects so that architects 
whose costs are lower are dissuaded from lowering their prices.  Furthermore, recom-
mended prices can mislead consumers as to what is a reasonable price for the service 
they are receiving, and as to whether this recommended price is negotiable. A scale that 
imposes or recommends minimum fees is unlikely to protect consumers against exces-
sive fees. It also does not prevent unscrupulous architects from offering poor-quality 
services. Since the fee scale was liable to discourage architects from working in a cost-
efficient manner, reducing prices, improving quality or innovating, it was decided that it 
violated Article 101(1) TFEU. 
 In the Netherlands, the SR 1997 used to indicate the fee basis by means of a refer-
ence to NEN 2631, which is a Dutch norm indicating how investment costs of building 
should preferably be calculated. A formula was drawn which led to the determination of 
a certain percentage which would then result in the fee. This formula left no room for 
price competition whatsoever and was often also used by architects which were no BNA 
members or to contracts to which the SR 1997 was not made applicable and was not 
only used by the Arbitration Institute Architecture but also by the ordinary courts.  This 
form of price fixing was not taken over by the NR 2005. 
 It follows that the absence of price fixing leaves open the possibility of introducing 
price reductions which, in turn, generates more competition. However the fixing of 
prices as a percentage of the construction costs, does not seem to be cost-efficient. 
 
  Chapter 12  
485 
With regard to advertising, Article 13 of the Deontological Code in Belgium foresees 
that the architect is allowed to make his activities known to the public in an independent 
and discrete manner. Obtrusive publicity has to be avoided however. The architect has 
to take into account that his name and title are not used in an illegal way by others, or 
are used for commercial purposes by others. He is allowed to mention his title in books, 
and is even obliged to mention it on a plate at the building site during the construction 
work, and is allowed to have it mentioned afterwards. 
  In the Netherlands, there is no general regulation about advertising which is appli-
cable for all architects. The disciplinary code of the BNA mentions, in Article 2(2), that 
architects have the freedom to make their activities, expertise, experience and compe-
tence known to the public. 
 Since there are no restrictions on advertising in Belgium and the Netherlands, con-
sumers can be informed adequately about the services offered by architects in order to 
come to a decision. However, since architectural services are often all different in nature, 
the disclosure of information is complicated, meaning that advertising might mislead 
consumers. It follows that advertising is quite important with regard to persuading cli-
ents in terms of a first buy, while the repeat buying mechanism should provide incen-
tives to provide a good price-quality ratio. 
  
Finally, with regard to structural restrictions in Belgium, mention should be made of 
Article 6 AA and Article 10 of the Deontological Code, by which architects are not al-
lowed to practise the profession of entrepreneur. Since architects should be independent 
(Article 4 Deontological Code) every association of an architect with an entrepreneur is 
forbidden.  
 In the Netherlands there is no such prohibition. Even though it may be argued that 
architects should be independent, it might be questioned whether such a severe restric-
tion is efficient, since the profession seems to function quite well in states in which there 
is no incompatibility between architects and entrepreneurs.  
  
RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
What are the tasks, obligations and liabilities of architects in Belgium and the Nether-
lands? 
In Belgium, design contracts are qualified as ‘entrepreneurial contracts’ which is a 
specification of the more general ‘rent of labour’. As held by Article 1779 CC, the rent of 
work and services covers work provided by entrepreneurs performing in accordance 
with building specifications. The architect has to advise his client, design a plan, deter-
mine the programme and the budget, and supervise the building work. For the architect 
to be liable, a fault in the performance of his contractual activities, damage and a causal 
link must be proven. In this regard, architects are also liable if they have engaged an 
expert who lacks sufficient skills. The liability regime is next to the general provisions in 
the Civil Code specifically laid down in Articles 1787-1799 CC. In principle, the archi-
tect is not liable beyond the time that the building work is accepted (received) by the 
building master. Only for (small) hidden defects is the architect still liable after recep-
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tion. The same is true for serious defects, which cause the building to perish totally or 
partially (Article 1792 jo 2270 CC) and for which the architects is liable for a ten year 
period. These Articles are public orders since they are said to protect public safety and 
cannot be contractually deviated from, so that the liability period cannot be limited. 
This gives protection to the building master. Furthermore, clauses that limit the extent 
of the architect’s liability are, in principle, void in Belgium. It follows that standard 
terms are not commonly used in Belgium, and disputes are almost always settled by 
judicial courts. For certain defects, such as problems with the stability, insulation and 
water tightness, architects have an obligation of result. However, the myriad of case law 
and legal literature indicates that Article 1792 CC does not contain a presumption of 
fault, which means that the one who holds the architect liable for a certain defect should 
prove the latter’s error. Architects are not liable just because there is damage. 
 In Belgium, the architect is often held liable in solidum with the entrepreneur. This 
means that if the entrepreneur is responsible for a certain defect in the construction, the 
architect is often held liable as well, since it is often claimed that he supervised the build-
ing work insufficiently or incorrectly. Building masters almost always ask for an in 
solidum conviction, since all architects, including legal persons, are obliged to buy in-
surance. In this way, the building master has more certainty that he will receive damage 
compensation in the event of a defect. Since the architect is the only building partner 
who is obliged to buy professional liability insurance, including the decennial liability, 
he mostly suffers from huge liability claims. To cover their own losses as well as losses of 
other building partners, building masters often take out a Construction All Risks Insur-
ance which covers damage during the realisation of the building work. The heavy weight 
on the shoulders of architects has been mitigated by the Laruelle Act, which also allows 
legal persons to practise the profession of architect. This means that the creditors of an 
architectural company can only claim compensation from the company’s assets and that 
the architect-natural person’s assets cannot be claimed against by way of damage com-
pensation. 
 
In the Netherlands, the relationship between the architect and the building master is 
qualified as a contract of services (Article 7:400 CC) and not as an entrepreneurial con-
tract. The provisions in title 12 of the Civil Code which are applicable, not only to build-
ing works, but also to all types of entrepreneurship, therefore do not regulate the rela-
tionship between the architect and his client. Entrepreneurial contracts only cover mate-
rial works, while architects generally carry out only intellectual tasks. The obligations of 
architects can be summarised as providing assistance and advice to clients, determining 
the programme and the budget, designing the plans and supervising the building work. 
These obligations are not laid down in the civil code, but are written down in standard 
terms, in case law and in the legal literature. Architects are, in principle, liable for every 
failure in the performance of their obligations (Article 6:74 CC). In general, they have an 
obligation of means, and have to act in the same way as a reasonable professional would 
have acted in these particular circumstances. They have to repair the damage which the 
creditor suffers because of their negligence, unless the failure is not attributable to them. 
If performance is not permanently impossible, the debtor has to be put in default before 
he is obliged to repair the damage. In the Netherlands, there is a large contractual free-
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dom with regard to architectural contracts. Several sets of standard terms exist in which 
the regulation between the architect and the building master is regulated. The most 
recent standard terms are the New Rules (NR) 2005. These standard terms are applica-
ble if parties so agree, and contain an arbitration clause which generally has to be spe-
cifically agreed to. With regard to the architectural responsibility, Article 13.1 NR holds 
that the architect is liable if he committed a culpable shortcoming (accountable fault) 
while the building master has put him in default in writing and has summoned him to 
repair the consequences of the shortcoming within a reasonable time and the architect 
has not (or not on time) repaired these shortcomings. As held by Article 7:758(2) CC, 
after delivery of the building works, the building master bears the risk for the building 
works. The general prescription period for liability is twenty years (Article 3:306 CC). 
Article 3:310 CC holds that claims for damage due to shortcomings in the performance 
of a contract, prescribe five years after the creditor discovered the shortcoming, while he 
is acquainted with the debtor. In a situation in which the creditor did not discover the 
damage, the liability period of ten years starts to run after the damage is caused. Article 
16 NR 2005 deviates from this rule and foresees a liability period of five years which 
starts the day upon which the commission is terminated, either by completion or cancel-
lation. Next to the limitation of the liability period, architects often limit the extent of 
their liability as well. In this regard, the damage to be compensated for by the consultant 
is limited per commission to a sum equal to the consultancy costs with a maximum of 
1,000,000 Euros. In the case of commissions where the client is a consumer, and the 
consultancy costs per commission are lower than 75,000 Euros, the damage to be com-
pensated is to a maximum of 75,000 Euros. 
 The UAV, which are the standard terms applicable in the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and his client, do not contain many clauses limiting the liability of the 
entrepreneur. It follows that the liability for a possible shortcoming of the design will be 
more easily laid with the entrepreneur if he did not warn about faults in the design. In 
any case, the entrepreneur can be held liable for hidden defects after delivery, and for 
damage caused by the perishing of the building due to serious defects. In solidum con-
victions are not used to solve liability issues. Since there is no strict liability with regard 
to the design and supervision of the building works by the architect (architects are, in 
principle, only strictly liable if they exceed their powers or gave incorrect advice on the 
applicable building legislation), the building master has to prove the architect’s short-
comings with regard to the liability of all the actors involved. There is therefore a heav-
ier weight on the building master’s shoulders. In the Netherlands, there is no mandatory 
insurance obligation except for BNA members (more than 3,000 members, more or less 
a third of all architects). If standard conditions are used which prescribe professional 
liability insurance, architects also have to buy insurance. In this way it can be concluded 
that most architects are insured. 
 
The extent and duration of the architectural liability is much higher in Belgium than in 
the Netherlands. It follows that not only public law relating to market access and market 
conduct, but also private (contract) law, may affect the free movement of architects. 
Even though empirical research is still needed with regard to the effects of private law 
legislation on architects, it is possible that Dutch architects feel reluctant to work in 
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Belgium since their professional liability lasts in general, twice as long as in the Nether-
lands. However, since this extended liability period can be covered by insurance, the fact 
that, in general, architects earn less in Belgium, will probably be a more compelling 
reason for Dutch architects not to establish in Belgium. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 4 
What does economic theory teach us about (self-)regulation in the professions? 
When choosing between tort law and regulation as instruments for controlling risky 
activities, Shavell indicates that four criteria should be taken into account: information, 
insolvency risk, the threat of a liability suit and administrative costs. Due to the fact that 
private parties have more and better information at their disposal, information asymme-
try favours a liability regime, since then they can make their own assessments concern-
ing the control of risk. If this is not the case, regulation can take care of the information 
asymmetry problem. The same is true with regard to administrative costs: most of the 
costs of a liability system seem to be present in the event that harm has actually oc-
curred. On the other hand, the inability to pay for harm done, as well as the possibility 
of a law suit, favour regulation, since regulation might be needed to prevent externalities 
causing large losses which professionals may not be able to cover due to insolvency or 
for which there is a lack of evidence. 
 
Even though liability rules may inspire architects to take due care, regulation may be 
needed to cure market failure. Since activities carried out by an architect can cause 
harm, architects need incentives to take good care. Contracting parties may agree be-
tween themselves that certain rules are applicable within their relationship, in addition 
to (or instead of) the rules created by the state or by the professional association (Coase 
theorem). Externalities can be internalized in different ways: moral persuasion, taxes, 
liability rules and regulation. In this regard, the classic economic analysis of law starts 
from the assumption that, by exposing the costs of their actions through liability rules, 
parties will be motivated to take optimal care to prevent accidents. In this way, a reduc-
tion in the total social costs of accidents can be achieved, since it is at this level of care 
that the costs of prevention and expected damage are minimised. For liability rules to 
work effectively, there must be a victim and an identifiable injurer who is able to pay 
damage compensation. This is not always the case, which means that other possibilities 
have to be resorted to, such as regulation, either by the government or by self-regulating 
organizations. However, when a building contains a certain default, the building master 
will have no difficulty identifying the architect as a possible injurer, since these parties 
have entered into a contract. Nevertheless, due to the problem of information asymme-
try, the building master is generally not in the position to determine the level of quality 
that should be provided, or the respective responsibilities of the engaged building part-
ners. It follows that regulation is still needed to cure this market failure. Since the cus-
tomer has less information at his disposal than the professional, he is not able to deter-
mine whether the design/building possesses the required quality level and is free from 
any defects. Due to the information asymmetry problem, regulation is needed in the 
architectural profession to safeguard quality. 
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 In fact, the architectural profession is characterized by high levels of regulation. 
This is often a mix of State regulation, self-regulation and custom and practice, which 
has evolved over a number of years. As suggested above, in spite of all the regulation 
policies, standard economic theory predicts that in a ‘perfect market’, an unregulated 
outcome is optimal, in that consumer welfare can only be improved at the detriment of 
producer welfare, and vice versa. It follows that there is a certain tension between, on 
the one hand, the need for a certain level of regulation in the professions and, on the 
other, competition law. Indeed, as noted above, national regulations are not only liable 
to restrict the free movement of professionals, but also free competition in the EU. 
 In economic theory, different approaches exist to explain why regulation has been 
created. According to the public interest approach, regulation is needed to cure market 
failure. Market failure might exist if there is no, or restricted, competition, if there is 
information asymmetry, if there are negative external effects and if the produced goods 
are public goods. Regulation is able to overcome these ‘problems’. The private interest 
approach, on the other hand, indicates that regulation is not only an answer to market 
failure, but also the result of rent-seeking behaviour on the part of interest groups. By 
manipulating the economic environment rather than through trade and the production 
of wealth, these interest groups seek gain. Regulation can be created by the government 
or by the private associations themselves. Since the government is not always the party 
with the best knowledge of a certain matter, government regulation is not always cost-
efficient. Furthermore, public regulatory regimes are not particularly flexible, while the 
costs of regulation are spread over society as a whole. However, according to the private 
interest approach, professional associations, which lack democratic legitimacy, will 
rather exclude competition than improve quality. In this regard the role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union should be to filter out those rent-seeking practices which 
amount to protectionism of the national market as against foreigners. 
 Since both approaches towards regulation are surrounded with difficulties, some 
other forms of regulation are suggested by Van den Bergh: co-regulation (public policy 
objectives are achieved through the combination of a certain degree of self-regulation 
and traditional public regulation) and competitive self-regulation (competition between 
different professions offering the same service). Experiments with these types of mixed 
regulation are needed to gain more knowledge about the efficiency gains of these meth-
ods which bring into play the information benefits and the benefits concerning the re-
duction of enforcement costs of self-regulation. 
 
As suggested above, liability rules can be used separately or jointly with ex ante regula-
tion to remedy market failure. Calabresi and Shavell made a comparison between ex 
ante regulations, which are categorized as ‘specific deterrence’ and ex post liability which 
is categorized as ‘general deterrence’. In the specific deterrence method, the government 
regulates a certain level of activities and care, decides who should perform certain activi-
ties, and in which way this should be done. This is due to the fact that people are said 
not to know what is best for themselves. When individuals do not live up to these gov-
ernment rules, they will be punished, and their behaviour is thus directly influenced by 
regulation. According to the general deterrence method, the regulator does not impose a 
particular type of behaviour, but links predetermined consequences to certain behav-
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iour. It follows that professionals come only into contact with these consequences once 
they have caused damage or are accused of having been at fault professionally. In liabil-
ity regimes, the victim is therefore compensated for the consequences of certain acts or 
omissions, so that he will be put in the same position as he found himself in before the 
damage causing event. As opposed to this, the specific deterrence method emphasizes 
the punitive character of criminal regulation. 
 
Finally it should be noted that, notwithstanding the use of liability rules, regulation or 
other instruments, damage can still occur. Insurance can increase the utility of risk 
averse persons, and can reduce transaction costs, since it is decided ex ante who will 
intervene in the event that damage occurs. However, this might bring about the situa-
tion that the behaviour of the insured party will change as soon as the risk is removed 
from him (moral hazard). As pointed out by Shavell, this can be solved by an appropri-
ate adaptation of the insurance premium, and by exposing the insured partially to a risk, 
or a combination of both. Compulsory liability insurance is often advanced as a means 
of protecting the innocent victim. With regard to compulsory liability insurance, it can 
be suggested that there is a trade-off between the benefits and costs for both architects 
and their clients. Since the damage caused by a fault in the design or the supervision of 
the building work is generally quite high, mandatory liability insurance might be more 
in the interest of the building master and injured parties, than would be liability rules 
without mandatory insurance. Due to the problem of underdeterrence caused by insol-
vency, the victim can be protected against the possible bankruptcy of the architect. 
However, if architects are the only professionals in the building industry who are 
obliged to buy insurance, it is very likely that the injured party will first turn to the ar-
chitect in order to obtain damage compensation, so the risk is shifted to those with the 
deepest pockets. In this regard it should be noted that it is also possible to force the 
architect ex ante, to provide certain compensation, a bank guarantee or another kind of 
payment as guarantee of compensation in the event that damage occurs. In such a case, 
architects are still liable in situations in which the damage is attributable to them, but 
are not obliged to buy insurance. This would be a flexible solution, provided that it en-
ables the damage to be compensated adequately ex post, since the architect can choose 
any market solution. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 5 
Is there any market failure in the Belgian and Dutch markets for architectural services 
which might justify regulation? 
As proposed by the public interest theory, a lack of competition might cause market 
failure. As demonstrated by the answer to research question 2, both Belgium and the 
Netherlands impose requirements upon architects before they can enter the profession. 
Belgian architects even have a monopoly with regard to designing and supervising 
building works. It follows that there is a higher level of competition in the Netherlands 
than in Belgium. This is because monopolists sell their output at a higher price level and 
can abuse their market power, which results in market failure. 
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 Negative externalities can also cause market failure. These appear in the architec-
tural market every time the quality of the service rendered by the architect is not high, 
and damage is caused. This can bring about huge losses for private parties and for soci-
ety as a whole: a poorly designed apartment building may collapse and cause damage, 
not only to the client, but also to visitors, neighbours, etc. It follows that regulation may 
be needed to obtain high quality buildings. However, even though consumer protection 
and a high quality of the built environment seem to be valid reasons for entry regula-
tion, the Dutch situation demonstrates that other ex ante tools such as the Dutch Build-
ing Decree, can also protect the quality of buildings without the negative effects relating 
to the restriction of competition. Furthermore, Welstandscommissies, which are com-
posed of architects, town planners and regular citizens, advise the municipality. They 
have to approve building applications and decide whether the proposed constructions 
are of sufficient quality and fit within the surroundings. It follows that it can be argued 
that according to the public interest theory, the tool used in Belgium to cure market 
failure goes too far. Since market competition is restricted to those who are allowed to 
use the title, the cure might be worse than the disease, and does not seem to be the most 
efficient solution to market failure. The Dutch certification process is recommended 
over licensing, since clients still have the choice with regard to engaging an architect. 
Furthermore, those who turn to a professional who is allowed to use the title can be sure 
that the latter does have a certain educational background and/or some professional 
experience. A less extreme option to dealing with the monopoly problem, next to the 
abolishment of it, can be found in the extension of the monopoly to others who also 
have the relevant knowledge and know-how. This might even be the case for certain 
entrepreneurs. Even though the prohibition of architects from associating with entre-
preneurs in Belgium might be justified on public interest grounds since the architect 
should be able to work in total independence, it might be questioned whether this re-
striction, which does not exist in the Netherlands, is proportional. In any case, cost-
benefit analyses have already demonstrated that business restrictions bring about more 
costs than benefits. 
 
The Mirza & Nacey research revealed that Dutch architects earn more and charge 
higher prices than Belgian architects. Even though they do not necessarily calculate their 
fees in the same way, it is still striking to notice that there is a big income difference. A 
possible explanation might be found in the fact that it is just because there is no mo-
nopoly in the Netherlands, and there are fewer ‘real’ architects in the Netherlands com-
pared to Belgium. Since individuals who are interested in making designs and supervis-
ing building works are allowed to carry out this activity without having to register, and 
thus also without using the title -they may even not have earned the title of architect- the 
number of possible suppliers is ultimately much higher, so that there is more competi-
tion in general. Furthermore, in the Netherlands, there is no reason for entrepreneurs 
and building promotors not to engage in drafting designs as well, since the legislator has 
not created incompatibilities as exist in Belgium. Since not everyone interested in, and 
capable of, drafting designs is obliged to register to be able to carry out this work, there 
is less competition among ‘real’ architects -those who are allowed to use the title, which 
might, in turn, explain the fact that ‘real’ architects charge higher prices. Of course con-
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sumers can choose whether to turn to a registered architect or another service provider. 
It might be argued that since most individuals only build once in their lives, and since 
this will probably be their most important spending decision ever, they are often in-
clined to choose based on the ‘surety’ of the competences of someone holding a relevant 
degree and belonging to an Order. The same goes for business clients since they also 
want to engage the best professionals for their projects. Since their financial assets are 
much higher than that of regular individuals, they have the possibility to turn to more 
expensive architects. On the other hand, on the Dutch building market, there are more 
large construction projects in which building promotors are engaged by public authori-
ties to construct numerous identical houses in a certain area. Architects who are en-
gaged in such projects can earn large profits with minimal investment, as opposed to 
their Belgian colleagues where such projects are not so popular. For this reason it might 
be argued that fewer architects are needed in the Netherlands. In any case it should be 
noted that a study conducted by Van den Bergh and Montangie with regard to the abol-
ishment of the solicitors’ monopoly for conveyancing services in England and Wales, 
and the deregulation of the Dutch notary profession, demonstrates that liberalization 
does not guarantee lower prices, so that increased competition is not guaranteed as a 
result of it. In this regard, mention should be made of the fact that even though the 
intensity of regulation in the Netherlands is lower with regard to entry to the profession, 
Dutch architects generally earn more than their Belgian colleagues. 
 
The states and professional organisations often hold that the obligation to hold profes-
sional qualifications is needed to enhance consumer protection, since the architectural 
profession is characterized by a high level of information asymmetry, which can cause 
market failure. This is especially the case within the traditional construction process in 
which the architect’s clients are generally one-time consumers, due to the fact that a 
house is considered to be a long and expensive investment. This can lead to adverse 
selection: since consumers cannot evaluate the properties of the supplied services, archi-
tects can be inclined to provide low quality services which are then bought by their cli-
ents. Furthermore, a moral hazard problem arises since clients are not able to determine 
whether the architect is working in their best interests, and are not able to sanction the 
architect’s attitude. For these reasons, regulation may be necessary. Since architects are 
more often consulted by developers in the Netherlands, and are mostly consulted by 
individual clients in Belgium, it is expected that the problem of information asymmetry 
is more serious is in Belgium. Furthermore, it can be said that since the advice and ser-
vices provided by an architect are generally so specific that another client with slightly 
different circumstances may not be able to use it, architectural services can, in principle, 
not be qualified as public goods, so that there is, in principle, no free rider problem for 
which regulation is warranted.  
 
Even though the public interest theory explains that regulation can be necessary to cure 
the problem of information asymmetry which is certainly present with regard to the 
architectural profession, one needs to keep in mind that this regulation needs to be 
proportionate. Furthermore, situations in which regulation generates more costs than 
benefits (regulatory failure) should be avoided. Reference should also be made to the 
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private interest approach that indicates that regulation is not always an answer to mar-
ket failure, but the result of rent-seeking behaviour on the part of interest groups. Pro-
fessional groups are likely to set standards too high, in order to push competitors out of 
the market or use licenses as an entry barrier which, in its turn, can lead to a monopolis-
tic situation and monopolistic advantages for the professions concerned, and can un-
dermine competition. The Belgian Architects’ Order and the Dutch BNA -membership 
of the latter is not mandatory- enjoy public law status, and can determine who may use 
the professional title. Furthermore, they can impose punishments on individuals not 
complying with the deontology, and ask for a financial contribution as a condition of 
membership. Since good quality designs and buildings can also be obtained by other 
means, it can be said that the Belgian monopoly does not serve public interest, but 
rather serves to limit the number of market participants. This is likely to generate rents 
for architects who are already registered. Furthermore, the private interest approach 
may also explain why progress on the programmes to harmonize national systems for 
professional qualifications was painfully slow. As stated before, it took more than seven-
teen years before the Architects’ Directive saw the light of day due to substantial differ-
ences in the way the profession was regulated, not only with regard to training condi-
tions and professional qualifications, but also with regard to architectural obligations 
and liabilities. While Belgium held that Directives should only apply to persons holding 
a university degree, the Netherlands also wanted to approve non-university education in 
cases where practical experience complemented the theoretical knowledge up to univer-
sity level. Since it took such a long time before agreement could be reached, it can be 
said that the architectural associations have defended their position fiercely. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 6 
Is the intensity of public regulation related to the intensity of the contractual obliga-
tions and liabilities of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands? 
Since bad quality services provided by architects can have major effect, not only for the 
building master, but also for persons renting the building or third parties walking by, ex 
ante regulation is needed to determine issues like the desired educational level of profes-
sionals and the desired level of quality. In this way, professionals who are, at first sight, 
not competent, are already ruled out, so that the situation is already safer. However, if 
professionals who do possess the desired educational level were not at risk of being sued, 
they might not have the necessary incentives to deliver good quality. 
 With regard to the profession of architect in Belgium and the Netherlands, the in-
tensity of regulation is not linked to the intensity of contract law. As held in the answer 
to research question 2, the entry to the architectural profession is more heavily regulated 
in Belgium than in the Netherlands, since architects have a monopoly in Belgium. Next 
to market entry regulation, market conduct regulation has an influence on the behav-
iour of architects in Belgium and the Netherlands. In this regard it must be stated that 
all architects practising in Belgium are subject to the deontological code, since they all 
have to be registered by the Order. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, there is no 
mandatory association with any professional organisation, so that deontological rules 
are not applicable unless one voluntarily chooses to become a BNA member. There are 
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no mandatory, minimum or maximum fee scales in Belgium and the Netherlands. The 
fee scale which used to exist in Belgium was withdrawn after the European Commission 
held it to be incompatible with EU competition law. Nevertheless, in both countries, 
prices are often calculated as a percentage of construction costs. Such a system is liable 
to undermine the incentives for architects to design in a way that reduces unnecessary 
construction costs, and is therefore not cost-efficient. There are no restrictions on ad-
vertising in Belgium and the Netherlands, as long as this happens in a discrete manner 
(Belgium). With regard to structural restrictions, it has to be noted that architects are 
not allowed to practise the profession of entrepreneur, and vice versa. This prohibition 
is created to ensure the independence of the architect, and to guarantee quality. In the 
Netherlands there is no such prohibition. Since the profession seems to function quite 
well in the latter state, it might be questioned whether such a severe restriction is effi-
cient with regard to curing any market failure. In any case, such restrictions prevent any 
one company from offering a total service package in which the building is designed and 
constructed by professionals who consider themselves as partners rather than adversar-
ies. Such cooperation can lead to higher levels of efficiency since there is less negotiation 
and transaction costs, while the professionals involved are more likely to cooperate from 
the beginning and seek joint solutions in the event of a problem with the design or the 
construction of the work. From a public interest perspective, it must therefore be argued 
that negative externalities can be detected more easily. 
 
Architects and their clients generally lay their respective rights and obligations down in 
a written contract. These contracts are entered into since regulations are often weak and 
cannot always be enforced. Contract law can be a useful (complementary) tool to deal-
ing with market failure. However, concluding private agreements brings about high 
transaction costs, since parties have to negotiate the content of the contract. In this re-
gard, standard conditions can be created which only bring about high transaction costs 
at the time of creation, and which can be adapted to the specific needs of every new 
situation. Especially in the Netherlands, standard conditions with an arbitration clause 
often form part of the agreement. It follows that self-regulation also has an influence on 
private law. Arbitration is popular, since disputes will be resolved by a body which is 
composed of professionals in the building industry (entrepreneur, architects, engineers) 
but also of building masters all of whom have a better knowledge than regular judges of 
design/construction problems. It follows that there are fewer administrative costs, which 
means that disputes can be resolved more quickly and less expensively. Arbitrators’ 
verdicts may be more accurate and predictable than those of a court, since arbitrators 
possess industry expertise. Of course, when arbitrators have to decide upon complex or 
novel cases, it is also difficult to predict the decision. The desirability of alternative dis-
pute settlement depends on the absence of information asymmetry and negative exter-
nal effects. If parties decide ex ante to resort to dispute settlement by means of arbitra-
tion, one can assume that this is useful for them, so that this agreement has to be hon-
oured, but this does not mean that the state has to encourage alternative dispute settle-
ment procedures. In the event of information asymmetry and negative externalities, a 
further cost benefit analysis is required before the desirability of an alternative dispute 
settlement can be determined. 
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Compared with other EU states, Belgium has a rather restrictive regime with regard to 
architects, while the Netherlands belongs to the group of more lenient states. Due to the 
regulatory differences, one might expect that parties in the Netherlands include heavier 
requirements in their contracts in order to guarantee quality and limit externalities. 
However, with regard to the contractual liability of architects, it seems that both in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, architects are generally liable for negligence. Furthermore, 
the ten year liability principle which is laid down by Belgian public regulation, and 
which is a public order, cannot be contractually deviated from, and thus always forms 
part of the contract. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, parties often deviate from 
the legal liability clauses in the Dutch Civil Code by means of standard conditions, 
which generally reduce the liability period to five years. It follows that the ten year liabil-
ity principle in Belgium constitutes a heavier burden for architects than the five year 
liability period which is generally laid down in the Dutch standard regulations. The 
heavier burden on architects in Belgium is strengthened by the fact that they are often 
held liable in solidum with entrepreneurs, and by the fact that architects in Belgium are 
generally strictly liable for defects relating to the stability, insulation, waterproofing and 
sound insulation of the work. Furthermore, Dutch architects are also allowed to limit 
the extent of their liability (see Article 15 NR), while clauses that limit the extent of the 
architect’s liability are, in principle, void in Belgium. It can be concluded that in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, the intensity of contractual liability is not linked to the inten-
sity of regulation. 
CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is the Dutch or the Belgian combination of regulations and contract law provisions 
most cost-efficient from an economic point of view? 
In this thesis it has been demonstrated that the regulation of the architectural title 
should be preferred over the regulation of the profession, since the latter can be replaced 
by other mechanisms to guarantee quality. Even though a professional monopoly might 
be justified to protect quality, it is not proportional, and is likely to benefit only the 
professionals themselves. It has been demonstrated also that price fixing, advertising 
restrictions (except those aimed at false and misleading advertising) and restrictions to 
business structure, are not cost-efficient. In this regard it can be stated that the entry to 
the profession is more heavily regulated in Belgium than in the Netherlands. Indeed, 
since only registered architects are allowed to design buildings for which a building 
permit is required, Belgian architects have a monopoly with regard to designing such 
buildings. It follows that more competition is possible in the Netherlands since there is 
no professional monopoly as in Belgium. Since architects are mostly consulted by indi-
vidual clients in Belgium, it is expected that the problem of information asymmetry is 
more serious is in Belgium. However, since the Dutch situation demonstrates that other 
ex ante tools such as the Building Decree can also protect the quality of buildings with-
out the negative effects as far as the restriction of competition is concerned, it might be 
assumed that, according to the public interest theory, the tool used in Belgium to cure 
market failure goes too far. Since market competition is already restricted to those who 
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are allowed to use the title, the cure might be worse than the disease. Curing market 
failure by licensing does thus not seem to be the most efficient solution. Certification is 
recommended over licensing, since clients still have the choice to engage an architect. 
Those who turn to a professional who is allowed to use the title, are sure that such an 
individual does have a certain educational background, and/or some professional ex-
perience. However, to determine whether the restrictions on competition resulting from 
exclusive rights (e.g. the architectural monopoly in Belgium) does not go further than 
necessary to achieve public interest goals, a cost-benefit analysis which compares the 
architectural monopoly in Belgium with the architectural title protection in the Nether-
lands is required. More empirical research is needed to solve this issue. It follows that in 
any case, the most efficient regulatory instrument(s) should be chosen, and account 
should be taken of the effects of regulation on consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
the deadweight welfare loss. In this regard it should be noted that it is important for 
regulation not be disproportionate to curing the market failure under consideration. 
 A less extreme option when it comes to dealing with the monopoly problem, next to 
its abolishment, can be found in the extension of the monopoly to other experts, who 
also have relevant knowledge and know-how. This might even be the case for certain 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, even though the prohibition of architects associating with 
entrepreneurs in Belgium might be justified in terms of the public interest, since the 
architect should be able to work in total independence, it might be questioned whether 
this restriction, which does not exist in the Netherlands, is proportional and thus effi-
cient to cure market failure. As indicated before, such restrictions prevent one company 
from offering a total service package in which a building is designed and constructed by 
professionals who consider themselves as partners rather than adversaries. Such coop-
eration can lead to higher levels of efficiency, since there are fewer negotiation and 
transaction costs, while the professionals involved are more likely to cooperate from the 
beginning and seek joint solutions in the event of a problem with the design or the con-
struction work appearing. Defects can be detected more easily by mutual monitoring. It 
follows that, from an efficiency point of view, the Dutch system should be preferred. In 
any case, cost-benefit analyses have demonstrated that business restrictions bring about 
more costs. 
 
This thesis has revealed that, with regard to the architectural profession, a combination 
of ex ante regulation and liability rules seems optimal. Since bad quality services pro-
vided by architects can cause harm to the building master and to third parties, ex ante 
regulation is needed to determine the desired level of professional qualifications, and the 
desired quality level. However, this is not enough if professionals who do fulfil these 
requirements cannot be sued. Therefore liability rules are also needed. In this regard it 
should be emphasized that the differences in the Belgian and Dutch liability regimes 
may also negatively influence the free movement of architects. However, it has been 
demonstrated that the intensity of public regulation is not related to the intensity of the 
contractual obligations, which means that architects in Belgium are subject to more 
burdensome public law requirements as regards access to the profession, but also to 
more onerous liability rules. Since it has been held that the monopolistic situation is not 
cost-efficient, the heavier private law responsibilities of architects can hardly be justified 
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from an economic perspective. Since Belgian architects face heavy claims, and are often 
held liable in solidum with the entrepreneur, problems of underinsurance and underde-
terrence due to insolvency can be ‘cured’ by the introduction of compulsory liability 
insurance. Since architects in Belgium are the only professionals in the building industry 
who are obliged to buy insurance, they are often held liable in solidum with the entre-
preneur. Consequently, it appears that the risk is shifted to those with the deepest pock-
ets. It should be questioned whether this is the best way to remedy the insolvency prob-
lem, certainly having regard to the fact that there will always be a moral hazard problem 
with liability insurance. In the event of compulsory liability insurance, often the total 
risk is shifted to the insurer, since the legislator often limits the possibilities of exposing 
the insured to risk. In this way, the duty to insure is often equal to the total amount of 
liability, which strengthens the moral hazard and brings about higher premiums. Other 
possibilities, such as first party insurance, might cure the problem at lower cost and thus 
be more proportional to attaining the objective. In the Netherlands, only BNA members 
are obliged to buy insurance. However, standard terms generally also demand manda-
tory insurance, with the result that the majority of architects are covered by insurance, 
so that the Dutch and Belgian systems do not differ that much in practice when it comes 
to professional liability insurance. Even though it might be argued that the Belgian sys-
tem is not cost-efficient, since architects who are not risk-averse have to pay the pre-
mium as well, while there will always be a moral hazard problem, it should be noted that 
this conclusion should be considered in the light of the number of architects who risk 
insolvency. Empirical research is needed to determine the number of architects belong-
ing to this insolvency category. If the risk of underdeterrence is considerable, the Dutch 
system might also not be efficient. In any case, other possibilities exist for providing 
compensation such as a bank guarantee, and this should also be considered. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that even though the limitation of the architectural liability by 
means of a private company with limited liability, which is possible in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, is cheaper than the limitation of liability by contractual clauses, and might 
be beneficial for architects, it is not desirable from a societal point of view, since the 
architect can ‘hide’ behind a legal person to safeguard his personal assets. In this way, 
only the capital of the company is at risk whenever a professional fault occurs, while the 
professional’s personal wealth is exempt from any claims. This again brings about prob-
lems of underdeterrence of architects and undercompensation of victims, and is thus 
not efficient when it comes to compensating for possible damage. 
Since the Belgian system is not proportionate when it comes to entry regulations to the 
profession, it can be concluded that, at least on this point, the Dutch system is more 
cost-efficient than the Belgium system. 
 
Policy recommendations 
In the spirit of the above-mentioned conclusions, I would like to propose the following 
recommendations with regard to the regulation of architects:  
- When discussing the free movement of professionals in and to the EU, more ac-
count should be taken of differences in liability systems, since it is possible that 
these may hinder free movement. 
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- The monopoly of architects in Belgium should be abolished, or at least extended to 
other experts such as experienced and qualified entrepreneurs. Since EU law does 
not forbid licensing systems as such, and since professional monopolies are, in 
principle, allowed unless they are not justified in the public interest and are dispro-
portionate to the objective pursued, it can be argued that the Belgian situation is 
disproportional to achieving consumer protection and a high quality in terms of the 
built environment. 
- The practice of the profession of architect should not be incompatible with the 
practice of the profession of entrepreneur. 
- Architects should be given the choice between purchasing compulsory liability 
insurance or the provision of a certain compensation ex ante, such as a bank guar-
antee or other kind of payment as a guarantee of compensation in the event that 
damage is occurring. 
- If architects are obliged to buy compulsory liability insurance, this obligation should 
also be extended to other building professionals, certainly in the light of the Belgian 
in solidum liability. 
 
Points for further research 
This thesis demonstrates that a law and economics approach towards regulation can be 
a useful method to analyse architectural law and policy. Economic theory has been ap-
plied to determine whether there is market failure within the Belgian and Dutch archi-
tectural markets, and to indicate to what extent it is efficient when it comes to regulating 
the architectural profession from both a public interest and a private interest perspec-
tive. The collection of empirical evidence of this market failure, and whether or not the 
Belgian and Dutch architectural regulation is the result of rent-seeking behaviour on the 
part of architects, might be useful to obtaining a better insight in this analysis.  Informa-
tion on the number of building defects caused by architects in Belgium and the Nether-
lands might provide useful insights regarding the presence and scope of negative exter-
nalities in both states.   
 In the introduction it was stated that this thesis only deals with the traditional con-
struction process in which a client engages an architect and an entrepreneur by himself. 
However, more complex relationships have arisen in the construction industry, and 
alternative construction processes can be recognized in which the building master signs 
an agreement with a promoter, and can only have a minimum amount of influence. 
Whether or not the same conclusions can be drawn for such alternative processes, espe-
cially with regard to the liability of architects, is an interesting point for further research. 
 This thesis has described the contractual obligations and liabilities of architects 
from a legal point of view. An economic analysis of these private law principles might 
reveal some interesting insights to determine whether the Dutch or the Belgian private 
law system is more cost-efficient. A comparison of the architects’ liability in tort, and his 
criminal liability, might also offer some interesting insights. Furthermore, empirical 
research may determine why the income of Dutch architects is higher than that of Bel-
gian architects, and whether the explanations I suggested for this are correct. 
 Finally, it should be noted that this thesis has not discussed whether it is better ac-
cording to economic theory to have EU legislation to uniformly regulate (harmonize) 
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the architectural profession. Reference was made to the Draft Common Frame of Refer-
ence and the PEL SC neither of which are legally enforceable, while a legal analysis of 
the regulation of architects in the European Union was provided in Part I of this thesis, 
which contains an effectiveness study to determine whether architects can practise their 
profession in other EU states without unjustified impediments. By applying the eco-
nomics of federalism, further research could demonstrate whether it would be more 
efficient to uniformly regulate the profession. 
 
Architecture is a fundamental feature of our history, our culture and of our future. The 
combined effect of competition rules and common market rules should lead to better 
functioning of a common market, and to an increase in competition. Through the geo-
graphical mobility of architects, cultures and architecture itself will be enriched. Even 
though building promoters are the leading figures in the Dutch market, architects are 
still engaged to make a design. The architectural profession is thus certainly not ‘dead’, 
but is rather in its infancy, due to new technologies which are developing with immense 
speed. As suggested by Frank Lloyd Wright, (architect 1869-1959), ‘The mother art is 
architecture. Without an architecture of our own we have no soul of our own civilization.’ 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit boek behandelt de regulering van architecten in de Europese Unie. Het beschrijft de 
vereisten waaraan EU architecten moeten voldoen opdat zij hun beroep in conformiteit 
met de regelgeving en rechtspraak van de Europese Unie kunnen uitoefenen in een 
andere lidstaat. Opdat het uitoefenen van een beroep in een andere staat mogelijk is, 
dienen architecten vooreerst het recht te hebben zich vrij te bewegen over de grenzen 
heen. Dit recht staat gecodificeerd in Artikel 21 van het Verdrag Betreffende de Werking 
van de Europese Unie (TFEU) dat voorziet dat iedere burger van de Unie het recht heeft 
vrij op het grondgebied van de lidstaten te reizen en te verblijven, zij het onder voorbe-
houd van de beperkingen en voorwaarden die bij de Verdragen en de bepalingen ter 
uitvoering daarvan zijn vastgesteld. Wat betreft deze beperkingen en voorwaarden dient 
te worden opgemerkt dat de periode waarin personen mogen verblijven op het grond-
gebied van een andere lidstaat afhangt van het feit of zij al dan niet economisch actief 
zijn of over voldoende bestaansmiddelen en over een verzekering beschikken die de 
ziektekosten in het gastland volledig dekt. Op deze manier dient te worden voorkomen 
dat zij tijdens hun verblijf ten laste komen van het sociale bijstandsstelsel van het gast-
land. Indien hieraan niet wordt voldaan, wordt het verblijf beperkt tot drie maanden. In 
bevestigend geval heeft men een verblijfsrecht van langer dan drie maanden dat zich 
uitstrekt zolang aan voornoemde vereisten wordt voldaan. Iedere burger van de Unie 
die gedurende een ononderbroken periode van vijf jaar legaal op het grondgebied van 
het gastland heeft verbleven, verkrijgt aldaar een permanent verblijfsrecht zonder dat 
bijkomende voorwaarden vervuld dienen te worden. Deze rechten zijn neergelegd in 
Richtlijn 2004/38/EG betreffende het recht van vrij verkeer en verblijf op het grondge-
bied van de lidstaten voor de burgers van de Unie en hun familieleden. Het basisprinci-
pe van het vrij verkeer van economisch actieve personen is daarenboven neergelegd in 
Artikel 45 TFEU betreffende werknemers terwijl Artikel 49 TFEU het recht van vesti-
ging van zelfstandig werkende personen neerlegt en Artikel 56 TFEU het vrij verrichten 
van diensten regelt. Dit houdt in dat elke vorm van discriminatie van economisch actie-
ve personen op basis van nationaliteit tussen de lidstaten is verboden. Al deze rechten 
zijn concrete uitvoeringen van het algemeen discriminatieverbod op basis van nationali-
teit, dat is gecodificeerd in Artikel 18 TFEU. Teneinde de toegang tot werkzaamheden te 
vergemakkelijken werden er door het Europees Parlement en de Raad richtlijnen vastge-
steld betreffende de onderlinge erkenning van diploma’s en professionele kwalificaties. 
Wat betreft architecten werd na jarenlange discussie Richtlijn 85/384/EEG gecreëerd die 
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thans vervangen is door Richtlijn 2005/36/EG. Deze richtlijn betreft professionele en 
niet academische erkenning, daar ze van toepassing is op personen die reeds volledig 
gekwalificeerd zijn als architect en hun beroep in die hoedanigheid reeds uitoefenen 
terwijl academische erkenning in principe een kwestie betreft die enkel onder de ver-
antwoordelijkheid van de lidstaten valt en niet onder die van de EU. 
 In principe kan worden gesteld dat de kwalificaties van architecten die vermeld 
worden in Annex V.7 van Richtlijn 2005/36/EG automatisch erkend dienen te worden 
door de andere lidstaten, zolang deze opleiding in totaal ten minste, hetzij vier jaar stu-
die op voltijdse basis, hetzij zes jaar studie waarvan ten minste drie jaar voltijds, aan een 
universiteit of een vergelijkbare onderwijsinstelling bevat (Titel III van Hoofdstuk III). 
Ter afsluiting van deze opleiding dient met goed gevolg een examen op universitair 
niveau te worden afgelegd en dient de verwerving van de in de richtlijn genoemde ken-
nis en bekwaamheid te zijn gewaarborgd. Ook de driejarige opleiding aan de Duitse 
‘Fachhochschulen’ dient te worden erkend voor zover deze opleiding wordt aangevuld 
met een periode van beroepservaring van vier jaar in Duitsland. Indien een diploma niet 
vermeld wordt in Annex V.7 kan ook het algemeen systeem neergelegd in Titel I van 
Hoofdstuk III van de Richtlijn worden toegepast als bepaalde voorwaarden zijn vervuld 
wat betreft het niveau van de behaalde beroepskwalificaties. Indien de duur van de op-
leiding ten minste één jaar korter is of indien de inhoud van de opleiding wezenlijk 
verschillend is, kan een aanpassingsstage of een proeve van bekwaamheid worden geëist 
door de ontvangende lidstaat. Het Europees Hof van Justitie (EHJ) heeft in dit opzicht 
geoordeeld dat rekening dient te worden gehouden met elke genoten opleiding en al de 
ervaring van de kandidaat (Vlassopoulou), ook indien die in een andere lidstaat werd 
verkregen (Haim, Hocsman). In dit opzicht stelt Richtlijn 2005/36/EG dat lidstaten de 
kwalificaties van EU-burgers behaald buiten de Unie mogen aanvaarden indien de bepa-
lingen van de Richtlijn worden nageleefd doch zij zijn hiertoe slechts verplicht indien 
een eerste lidstaat de kwalificaties reeds heeft erkend en de kandidaat drie jaar professi-
onele ervaring heeft. Ook al werd door het EHJ geoordeeld in Gül dat ook bepaalde 
personen die niet de nationaliteit bezitten van een EU-lidstaat het erkenningsregime 
zoals neergelegd in Vlassopoulou kunnen inroepen, zijn de artikelen uit het verdrag en 
Richtlijn 2005/36/EG in principe niet van toepassing op derdelanders. Richtlijn 
2004/38/EG verleent echter aan bepaalde familieleden van EU-burgers, zelfs indien zij 
niet de nationaliteit bezitten van een EU-staat, het recht op gelijke behandeling. Daar-
enboven werden er na de inwerkingtreding van het Verdrag van Amsterdam vijf Richt-
lijnen gecreëerd alsook één ontwerprichtlijn die een aantal rechten verlenen aan bepaal-
de categorieën van derdelanders. Ook associatie- en partnerakkoorden met staten die 
niet behoren tot de EU werden gesloten. De situatie van architecten uit derde landen is 
ver van gelijk of vergelijkbaar met de status van EU-architecten. 
 
Het beroep van architect wordt vaak niet enkel gereguleerd door de lidstaten doch ook 
door de beroepsorganisaties. Deze reguleringen kunnen niet enkel het vrij verkeer van 
architecten hinderen, doch kunnen er ook voor zorgen dat de vrije mededinging wordt 
gelimiteerd. Regels betreffende de toegang en de uitoefening van het beroep, alsook 
regels die prijzen vastleggen, publiciteit verhinderen of samenwerkingsvormen verbie-
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den, zijn in dit opzicht gekende voorbeelden. Dit boek bespreekt wanneer zulke regels 
een inbreuk vormen op het Europese mededingingsrecht. 
 
Niet enkel de situatie van architecten op EU-niveau wordt besproken in dit boek. Er 
wordt tevens een analyse van de Belgische en Nederlandse regulering geboden. Zowel in 
België als in Nederland mogen in principe enkel zij die de gepaste opleiding hebben 
genoten de titel van architect voeren. Na registratie door de Orde van architecten zijn 
deze personen ook exclusief bevoegd om het beroep van architect uit te oefenen wat 
betreft bouwwerken waarvoor een bouwvergunning is vereist in België. Dit betekent 
aldus dat de Belgische architecten een monopoliepositie hebben, daar niemand anders 
de taken van de architect mag uitvoeren. In Nederland daarentegen mag iedereen het 
beroep uitoefenen en wordt enkel het gebruik van de titel beperkt tot zij die het vereiste 
diploma bezitten. Dit betekent dat de Nederlandse architect niet over een monopolie 
beschikt wat betreft het maken van een plan of het houden van toezicht. Nederlandse 
architecten dienen zich te laten registreren door de Stichting Bureau Architectenregis-
ter. Deze stichting is geen beroepsorde zodat zij ook geen deontologische beroepscode 
heeft uitgewerkt zoals de Belgische Orde. Enkel architecten die zich apart laten registe-
ren door de Bond der Nederlandse Architecten (BNA) dienen de code van deze profes-
sionele organisatie te respecteren. 
 Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat er in beide staten ook verschillen zijn wat betreft 
het cliënteel en de inkomsten van architecten: in België worden architecten vaker inge-
schakeld door gewone consumenten terwijl in Nederland architecten vaker werken voor 
projectontwikkelaars of gemeenten. Dit is ook merkbaar in het bouwlandschap dat in 
België gekarakteriseerd wordt door een aaneenschakeling van verschillende soorten 
woningen terwijl in Nederland hele wijken bestaan uit hetzelfde soort huizen. Architec-
ten in Nederland verdienen daarenboven aanzienlijk meer dan hun Belgische collega’s. 
 
Naast de ‘publieke’ regelgeving die ondermeer regelt wie de titel mag voeren en wie het 
beroep mag uitoefenen, bespreekt dit boek ook de situatie van architecten onder het 
Belgische en Nederlandse contractenrecht met betrekking tot het traditionele bouwpro-
ces. In dit opzicht dient te worden opgemerkt dat er geen afdwingbaar Europees con-
tractenrecht bestaat dat werd onderschreven door de lidstaten van de EU. 
 Een eerste belangrijke vaststelling is dat waar in België de verhouding tussen de 
architect en de bouwheer in principe geregeld wordt door de specifieke inhoud van het 
contract en de relevante bepalingen van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, deze verhouding in 
Nederland zeer vaak beheerst wordt door Standaardvoorwaarden zoals ‘De Nieuwe 
Regeling 2005’ (NR). Deze voorwaarden bevatten een door de BNA uitgewerkte regeling 
inzake de verplichtingen, aansprakelijkheden en rechten van de architect en de bouw-
heer en worden zeer vaak toegepast, zelfs indien de betreffende architect geen lid is van 
de BNA. De Nieuwe Regeling voorziet daarenboven in de beslechting van geschillen 
door de Raad van Arbitrage voor de Bouw. Wat betreft de aansprakelijkheid van archi-
tecten in het bijzonder voorziet de Belgische wetgeving dat architecten niet meer aan-
sprakelijk zijn na oplevering van de werkzaamheden. Dit is enkel anders indien het 
gebouw geheel of gedeeltelijk teniet gaat door een gebrek in de bouw waarvoor architec-
ten en aannemers gedurende tien jaren aansprakelijk zijn, alsook in het geval van bedrog 
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en bij verborgen gebreken. Het Nederlandse Burgerlijk Wetboek stelt dat een rechtsvor-
dering tot vergoeding van schade door verloop van vijf jaren verjaart na de aanvang van 
de dag waarop de benadeelde met de schade en met de daarvoor aansprakelijke persoon 
bekend is geworden. Krachtens de NR vervalt elke aansprakelijkheid van de architect 
door verloop van vijf jaren vanaf de dag waarop de opdracht is geëindigd. Het is aldus 
duidelijk dat de periode waarin de architect doorgaans aansprakelijk kan worden ge-
houden half zo kort is in Nederland ten opzichte van in België. De aannemer die in 
beginsel niet meer aansprakelijk kan worden gehouden na oplevering, blijft in Neder-
land toch aansprakelijk voor verborgen gebreken (de rechtsvordering verjaart door 
verloop van twee jaren na protest van de opdrachtgever en is in ieder geval verjaard 
door verloop van twintig jaren na de oplevering). Indien de Uniforme Administratieve 
Voorwaarden (UAV) worden toegepast die in het algemeen de relatie tussen de bouw-
heer en de aannemer regelen, kan de aannemer gedurende tien jaar aansprakelijk wor-
den gehouden indien het gebouw geheel of gedeeltelijk teniet is gegaan. Daarenboven 
wordt ook de omvang van de aansprakelijkheid van de architect in Nederland beperkt 
door de NR, terwijl dit in België niet is toegestaan. Hierbij komt nog dat in België archi-
tecten doorgaans in solidum aansprakelijk worden gesteld tezamen met de aannemer. 
Zowel in België als in Nederland zijn ook rechtspersonen in de mogelijkheid het beroep 
uit te oefenen. Op deze manier kan de Belgische architect sinds kort ook zijn persoonlij-
ke aansprakelijkheid beperken. Het is duidelijk dat de intensiteit van de regulering (in 
België: monopolie; in Nederland: geen monopolie) niet gerelateerd is aan de intensiteit 
van de aansprakelijkheid van architecten (in België: tien jaar voor gebreken die de ste-
vigheid van het gebouw aantasten, geen beperking van de omvang van de aansprakelijk-
heid mogelijk, in solidum aansprakelijkheid mogelijk; in Nederland doorgaans vijf jaar; 
beperking van de omvang van de aansprakelijkheid mogelijk, geen in solidum aanspra-
kelijkheid). 
 
Aangezien architecten door het uitvoeren van hun taken schade kunnen veroorzaken, is 
het van belang dat zij als een goede huisvader te werk gaan. De klassieke economische 
analyse van het recht stelt dat aansprakelijkheidsregels er voor kunnen zorgen dat men 
goede zorg draagt om schade te voorkomen. Vaak zijn zulke regels evenwel niet vol-
doende en is regulering nodig opdat architecten en andere beroepsbeoefenaars werk van 
hoge kwaliteit afleveren. De reden hiervoor is dat de architectenmarkt gekenmerkt is 
door informatieasymmetrie waarbij cliënten vaak leken zijn die niet in staat zijn om te 
beoordelen of het werk al dan niet aan de gestelde vereisten voldoet of wie aansprakelijk 
is voor eventuele schade. Ex-ante regulering kan bepaalde eisen stellen waaraan steeds 
dient te worden voldaan door de beroepsbeoefenaar. De standaard economische theorie 
voorspelt echter dat in een perfecte markt waarin er onbelemmerde marktwerking is, de 
afwezigheid van regulering optimaal is. Een algemeen evenwicht wordt bereikt indien er 
vele kleine en identieke producenten zijn die niet in staat zijn het prijsniveau beduidend 
te beïnvloeden en die homogene producten verkopen; er perfecte informatie is zodat 
iedereen geïnformeerd is over de prijs en eigenschappen van de producten; er geen ex-
terne effecten zijn en de producten private goederen zijn. Zoals aangegeven rijst er zeer 
vaak een probleem van informatieasymmetrie. Dit kan leiden tot antiselectie waarbij 
cliënten kiezen voor goedkope diensten die van slechte kwaliteit blijken te zijn omdat zij 
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niet in staat zijn de kwaliteit te beoordelen alsook tot een moreel risico waarbij een ar-
chitect zich anders gaat gedragen en slechtere kwaliteit of extra (onnodige) diensten zal 
leveren daar hij weet dat zijn cliënten minder of geen kennis van zaken hebben. Daaren-
boven kunnen zich negatieve externe effecten (schade, ook aan derden) voordoen indien 
de architect niet met voldoende zorg zijn werkzaamheden heeft uitgevoerd. Aangezien 
voornoemde voorwaarden die vervuld dienen te zijn om een evenwicht te bereiken in 
een perfecte markt in principe niet (allen) vervuld zijn wat betreft de diensten verleend 
door architecten en er alzo marktfalen is, stelt de economie van het publiek belang dat 
regulering nodig is om dit marktfalen te herstellen. Dit brengt met zich mee dat er een 
spanningsveld is tussen enerzijds de regulering van het beroep en het mededingings-
recht anderzijds. Er dient echter op toegezien te worden dat regulering niet verder gaat 
dan nodig om het doel van het waarborgen van voldoende kwaliteit te bereiken. Zoals 
aangegeven beschikken architecten in België over een professioneel monopolie. In Ne-
derland worden andere instrumenten gebruikt om kwaliteit te waarborgen: het Neder-
lands Bouwbesluit bevat bepalingen waaraan de gebouwen dienen te voldoen en Wel-
standscommissies adviseren de gemeente inzake de geschiktheid en kwaliteit van een 
voorgestelde constructie. Volgens de theorie van het publiek belang gaat het monopolie-
systeem in België dan ook te ver. Desalniettemin zijn de prijzen in België toch lager dan 
in Nederland zodat kan worden gesteld dat (partiële) liberalisatie niet noodzakelijk leidt 
tot lagere prijzen. De theorie van het private belang stelt aan de andere kant dat regule-
ring het resultaat is van het gedrag van belangengroeperingen die winst zoeken (rent-
seeking) en de politici proberen te overtuigen regulering in hun voordeel te creëren. Om 
te bepalen of de beroepsorganisaties van architecten succesvolle rent-seekers zijn is een 
empirische analyse nodig. 
 
Dit boek heeft aangetoond dat wat betreft het beroep der architect, een combinatie van 
ex-post aansprakelijkheidsregels en ex-ante regulering optimaal is. Ex-ante regulering, 
zoals regulering betreffende de vereiste beroepskwalificaties, is nodig om het niveau te 
bepalen van de gewenste kwaliteit. Aangezien ook architecten die aan de diplomavereis-
ten voldoen aansprakelijk moeten kunnen worden gesteld indien er zich toch schade 
voordoet, is een aansprakelijkheidsregime eveneens nodig. Aangezien zulk regime niet 
voldoende prikkels biedt indien de architect niet in staat is de schade te vergoeden, is de 
dekking die door zijn verzekering wordt geboden van belang. Echter, bij verzekering 
rijst wederom het moreel risico: het is mogelijk dat de architect minder zorg aan de dag 
zal leggen indien hij weet dat zijn verzekering toch de eventuele schade zal dekken. 
Daarom dient de premie die betaald moet worden voldoende aangepast te zijn aan zijn 
gedrag en de geleverde kwaliteit en is het nuttig de architect zelf ook gedeeltelijk aan het 
risico bloot te stellen. Een systeem van verplichte verzekering wordt vaak beschouwd als 
de oplossing om de bouwheer te beschermen. Terwijl in België alle architecten verplicht 
zijn een aansprakelijkheidsverzekering af te sluiten, is dit in Nederland enkel het geval 
voor BNA-leden. In België wordt de bouwheer aldus beschermd tegen het eventuele 
faillissement van de architect. Aangezien de architect evenwel de enige bouwpartner is 
die bij wet verplicht is zich te verzekeren en aangezien architecten doorgaans in solidum 
aansprakelijk worden gesteld tezamen met de aannemer, wordt het risico gelegd bij 
degene met het grootste vermogen. Dit kan een effect hebben op de premie die betaald 
  Samenvatting  
506 
dient te worden en die architecten nadien kunnen doorrekenen aan de bouwheer. Hoe-
wel gesteld kan worden dat het Belgisch systeem niet kostenefficiënt is daar ook archi-
tecten die weinig risico lopen verplicht zijn zich te verzekeren en er steeds een moreel 
risico kan zijn, moet deze conclusie gezien worden in het licht van het aantal architecten 
dat insolvabel zou zijn. Empirisch onderzoek is nodig om te bepalen hoeveel architecten 
tot deze categorie behoren. Indien er te weinig afschrikking is wat betreft het insolven-
tierisico waardoor de kans op insolventie groter is, kan worden gesteld dat het Neder-
landse systeem in dit opzicht ook niet efficiënt is. Om deze reden dienen andere moge-
lijkheden om schade te vergoeden, zoals een bankgarantie, ook overwogen te worden. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Ce livre a pour sujet la régulation des architectes dans l’Union Européenne. Il décrit les 
conditions qui doivent être remplies par les architectes ressortissants de l’UE avant 
qu’ils ne puissent poursuivre leur profession dans un autre État membre en conformité 
avec les règlements et la jurisprudence de l’UE. Afin d’exercer leur profession dans un 
autre État membre, il faut que les architectes aient le droit de circuler librement dans 
tout le territoire de l’Union. Ce droit est codifié dans l’Article 21 du Traité sur le Fonc-
tionnement de l’Union (TFEU) qui prescrit que tout citoyen de l’Union a le droit de 
circuler et de séjourner librement sur le territoire des États membres, sous réserve des 
limitations et conditions prévues par les traités et par les dispositions prises pour leur 
application. Concernant ces limitations et conditions, il faut remarquer que la période 
pour laquelle les personnes ont le droit de séjourner sur le territoire d’un autre état dé-
pend du fait s’ils exercent une activité économique ou s’ils disposent, pour eux et pour 
les membres de leur famille de ressources suffisantes garantissant qu’ils ne seront pas 
une charge pour le système d’assistance sociale de l’État membre d’accueil au cours de 
leur séjour et d’une assurance maladie complète à l’État membre d’accueil. Dans la néga-
tive, le séjour est limité à trois mois. Dans l’affirmative, on a un titre de séjour de plus de 
trois mois qui se prolonge aussi longtemps que l’on satisfait aux conditions nommées ci-
dessus. Ces droits sont codifiés dans la Directive 2004/38/CE relative au droit des ci-
toyens de l’Union et des membres de leur famille de circuler et de séjourner librement 
sur le territoire des États membres. Le principe de base de la libre circulation des per-
sonnes en activité économique est en effet codifié dans l’Article 45 TFEU en ce qui 
concerne les salariés tandis que l’Article 49 TFEU contient la liberté d’établissement et 
que l’Article 56 TFEU codifie la libre prestation des services. Cela implique qu’en prin-
cipe toute discrimination exercée en raison de la nationalité est interdite dans le domai-
ne d’application des traités. Ces droits sont des élaborations plus concrètes du principe 
général de non-discrimination ce qui est codifié dans l’Article 18 TFEU. Afin de faciliter 
l’accès aux activités, le Parlement européen et le Conseil ont arrêté des directives visant à 
la reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes, certificats et autres titres, ainsi qu’à la coordi-
nation des dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives des États membres. 
En ce qui concerne la profession d’architecte, les États membres ne réussissaient pas à 
conclure un accord sur les coordinations des dispositions à cause des grandes différen-
ces de programmes d’enseignement et c’est seulement après plus de dix-sept ans de 
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négociations que la Directive 85/384/CEE concernant la reconnaissance mutuelle des 
diplômes, certificats et autres titres du domaine de l’architecture et comportant des 
mesures destinées à faciliter l’exercice effectif du droit d’établissement et de libre presta-
tion de services, est entrée en vigueur. Celle-ci est actuellement remplacée par la Directi-
ve 2005/36/CEE. Il faut remarquer que cette Directive concerne la reconnaissance pro-
fessionnelle et non pas la reconnaissance académique puisqu’elle est applicable aux 
personnes qui ont déjà été admises à exercer la profession d’architecte et qui exercent 
déjà la fonction. La reconnaissance académique est en principe une affaire appartenant 
seulement à la responsabilité des États membres. 
 En ce qui concerne la Directive, on peut avancer que les États membres sont obligés 
de reconnaître les qualifications dans le domaine d’architecture nommées dans l’annexe 
V.7. automatiquement si le demandeur a suivi une formation contenant en total au 
moins quatre ans à plein temps ou six ans dont au moins trois ans à plein temps dans 
une université ou dans un autre établissement d’enseignement (Titre III du Chapitre 
III). Il faut qu’à l’issue de cette formation le demandeur ait réussi un examen au niveau 
universitaire et qu’il ait gagné toutes les connaissances et compétences indiquées dans la 
Directive. Aussi la formation dispensée par les ‘Fachhochschulen’ allemands qui dure 
trois ans doit être reconnue si elle est suivie d’une période d’expérience professionnelle 
de quatre ans en Allemagne. Si un diplôme n’est pas mentionné dans l’Annexe V.7., il 
est possible de se servir du système général codifié dans Titre I du Chapitre III de la 
Directive si les conditions concernant le niveau des qualifications sont remplies. Si la 
durée de la formation suivie est inférieure au moins d’un an à celle requise dans l’État 
membre d’accueil ou lorsque la formation qu’il a reçue porte sur des matières substan-
tiellement différentes de celles couvertes par le titre de formation requis dans l’État 
membre d’accueil, l’État membre d’accueil a le droit d’exiger du demandeur qu’il ac-
complisse un stage d’adaptation pendant trois ans au maximum ou qu’il se soumette à 
une épreuve d’aptitude. A cet égard la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne a décidé 
que les autorités nationales sont tenues d’examiner dans quelle mesure les connaissances 
et qualifications attestées par le diplôme acquis par l’intéressé dans son pays d’origine 
correspondent à celles exigées par la réglementation de l’État d’accueil (Vlassopoulou). 
En outre les qualifications obtenues dans un autre État membre doivent être prises en 
considération (Haim, Hocsman). Par contre, la Directive 2005/36/CE indique que cha-
que État membre peut permettre sur son territoire, selon sa réglementation, l’exercice 
d’une profession réglementée aux ressortissants des États membres titulaires de qualifi-
cations professionnelles qui n’ont pas été obtenues dans un État membre. Néanmoins, 
tout titre de formation délivré dans un pays tiers doit être assimilé à un titre de forma-
tion obtenu dans l’Union dès lors que son titulaire a, dans la profession concernée, une 
expérience professionnelle de trois ans sur le territoire de l’État membre qui a reconnu 
ledit titre conformément. 
 Bien que la Cour ait jugé dans le cas Gül que certaines personnes qui ne disposent 
pas de la nationalité d’un État membre sont également autorisées à invoquer le système 
de reconnaissance comme établi dans Vlassopoulou, en principe les articles du traité et 
de la Directive 2005/36/CE ne sont pas applicables aux personnes qui ont la nationalité 
d’un tiers pays tiers. Par contre, la Directive 2004/38/CE confère à certains membres de 
la famille des ressortissants de l’UE même s’ils ne disposent pas de la nationalité d’un 
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État membre, le bénéficie de l’égalité de traitement. En outre, après l’entrée en vigueur 
du Traité d’Amsterdam, cinq Directives ont été créées ainsi qu’un projet de Directive 
qui confèrent certains droits aux quelques catégories de personnes des états tiers en vue 
de l’intégration dans l’Union. Aussi des accords d’association et de partenariat ont été 
conclus avec des états qui n’appartiennent pas à l’Union. Néanmoins, la situation des 
architectes venants des pays tiers n’est ni identique, ni comparable au statut des archi-
tectes de l’UE. 
 
Souvent la profession d’architecte n’est pas seulement régulée par les États membres 
mais aussi par les associations professionnelles. Il est possible que ces régulations ne 
dérangent pas seulement la circulation libre des architectes mais aussi la libre concur-
rence. Des réglementations concernant l’accès à et l’exercice d’une profession et les 
règles qui imposent des prix, interdisent la publicité ou des formes de coopération sont 
des exemples connus. Ce livre examine, également, les violations des règles européennes 
par certaines de ces réglementations 
 
Ce livre ne traite pas seulement la situation des architectes au niveau de l’UE. Il contient 
aussi une analyse des régulations belges et néerlandaises. En principe, dans ces deux 
pays les architectes sont seulement autorisés à l’emploi du titre d’architecte après avoir 
achevé la formation nécessaire. En Belgique ces personnes sont -après l’enregistrement à 
l’Ordre des architectes- exclusivement compétentes pour exercer la profession quant 
aux ouvrages exigeants un permis de constructions. Cela implique que les architectes 
belges ont un monopole puisque personne d’autre n’a le droit d’exercer la profession. 
Par contre, aux Pays-Bas tout le monde a le droit d’exercer la profession. C’est seule-
ment l’utilisation du titre qui est réservée à ceux qui possèdent le diplôme nécessaire. 
Aux Pays-Bas les architectes ne jouissent pas d’une position monopolistique pour le 
dessin du plan et la supervision des travaux de construction. Aux Pays-Bas les archi-
tectes sont obligés de s’enregistrer auprès de la ‘Fondation Bureau Registre des Architec-
tes’. Cette fondation n’est pas un Ordre professionnel et n’a donc pas crée de code pro-
fessionnel comme l’Ordre belge. Seuls les architectes qui sont enregistrés spécialement 
chez ‘l’Association des Architectes Néerlandais’ (BNA) sont tenus de respecter la déon-
tologie de cette organisation professionnelle. 
 Des études ont démontré qu’il y avait des différences dans les deux états en ce qui 
concerne la clientèle et le revenu des architectes : en Belgique les architectes sont plus 
souvent consultés par des consommateurs individuels tandis qu’au Pays-Bas les archi-
tectes travaillent plutôt pour les promoteurs de construction ou pour les municipalités. 
A cet égard le paysage de construction belge est caractérisé par une chaîne de maisons 
de toutes sortes alors que les quartiers remplis d’habitations plus ou moins identiques 
sont courants aux Pays-Bas. En plus, aux Pays-Bas les architectes ont un revenu considé-
rablement plus haut que celui de leurs collègues en Belgique. 
 
A côté de la réglementation publique qui détermine qui a le droit d’utiliser le titre et qui 
peut exercer la profession, ce livre traite aussi la situation des architectes par rapport au 
droit du contrat belge et néerlandais dans le processus de la construction traditionnelle. 
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A cet égard il faut remarquer qu’il n’existe pas de droit européen des contrats contrai-
gnant souscrit par les États-membres de l’UE. 
 Une première constatation importante est que comme la relation entre l’architecte 
et le maître d’ouvrage est en principe réglé par le contenu spécifique du contrat et par les 
articles relevant du Code Civil en Belgique, aux Pays-Bas cette relation est fréquemment 
réglée par les conditions types comme La Nouvelle Régulation’ (NR). Ces conditions 
règlent les obligations, les responsabilités et les droits de l’architecte et du maître 
d’ouvrage. Elles sont créées par le BNA et sont appliquées le plus souvent, même si 
l’architecte n’est pas membre du BNA. En outre, la Nouvelle Régulation prévoit les rè-
glements de contentieux par le Conseil d’Arbitrage de la Construction. En ce qui 
concerne la responsabilité des architectes en particulier, la législation belge indique que 
les architectes ne sont plus responsables après la réception des travaux. Néanmoins si 
l’édifice construit à prix fait ou s’il y a la possibilité qu’il menace de périr en tout ou en 
partie par le vice de construction, même par le vice du sol, l’architecte et l’entrepreneur 
sont responsables pendant dix ans. Comme une faute commise par un architecte a sou-
vent des conséquences sérieuses, la responsabilité décennale est souvent invoquée. La 
période de responsabilité est aussi prolongée en cas de dol et de défauts cachés. Le Code 
Civil néerlandais stipule que l’action en justice pour obtenir des dommages est couverte 
par la prescription de cinq ans à partir du jour où la victime a pris de connaissance de 
l’identité du responsable. Le NR indique que toute responsabilité s’éteint cinq ans après 
le jour où les travaux sont finis. Il est clair que la période lors de laquelle l’architecte peut 
habituellement être tenu responsable aux Pays-Bas ne représente que la moitié de la 
période en Belgique. En principe, l’entrepreneur n’est plus responsable après la récep-
tion de travaux sauf pour les défauts cachés (l’action en justice se prescrit deux ans après 
la protestation du maître d’ouvrage et s’est en tout cas prescrit vingt ans après la récep-
tion). Si les Conditions Administratives Uniformes (UAV) qui règlent en général la 
relation entre le maître d’ouvrage et l’entrepreneur, sont appliquées, l’entrepreneur peut 
être tenu responsable pendant dix ans si l’édifice a périt en tout ou en partie. En outre, 
l’étendue de la responsabilité de l’architecte aux Pays-Bas est limitée par le NR, tandis 
que cela n’est pas permis en Belgique. Il faut ajouter qu’en Belgique les architectes sont 
généralement tenus responsable in solidum avec l’entrepreneur. En Belgique comme aux 
Pays-Bas les personnes morales ont la possibilité d’exercer la profession. De cette ma-
nière l’architecte belge peut depuis récemment limiter sa responsabilité. Il est clair que 
l’intensité de la régulation (en Belgique : situation monopolistique ; aux Pays-Bas : pas 
de monopole) n’est pas liée à l’intensité de la responsabilité des architectes (en Belgique : 
dix ans pour les défauts qui atteignent la fortitude de l’édifice, pas de limites sur 
l’étendue de la responsabilité, couramment responsabilité in solidum ; aux Pays-Bas 
généralement cinq ans ; limitation du volume de la responsabilité possible, pas de res-
ponsabilité in solidum). 
 
Puisque les architectes peuvent causer des dommages en exerçant leur profession, il est 
important qu’ils travaillent avec la prudence d’un bon père de famille. L’analyse écono-
mique du droit classique détermine que les règles de la responsabilité peuvent contri-
buer à la prévention du dommage. Néanmoins, souvent ces règles ne sont pas suffisantes 
de sorte que l’on a besoin des régulations pour s’assurer que le travail des architectes et 
  Résumé  
511 
des autres professionnels garantit d’une qualité élevée. La raison est que le marché 
d’architectes est connu par l’asymétrie de l’information puisque les clients sont généra-
lement des profanes qui ne sont pas capable de juger si l’ouvrage satisfait aux conditions 
nécessaires ou qui est responsable pour un dommage éventuel. La régulation ex ante 
peut exiger des qualités que le professionnel doit satisfaire. Néanmoins, la théorie 
d’économie standard expose que dans un marché parfait dans lequel il y a une concur-
rence illimitée, l’absence des régulations est optimale. Un équilibre général est atteint 
quand il y a beaucoup de petits producteurs identiques qui ne sont pas capables 
d’influencer le niveau des prix significativement et qui vendent des produits homogè-
nes ; il y a une information parfaite de sorte que tout le monde est bien informé du prix 
et des qualités des biens ; il n’y a pas d’effets externes et les produits sont des biens pri-
vés. Comme indiqué ci-dessus, le problème d’asymétrie de l’information se présente 
souvent sur le marché des architectes. Cela peut aboutir sur l’anti-sélection ce qui impli-
que que les clients choisissent des services moins chers de mauvaise qualité puisqu’ils ne 
sont pas capables de juger la qualité ainsi qu’à un risque moral causant qu’un architecte 
change son comportement et fournit des services de mauvaise qualité ou des services 
superflues puisqu’il sait que ses clients ont moins ou pas de connaissance en la matière. 
En outre, il est possible que des effets externes négatifs (dommage, aussi aux tiers) se 
présentent si l’architecte n’a pas travaillé avec assez de soins. Comme les conditions qui 
doivent être satisfaites pour atteindre un équilibre sur un marché parfait ne sont, en 
principe, pas remplies dans le domaine des services rendus par un architecte ce qui 
implique qu’il y a défaillance du marché, la théorie de l’intérêt public indique qu’il faut 
de la régulation pour rétablir cette défaillance. Il s’ensuit qu’il y a une zone de tension 
entre la régulation de la profession d’une part et le droit de la concurrence d’autre part. 
Néanmoins il faut veiller à ce que la régulation n’aille pas plus loin que nécessaire pour 
atteindre la garantie d’une qualité suffisante. Comme indiqué ci-dessus, en Belgique les 
architectes disposent d’un monopole professionnel. Par contre, aux Pays-Bas d’autres 
instruments sont utilisés pour garantir la qualité : le Décret de la Construction néerlan-
dais contient les conditions auxquelles les édifices doivent satisfaire et des Services 
d’Urbanisme conseillent les municipalités sur l’aptitude et la qualité d’une construction 
proposée. Cela signifie que d’après la théorie de l’intérêt publique la situation monopo-
listique n’est pas proportionnelle. Néanmoins, les prix en Belgique sont plus bas qu’aux 
Pays-Bas ce qui peut indiquer que la libéralisation (partielle) ne mène pas nécessaire-
ment à des prix plus bas. 
 D’autre part, la théorie de l’intérêt privé stipule que la régulation est le résultat du 
comportement des groupements d’intérêts qui cherchent du profit (rent-seeking) et 
essaient de convaincre les politiciens de créer des règles à leur avantage. Afin de déter-
miner si les associations professionnelles des architectes sont des ‘rent-seekers’ réussis il 
faut une analyse empirique. 
 
Ce livre a démontré que, en ce qui concerne la profession d’architecte, une combinaison 
des règles de responsabilité ex post et de la régulation ex ante est optimale. La régulation 
ex ante, comme la régulation des qualifications professionnelles nécessaires, est 
nécessaire pour déterminer le niveau de la qualité désirée. Puisqu’il faut que les 
architectes qui satisfont les conditions des qualifications professionnelles soient 
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également tenus responsables en cas de dommage, il faut de plus un régime 
d’imputabilité. Étant donné qu’un tel régime n’offre pas assez de stimulations si 
l’architecte n’est pas dans la possibilité d’indemniser la victime, le paiement par son 
assurance est une affaire d’importance. Cependant l’assurance facilite à nouveau les 
problèmes de hasard moral : il est possible que l’architecte soit moins sérieux dans son 
travail s’il sait que son assurance sera responsable financièrement pour le dommage. 
Voilà ce qui explique pourquoi la prime doit être adaptée suffisamment à son 
comportement et à la qualité fournie et pourquoi il est utile d’exposer l’architecte lui-
même partiellement au risque. Un système d’assurance obligatoire est souvent vu 
comme solution pour protéger le maître d’ouvrage. Pendant qu’en Belgique tous les 
architectes sont obligés de se couvrir avec une assurance de responsabilité, aux Pays-Bas 
seulement les membres du BNA y sont tenus. Il s’en suit qu’en Belgique le maître 
d’ouvrage est donc protégé contre la faillite éventuelle de l’architecte. Comme 
l’architecte est le seul partenaire du processus de construction qui est obligé par loi de 
s’assurer et comme les architectes sont généralement responsables in solidum avec les 
entrepreneurs, le risque est mis chez le plus fortuné. Cela peut avoir un effet à la prime 
que les architectes peuvent inclure dans le prix à payer par le maître d’ouvrage. Même si 
on peut estimer que le système belge n’est pas efficace en termes de coûts puisque les 
architectes qui ne courent pas vraiment de risques sont également obligés de payer une 
assurance et attendu qu’il y aura toujours un problème de hasard moral, il faut que cette 
conclusion soit lu par rapport au nombre d’architectes risquant l’insolvabilité. Des 
études empiriques sont nécessaires afin de déterminer combien d’architectes 
appartiennent à cette catégorie. Si les architectes sous-estiment les risques qu’ils 
encourent de sorte que le risque d’insolvabilité sera plus grand, on peut soutenir que le 
système néerlandais n’est pas efficace non plus à cet égard. Pour cette raison des autres 
possibilités pour indemniser le dommage, comme une garantie bancaire, doivent être 
considérées. 
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